Informing the Army’s Future Structure

[Colin Parkinson]

Light AT mixed with recce and flank security would be good roles for the Armoured Reserve.

 

[Kirkhill]

Light vehicles, like jeeps, unarmoured, would also make for unobtrusive patrol vehicles for domestic operations in Canada. Giving the "Cavalry" the opportunity to practice seeing without being seen.

And, apparently you can fit four ready to fire ATGMs on a jeep. Even if you have to dismount and launch them remotely.

Meanwhile the Danes are adding a dedicated LIB to there toolkit.

Light Infantry: a New Tool for the Danish Army

The Danish Army is in the process of raising a new light infantry battalion to enable it to react more quickly to situations developing around the world.

euro-sd.com

 

[Blackadder1916]

Canada's looked like this:

On the other hand we had more then than we do now.

Or this;




Checking the map to find a gasthof with a better field of fire.

 

[Good2Golf]

Wow! Check out the awesome Rouleau-RollTM on the driver and CC's boonie caps!

 

[markppcli]

Mounting the support weapons and their ammo on the vehicles that have to be left behind once the bullets and bombs start flying wouldn't be my first choice, If there’s a shortage of armoured vehicles, I’d prefer to mount the riflemen (with their e-tools!) in the trucks, and put the support weapons under armour.

If you’ve sighted your TOW properly it’s should be like 1 k back and to the flank. Direct fire shouldn’t be a huge worry and by doctrine it should relocate rapidly after the first round. Can do that in a g ride easy enough. Let me add it’s not the ideal option, it’s just what we have in the cupboard right now.

 

[KevinB]

If you’ve sighted your TOW properly it’s should be like 1 k back and to the flank. Direct fire shouldn’t be a huge worry and by doctrine it should relocate rapidly after the first round. Can do that in a g ride easy enough. Let me add it’s not the ideal option, it’s just what we have in the cupboard right now.

While I agree that is ideal - based on my experience with US Armor moving in Iraq in the cities - and what I have seen of Russian and Chinese formations - I don't think you are going to get a symetrical battlespace to work in and the DS answer won't work.

Personally I think that the time for TOW has come and gone - and the CF should be looking at Hellfire options -
It (Hellfire) can also fill a (limited) SHORAD role as well

 

[markppcli]

It’s absolutely past it’s prime. No question. But this is a thread about Force 2025 which is built around limited investment and no real substantial changes. It’s what can we fix in four years.

In an ideal world I’d see us with Spike in its various forms with NLOS at Brigade level, but hey that’s not a 4 year fix (in this army).

 

[KevinB]

It’s absolutely past it’s prime. No question. But this is a thread about Force 2025 which is built around limited investment and no real substantial changes. It’s what can we fix in four years.

I rather cynically thing that it could be Force 3025 and the Army still wouldn't have the time...

In an ideal world I’d see us with Spike in its various forms with NLOS at Brigade level, but hey that’s not a 4 year fix (in this army).

The only thing that concerns me is the Israeli "over marketing" with the range spec of the NLOS - they claim 25km
Hellfire MMW NLOS is only 14km with a larger missile with more fuel
Javelin is 5km with the new CLU - and a similar size missile

Plus the US systems are cheaper - and the logistical tail here can support the CF a lot better, unless the CF is going to get into domestic production of an ATGM under license (not unheard of - but unlikely for the CF build/buy quantity).

 

[Kirkhill]

WRT e-Missiles, Virtual Battles and stuffing TOWs in LAVs

Item the first. TOWs were not stuffed in LAVs. Javelins were stuffed in Strykers.

The Javelin provides dismounted Infantrymen a surefire way to effectively kill tanks. The system’s portability makes it the anti-armor weapon of choice for light early entry forces. It has an extremely high probability kill rate against enemy armor and is effective out to 2,500 meters.3

First used in combat during the invasion of Iraq in 2003, the Javelin was effective at destroying T-72 and Type 69 tanks. In one engagement, a Special Forces Operational Detachment-Alpha (ODA) destroyed two T-55 tanks, eight armored personnel carriers, and four troop trucks with the Javelin.4

I'm sure there are those here that can correct but I understand an SF-ODA is a team of 12 highly experienced soldiers.

2x T55
8x APC
4x Trucks

Doesn't sound like a bad day's work for a dozen soldiers. Even if you are talking ancient T55s.

Using the eight-step training model, we developed a four-day program of instruction (POI) to teach designated battalion personnel how to employ and operate the Javelin prior to the NTC rotation. We utilized a four-man team of NCOs who had graduated from the Heavy Weapons Leader Course at Fort Benning as instructors.....Four designated instructors were able to train 40 Javelin operators during the course, providing each company (including our Headquarters and Headquarters Company) the ability to employ Javelins at NTC. The anti-armor POI gave designated Javelin operators eight hours of hands-on training time.

4 NCO instructors trained 40 operators in 4 days giving each operator 8 hours of hands-on training time.

As for the e-Training

Use of the Javelin at NTC 14-03​

The employment of the M98A2 using the FTT proved to be a critical asset for the battalion during the force-on-force scenario of NTC rotation 14-03. The FTT is a fully integrated, three-dimensional force-on-force training device consisting of a simulated round, a battery charger, and batteries. The round incorporates a MILES laser transmitter to allow simulated Javelin engagements during training exercises. The FTT is designed to simulate the Javelin’s operational and engagement parameters. The battalion was able to destroy enemy mechanized elements at distances of 1,500-2,000 meters away from positions of dominant terrain with a clear line of sight. Trained Soldiers were able to achieve a 50-percent kill ratio on enemy armored vehicles in both offensive and defensive operations. While 50 percent is low, it was in real-world battlefield conditions with Infantrymen climbing up significant terrain to achieve effects against enemy armor.

The key to the employment of the M98A2 was the use of movement and maneuver of the Stryker vehicles and the dismounted Infantry. NTC’s vast open terrain allowed for the employment of weapon systems at their maximum effective ranges. This required a “push and pull” technique between dismounted and mounted Infantry Soldiers. The Stryker platoons would dismount Infantry squads and “push” them forward, utilizing the Strykers’ remote weapon systems to cover their movement. The dismounted squads seized dominate terrain, established hasty support-by-fire positions using Javelins, and provided overwatch for the Strykers as they “pulled” forward. The “push and pull” technique allowed the battalion to defeat enemy armor by maneuvering the dismounted Infantry with Javelins to positions of advantage and overwatch the movement of vehicles as they bounded forward. This technique requires a thorough terrain analysis by the battalion staff during the military decision-making process and the company leadership during troop leading procedures in order to maximize the usage of the terrain available.

During Battle Period 4 of NTC 14-03, we found ourselves attacking into an enemy armored formation defending key terrain in vicinity of the Arrowhead and Alpha/Bravo Pass. We had to maneuver to Refrigerator Gap and conduct a breach of enemy obstacles to pass elements of the brigade onto their objective. The terrain was not the most suitable place to maneuver Strykers as it was restrictive or severely restrictive in nature. Based on the posture of the enemy, we recognized we would have to employ the “push and pull” technique described above. Our rifle companies deliberately cleared mountainous terrain dismounted en-route to their objective and only moved vehicles forward once overwatch positions with Javelins were established. While this technique took extended time to execute, it enabled our battalion to destroy 10 armored vehicles before reaching our objective.

Now maybe I am misreading this 2014 script but it sure sounded like a real world exercise to me.

U.S. Army | Infantry Magazine

www.benning.army.mil

And, since 2014 the effective range of the Javelin has been demonstrated as 4750m when fired from a vehicle mounted CLU and 4000 m when fired dismounted with a modernized lightweight CLU.

JJV demonstrates Javelin missile's extended range capability - Army Technology

The Javelin surface-to-air missile has demonstrated its ability to engage targets beyond the existing maximum range during a series of US Army tests.

www.army-technology.com

TOW 3000 to 3750 m

• Weight: 204 lbs (92.5 kg) (empty M220 launcher with TOW 2 mods and AN/TAS-4A fitted) + 52.8 lbs (23.9 kg) for TOW-2 FCS module with inserted battery pack (21 lbs (9.5 kg) for separate BPS with power conditioner) and ~ 60 lbs (27.2 kg) for missile

Javelin 1500 to 4750 m depending on launch platform.

Mass	22.3 kg (49.2 lb): (Ready to fire) 6.4 kg (14.1 lb) Detachable Command Launch Unit (CLU)[6][7] 15.9 kg (35 lb): Missile in launch tube
Length	Missile: 1.1 m (43 in) Launch tube: 1.2 m (47 in)
Diameter	Missile: 127 mm (5.0 in) Launch tube: 142 mm (5.6 in)

Spike MR/LR/LR2 - 2500m/4000m/5500m

Spike-MR[edit]​

The medium range version (Israeli designation: NT-Gil). The weight of the missile is 14 kg (30 lb 14 oz), its minimum range is 200 m, while its maximum range is 2,500 m (1.6 mi). It is used by infantry and special forces.[15]

Spike-LR[edit]​

Long range version (Israeli designation: NT-Spike). The weight of the missile is 14 kg (30 lb 14 oz), and the weight of the complete system is less than 45 kg (99 lb 3 oz).[16] Maximum range is 4,000 m (2.5 mi) and it is used by infantry and light combat vehicles. It adds fiber-optic communication to and from the operator during flight.[17] Reported armour penetration capability is more than 700 mm (28 in) of Rolled homogeneous armour (RHA).[18] It is also deployed by Sentry Tech remotely controlled weapons stations along the Gaza border.[19] In early 2014, Rafael revealed they had increased the range of the Spike-LR to 5 km (3.1 mi), enhancing versatility on existing firing platforms and allowing it to be utilized on new ones like light helicopters.[20]

Spike-LR II[edit]​

Spike LR 2
A new generation of the original Spike-LR is in full-scale development and scheduled to be operational by the end of 2018. Spike-LR II (Israeli designation: Gil-2, גיל 2) has reduced weight to 12.7 kg (28 lb), increased range of 5.5 km (3.4 mi) at ground level and 10 km (6.2 mi) from helicopters using an RF data-link, warhead options of tandem HEAT with 30% increased armor penetration or a multipurpose blast warhead with selectable impact or penetration detonation fusing, a new seeker that includes an uncooled IR sensor with a smart target tracker with artificial intelligence features, the ability to fire on grid target coordinates using an inertial measurement unit for third party-target allocation, and is compatible with legacy launchers. The missile is designed with a counter-active protection system (CAPS) capability, being able to hit targets at higher impact angles of up to 70 degrees.[21][22] First ordered by the IDF in October 2017.[23]

e-Warriors or not I still find it hard to understand that these aren't already in all our infantry battalions arms lockers. Along side the Carl Gustafs.

 

[Kirkhill]

And there is always this

RAFAEL Introduces an Airmobile Spike NLOS for Special Ops - Defense Update:

RAFAEL has tested a new lightweight launcher for its Spike NLOS missile system, designed for integration on light offroad vehicles. For the launcher qualification testing the system was integrated into the Tomcar TE6 all-terrain, hybrid-electric powered vehicle, demonstrating unique operational...

defense-update.com

4x NLOS Missiles with 30km range mounted on a UTV - total weight 1780 kg

 

[KevinB]

I'm sure there are those here that can correct but I understand an SF-ODA is a team of 12 highly experienced soldiers.

2x T55
8x APC
4x Trucks

Doesn't sound like a bad day's work for a dozen soldiers. Even if you are talking ancient T55s.

It was ironically 1 dude with the Javelin who caused the mayhem - yes the book value for a SODA is 12, but I've seen deployed teams of 10-15.
A lot of teams where run by Warrants (most who had been NCO's for ages) for a bit when times where lean pre GWOT.

I am personally disappointed an enterprising young Captain or Major never tried to sneak Javelin in as a IOR/UOR buy.

 

[Kirkhill]

Are we getting it wrong thinking that 20-30 km range makes the N-LOS a Brigade Asset?

If the Squad/Section is receiving AT and AD missiles with 5 km ranges and 40mm UAVs with 10 km ranges then isn't 20-30 km a Bn range weapon?

 

[MilEME09]

Hear me out, everything that is old is new sooo

TH-495 - Wikipedia

en.m.wikipedia.org

Back to the drawing board. In seriousness though would a bolt on AT or AA pod work on a LAV 6? Have it reloaded via the air sentry hatch? Or via a hatch near the gunner?

 

[markppcli]

Are we getting it wrong thinking that 20-30 km range makes the N-LOS a Brigade Asset?

If the Squad/Section is receiving AT and AD missiles with 5 km ranges and 40mm UAVs with 10 km ranges then isn't 20-30 km a Bn range weapon?

The NLOS is a fair bit heavier and needs some more asset coordination to make it work from my understanding.

What I like about Spike is it’s ability to “semi loiter” you can get a range and bearing, but the missile in the air, and acquire with the optics in the missile.

 

[FJAG]

Wow! Check out the awesome Rouleau-RollTM on the driver and CC's boonie caps!

I still have my Robin Hood hat from 40 years ago complete as per EIS with a gunner cap badge.

I'm sure there are those here that can correct but I understand an SF-ODA is a team of 12 highly experienced soldiers.

An ODA is established for a captain with a warrant officer 1 or 2 (the US type) an ops master sergeant, an ops/int sergeant first class and eight sergeants first class/sergeants with specialties in weapons, engineering, medical and communications (two of each). As KevinB points out, that's the establishment but teams are frequently short folks or are augmented such as by a SOT-A (Special Operations Team - Alpha) which are SIGINT specialists

e-Warriors or not I still find it hard to understand that these aren't already in all our infantry battalions arms lockers. Along side the Carl Gustafs.

It's not hard to understand at all - lack of arty --> $$$; lack of air defence --> $$$; lack of anti-armour --> $$$. $$$ is a matter of priorities. What will we fund? and each of the listed items was low on the priority list. I've said it before: If the Taliban would have used tanks and aircraft we'd have anti-armour and air defence today - maybe only bought on a UOR but still.

 

[Kirkhill]

It's not hard to understand at all - lack of arty --> $$$; lack of air defence --> $$$; lack of anti-armour --> $$$. $$$ is a matter of priorities. What will we fund? and each of the listed items was low on the priority list. I've said it before: If the Taliban would have used tanks and aircraft we'd have anti-armour and air defence today - maybe only bought on a UOR but still.

On the other hand since I got married and left the militia (Yes, the events are linked) the army appears to have gone through a SRAAW(H) = Eryx programme, a MRAAW(H) = Milan programme, a LRAAW(H) = TOW replacement programme, an ALAAWS = Javelin/Spike programme. And I got married in 1984. Before the walls fell Shaka!.

 

[CBH99]

Before the walls fell Shaka!.

Oooohhhhh…. TNG Picard reference?

 

[GR66]

Looking a bit more at the numbers comparison between our current Infantry structure and the Swedish Mechanized Infantry structure you get some interesting numbers.

Just looking at the line Infantry Platoon structure, currently each Infantry Platoon is 40 x troops (3 x 10-man Sections and a 10-man Command Element plus Weapons Detachment) with the Mechanized Infantry Platoons each having 4 x LAVs.

Current Structure:

3 x symmetrical Brigades each with:
2 x LAV Battalions (18 x Mech Platoons = 72 x LAVs and 720 x Troops)
1 x Light Battalion (9 x Light Platoons = 360 x Troops)

That gives us a total of 216 x LAVs and 3,240 x Troops in our line Infantry Platoons.

By comparison, using the Swedish model, each Mechanized Platoon would have 29 x Troops riding 3 x LAVs

So using a Swedish Platoon model, if you were to have one Heavy Brigade consisting of 3 x combined arms Battalions (18 x Mech Infantry Platoons) and two fully Mechanized Infantry Battalions (each with 27 x Mech Infantry Platoons) you'd end up with a total of 72 x Swedish-style Mech Platoons.

That would give us a total of 216 x LAVs and 2,088 x Troops.

Same total number of LAVs, but a savings of 1,152 Infantry PYs. And this is just the savings from the line Infantry Platoons. I haven't considered any savings from differences in the CS Company, etc. numbers between the two models.

This would allow us to have an all-Mechanized Infantry force with PYs to spare. Those numbers could be used to either bring our Force Generation numbers up closer to the unit Establishment numbers, or we could even stand up an additional dedicated Light Battalion in addition to our existing units.

 

[FJAG]

Looking a bit more at the numbers comparison between our current Infantry structure and the Swedish Mechanized Infantry structure you get some interesting numbers.

I like where some of this is heading.

When it comes to reducing the size of establishments I always tend to give a thought of redundancy for LOBs and casualties and how many of those a given unit could absorb before becoming combat ineffective. I've read a number of articles on that - usually written by someone looking to make their name with a staff paper aimed at revolutionizing the world - but have rarely seen anything persuasive that leads me to go one direction or the other. On top of that there are our own experiences which show how platoons and companies continue to function even with casualties. Most notably was C Coy 1 RCR during Op Medusa.

While the above makes one wonder to what level organizations can be reasonably trimmed, I find it particulalry disconcerting that rather than study and analyze those structures (or at least not report them when if we do) to determine if there is a minimal acceptable level, we continue to maintain that structure while readily giving up capabilities in other fields. Simple examples are when the Army was pressed for PYs to form CMTC the infantry gave up mortar platoons and assault pioneers rather than downsizing companies. Where is the study to justify that? Similar examples abound vis a vis anti-armour, air defence and even basic artillery.

I have for many years looked at Russian (and previously Soviet) establishments and marveled at how they can operate a BMP battalion on 461 personnel, a tank battalion on 151 personnel, a self propelled howitzer battalion on 211 and a complete brigade with a total of four manoeuvre battalions and six separate artillery battalions for 3,000 to 4,500 personnel. Yes there are differing operational concepts but why don't we adopt those as well. Their system would easily slip into a NATO formation and we can see that by the number of former-Soviet bloc nations now a part of NATO and still operating more or less using Russian structures. Why we haven't developed efficient autoloaders for tanks and artillery like the Russians did many decades ago also boggles my mind.

When we reduce a platoon (infantry or armour) to a three vehicle construct, we can effectively form two tank battalions in Canada vice one (with spares) and can make nine mechanized infantry battalions vice six. That's not to say that the extra battalions need to be fully manned by Reg F personnel. The extras could be a less expensive to maintain and pay Res F organization. Yes, there are also issues with respect to the "tail" in each brigade and behind that but reductions occur with them as well. The point is one could create more fighting organizations fully equipped from the existing stockpile of gear that we have.

There are places where we can't change things as dramatically. Artillery and anti-armour are the biggest headache with a very limited stock of guns and capabilities. Further, we need to clearly articulate how we intend to incorporate modern weapon systems and how our doctrine will change to deal with new threats. An overarching plan for a future Force 2030 is essential to allow us to start the work on structure for Force 2025 and lay the capital project foundations needed for the next decade.

If we don't know the final direction we want to go in, its impossible to take the first step. Frankly there is nothing in the institutional options for Force 2025 that makes me feel warm and fuzzy about that direction. If anyone has any outcomes from the most recent discussions I'd be happy to see them (and probably be disappointed again).

 

[Kirkhill]

Looking a bit more at the numbers comparison between our current Infantry structure and the Swedish Mechanized Infantry structure you get some interesting numbers.

Just looking at the line Infantry Platoon structure, currently each Infantry Platoon is 40 x troops (3 x 10-man Sections and a 10-man Command Element plus Weapons Detachment) with the Mechanized Infantry Platoons each having 4 x LAVs.

Current Structure:

3 x symmetrical Brigades each with:
2 x LAV Battalions (18 x Mech Platoons = 72 x LAVs and 720 x Troops)
1 x Light Battalion (9 x Light Platoons = 360 x Troops)

That gives us a total of 216 x LAVs and 3,240 x Troops in our line Infantry Platoons.

By comparison, using the Swedish model, each Mechanized Platoon would have 29 x Troops riding 3 x LAVs

So using a Swedish Platoon model, if you were to have one Heavy Brigade consisting of 3 x combined arms Battalions (18 x Mech Infantry Platoons) and two fully Mechanized Infantry Battalions (each with 27 x Mech Infantry Platoons) you'd end up with a total of 72 x Swedish-style Mech Platoons.

That would give us a total of 216 x LAVs and 2,088 x Troops.

Same total number of LAVs, but a savings of 1,152 Infantry PYs. And this is just the savings from the line Infantry Platoons. I haven't considered any savings from differences in the CS Company, etc. numbers between the two models.

This would allow us to have an all-Mechanized Infantry force with PYs to spare. Those numbers could be used to either bring our Force Generation numbers up closer to the unit Establishment numbers, or we could even stand up an additional dedicated Light Battalion in addition to our existing units.

Like FJAG I like this avenue of investigation.

Couple of more points especially with respect to the HQ company and Combat Support

16 more LAV/ACSVs buy you

4 LAVs in a Recce Platoon (2x 2?) PYs unknown - allow for 40? but possibly as low as 24?
4 LAVs in an AD Platoon 12 PYs (3 crew per vehicle)
8 LAVs in 2x 120mm Mor Platoons 24 PYs (3 crew per vehicle)

2nd point

If you are looking at Combined Arms Battalions you are now looking at 6 Cap Badges, not 3, and 12 units, not 9. But you are also looking at the field strength of both the RCIC and the RCAC.

It is the right thing to look at. It is also the right thing to disregard the Cap Badges. For the purpose of this exercise.

With respect to FJAG's concerns about casualties:

There are two primary means of handling casualties. You can replace individuals. You can replace units. Large sections with LOBs speak to the former. Small sections with entire LOB sections speak to the latter.

Life gets simpler if the LIB Sections reflect the requirements of the LAV platoons. In other words, if 3 LAVs in a platoon and a ground element of 20 then make 20 the basis of the LIB platoon. And use the extra PYs to create a 4th platoon in the Company and add Combat Support elements. But maintain the 20 PY establishment, even in the CS elements so that, in extremis, they can become GIBs in the back of a standard LAV platoon.