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Iran Super Thread- Merged

In doing so, has he squandered an opportunity to deal with Iran?

His instinct on Iran was not wrong. The Islamic Republic is a cancer that grew because it was left unchecked. But it's exactly for that reason that competence in execution is paramount. This is probably the only chance the US will ever get in any of our lifetimes. Half assing all but guarantees that the regime that survives will go full North Korea in their quest for survival. Including with nukes. So if Trump wasn't willing to go all in, it was probably a bad idea to start the war in the first place.
 
Can you explain to me what YOU believe American/Israeli strategic objectives are?

I'll tell you what I believe they are, but I want to hear what you think they are...

I believe there are two immediate military objectives:

Nuclear Disarmament: Preventing Iran from developing or pursuing nuclear weapons.
Military Capacity Reduction: Destruction of Iran's missile production, missile stockpiles, and navy.

These are ongoing and the Israeli/American coalition is achieving considerable success.

I believe this is a medium-term military objective:

Proxy Network Neutralization: Stripping away the "Axis of Resistance" (e.g., Hamas, Hezbollah).

Israel is mobilizing and looks poised to invade Southern Lebanon. Iran has been considerably weakened in Syria and elsewhere. The Houthi problem still needs to be resolved but the Saudis/Gulf States may be able to make a move there with Iran tied up at home.

I believe these two are longer-term strategic objectives:

Regional Hegemony Control: Impoe a new, more stable regional security architecture and eliminating Iran's ability to project power.
Regime Change/Collapse: Topple the current Iranian leadership or make them subservient to American hegemony.

Ongoing but this will not happen overnight.


This move is being done at the behest of the Gulf States. The leadership there is encouraging Trump in private. They are our Allies in the region and want the Iranians weakened. They also get it done without really having a lift a finger. It's a win-win for them.


Explain how it's a negative trajectory and why you believe this to be the case?

Sorry dude. Didn’t intend to ignore this, I just forgot. It’s been quite a week on my end, I mentally filed this as “reply when I have more time”, and then decidedly did not have more time… bit of a shit show on my end. This won’t be well structured; I’m just bashing out a weekend worth of thoughts five minutes at a time between tasks.

Anyway- Israel and the U.S. have overlapping but not matching objectives, nor are their objectives fully aligned.

Israel is easy. National survival first, safety of Israelis an immediate second, generally improving their situation and relationships in the region a trailing third. Not because it’s not important, but because the first two are so utterly dominant.

I largely align with you on what Israel wants. Prevent Iran from getting nukes at all cost. Limit to the extent feasible Iran’s conventional weapon development. Reduce the risk to Israelis from Iranian proxies in Hamas and Hezbollah (that one I think already largely achieved in the near to mid term) Ultimately, regime change in Iran is likely a necessary condition for both the nukes and conventional weapons, but only if it results in a government less threatening to Israel and that’s not a given. So I think you and I largely see the same thing in what Israel wants. Their objectives are pretty clear and rational, and can be accomplished in part but not whole without the venture being a loss.

What the U.S. wants really depends on what Trump wants due to his significant capture of the U.S. government. His first and foremost concern is his own political and material benefit, and whatever positively reinforces his narcissistic self-conception. The benefit of America and Americans matters when it bolsters those. Anyone more mature and rational in his orbit or in the larger administration will be most likely to succeed when they tie rational strategic goals to Trump’s own self-interest.

I believe Trump wants to be given the credit of ‘solving’ the Iran problem. To him that's simply an Iran that is less of a material threat to neighbours, which he can take credit for and parlay into other political benefit. Right now that’s the midterms more than anything. He has tried and failed to convince people he is a ‘peacemaker’. Post-Venezuela he’s high on his own supply and thinking he could repeat that clear and decisive tactical victory and get Iran to quickly cave… Except they haven’t. That therefore shifts him into a combination of ‘dodge blame’ - and there we see his efforts to dump the Strait onto anyone and everyone else - and still find a way to look tough and take credit for something; hence the threats to Iran of ‘cut it out or else’.

The problem with Trump’s attempts at coercion is that his understanding of such things isn’t geopolitical, but rather informed by being a real eatate developer who’s had to contend with the mafia. They of course are still first and foremost a business and their threats must make business sense. So, Trump is attempting to bully the Iranian regime from a point of profound misunderstanding of their underlying objectives and principles. He comes into this thinking that if you threaten to burn someone’s store down, they’ll pay protection money. That’s not how they see it or will react.

So Trump’s initial objective of a fast, clean military onslaught that would force the survivors of the Iranian regime to cave to his proposed deals has failed to be met. Instead he’s now partly wearing massive economic harm, disrupted state relationships in the gulf, massive spikes in commodity prices, and increased inflation in the bears to mid term. That later isn’t me trying to punny, but yes the mid terms will = the midterms.

That having not gone well, he’s now struggling to figure out what to do next. His objectives remain his own political and material self interest, but his theory of victory stepped on a rake and he doesn’t have a new one. He is however surrounded by people with their own direct or vicarious interests who will try to steer this mess. Some of their objectives are probably quite reasonable and rational (“let’s unfuck this so we don’t get smoked in November”, or “let’s wind this down so we don’t lose massive investments from the Gulf”, or “let’s do everything we can to further neutralize Iran while we’re already here”), but to turn that to policy they have to sell Trump on it. How they do so is too much insider baseball for me to guess.

Stepping aside form the U.S. politics of it and to a few of the specific problems:

Nuclear and ballistic missile disarmament: totally valid and laudable objectives. Iran with nukes cannot happen, and their missiles are obviously a major threat though I wouldn’t say justifying of a war on their own. Problem with both is that scientific advancements are hard to roll back even though infrastructure and kit can get wrecked. Israel can, will, and does target Iran’s knowledge base on weapons development. They can delay development by bombing facilities, killing scientists etc. ultimately though if Iran’s government maintains the intent of developing these weapons, they have a ton of geography permissive of doing so.

The U.S. has longer reach. All of Iran is reachable by their strategic bombers on the X and Y axes, albeit limited by mission turnaround and payload. Only the B2s and soon ( or already?) the B21s can truly go anywhere. However Iran will be able to simply bury things quite a bit deeper on the Z axis, impervious to conventional munitions. Iran will likely in the mid to long term preserve the ability to develop any desired weapons largely outside of military reach of the U.S. or Israel short of a major ground operation. We all know the challenges and risks that would bring. I don’t think anyone here will argue that large scale ground ops would be well advised, and the farther northeast in Iran you go the more true that is. I do still believe limited ground ops aiming at some of the key existing nuclear sites are probably on the table.

So… Iran’s claws can be trimmed, but I don’t know that they can be fully defanged indefinitely short of an invasion and reasonably lengthy occupation that was already tried and largely failed with two of Iran’s neighbours. Absent that, so long as the Iranian regime substantially maintains sovereignty, they have geography and other trade/economic relationships that work against rational Israeli and American (versus Trump) interests.

You asked why I think the trajectory is bad… Admittedly I’m replying to your question with the benefit of a week’s additional events, so my expectations of a week ago are supported by evidence of hindsight. What I believed and expected then, and what we have continued to see since, is that the U.S., because of the incoherence of their objectives, does not have a good handle on this. It’s been a rapid oscillation between “We already won”, “Iran is obliterated”, to “NATO are cowards”, “other countries should step up”, “we don’t use the strait anyway”, to “you have 48 hours to cut it out or else”. Iran has proven itself willing and able to inflict great economic pain and there’s no reason to think they won’t keeping so.

Israel is seeing the Iranian can kicked down the road a fair bit; that suits them, it is not a full achievement of their objectives, but it’s aligned. The U.S…. well, I don’t see a net benefit to their national interest in how this is going so far.

Iran has been kicked about hard. But the regime is still in place, not appear to have suffered any irreparable harm, and don’t aeem to face acute political threat yet. They have learned and proven that they can cause great harm to regional economies. They have proven that they can turn that into some degree of leverage against the U.S. by their partners in trade, business - and illicit graft. Iran has proven it can land blows on shipping throughout the Gulf. While the Strait of Hormuz is key terrain, but it is not, strategically, vital ground. ‘Securing’ the strait and its beaches will not end the Iranian threat.

The U.S. is now in a bind where they’ve landed heavy punches, but their opponents hasn’t heard no bell, and plain threats of economic destruction of civilian infrastructure are facing defiance. Iran has continued to fire ballistic missiles in the time I’ve been gradually writing this, so their defiance is likely not empty words. The economic costs of the war continue to mount and will get worse fast. The political costs to the U.S. president continue to mount and will likely outweigh rational strategic considerations and decisions. Iran is debilitated but not incapacitated and should be able to rebuild its capacity to present all the same threats they have up til now, with a lot of added information about what to prioritize and how to protect it.

All in all, that’s my rambling and sleep deprived Sunday take on the soup sandwich that is the 2026 Iran war as of today. Who the hell knows what’ll happen tomorrow or any day after.
 
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Israel is easy. National survival first, safety of Israelis an immediate second, generally improving their situation and relationships in the region a trailing third. Not because it’s not important, but because the first two are so utterly dominant.

You are ignoring an essential secondary aim of the Israeli current government: To keep pressure off Netanyahu's legal quagmire and pushing any resolution of it further and further away as much as possible.
 
Not surprising...

Iran will completely close strait of Hormuz if Trump acts on threats to target power plants - statement​

The Reuters news agency is carrying a statement from Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) in response to the US president, Donald Trump, giving Iran 48 hours to reopen the strait of Hormuz to shipping or face the destruction of its energy infrastructure.

In a new statement, the IRGC said Iran will completely shut the strait if Trump proceeds with his threats to target Iranian energy facilities.

The IRGC were quoted as saying that companies with US shares would be “completely destroyed” if Iranian energy facilities were targeted by Washington, and said energy facilities in countries that host American bases would be “lawful” targets.

“We did not start the war and we will not start it now, but if the enemy harms our power plants, we will do everything to defend the country and the interests of our people,” the statement reads.


 
You are ignoring an essential secondary aim of the Israeli current government: To keep pressure off Netanyahu's legal quagmire and pushing any resolution of it further and further away as much as possible.

Honestly? Kinda spectacular how much Bibi is getting out of this. Gotta respect his game.

Putin, Xi, the Ayatollahs, Bibi and possibly even MBS might get more out of this than Trump and the American people. That's some impressive strategic calculus.
 
Sorry dude. Didn’t intend to ignore this, I just forgot. It’s been quite a week on my end, I mentally filed this as “reply when I have more time”, and then decidedly did not have more time… bit of a shit show on my end. This won’t be well structured; I’m just bashing out a weekend worth of thoughts five minutes at a time between tasks.

Anyway- Israel and the U.S. have overlapping but not matching objectives, nor are their objectives fully aligned.

Israel is easy. National survival first, safety of Israelis an immediate second, generally improving their situation and relationships in the region a trailing third. Not because it’s not important, but because the first two are so utterly dominant.

I largely align with you on what Israel wants. Prevent Iran from getting nukes at all cost. Limit to the extent feasible Iran’s conventional weapon development. Reduce the risk to Israelis from Iranian proxies in Hamas and Hezbollah (that one I think already largely achieved in the near to mid term) Ultimately, regime change in Iran is likely a necessary condition for both the nukes and conventional weapons, but only if it results in a government less threatening to Israel and that’s not a given. So I think you and I largely see the same thing in what Israel wants. Their objectives are pretty clear and rational, and can be accomplished in part but not whole without the venture being a loss.

What the U.S. wants really depends on what Trump wants due to his significant capture of the U.S. government. His first and foremost concern is his own political and material benefit, and whatever positively reinforces his narcissistic self-conception. The benefit of America and Americans matters when it bolsters those. Anyone more mature and rational in his orbit or in the larger administration will be most likely to succeed when they tie rational strategic goals to Trump’s own self-interest.

I believe Trump wants to be given the credit of ‘solving’ the Iran problem. To him that's simply an Iran that is less of a material threat to neighbours, which he can take credit for and parlay into other political benefit. Right now that’s the midterms more than anything. He has tried and failed to convince people he is a ‘peacemaker’. Post-Venezuela he’s high on his own supply and thinking he could repeat that clear and decisive tactical victory and get Iran to quickly cave… Except they haven’t. That therefore shifts him into a combination of ‘dodge blame’ - and there we see his efforts to dump the Strait onto anyone and everyone else - and still find a way to look tough and take credit for something; hence the threats to Iran of ‘cut it out or else’.

The problem with Trump’s attempts at coercion is that his understanding of such things isn’t geopolitical, but rather informed by being a real eatate developer who’s had to contend with the mafia. They of course are still first and foremost a business and their threats must make business sense. So, Trump is attempting to bully the Iranian regime from a point of profound misunderstanding of their underlying objectives and principles. He comes into this thinking that if you threaten to burn someone’s store down, they’ll pay protection money. That’s not how they see it or will react.

So Trump’s initial objective of a fast, clean military onslaught that would force the survivors of the Iranian regime to cave to his proposed deals has failed to be met. Instead he’s now partly wearing massive economic harm, disrupted state relationships in the gulf, massive spikes in commodity prices, and increased inflation in the bears to mid term. That later isn’t me trying to punny, but yes the mid terms will = the midterms.

That having not gone well, he’s now struggling to figure out what to do next. His objectives remain his own political and material self interest, but his theory of victory stepped on a rake and he doesn’t have a new one. He is however surrounded by people with their own direct or vicarious interests who will try to steer this mess. Some of their objectives are probably quite reasonable and rational (“let’s unfuck this so we don’t get smoked in November”, or “let’s wind this down so we don’t lose massive investments from the Gulf”, or “let’s do everything we can to further neutralize Iran while we’re already here”), but to turn that to policy they have to sell Trump on it. How they do so is too much insider baseball for me to guess.

Stepping aside form the U.S. politics of it and to a few of the specific problems:

Nuclear and ballistic missile disarmament: totally valid and laudable objectives. Iran with nukes cannot happen, and their missiles are obviously a major threat though I wouldn’t say justifying of a war on their own. Problem with both is that scientific advancements are hard to roll back even though infrastructure and kit can get wrecked. Israel can, will, and does target Iran’s knowledge base on weapons development. They can delay development by bombing facilities, killing scientists etc. ultimately though if Iran’s government maintains the intent of developing these weapons, they have a ton of geography permissive of doing so.

The U.S. has longer reach. All of Iran is reachable by their strategic bombers on the X and Y axes, albeit limited by mission turnaround and payload. Only the B2s and soon ( or already?) the B21s can truly go anywhere. However Iran will be able to simply bury things quite a bit deeper on the Z axis, impervious to conventional munitions. Iran will likely in the mid to long term preserve the ability to develop any desired weapons largely outside of military reach of the U.S. or Israel short of a major ground operation. We all know the challenges and risks that would bring. I don’t think anyone here will argue that large scale ground ops would be well advised, and the farther northeast in Iran you go the more true that is. I do still believe limited ground ops aiming at some of the key existing nuclear sites are probably on the table.

So… Iran’s claws can be trimmed, but I don’t know that they can be fully defanged indefinitely short of an invasion and reasonably lengthy occupation that was already tried and largely failed with two of Iran’s neighbours. Absent that, so long as the Iranian regime substantially maintains sovereignty, they have geography and other trade/economic relationships that work against rational Israeli and American (versus Trump) interests.

You asked why I think the trajectory is bad… Admittedly I’m replying to your question with the benefit of a week’s additional events, so my expectations of a week ago are supported by evidence of hindsight. What I believed and expected then, and what we have continued to see since, is that the U.S., because of the incoherence of their objectives, does not have a good handle on this. It’s been a rapid oscillation between “We already won”, “Iran is obliterated”, to “NATO are cowards”, “other countries should step up”, “we don’t use the strait anyway”, to “you have 48 hours to cut it out or else”. Iran has proven itself willing and able to inflict great economic pain and there’s no reason to think they won’t keeping so.

Israel is seeing the Iranian can kicked down the road a fair bit; that suits them, it is not a full achievement of their objectives, but it’s aligned. The U.S…. well, I don’t see a net benefit to their national interest in how this is going so far.

Iran has been kicked about hard. But the regime is still in place, not appear to have suffered any irreparable harm, and don’t aeem to face acute political threat yet. They have learned and proven that they can cause great harm to regional economies. They have proven that they can turn that into some degree of leverage against the U.S. by their partners in trade, business - and illicit graft. Iran has proven it can land blows on shipping throughout the Gulf. While the Strait of Hormuz is key terrain, but it is not, strategically, vital ground. ‘Securing’ the strait and its beaches will not end the Iranian threat.

The U.S. is now in a bind where they’ve landed heavy punches, but their opponents hasn’t heard no bell, and plain threats of economic destruction of civilian infrastructure are facing defiance. Iran has continued to fire ballistic missiles in the time I’ve been gradually writing this, so their defiance is likely not empty words. The economic costs of the war continue to mount and will get worse fast. The political costs to the U.S. president continue to mount and will likely outweigh rational strategic considerations and decisions. Iran is debilitated but not incapacitated and should be able to rebuild its capacity to present all the same threats they have up til now, with a lot of added information about what to prioritize and how to protect it.

All in all, that’s my rambling and sleep deprived Sunday take on the soup sandwich that is the 2026 Iran war as of today. Who the hell knows what’ll happen tomorrow or any day after.
The fact that you consider this sleep deprived rambling is very modest of you to the point nearing arrogance. Great post.

Plus you got a South Park reference in there... fuck you... :)
 
What's your actual experience in the MENA AO to justify your position? Or have you ever served anywhere near the MENA? Iran is a bully, I've done my own dance with the IRGC and think this is long overdue. An unrestricted Naval and Air Campaign is exactly the medicine needed.
@ytz I too am curious and would like to understand if you have an experiential base upon which you built your convictions when it comes to MENA and would love to see any answer to that question....

If you would prefer to DM, please fell free to do so.
 
It isn't necessary to try to divine US strategic objectives in this war - Hegseth and Caine explicitly listed them in a press conference:
  1. Dismantle Iran’s missile launch capability
  2. Degrade Iran’s defense-industrial base
  3. Degrade Iran’s navy
  4. Prevent Iran from obtaining a nuclear weapon
The one (major) issue is a mercurial President who seems to flip-flop daily on whether regime change is the stated political aim to guide these objectives, or if simply establishing deterrence will do.

While these provide a clear list of strategic objectives, I did hear a great podcast listing three potential political objectives driving these (different policy makers are probably driven by one or a combination of these):
  1. Underwriting Iran as a threat in a future confrontation with China. Combining this with mollifying Russia by trying to offer it Ukraine means the US can face China alone. (geostrategic objective)
  2. Eliminating a long-standing enemy of the United States who has consistently opposed it and attacked it when it can, and who is deeply despised by many Americans. (ideological objective)
  3. Establish control over additional crude oil production. Combining this with Venezuela means that the US could have a direct say in the sources for 25% of China's oil (even more if friendly Gulf Arab states are included), and can enable Trump to cut deals. (economic objective)
 
History might not repeat itself but sometimes it rhymes...

Before Waging War, Consult Historians First​

The Iran war fits into a long list of predictable miscalculations.


From the time of Thucydides and the Peloponnesian Wars through the advent of World War I to Vietnam, Afghanistan, Iraq and now Iran, historians have had a better grasp of the confounding crosscurrents and unintended consequences likely to result from armed conflicts than the over-confident leaders who prosecute them.

In a recent essay in The Free Press titled “This Is How The Iran War Goes Global,” the conservative historian Niall Ferguson recounts once again the lessons of “applied history” that decision-makers in Washington would be wise to heed now that they have leapt headlong into the fog of war.

Six Lessons

Ferguson enumerates six lessons from the episode, all of which he sees applying to the problem of the Strait of Hormuz today:

  1. Policymakers struggle to foresee second- and third-order consequences of their decisions. Enemy actions are hard to predict, even with good intelligence, and the complexity of the global economic system means even modest perturbations can produce nonlinear ‘butterfly’ effects.
  2. The structure of decision-making at the strategic and operational levels often creates competing arguments about what actions should be taken, reflecting not only the personalities of the principals but also their departmental priorities.
  3. In representative governments, military expertise is often overridden by domestic-political calculations.
  4. Decision-makers also cannot ignore the different priorities of allied governments or the interests of neutral governments, for fear of turning them into adversaries.
  5. In crises that have adverse economic effects, governments are almost always tempted to intervene in markets. These interventions tend to have unintended consequences because even talented politicians and bureaucrats do not fully understand the mechanisms of, say, insurance and futures markets.
  6. In a crisis, the tempo of decision-making rises, exacerbating the inherent difficulty of acting under uncertainty.”


 
@ytz I too am curious and would like to understand if you have an experiential base upon which you built your convictions when it comes to MENA and would love to see any answer to that question....

If you would prefer to DM, please fell free to do so.

Answered here:

No deployment there. Spent the majority of my childhood (11 years) there. And still have plenty of family there.

It isn't necessary to try to divine US strategic objectives in this war - Hegseth and Caine explicitly listed them in a press conference:
  1. Dismantle Iran’s missile launch capability
  2. Degrade Iran’s defense-industrial base
  3. Degrade Iran’s navy
  4. Prevent Iran from obtaining a nuclear weapon

Those are great goals. But if it's just those goals, then presumably they have met their goals and it's time to pack up. Guessing they don't want to talk about the implied tasks on the list, such as "Keep the Strait and Gulf open to friendly shipping".

Also, would love to see what their Mesures of Effectiveness are for those goals. Cause if we're saying that they need to destroy every FIAC to destroy the navy and every shed making styrofoam Shahed parts, this is going to be one of those "forever wars" they claim to abhor.

I do think there's a bit of retconning here. They set out for regime change. Trump openly told Iranians it was time to revolt. Now they are trying to rewrite goals that let them hang up a mission accomplished banner. Not necessarily a bad thing. But I don't think it's fully honest. It's face saving.
 
Before Waging War, Consult Historians First

Genuinely wondering if they consulted the Pentagon or even Centcom. I refuse to believe this hasn't been wargamed six ways to Sunday with conplans up the wazoo. But the fact that they kicked off with such obvious gaps (low SPR, no ARG QRF, no minesweepers, insufficient AD) has me suspecting that they weren't interested in listening to the uniforms.
 
[/QUOTE]
His instinct on Iran was not wrong. The Islamic Republic is a cancer that grew because it was left unchecked. But it's exactly for that reason that competence in execution is paramount. This is probably the only chance the US will ever get in any of our lifetimes. Half assing all but guarantees that the regime that survives will go full North Korea in their quest for survival. Including with nukes. So if Trump wasn't willing to go all in, it was probably a bad idea to start the war in the first place.
Thank Bush Sr, Bush Jr, Clinton and Obama for all those lines in the sand.
 
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Genuinely wondering if they consulted the Pentagon or even Centcom. I refuse to believe this hasn't been wargamed six ways to Sunday with conplans up the wazoo. But the fact that they kicked off with such obvious gaps (low SPR, no ARG QRF, no minesweepers, insufficient AD) has me suspecting that they weren't interested in listening to the uniforms.

Of course they did. There are standing CONPLANS in CENTCOM for this. Doesn't mean they were pulled off the shelf.

One report cited a source stating that when the Chairman briefed POTUS, the latter was convinced that the country would overturn the regime after a decapitations strike and if the Straits were threatened, "the US Military could deal with it." If true, there is a case to be made that the estimate was situated. It could be said that political decision makers opted to pursue the "Three Day Special Military Operation" COA, with hope being the critical factor.
 
Thank Bush Sr, Bush Jr, Clinton and Obama for all those lines in the sand.

100%. This would have been a lot easier before they had drones and such long range BMs. But a side effect of trying to bring democracy to Iraq is that Iran basically got a two decade pass because the US had no capacity for a third war in the region.
 
I'm really hoping that a lot of folks here shooting from the hip were never higher than MCpl or Captain. Cause so many of these ideas violate some pretty basic military principles. Or maybe I should not be surprised that so many people can't think beyond first order effects.

First off ytz, I appreciate the substance of your posts.

But why do you see the need to insult, it detracts from your message. I agree that some stuff on this site is laughable and concerning if we assume the poster is still serving but it’s an Internet forum so not surprising. Usually the belittling doesn’t bother me but in this case you seem to be punching down to lower ranks unnecessarily. I guess what you were trying to get across was that higher ranks should be held to a higher standard (reasonable) but it sounded like you think everyone below a certain rank is worthless. But from your posting history you also think that most senior ranks are idiots too.

You lament the level of education our seniors receive/require and imply that prestigious schools and STEM programs should be prioritized. I tend to agree. However, getting a STEM degree from an Ivy League school won’t ensure our executives/GOFOs are getting better at selecting and maintaining the aim at the strategic level. Nor will it ensure acumen in advising the political level.

I chuckle when you insult the secdef as a terminal major, he deserves it. But it also comes off like you would wholesale discard the arguments of anyone below a certain rank. Will you continue raising the minimum rank required to have credibility as you rise through the ranks yourself? From my limited experience you would be doing that at your own peril.

You make it sound like selection and maintenance of the aim is simple. From the limited exposure I’ve seen at MNDO, DMO, SJS, ADM(Pol) etc the making of the sausage is ugly.

Honestly, really like the substance of your posts.

Signed/ somebody with an mprr and school transcripts you probably wouldn’t respect.
 
Signed/ somebody with an mprr and school transcripts you probably wouldn’t respect.

See the edit I added below to clarify. Maybe you missed it:

Edit. Will add too that I didn't mean to suggest no opinion below the rank of Major counts. That's a bad faith reading of my post. I specifically said I hope the people pushing uncritical thought here didn't reach leadership levels. Cause I sure as well wouldn't want someone in charge of me who can't think through more than one chess move.

I don't think at all that your rank determines the value of your opinion. If you meet me IRL you'd learn quickly how little I care for it. I think it's competence that matters. My one rule that has stuck with me from my time as a 2LT (from a mentor) was, "If they don't respect you with your rank off, they won't respect you with your rank on." As such, I sincerely worry when otherwise smart people can't actually think through a COA. And yes, I wouldn't want someone like that above me or below me. In or out of uniform. And regardless of rank.

I genuinely believe that if you're going to order troops to risk their lives you owe it to them to do everything in your fucking power to make sure they have the best shot at success and at coming home. I'm frustrated at what I see as some outright incompetence with lives on the line.
 
It isn't necessary to try to divine US strategic objectives in this war - Hegseth and Caine explicitly listed them in a press conference:
  1. Dismantle Iran’s missile launch capability
  2. Degrade Iran’s defense-industrial base
  3. Degrade Iran’s navy
  4. Prevent Iran from obtaining a nuclear weapon
The one (major) issue is a mercurial President who seems to flip-flop daily on whether regime change is the stated political aim to guide these objectives, or if simply establishing deterrence will do.

While these provide a clear list of strategic objectives, I did hear a great podcast listing three potential political objectives driving these (different policy makers are probably driven by one or a combination of these):
  1. Underwriting Iran as a threat in a future confrontation with China. Combining this with mollifying Russia by trying to offer it Ukraine means the US can face China alone. (geostrategic objective)
  2. Eliminating a long-standing enemy of the United States who has consistently opposed it and attacked it when it can, and who is deeply despised by many Americans. (ideological objective)
  3. Establish control over additional crude oil production. Combining this with Venezuela means that the US could have a direct say in the sources for 25% of China's oil (even more if friendly Gulf Arab states are included), and can enable Trump to cut deals. (economic objective)
You know from other discussions that I greatly value your strategic insight, so I say the following with nothing but respect and out of an interest to intellectually engage with this.

The biggest problem with this take is that it requires taking at face value the statements of senior officials of a post-credibility administration nearly three weeks into a war that they never clearly stated up front the purpose nor objectives of. They did not attempt to articulate clear objectives from day one, or at least early on; no clear and objective case was made to Congress nor to the American people writ large. Whatever Trump’s initial objectives are, no claim was staked and so he cannot be held to them. No metrics or success were stated nor can be inferred. @ytz beat me to my intended use of the term retcon; whatever Trump initially wanted or intended, by the time Hegseth and Caine spoke, they could massage their message based on the reality of that date- again. Early three weeks in, after a lot has seemingly gone poorly.

The objectives stated by Hegseth and Caine are rational. They are what I would have expected on day one. They don’t match what the administration is currently saying or doing, though. By the date of that interview the flow of trade and the preservation of Gulf economic infrastructure were clearly dominant factors in this conflict, but they are unstated and unaddressed. The most generous interpretation is that we’re getting the February 28th intent on March 19th, without accounting for any of what has happened in between. More likely we’re seeing the adults in the room taking their best stab at an ex post facto justification of what was probably supposed to be a quick in and out with a regime collapse.

Regarding the three additional political objectives you referenced:

1. Iran is, if anything, driven further to China’s bosom than they were before… And that was already a lot. Watch for China to fund reconstruction and redevelopment on terms that are seemingly generous up front but that further bind Iran to them in trade flows. China will also be milking this war for every possible lesson learned about how to defeat American air defense and standoff weapons. China (and probably Russia) will help Iran rebuild itself as a regional foil to America’s reasserted imperialism. China is likely happy to keep this thing rolling so that American produced (not just their own, but inclusive of those they’ll be pressured to replace) interceptor stocks are further depleted.

2. The notion that this will ‘eliminate’ Iran as an enemy of the U.S. is, without a regime change that is both succesful and facourable, frankly farcical. They will now be more pissed off and more determined to develop and possess the means to resist US hegemony. Their proxies are currently largely neutered, but they’ll rebuild. The Iranian regime appears resilient, and regime change is not one of the states at aims, nor do U.S. actions paint a picture of that as a covert intent. The regime seems here to stay. They will remain an enemy, and will be generationally refreshed as such.

3. Without the aforementioned regime change, the US will have no additional control over crude oil production, save for perhaps being able to cause some supply destruction. They can put a hand on the taps of more distribution. Will they have the cojones to stare China down and choke off more of their supply? Not sure. China has extremely potent levers they can pull… Word on the street is the U.S. may have a sudden and significant need to replenish a lot of munitions that require certain critical minerals that they need to buy from China for a few years yet. China is powerful enough that they don’t need to tolerate the U.S. choking off their Iranian oil supply, they’ve clearly made a deal with Iran to allow their supplies through, and the U.S. seems loath to intercept any of these sanction China-destined tankers at sea. China seems to have enough cards to make a hand.

I can’t and won’t speak to whether any particular nation or government or personality has undue influence over Trump and urged him to this course of action. Whatever led him to be convinced to this war, it seems very likely now that he blundered. He thought he was getting something clean and quick… He’s gotten something more different than that with each day that passes.

And it sucks, because the Iranian regime is evil. If this was going to be done, it needed to be done right so it could be decisive and effective. A pragmatic decision to go after Iran should have come with all the proper planning and prep - and the casualty acceptance - to make sure the Iranian regime as we know it would cease to be, and that a viable and tolerable alternative would be put in place. Sadly the ‘week after’ seems to be an afterthought…
 
I genuinely believe that if you're going to order troops to risk their lives you owe it to them to do everything in your fucking power to make sure they have the best shot at success and at coming home. I'm frustrated at what I see as some outright incompetence with lives on the line.

You were never in the Infantry, were you... ;)
 
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You were never in the Infantry, were you... ;)
I mean, his underlying point is valid. Even in the infantry, yeah, Charlie team take the trench, but they’d best send you, and through you, I, into the best fight they can. The problem is he’s taking a very justified gripe about the shit show in the U.S., and generalizing it to presumptions of incompetence that cloud his assessment of a few particularly excellent people who have contributed to this thread with views that don’t fully align with his. And this largely based on online forum discussions of small portions of the overall bigger situation. His assessment of the competence of some people here based on this thread is rather lacking in rigour.
 
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