• Thanks for stopping by. Logging in to a registered account will remove all generic ads. Please reach out with any questions or concerns.

Iran Super Thread- Merged

In doing so, has he squandered an opportunity to deal with Iran?

His instinct on Iran was not wrong. The Islamic Republic is a cancer that grew because it was left unchecked. But it's exactly for that reason that competence in execution is paramount. This is probably the only chance the US will ever get in any of our lifetimes. Half assing all but guarantees that the regime that survives will go full North Korea in their quest for survival. Including with nukes. So if Trump wasn't willing to go all in, it was probably a bad idea to start the war in the first place.
 
Can you explain to me what YOU believe American/Israeli strategic objectives are?

I'll tell you what I believe they are, but I want to hear what you think they are...

I believe there are two immediate military objectives:

Nuclear Disarmament: Preventing Iran from developing or pursuing nuclear weapons.
Military Capacity Reduction: Destruction of Iran's missile production, missile stockpiles, and navy.

These are ongoing and the Israeli/American coalition is achieving considerable success.

I believe this is a medium-term military objective:

Proxy Network Neutralization: Stripping away the "Axis of Resistance" (e.g., Hamas, Hezbollah).

Israel is mobilizing and looks poised to invade Southern Lebanon. Iran has been considerably weakened in Syria and elsewhere. The Houthi problem still needs to be resolved but the Saudis/Gulf States may be able to make a move there with Iran tied up at home.

I believe these two are longer-term strategic objectives:

Regional Hegemony Control: Impoe a new, more stable regional security architecture and eliminating Iran's ability to project power.
Regime Change/Collapse: Topple the current Iranian leadership or make them subservient to American hegemony.

Ongoing but this will not happen overnight.


This move is being done at the behest of the Gulf States. The leadership there is encouraging Trump in private. They are our Allies in the region and want the Iranians weakened. They also get it done without really having a lift a finger. It's a win-win for them.


Explain how it's a negative trajectory and why you believe this to be the case?

Sorry dude. Didn’t intend to ignore this, I just forgot. It’s been quite a week on my end, I mentally filed this as “reply when I have more time”, and then decidedly did not have more time… bit of a shit show on my end. This won’t be well structured; I’m just bashing out a weekend worth of thoughts five minutes at a time between tasks.

Anyway- Israel and the U.S. have overlapping but not matching objectives, nor are their objectives fully aligned.

Israel is easy. National survival first, safety of Israelis an immediate second, generally improving their situation and relationships in the region a trailing third. Not because it’s not important, but because the first two are so utterly dominant.

I largely align with you on what Israel wants. Prevent Iran from getting nukes at all cost. Limit to the extent feasible Iran’s conventional weapon development. Reduce the risk to Israelis from Iranian proxies in Hamas and Hezbollah (that one I think already largely achieved in the near to mid term) Ultimately, regime change in Iran is likely a necessary condition for both the nukes and conventional weapons, but only if it results in a government less threatening to Israel and that’s not a given. So I think you and I largely see the same thing in what Israel wants. Their objectives are pretty clear and rational, and can be accomplished in part but not whole without the venture being a loss.

What the U.S. wants really depends on what Trump wants due to his significant capture of the U.S. government. His first and foremost concern is his own political and material benefit, and whatever positively reinforces his narcissistic self-conception. The benefit of America and Americans matters when it bolsters those. Anyone more mature and rational in his orbit or in the larger administration will be most likely to succeed when they tie rational strategic goals to Trump’s own self-interest.

I believe Trump wants to be given the credit of ‘solving’ the Iran problem. To him that's simply an Iran that is less of a material threat to neighbours, which he can take credit for and parlay into other political benefit. Right now that’s the midterms more than anything. He has tried and failed to convince people he is a ‘peacemaker’. Post-Venezuela he’s high on his own supply and thinking he could repeat that clear and decisive tactical victory and get Iran to quickly cave… Except they haven’t. That therefore shifts him into a combination of ‘dodge blame’ - and there we see his efforts to dump the Strait onto anyone and everyone else - and still find a way to look tough and take credit for something; hence the threats to Iran of ‘cut it out or else’.

The problem with Trump’s attempts at coercion is that his understanding of such things isn’t geopolitical, but rather informed by being a real eatate developer who’s had to contend with the mafia. They of course are still first and foremost a business and their threats must make business sense. So, Trump is attempting to bully the Iranian regime from a point of profound misunderstanding of their underlying objectives and principles. He comes into this thinking that if you threaten to burn someone’s store down, they’ll pay protection money. That’s not how they see it or will react.

So Trump’s initial objective of a fast, clean military onslaught that would force the survivors of the Iranian regime to cave to his proposed deals has failed to be met. Instead he’s now partly wearing massive economic harm, disrupted state relationships in the gulf, massive spikes in commodity prices, and increased inflation in the bears to mid term. That later isn’t me trying to punny, but yes the mid terms will = the midterms.

That having not gone well, he’s now struggling to figure out what to do next. His objectives remain his own political and material self interest, but his theory of victory stepped on a rake and he doesn’t have a new one. He is however surrounded by people with their own direct or vicarious interests who will try to steer this mess. Some of their objectives are probably quite reasonable and rational (“let’s unfuck this so we don’t get smoked in November”, or “let’s wind this down so we don’t lose massive investments from the Gulf”, or “let’s do everything we can to further neutralize Iran while we’re already here”), but to turn that to policy they have to sell Trump on it. How they do so is too much insider baseball for me to guess.

Stepping aside form the U.S. politics of it and to a few of the specific problems:

Nuclear and ballistic missile disarmament: totally valid and laudable objectives. Iran with nukes cannot happen, and their missiles are obviously a major threat though I wouldn’t say justifying of a war on their own. Problem with both is that scientific advancements are hard to roll back even though infrastructure and kit can get wrecked. Israel can, will, and does target Iran’s knowledge base on weapons development. They can delay development by bombing facilities, killing scientists etc. ultimately though if Iran’s government maintains the intent of developing these weapons, they have a ton of geography permissive of doing so.

The U.S. has longer reach. All of Iran is reachable by their strategic bombers on the X and Y axes, albeit limited by mission turnaround and payload. Only the B2s and soon ( or already?) the B21s can truly go anywhere. However Iran will be able to simply bury things quite a bit deeper on the Z axis, impervious to conventional munitions. Iran will likely in the mid to long term preserve the ability to develop any desired weapons largely outside of military reach of the U.S. or Israel short of a major ground operation. We all know the challenges and risks that would bring. I don’t think anyone here will argue that large scale ground ops would be well advised, and the farther northeast in Iran you go the more true that is. I do still believe limited ground ops aiming at some of the key existing nuclear sites are probably on the table.

So… Iran’s claws can be trimmed, but I don’t know that they can be fully defanged indefinitely short of an invasion and reasonably lengthy occupation that was already tried and largely failed with two of Iran’s neighbours. Absent that, so long as the Iranian regime substantially maintains sovereignty, they have geography and other trade/economic relationships that work against rational Israeli and American (versus Trump) interests.

You asked why I think the trajectory is bad… Admittedly I’m replying to your question with the benefit of a week’s additional events, so my expectations of a week ago are supported by evidence of hindsight. What I believed and expected then, and what we have continued to see since, is that the U.S., because of the incoherence of their objectives, does not have a good handle on this. It’s been a rapid oscillation between “We already won”, “Iran is obliterated”, to “NATO are cowards”, “other countries should step up”, “we don’t use the strait anyway”, to “you have 48 hours to cut it out or else”. Iran has proven itself willing and able to inflict great economic pain and there’s no reason to think they won’t keeping so.

Israel is seeing the Iranian can kicked down the road a fair bit; that suits them, it is not a full achievement of their objectives, but it’s aligned. The U.S…. well, I don’t see a net benefit to their national interest in how this is going so far.

Iran has been kicked about hard. But the regime is still in place, not appear to have suffered any irreparable harm, and don’t aeem to face acute political threat yet. They have learned and proven that they can cause great harm to regional economies. They have proven that they can turn that into some degree of leverage against the U.S. by their partners in trade, business - and illicit graft. Iran has proven it can land blows on shipping throughout the Gulf. While the Strait of Hormuz is key terrain, but it is not, strategically, vital ground. ‘Securing’ the strait and its beaches will not end the Iranian threat.

The U.S. is now in a bind where they’ve landed heavy punches, but their opponents hasn’t heard no bell, and plain threats of economic destruction of civilian infrastructure are facing defiance. Iran has continued to fire ballistic missiles in the time I’ve been gradually writing this, so their defiance is likely not empty words. The economic costs of the war continue to mount and will get worse fast. The political costs to the U.S. president continue to mount and will likely outweigh rational strategic considerations and decisions. Iran is debilitated but not incapacitated and should be able to rebuild its capacity to present all the same threats they have up til now, with a lot of added information about what to prioritize and how to protect it.

All in all, that’s my rambling and sleep deprived Sunday take on the soup sandwich that is the 2026 Iran war as of today. Who the hell knows what’ll happen tomorrow or any day after.
 
Last edited:
Israel is easy. National survival first, safety of Israelis an immediate second, generally improving their situation and relationships in the region a trailing third. Not because it’s not important, but because the first two are so utterly dominant.

You are ignoring an essential secondary aim of the Israeli current government: To keep pressure off Netanyahu's legal quagmire and pushing any resolution of it further and further away as much as possible.
 
Back
Top