Informing the Army’s Future Structure

[dapaterson]

The Army has no command ranks above LCol. Brigades are administrative, not operational.

"Upper brass hates us" is not at all the situation. The P Res culture is diseased, and practice is not aligned with the legal framework.

The artificial divide between Reg and Res is a self inflicted self licking problem.

 

[Fabius]

The whole officer development system is designed so that commanders are progressively provided education, training and experience to prepare them for the next command level. When they get there, they are already trained.

Command itself includes the concept that the commander of any organization, together with his staff and subordinate commanders have the ability to train their formation and units PROVIDED THEY ARE ALLOCATED THE RESOURCES TO DO SO. Senior commanders at all levels monitor the training of their subordinate formations and units.

I'm an old school guy who doesn't believe much in the concept of having outside agencies monitor and certify an organizations readiness. I do believe in having training centres set up to facilitate the training of organizations in various ways. That, to me, is part of the resources provided to units and formations.

I don’t agree fully with this in terms of combat capability. Our commanders are trained effectively to be institutional leaders, however the Bn and Bde Comd need as much training as our sub unit and Pl Comd do in terms of actual combat capabilities.

The capabilities needed of the higher level formation commanders is obviously different than lower commanders but it’s not been the case that they are good combat commanders because of the training for institutional leadership.

Senior Comd are enabled by staff but are still key in developing their formations plans and executing them. Our units and formations are not as good as they could be specifically due to the CA approach to collective training and how we are reluctant to actually test commanders.

Commanders if given resources to train their organization always want to train their subordinates, this is true to the point that it’s common to have people upset that Platoon X didn’t get in a fight during a Level 6 BG exercise. They fundamentally misunderstood that the exercise was about them as the BG not about ensuring all of their soldiers get equal amount of enemy contact.

The benefit of an outside organization is that Comd CA and the entire Army could get its units and formations, their Comds and their staffs evaluated and graded against a standard. Not a pass or fail, not a ready or not ready, I agree with leaving that decision to the CCA. However a grade against a standard is a useful tool to judge the efficiency and effectiveness of the resources that we have applied to the units and formations.

 

[daftandbarmy]

The Army has no command ranks above LCol. Brigades are administrative, not operational.

"Upper brass hates us" is not at all the situation. The P Res culture is diseased, and practice is not aligned with the legal framework.

The artificial divide between Reg and Res is a self inflicted self licking problem.

An oldie but goodie

2016 Spring Reports of the Auditor General of Canada​

Report 5—Canadian Army Reserve—National Defence​

https://www.oag-bvg.gc.ca/internet/English/parl_oag_201602_05_e_41249.html

 

[Fabius]

Yeah, Bingo - pretty much.

Commanders at the Formation and Unit level should have enough resources to help them prepare for just about anything. The tests should be done during exercises where their bosses decide if they've done their jobs OK and, if not, give them a chance to reset and give it another go

If there's still a problem then that's time to sort out the Commanders, of course..

When 'Standards Cells' etc start getting in between Commanders, the rot starts...

Interestingly perhaps we could ask two questions.

1. Why do all our peer allies armies have collective training centres that assess their formations combat abilities against doctrinal standards? As does NATO.

2. How many Canadian Army units and formations have been assessed as needing additional training and had themselves sent back to do it again? Is this common or uncommon?

 

[dapaterson]

Interestingly perhaps we could ask two questions.

1. Why do all our peer allies armies have collective training centres that assess their formations combat abilities against doctrinal standards? As does NATO.

2. How many Canadian Army units and formations have been assessed as needing additional training and had themselves sent back to do it again? Is this common or uncommon?

Paul Morneault would like a few words.

 

[OldSolduer]

Paul Morneault would like a few words.

Somalia work up training IIRC.

 

[daftandbarmy]

Paul Morneault would like a few words.

Worth reflecting on that a bit...


The Airborne consisted of multiple sub-units drawn from each of Canada's regular infantry regiments. Later, LCol. Kenward suggested that the line regiments had offloaded some of their "bad apples" into the CAR. LCol. Morneault, the commanding officer of the CAR, declared the "rogue commando" unit unfit for service abroad and sought to have it remain in Canada. Instead, he was relieved of his command and replaced by Lieutenant Colonel Carol Mathieu.

Somalia affair - Wikipedia

en.wikipedia.org

 

[Fabius]

Canadian Army Today piece on modernization.

Modernizing for major combat operations | Canadian Army Today

canadianarmytoday.com

There are a couple interesting items here. I think though it’s pretty light on details of how the Army is looking to modernize given some of the decisions already made.

However interesting items.

1. The interview would seem to indicate that the CA views the Latvia based forces as the trials and experimentation element.

2. Much of the answers are focused on process. Ie asked about the modernization priorities he talks about the staff process to figure out priorities.

3. Statements of being bold but no articulation of what that will mean. Elaboration would be interesting. The acceptance of asymmetrical formations for example.

4. Continuous Capability Sustainment. This could be very very beneficial to the CA. Time will tell.

5. Engagement with industry is fine but those discussions need to be backed with cash and rapid orders or they are largely pointless.

6. Digitization. I’m not convinced that the Army understands where warfare is going in terms of networked warfare. I don’t know if anyone does but I don’t think we have a good understanding of how fundamental this is. We are 15-20 years behind.

 

[OldSolduer]

Worth reflecting on that a bit...


The Airborne consisted of multiple sub-units drawn from each of Canada's regular infantry regiments. Later, LCol. Kenward suggested that the line regiments had offloaded some of their "bad apples" into the CAR. LCol. Morneault, the commanding officer of the CAR, declared the "rogue commando" unit unfit for service abroad and sought to have it remain in Canada. Instead, he was relieved of his command and replaced by Lieutenant Colonel Carol Mathieu.

Somalia affair - Wikipedia

en.wikipedia.org

Yes and the regiment that unloaded bad apples was.....

I recall a in the late 80s a CSM in a certain unit in Calgary send off shit sticks to the CAR "cause the CAR will straighten them out".

Soon the shit sticks had critical mass - and it went downhill from there. I can even recall one of the platoon commanders implicated - an EHLB = Empty Headed Lunch Bucket.

 

[rmc_wannabe]

1. The interview would seem to indicate that the CA views the Latvia based forces as the trials and experimentation element.

That is because MNB-LVA has been used as the justification for UORs to put everything in the express lane for Cap Dev money.

Projects that would take DLR 5-10 years to see from cradle to grave are being done in 2 years or sooner.

2. Much of the answers are focused on process. Ie asked about the modernization priorities he talks about the staff process to figure out priorities.

Having worked for MGen Masson, he is meticulous about pprocesses, developing CoAs, and wargaming as much as possible. This makes sure that the decisions made are well thought out and can stand the test of time and scrutiny.

The only downside is when time is luxury we don't have, it can look like indecision and dithering.

3. Statements of being bold but no articulation of what that will mean. Elaboration would be interesting. The acceptance of asymmetrical formations for example.

I am not sure CCA is ready to open Pandora's box in that regard.

Be bold is a good soundbite. Cracking open ORBATs and hurting Regimental Associations feelings is another thing entirely.

4. Continuous Capability Sustainment. This could be very very beneficial to the CA. Time will tell.

DLR spoke to my FSOC course last summer about the concept of Spiral Cap Dev. Instead of a 10 year project to maintain a capability for 25-30 years, it would be a continual release of IOC+ every 4 years, with staggered roll outs (like of how we recap IT eqpt). It was really interesting to hear about.

5. Engagement with industry is fine but those discussions need to be backed with cash and rapid orders or they are largely pointless.

See above. If we know that we are going to be going back to a vendor 4 years from now and wanting the 2030 model, it will help build those ties even if we don't have mo ey up front. Or so the legend goes.

6. Digitization. I’m not convinced that the Army understands where warfare is going in terms of networked warfare. I don’t know if anyone does but I don’t think we have a good understanding of how fundamental this is. We are 15-20 years behind.

The problem is that the Army knows, it just doesn't have the talent on it's payroll to do it in house. Additionally, we need to better socialize our Staff Officers on stuff like the Kill Web and the interconnected systems we need to have from Sensor to Shooter.

I would also add that our rank and file are all digital natives: they have not known a world without digital technology and the internet. The main audience we need to convince are those in far senior ranks, who had their formative years still in the analog processes and still think in that mindset.

 

[McG]

Projects that would take DLR 5-10 years to see from cradle to grave are being done in 2 years or sooner.

No. Band-aids have been getting done in short order, but the actual projects for an enduring capability are still waiting in the wings (now more delayed).

See above. If we know that we are going to be going back to a vendor 4 years from now and wanting the 2030 model, it will help build those ties even if we don't have mo ey up front. Or so the legend goes.

Meanwhile, industry is indicating that they are not building their capacity without contracts and the assurance of funding that comes with that.

 

[MilEME09]

The Army has no command ranks above LCol. Brigades are administrative, not operational.

"Upper brass hates us" is not at all the situation. The P Res culture is diseased, and practice is not aligned with the legal framework.

The artificial divide between Reg and Res is a self inflicted self licking problem.

It's a culture rich in a tradition of neglect, and it ain't the senior PRes officers thats are going to fix it. It's going to take a L1 with a spine to actually come down hard and sort the reserves out. Forcefully, and quickly, and any COs trying to resist the change relieved of their command. The Ressrvee must change if we want to benefit the army beyond a handful of augmentation

 

[daftandbarmy]

It's a culture rich in a tradition of neglect, and it ain't the senior PRes officers thats are going to fix it. It's going to take a L1 with a spine to actually come down hard and sort the reserves out. Forcefully, and quickly, and any COs trying to resist the change relieved of their command. The Ressrvee must change if we want to benefit the army beyond a handful of augmentation

If only hammering the ARes COs would fix all the institutional issues. Alot of the time they're the ones holding everything together against all odds...

 

[FJAG]

Having worked for MGen Masson, he is meticulous about pprocesses, developing CoAs, and wargaming as much as possible. This makes sure that the decisions made are well thought out and can stand the test of time and scrutiny.

DLR spoke to my FSOC course last summer about the concept of Spiral Cap Dev. Instead of a 10 year project to maintain a capability for 25-30 years, it would be a continual release of IOC+ every 4 years, with staggered roll outs (like of how we recap IT eqpt). It was really interesting to hear about.

The problem is that the Army knows, it just doesn't have the talent on it's payroll to do it in house. Additionally, we need to better socialize our Staff Officers on stuff like the Kill Web and the interconnected systems we need to have from Sensor to Shooter.

The problem is that engineers, gunners and logisticians, for the most part, need to understand the workings of the combat arms to do their own jobs properly. Unfortunately we do not take enough time and effort to educate or provide experience to combat arms officers in the detailed functioning of CS and CSS. Yes, there is a fundamental understanding and a belief that one should let them practice their magic. That may work in a brigade headquarters but it does not help in the army headquarters, where those average combat arms officers predominate, when designing the next iteration of the army or allocating scarce funding. Sorry - let the backlash begin.

I would also add that our rank and file are all digital natives: they have not known a world without digital technology and the internet. The main audience we need to convince are those in far senior ranks, who had their formative years still in the analog processes and still think in that mindset.

I had spent my working life on the bleeding edge of technology. My biggest challenge throughout was getting my peers (military and civilian) to understand and accept the benefits and limitations that technology could bring to their business processes. People were just damn comfortable with their paper forms and pro forma processes.

It's a culture rich in a tradition of neglect, and it ain't the senior PRes officers thats are going to fix it. It's going to take a L1 with a spine to actually come down hard and sort the reserves out. Forcefully, and quickly, and any COs trying to resist the change relieved of their command. The Ressrvee must change if we want to benefit the army beyond a handful of augmentation

I'm sorry. But you just can't expect to go to a bunch of reserve force LCols who have had marginal training and experience and tell them to sort themselves out, or else. That gets us back to the definition of insanity; doing what we've been doing for 70 years and expecting a different result. Yelling louder won't work. If you are looking for a structure that can turn out reasonably competent privates and corporals and the occasional bright sergeant, lieutenant or captain for augmentation then its good enough. If you are looking for a reasonably mobilizable force then you are shit out of luck.

The first questions the army has to wrestle with are: do we actually want more than augmentees? Do we want a mobilizable force? Do we want a larger, equipped army that costs less year to year than a wholly professional full-time army costs?

My personal opinion is that Canada needs a much larger army than it has. I also believe it doesn't need to or should put all of its resources into a full-time force; a large portion can and should be - for costs, if no other reason - part time. To me that means a top to bottom restructuring of the entire army to include various structures of varying ratios of hybrid organizations.

Simply put, there is no easy or simple solution. It will take a long term commitment and, perhaps, over time, one can build a reserve structure that is less reliant on hybrid organizations. That's decades away, however.