Informing the Army’s Future Structure

[Colin Parkinson]

So, my experience (which with $2 gets a coffee at Tim's):

Admin will suck up the equivalent of 1/2 to 1 day per week. There's a lot of things that CO can't delegate, or there are things where, even if delegated, the CO still has to review or at least maintain SA on. Assuming the average of those, that's 39 days a year. I'll include the monthly (in not more frequent) brigade meetings for an evening in that tally.

There's the infamous one weekend a month - call it 2.5 days for eight months of the year. That's another 20 days - some of which will be in unit, some will be Bde inflicted PD.

There are ceremonial and representational activities. Even at a half day a month, that's another 5-6 days a year.

And there are the pop-ups, the things that are not scheduled, not planned, like the MP investigations requiring a reply, the queries from much higher HQs about what Bloggins did; the summary proceedings etc etc that are easily a day every month, another 10-12 days a year.

That's easily 75+ days a year. If a CO commands a geographically dispersed unit, with subunits more than 150km away, add in travel days.

Hell even as a Cadet CO with 30 kids I am doing something related to the program on average 3 days a week.

 

[FJAG]

Flew in an A 330-200 the other day. Impressive plane. It reinforced my view that Canada now does have the capability for a viable fly-over reinforcement of its forces in Europe or anywhere it holds prepositioned equipment and supplies and conditions are pre-active hostilities.

IMHO, buying those (even configured as MRTT) is one of the best decisions the RCAF made. Each aircraft can hold around 300 pax, depending on configuration) which effectively means you can lift a battalion of troops on two aircraft. We could conceivably reinforce a forward deployed armoured/mech brigade in one lift.

 

[Fabius]

I am curious what people think of this concept that I saw this month.

1. Remove the Light Bns from each of the 3 CMBGs.

2. Form a new Light Infantry Regiment (LIR) with the 3 Light Bns (No Cap Badge changes)

3. This LIR would have a LIR HQ and the 3 Bns. The HQ is more of a force generation HQ. Initially the LIR would not be intended to fight as a Regiment or Bde, however there would be scope to expand it into a full light Bde slowly over 10 years plus.

4. The 3 CMBGs would all now have two mech infantry Bns and their Armoured Regiment ( Medium or Heavy Cav I guess depending on the Bde)

 

[FJAG]

I am curious what people think of this concept that I saw this month.

1. Remove the Light Bns from each of the 3 CMBGs.

I'm all for the concept but would want to see it taken to its logical conclusion as a bde even if that means folding a company in each of the bns to form a bde hq and CSS element. Fill the third companies and the rest of the CSS with ARes personnel. Better yet, thin out the herd in Ottawa.n
I'm generally against administrative force generating structures. They aim too low.

 

[Fabius]

At first glance I thought it was good, and it has potential. However I too think it should aim at the Bde level.
That’s were I start wondering about the overall theme of keeping all 3 CMBGs and their respective Engr, Arty, Svc Bn, HQ and Sigs and Fd Amb units as Mechanized units.

All while the new LIR has no associated light CS and CSS elements. That problem has already raised its head with regards to the GRTF structure and its Managed Readiness Plan in relation to those CS and CSS elements.

 

[KevinB]

At first glance I thought it was good, and it has potential. However I too think it should aim at the Bde level.

Agreed, but I think it’s a win at this point to at least separate the LIB’s.
Right now they just have BN tasks, so while I’d prefer a Light Bde, I’d say this is a start and most importantly not the same status quote that has existed for 30 years.

That’s were I start wondering about the overall theme of keeping all 3 CMBGs and their respective Engr, Arty, Svc Bn, HQ and Sigs and Fd Amb units as Mechanized units.

I see it as the start of a Mechanized/Armoured Div. Something that the CA really hasn’t ever had and only cosplayed at in the 89’s and 90’s.

All while the new LIR has no associated light CS and CSS elements. That problem has already raised its head with regards to the GRTF structure and its Managed Readiness Plan in relation to those CS and CSS elements.

Crawl, walk, run.

I think just getting the CA to understand that the symmetrical C “M” BG’s were not good is a win.

 

[Fabius]

I think just getting the CA to understand that the symmetrical C “M” BG’s were not good is a win.

That is very true. That sets the stage for everything. It’s a hard slog to destroy the hold symmetry has on the CA.

 

[daftandbarmy]

Agreed, but I think it’s a win at this point to at least separate the LIB’s.
Right now they just have BN tasks, so while I’d prefer a Light Bde, I’d say this is a start and most importantly not the same status quote that has existed for 30 years.

There also seems to be a paradigm that if you start as a 'light' unit you will always be a light unit.

Other countries' militaries regularly rotate their units through light and other roles, like mech.

 

[Fabius]

The other item that’s interesting in this developing structure is that the 3 CMBGs are grouped as a single war fighting division with intentions to create the fires, protection and sustainment Bdes along with the Div HQ to make it a war fighting Div.
Interestingly the reserves don’t seem to have any formal role above individual augmentation in this Div.
The reserves are all held in a separate “continental Div” that doesn’t seem to have a war fighting role but rather is an administrative Div.

 

[dapaterson]

The other item that’s interesting in this developing structure is that the 3 CMBGs are grouped as a single war fighting division with intentions to create the fires, protection and sustainment Bdes along with the Div HQ to make it a war fighting Div.
Interestingly the reserves don’t seem to have any formal role above individual augmentation in this Div.
The reserves are all held in a separate “continental Div” that doesn’t seem to have a war fighting role but rather is an administrative Div.

They appear to be CMBs, not CMBGs. Putting a stake through the heart of the "mini division" will be a win in and of itself.

 

[daftandbarmy]

Interestingly the reserves don’t seem to have any formal role above individual augmentation in this Div.
The reserves are all held in a separate “continental Div” that doesn’t seem to have a war fighting role but rather is an administrative Div.

Given the current terms of service, structure, scale of weapons and equipment issue, and leadership approach for the PRes that's about all you could reasonably expect at this point IMHO.

The more we sustain a 'two army' approach to the CAF the less integration - and the more waste and inefficiency - we will continue to sustain.

 

[Kirkhill]

Muddy wheels, foggy lenses: 25th ID tests new vehicles, drones during Philippines exercises

The Army’s Transformation-in-Contact program is tackling the climate on the next battlefield.

www.defenseone.com

HONOLULU–When Army officials picked the 25th Infantry Division for the Transformation-in-Contact program, they knew water would shape its performance on the kind of island terrain that might be a future battlefield.

“Obviously, wet ground is harder to go, especially with slope… There's some gnarly terrain out here.”

The infantry squad vehicle may be a big upgrade from the Humvee, which the Army recently announced it will axe, but soldiers are still trying to figure out how much equipment they can load onto it and still get it up a muddy hill in the jungle.

“More power is always better, but right now they have absolutely enough power,” Siglock said. ISVs “handle it better than any of our previous vehicles. Can they go over everything? Absolutely not, but no vehicle can. And then it's once again, how do we carry our equipment as we're going over that rough terrain?”

Then there’s the small drones, which have been a key feature of each TiC unit’s experimentation. High humidity and daily rain are a major consideration.

“Some of the optics sometimes might be degraded because of it, but that's what we're figuring out,” Siglock said. “I've seen our medium-range reconnaissance drones fly in fairly heavy rain and still be not as effective, but effective.

Two examples of "something is better than nothing".

.....

For INDOPACOM, small drones are particularly useful for infantry units needing to get eyes across the water, because they can’t just send scouts on ground vehicles from island to island.

“Now we have equipment where we can fly a drone and recon the far, far side of a linear or open-water obstacle very, very, very quickly,” Siglock said. “So what would have taken us hours before now actually takes minutes, and it's getting our soldiers to employ those devices often, just to save time and to basically make us more efficient, to where a smaller formation can cover a larger piece of ground.”

...

As interesting as the tech outcomes are the systems being developed for managing change.

 

[Kirkhill]

Meanwhile - the Armored guys

3rd ID experiments with new tank formations at Germany training rotation

The Army’s first armored Transformation-in-Contact unit is integrating 3D-printed drones for greater “massing of effects.”

www.defenseone.com

the Army has tasked Stryker and armored brigades with testing out new systems in the field, sending feedback to industry, and getting updated prototypes back into soldiers’ hands, in an effort to change how the Army fights at the same time as it changes how it buys equipment.

The 3rd Infantry Division’s 1st Armored Brigade Combat Team .... will test a new configuration: first-person viewer unmanned aerial vehicles with forward observers and other anti-tank elements.

“And we think that this team is going to produce a lot more massing of effects than maybe a larger team would,” Col. Jim Armstrong, 1st ABCT’s commander, told reporters Tuesday.

The drones, designed by the division’s Marne Innovation Center and 3D-printed on site, help solve the problem of defending M1 Abrams tanks from drone swarms

The brigade has also integrated a second electromagnetic warfare platoon, whereas most armored brigades have one, Armstrong told reporters, to help jam drone swarms as well as enemy communication networks.

“What you'd also see is that third infantry squad in our infantry platoons is a UAS team with anti-tank systems,”

“You'd also see, at the infantry battalion level, four FPV attack teams that the battalion commander places on the battlefield.”

The brigade is also testing new tech provided by industry partners, Armstrong said, prototypes they are able to experiment with and then send feedback on to the manufacturers.

That includes a software-defined radio counter-UAS system, which has followed the brigade through multiple training rotations.

“So some of them, we've already had partnerships with and provided feedback and gotten [a] better version between our NTC rotation and our deployment,” Armstrong said. “Others showed up and met us here, and we started giving them feedback right away.”

That includes some TSM radios and servers that can move from using low-earth orbit to geostationary orbit satellites to 5G networks.

“So essentially, automatically execute a primary, ultimate contingency communications plan,” he said. “So, you know, we've given some feedback for those, we haven't seen a turn, nor do I expect to see one inside of this rotation.”

....

In my mind, ever since the US Army started fielding Javelins at the squad level in its mounted units (Bradley and Stryker) I have seen the infantry largely as an anti-tank adjunct to the Armored force. Dismounting the GIBs with their Javelins gave the Armored force a hinge or pivot around which they could manoeuvre.

The sense I a getting from this article is that there is a lot more of that in the infantry's future - "that third infantry squad in our infantry platoons is a UAS team with anti-tank systems" and "four FPV attack teams that the battalion commander places on the battlefield" and FOOs with FPVs.

How long range are those Anti-tank systems? If they are Switchblade 600s then

Range​

24.9+ mi (40+ km)
56+ mi (90+ km) w/ Forward Pass

Endurance​

40+ min

Speed​

Loiter: 70 mph (113 km/h)
Sprint: 115 mph (185 km/h)

Weight​

Munition: 33 lb (15 kg)
AUR: 65 lb (29.5 kg)

....

The other major focus seems to be on the electromagnetic spectrum

• an extra EW platoon
• new comms systems that are hardened and more capable (integrating offensive EW?)

...

And, the Division is manufacturing its own Drones to counter enemy drone swarms....

...

Lots of local innovation.

 

[Fabius]

In relation to the US Army transformation in contact and some of the other NATO army’s experimentation Bns, should the CA have a designated experimentation Bn?

This would not be the same as the Canadian Army Trials and Evaluation Unit. CATEU seems focused on equipment technical parameters only vs the TiC focus on integrating doctrine, TTPs and new equipment and technologies in new and old combinations to inform doctrine.

A number of Armies are using their collective training Combat Training Centres and their OPFOR units as experimentation test beds as well. What should the CA’s collective training CTC and OPFOR look like to ensure war fighting proficiency and lethality across the field force? Should the experimentation unit be the OPFOR unit?

 

[Brad Sallows]

Should the experimentation unit be the OPFOR unit?

I'd suppose "yes". Properly done, they'd look at all kinds of OPFOR and they'd want to steel-man the OPFOR performance. To do that, they'd have to know all sides well.

 

[daftandbarmy]

In relation to the US Army transformation in contact and some of the other NATO army’s experimentation Bns, should the CA have a designated experimentation Bn?

This would not be the same as the Canadian Army Trials and Evaluation Unit. CATEU seems focused on equipment technical parameters only vs the TiC focus on integrating doctrine, TTPs and new equipment and technologies in new and old combinations to inform doctrine.

A number of Armies are using their collective training Combat Training Centres and their OPFOR units as experimentation test beds as well. What should the CA’s collective training CTC and OPFOR look like to ensure war fighting proficiency and lethality across the field force? Should the experimentation unit be the OPFOR unit?

FWIW, as I recall, every road move was an experiment... with fate

 

[KevinB]

In relation to the US Army transformation in contact and some of the other NATO army’s experimentation Bns, should the CA have a designated experimentation Bn?

One might argue that the CA already has two experimentation Regiments, just not by doctrine or equipment.

This would not be the same as the Canadian Army Trials and Evaluation Unit. CATEU seems focused on equipment technical parameters only vs the TiC focus on integrating doctrine, TTPs and new equipment and technologies in new and old combinations to inform doctrine.

To me the CA isn’t large enough to support a true CTC (as seen with the failure of CMTC Wainwright). I beleive that like what was done back when I was in for Future Warrior etc was to send subunits down to Ft Benning and be part of US testing/trials.

That was primary for Light Infantry troops, but there is no reason that it could not be expanded into some of the larger programs and ground equipment as well.

A number of Armies are using their collective training Combat Training Centres and their OPFOR units as experimentation test beds as well. What should the CA’s collective training CTC and OPFOR look like to ensure war fighting proficiency and lethality across the field force? Should the experimentation unit be the OPFOR unit?

IMHO the OpFor should be set for a specific threat (cough Russia cough). Experimentation should be done by a Blue side formation against a Red Team that is formed as a modern Peer equipped adversary.

Experimentation by Red against the Blue Force can show weakness etc, but doesn’t necessarily provide a realistic training environment.

While there is a value in that, to me that is an entirely different focus.

 

[Fabius]

To me the CA isn’t large enough to support a true CTC (as seen with the failure of CMTC Wainwright). I beleive that like what was done back when I was in for Future Warrior etc was to send subunits down to Ft Benning and be part of US testing/trials.

That was primary for Light Infantry troops, but there is no reason that it could not be expanded into some of the larger programs and ground equipment as well.

The CA still needs some sort of CTC to conduct the collective training piece for the field force. I am not convinced that the field force can properly challenge itself if it’s left to do collective training (CT)by itself.
As is the Army has largely outsourced all CT to either JRTC and JPMRC or to CJOC and the Latvia based CREVALs. The Army right now is slowly coming to grips with the decisions made 2-3 years ago that have seen the Army not be in charge of its own CT.
The question then is what does CT look like and who manages it inside the Army, ie what does that CTC look like?

Experimentation should be done by a Blue side formation against a Red Team that is formed as a modern Peer equipped adversary.

Experimentation by Red against the Blue Force can show weakness etc, but doesn’t necessarily provide a realistic training environment.

While there is a value in that, to me that is an entirely different focus.

Yeah, that makes sense to me. It would be nice to see a line unit designated as an experimentation unit and given larger authorities and responsibilities. That along with some embedded DLR and project type staff with funds that the unit can use as it sees fit to procure and test technology and develop TTPs.

I think the OPFOR question is harder, but the CA likely needs an entire unit dedicated as OPFOR. I wonder if a 70/30 type Reserve unit would be viable for the OPFOR. Might depend on how many serials the CTC needs to run per year and at what levels.

 

[daftandbarmy]

The CA still needs some sort of CTC to conduct the collective training piece for the field force. I am not convinced that the field force can properly challenge itself if it’s left to do collective training (CT)by itself.
As is the Army has largely outsourced all CT to either JRTC and JPMRC or to CJOC and the Latvia based CREVALs. The Army right now is slowly coming to grips with the decisions made 2-3 years ago that have seen the Army not be in charge of its own CT.
The question then is what does CT look like and who manages it inside the Army, ie what does that CTC look like?

I see contractors, lots of contractors....

 

[Brad Sallows]

I see contractors, lots of contractors....

Doesn't Calian provide tough battle-hardened and -experienced advisors to the CAF?