Informing the Army’s Future Structure

[Brad Sallows]

Others have already said it: Corps '86 anybody?

Details of what was in the book fade, but Corps '86 was only ridiculous if it was held up as an example of what we intended to buy at the time and for being over-stuffed. Someone long ago described it as an incomplete document that had gone through the "what does everyone think they need" phase, but not a scrub-down phase. Reduce the 10-tube batteries, remove the tank destroyers, reduce/remove some other wish-list over-reach, and some kind of Corps '25 (or, really, Army '25) target ought to exist. It has to be anchored to an estimate of the manpower and materiel the country can sustain through at least, say, 3 years of war, and can't usefully exist in the absence of similar work for naval and air forces, including all the "home" establishments. (IOW, everything taken together). Producing and continuously updating a "plan" that reflects the maximum we think we could project at steady state for some reasonable duration at least means we're thinking about a practical upper bound, how to reach it, and how to stay there (not necessarily indefinitely). Obviously we aren't obligated to perpetually strain ourselves in relative peace-time to implement it.

 

[Brad Sallows]

An alternate organization for discussion sake. In all reality will we ever see a time when the CA deploys a full division, or even a division minus with a full division headquarters? I suggest not.

Depends on whether you believe Russia (or China) poses a threat that Europe (or east Asia, backed by the US) can't handle without us. Plenty of people are waving the threat, but that might just be political grand-standing because they've suddenly been presented with the prospect of having to spend more on military forces.

 

[FJAG]

Again agree, but what I'm referring to here is that conditions have deterioted to the point that a partial mobilization is taking place, but not to the point of "total" war. I would consider this to be comparable to the creation of the "Special Force" for the Korean War. It was for all intents and purposes a reserve force, even though many RegF individuals volunteered for it.

It's interesting that you mention Korea. A study of the creation of the special force and the problems associated with that is useful. See Strange Battleground.

The planning figures for the brigade group was based on 5,000 with a reinforcement group of 2,105. The planning assumptions were that 50% of the officers and NCMs down to [MCpl] would come from the active force. That the other 50% of the officers and NCMs down to sergeant would come from the reserves. 90% of the rank and file would come from the reserves or from veterans. Roughly 10,000 were recruited to select from.

At the time the Active army was understrength of even its restricted establishments and unable to fully do its peacetime roles.

There were also a number of discussion as to the practicality/legality of recruiting this contingent into the regular or reserve force before a decision was made to use the special force. The section on the number of discharges, desertions, apprehensions and legal proceedings on pg 36 is interesting.

The criteria for selecting officers for the brigade was heavily weighted to volunteers with war-time service. Only if a volunteer wasn't found di they turn to the Active army to appoint someone. At the brigade, unit CO and specialist officers roughly 78 of 111 officers were active force, the rest reserve or veteran. At the battalion level 86 out of 113 were reserve or veteran and only 27 were Active army.

Interestingly as well, it became quickly necessary to "call out" reservists (120 officers and 558 NCMs) to "train and administer" the special force.

Unfortunately, unlike some, I have only a limited number of reference books (You should have seen OldSweat's house) and can't pinpoint the total number of Active army that ended up in the brigade but with the intent to hold the Mobile Striking Force back in Canada and the planning figures, the vast majority were from the reserves and veterans.

The problem with using Korea as an example - and I fully agree that it should be used as an example - is that it ignores the subsequent (mid 1950s) development of the concept of "forces-in-being" as the basis of our operational (read NATO) commitments. "Forces-in-being" is what transitioned the Canadian army into a large RegF small Militia structure which remains to this day. In order to return to a mobilization model we need to wean the CAF HQ off decades of "forces-in-being" thinking.

 

[Baz]

I think there is more than semantics distinguishing between an uncommitted force that exists in some state of readiness before a crisis and a force that is created from nothing once the crisis has commenced.

No disagreement. I was just trying to use an example of “limited mobilization” that, in my mind, should still start to use “reserve type” forces.

I do think it’s important to understand that a plan is a starting point. The plan might be: RegF forces in being, including deployments like Latvia, augmented by Reserves, but a large, equipped reserve to form the basis of mobilization. When the actual balloon goes up there might be numerous reasons to switch to something like a “Special Force,” which may or may not look like what happened in Korea.

I’d be happy if someone (in a position of authority) actually had a workable plan that Canadians understand.I think the old assumption, by some, that there will not be a major conflict is proving to be incorrect.

 

[Oldgateboatdriver]

A lot of the current discussion in this forum is driven by Canada's NATO obligation.

I think it's wrong. There is a lot of "army" types here that want (or seem to want) the glory of WWII and the Cold War all over again.

The current situation is radically different. In WWII, as a result of France's capitulation, it was the UK versus Germany, with the assistance of the commonwealth - mostly Canada - and the rest of Europe not really being involved. Then they looked at NATO versus the Eastern Bloc.

Today's situation is "just about everybody in Europe versus Russia. This means, if you exclude the US, Canada and the UK, a population of 530 millions (the rest of NATO) versus 146 millions (Russia).

If you throw in the actual obligations of NATO's article 5 to take consider being attacked (and thus at war and to take "such action as [they] deem necessary, including the use of armed force", then you can see that Canada doesn't have to send large land forces to help Europe. This time, we don't need to be the "saviour" in term of soldiers. Contribution by being the manufacturer and shipper of weapons, and making sure it gets there by sea meets our obligation towards the other members of NATO.

It gets back to a proper discussion of what Armed Forces we need in Canada: Air defense against intrusions in our air space (NORAD), maritime defense of our sides of the oceans, and army's capability with high end weapons systems, to repel the limited incursions we may possibly experience in the edges of our country, including the Arctic..

Sorry Army, but you ain't needed to fight the next big European war, if any, ..... and a land war against China, well, that's unwinnable even by the USA so we shouldn't bother.