Justin Trudeau hints at boosting Canada’s military spending

I'll believe it when I see it.

 

[PrairieFella]

There should be various PM shops that are staffed to conduct programs as well as work on their support (with the LCMM) and replacement / upgrades.

Yes it’s position heavy in the Captain-Col and Sgt-MWO ranks as well as GS civilians (I forgot what DND calls their civilian staff), and their can be some rationalizations between programs but short of just buying into other NATO programs and putting some LO’s into their PM shops there isn’t a real alternative.

They should strive to spread work out to the regions. It's tough to find DND procurement staff in Ottawa. It's hard, thankless work that often gets canned under your feet after you put three years into a project. People jump ship to different departments. A solution in my book is to spread out positions to the regions, if they have a base to work on to manage the security concerns. There's no reason we can't have hundreds of procurement positions working out of 1 CAD's lines in Winnipeg, on the grounds of CFB Valcartier, on the grounds of CFB Edmonton, etc.

That might even allow the employees to liaise with stakeholders. What better place to work on the tank force than Edmonton where you can bounce stuff off the CO LdSH? Work on the guns in Shilo with employees living in Brandon, why not? Light forces procurement out of Valcartier? Hell yeah, they'll be using the kit. Etc etc etc.

 

[KevinB]

Realistically one needs to have the equipment etc that one expects to need for their mobilized force on hand -

After some of their equipment debacles in the beginning 1963 Arab-Israeli war, the IDF opted for a 75% lifecycle program.

Where items got used from 100% to 75% and then got either rebuilt if possible, or sold off. Because they decided that equipment needed to be near 100% at the start of any conflict and based on their history any conflict would likely be one for national survival.

Canada’s climate doesn’t really lend itself to having something like a Sierra Army Depot or the Aircraft ‘boneyard’ at Davis-Monthan AFB.

Canada would need to create POMCUS like depot storage facilities across Canada to store spare or reserve equipment.


OFC it would first need to have enough equipment for its military first.

 

[KevinB]

They should strive to spread work out to the regions. It's tough to find DND procurement staff in Ottawa. It's hard, thankless work that often gets canned under your feet after you put three years into a project. People jump ship to different departments. A solution in my book is to spread out positions to the regions, if they have a base to work on to manage the security concerns. There's no reason we can't have hundreds of procurement positions working out of 1 CAD's lines in Winnipeg, on the grounds of CFB Valcartier, on the grounds of CFB Edmonton, etc.

That might even allow the employees to liaise with stakeholders. What better place to work on the tank force than Edmonton where you can bounce stuff off the CO LdSH? Work on the guns in Shilo with employees living in Brandon, why not? Light forces procurement out of Valcartier? Hell yeah, they'll be using the kit. Etc etc etc.

Light Force stuff in Pet not Val. I’d argue that Suffield would probably be ideal for a lot of the Army stuff, as it has the ranges, and DRES to tap into.
Would have been nice if LETE wasn’t ruined.

Honestly most of the jobs don’t need to be either with the force or in Ottawa. But some do need to be in Ottawa to simply show the flag and keep awareness up.

 

[PrairieFella]

Light Force stuff in Pet not Val. I’d argue that Suffield would probably be ideal for a lot of the Army stuff, as it has the ranges, and DRES to tap into.
Would have been nice if LETE wasn’t ruined.

Honestly most of the jobs don’t need to be either with the force or in Ottawa. But some do need to be in Ottawa to simply show the flag and keep awareness up.

I use that as a general example but your point is taken. Ottawa having a death grip on all things DND certainly isn't helping.

 

[Good2Golf]

Ottawa having a death grip on all things DND certainly isn't helping.

Dispersing lower-level PSPC PG-02/03/04 staff to the nether regions will in no way ease PMO/PCO/TB/PSPC/GAC/FIN/DOJ grip on DND…

 

[PrairieFella]

Dispersing lower-level PSPC PG-02/03/04 staff to the nether regions will in no way ease PMO/PCO/TB/PSPC/GAC/FIN/DOJ grip on DND…

You're not wrong but then at least vacant positions will mostly be filled. PS talks and people like to avoid DND. A poster above mentioned hundreds of vacancies at DND's procurement shops. Spreading them to the regions will get those spots filled as people fight for those Fed jobs. It won't solve the problem but at least it'll alleviate one of the conditions causing the problem.

 

[FJAG]

Ignorant civvy question.

Harper took office - with Gordon O'Connor heading up defense- in February 2006. By April 2007 MGS was cancelled and a layered procurement plan with an immediate equipment loan, equipment purchase, equipment upgrades was in place.

How much of that is a demonstration of the ability of political will to cut the Gordian Knot of procurement bureaucracy and how much was unique circumstance? If the government were to decide, we want x number of SP155's by x date, and y by y date, put the ask out to all Allied governments, and the US came up with a 109 solution that mirrored the Leopard- could we execute?

That's an interesting question and involves several moving parts.

To start with the early 2000s were a restructuring of the army from its Cold War (post 4 CMBG construct) where there was both a lack of funding due to the peace dividend, rusting out of much of the mechanized equipment and what IMHO was an almost religious fervour to create a lighter, more mobile force such as was needed for Bosnia.

Both the artillery and the armoured corps were near panic in trying to establish their relevance to this future construct. The Leopard C2s were slated for divestment and there were trials to create a single direct fire unit composed of the new MGS run by tankers, a LAV based TOW under armour run by the infantry and the dual purpose ADATS run by the artillery all under the command of the LdSH(RC). Many trials were held. To say that there were differing opinions about this whole thing is an understatement ... but PYs were at stake all around. Gen Leslie as the new CLS in the summer of 2006 put a pause on the planned divestment of the Leos (albeit the M109s went a year or two prior)

Meanwhile in Afghanistan, rather than a peaceful PRT, TF ORION found itself in a shooting and to some extent a building IED war. The 3rd and 19th of August of 2006 were particulalry problematic as intelligence finally got wind of the fact that the Taliban had quietly been building for an offensive in the south. This new fight had started early in the year in Helmand and by May had spread to Zhari, north of the Arghandab River which is particulalry complex terrain which the LAVs had trouble manoeuvring in. After the 19 Aug massive Taliban attack on Ma'Sum Ghar, Gen Leslie got in touch with the newly arrived RCR leadership and that of the brigade and asked if they needed tanks. The answer was a resounding yes and the armoured corps very quickly salvaged a squadrons worth of Leopard C2 tanks which were fixed up and sent to Kandahar and were in action by December of that year. There was some initial reluctance by the new Dutch ISAF leadership to use them, but Kharzai in fact approved their use on the rationale that a direct aimed tank shell is less likely to cause collateral damages than artillery or bombs.

While that was going the army explored replacing the clapped out C2s with a new tank and eventually, on a UOR basis, bought Dutch Leo2A4s and borrowed German A6Ms funding everything from the money that had been earmarked for the MGS.

It was very much a unique circumstance. Lives were directly at stake. As a side note the MGS program was an unsuccessful one - the US bought 142 low rate production models (it never went into full rate production) to use in their Stryker BCTs (initially a three vehicle platoon per rifle company. These were later withdrawn and some were placed into the SBCT's cavalry squadron. IMHO Canada dodged what would have been self-inflicted wound. Incidentally, just before all this Canada had already decided not to fund the MMEV project which was a new LAV based ADATS for use with the DFU.

There are several other incidents during Afghanistan where UOR based rapid fielding took place. UORs have an issue which relates to the fact that these are seen as temporary, operation specific acquisitions and therefore come without full life-cycle management. These things cause unpleasant 2nd and 3rd order effects and are reactive rather than proactive equipment solutions. UORs are still with us and there are numbers of them associated with Latvia.

My completely unfounded speculation is that the VCBI was doing better than expected due to loosely written requirements, and between the London pork-barreling plus a desire to avoid the PR and functional absurdity of trotting out a split fleet of foreign purchased VCBI's and essentially equal upgraded LAV's there was no way to carry the project forward and not look stupid.

Doubling up on the tinfoil- this happened by design.

Yes and no. Once again, terrain and IED issues in Afghanistan raised their heads. LAV 3s had inadequate armour and were flat bottomed and thus more susceptible to IEDs with resulting casualties. The LAV series of vehicles were seen, like the Strykers, as primarily vehicles to carry infantry forward for a dismounted fight. With the acquisition of the Leo2s, there was a need seen for a more robust class of infantry IFV (or CCV) which could accompany tanks into the fight. The SOR did not specify "tracked" and thus the bidders were 3 wheeled and one tracked contender. Meanwhile, no one was going to throw out the LAV which still had a valid function and so the LAV UP program ran almost concurrently. In the end the CCV and the LAV UP were considered fairly close in specifications (and costly). Several other issues came into play but basically the CCV was cut.

Incidentally again, it was at this time as well that the TAPV program ran as well as a program for a HIMARS-like precision rocket system. TAPV was built and the rocket system is still on the books but in the category of up and down priorities.

 

[dapaterson]

The folks working on new army uniforms are almost done - they could start working on tanks, self propelled guns, precision rockets, ATGMs and UAVs next.

Okay. Sure. That was facetious, but really, its a long process, one could plan for growing the procurement work force, reassigning personnel from lower priority projects, simplify the procurement processes, reassess acquisition priorities, plan a new force vision and target, allocate funding ... Do all those things we've known for decades that need doing.

Constantly shifting priorities means nothing gets accomplished.

 

[Halifax Tar]

Constantly shifting priorities means nothing gets accomplished.

When everything is a priority, nothing is a priority.

 

[KevinB]

LAV 3s had inadequate armour and were flat bottomed and thus more susceptible to IEDs with resulting casualties.

Minor quibble the LAV did have a mostly V hull, but not the double V of the LAV 6.0 and Stryker 2.0 (or current Stryker to be more accurate).

 

[IKnowNothing]

That's an interesting question and involves several moving parts.

Thank you for the detailed history- so yes it was a unique circumstance. But..... if we go back one more generation (strange how tank procurements seem to get the gold star)

"The speed of the program compared tomost projects was breathtaking – Cabinet directed the armyto purchase new tanks in November 1975, approved a deal inMay 1976, and the government signed a contract in October1976. By 1979, the army received 128 modern tanks, on timeand under budget"

http://www.journal.forces.gc.ca/vol16/no4/PDF/CMJ164Ep16.pdf

What I'm trying to understand is how much of the "big ticket" army things need a procurement process fix vice a from the top vision and leadership fix that obviates some of the process. by

 

[PrairieFella]

Thank you for the detailed history- so yes it was a unique circumstance. But..... if we go back one more generation (strange how tank procurements seem to get the gold star)

"The speed of the program compared tomost projects was breathtaking – Cabinet directed the armyto purchase new tanks in November 1975, approved a deal inMay 1976, and the government signed a contract in October1976. By 1979, the army received 128 modern tanks, on timeand under budget"

http://www.journal.forces.gc.ca/vol16/no4/PDF/CMJ164Ep16.pdf

What I'm trying to understand is how much of the "big ticket" army things need a procurement process fix vice a from the top vision and leadership fix that obviates some of the process. by

Tanks are a hard sell to Canadians by both governing parties. For the Conservatives, they are maintenance heavy and very expensive. For the Liberals they serve no purpose in our "peacekeeping" public zeitgeist since they are offensive weapons first and foremost. This rationale goes for all offensive capabilities we desperately need. I expect situation no change on new kit when there's a change of government since the public books are so fucked. Same ole same ole

 

[FJAG]

What I'm trying to understand is how much of the "big ticket" army things need a procurement process fix vice a from the top vision and leadership fix that obviates some of the process. by

There're others here who know the procurement system far, far better than I. My understanding about the speed of the Leo 1 purchase is that it has to do with Trudeau senior getting an education from the Germans about how much trans Atlantic trade depended upon his getting off his ass and modernizing the CAF in Europe.

Incidentally, if you want to see one person's view about the tank v MGS situation see Lee Hammonds 2001 - 2002 article in the Army Doctrine and Trg Bulletin Vol 4 No 4 at pg 74. Lee ended up with some major staff posts subsequently at the Artillery school and Dir Gen Strat Planning and with General Leslie and dealing with the VCDS re army equipment issues when much of this went on. He ended up commanding 1 RCHA and retired a colonel.

 

[KevinB]

There're others here who know the procurement system far, far better than I. My understanding about the speed of the Leo 1 purchase is that it has to do with Trudeau senior getting an education from the Germans about how much trans Atlantic trade depended upon his getting off his ass and modernizing the CAF in Europe.

One of my fathers contracts as a lawyer was working on that contract, he was made a partner shortly after.

 

[McG]

They should strive to spread work out to the regions. It's tough to find DND procurement staff in Ottawa. It's hard, thankless work that often gets canned under your feet after you put three years into a project. People jump ship to different departments. A solution in my book is to spread out positions to the regions, if they have a base to work on to manage the security concerns. There's no reason we can't have hundreds of procurement positions working out of 1 CAD's lines in Winnipeg, on the grounds of CFB Valcartier, on the grounds of CFB Edmonton, etc.

That might even allow the employees to liaise with stakeholders. What better place to work on the tank force than Edmonton where you can bounce stuff off the CO LdSH? Work on the guns in Shilo with employees living in Brandon, why not? Light forces procurement out of Valcartier? Hell yeah, they'll be using the kit. Etc etc etc.

No.

There are requirements staff already remote working from bases across the country. We do not want unit COs having tighter access to the procurement officer than the project director (the Army officer responsible to the Army Commander for ensuring the project deliver’s the Army’s requirements) and project manager. The COs have their own jobs to worry about and there are avenues available to influence projects if they need to. Meanwhile, a procurement officer has no business tinkering with either the requirement or the specification.

 

[McG]

are a hard sell to Canadians by both governing parties. For the Conservatives, they are maintenance heavy and very expensive. For the Liberals they serve no purpose in our "peacekeeping" public zeitgeist …

Tanks made it into ONSF, so apparently they are not too difficult for either the Conservatives or Liberals to accept. Where we really fall down is that we will replace our fighting vehicle fleets at least twice as frequently as all the systems needed to support/sustain the Army.

 

[dapaterson]

Tanks made it into ONSF, so apparently they are not too difficult for either the Conservatives or Liberals to accept. Where we really fall down is that we will replace our fighting vehicle fleets at least twice as frequently as all the systems needed to support/sustain the Army.

Fuel, food, ammunition and spare parts are all highly overrated.

 

[McG]

And who needs bridges or recovery vehicles that can actually support that really heavy new vehicle you just bought.

 

[daftandbarmy]

Fuel, food, ammunition and spare parts are all highly overrated.

Sounds like a little process mapping might have gone a long way

Adam Zivo: How Canada sabotaged its own fleet of tanks​

Maybe the reason we can't provide tanks to Ukraine is because a decade of neglect has rendered a significant portion of our tanks inoperable


According to Maj. Johns, the CAF initially estimated that the Leopard 2’s maintenance requirements would be roughly the same as the Leopard 1’s. However, whereas Leopard 1C2 tanks require an average of 296 hours per year in maintenance, the Leopard 2 requires 1,795 hours — a six-fold increase. This “significant underestimation” left the fleet in “dire straits.”

Likewise, according to the report, the CAF had only half the technicians needed to adequately service the Leopard 2s. With the training rate of new technicians being “far below the required numbers,” it estimated that it would take at least 10 years (2028, based on time of writing) to fill the gap, assuming only minimal attrition of personnel. But multiple indicators suggested that the Leopard 2s would be obsolete by then.

Even worse, Maj. Johns wrote that the Leopard 2 fleet suffered from a chronic shortage of critical components, which at one point led to “a culture of cannibalizing and robbing of vehicles” to ensure that a minimum number of tanks would be available for key exercises. By 2018, the cannibalization issue had allegedly subsided, but the ongoing, total unavailability of some crucial parts meant that some tanks were impossible to repair.

General infrastructure for tank maintenance was also allegedly inadequate. For example, neither of the two usable training areas for tanks in Canada — Wainwright and Gagetown — had the facilities needed to maintain Leopard 2s in large quantities. As such, storage facilities were allegedly retrofitted into de facto work bays, leading to tanks being stored outside while repair work was done in cramped storage buildings, further exacerbating maintenance issues.

By Maj. Johns’ 2018 estimation, only 15-20 per cent of Canada’s Leopard 2 tanks were typically usable (if needed, a maximum of 30 per cent could be put into service). “The current approach to managing and employing the Leo 2 FoV is institutionally unsound, logistically unsupportable and rapidly approaching obsolescence,” he wrote.

Adam Zivo: How Canada sabotaged its own fleet of tanks

Maybe the reason we can't provide tanks to Ukraine is because a decade of neglect has rendered a significant portion of our tanks inoperable

nationalpost.com

 

[PrairieFella]

Sounds like a little process mapping might have gone a long way

Adam Zivo: How Canada sabotaged its own fleet of tanks​

Maybe the reason we can't provide tanks to Ukraine is because a decade of neglect has rendered a significant portion of our tanks inoperable


According to Maj. Johns, the CAF initially estimated that the Leopard 2’s maintenance requirements would be roughly the same as the Leopard 1’s. However, whereas Leopard 1C2 tanks require an average of 296 hours per year in maintenance, the Leopard 2 requires 1,795 hours — a six-fold increase. This “significant underestimation” left the fleet in “dire straits.”

Likewise, according to the report, the CAF had only half the technicians needed to adequately service the Leopard 2s. With the training rate of new technicians being “far below the required numbers,” it estimated that it would take at least 10 years (2028, based on time of writing) to fill the gap, assuming only minimal attrition of personnel. But multiple indicators suggested that the Leopard 2s would be obsolete by then.

Even worse, Maj. Johns wrote that the Leopard 2 fleet suffered from a chronic shortage of critical components, which at one point led to “a culture of cannibalizing and robbing of vehicles” to ensure that a minimum number of tanks would be available for key exercises. By 2018, the cannibalization issue had allegedly subsided, but the ongoing, total unavailability of some crucial parts meant that some tanks were impossible to repair.

General infrastructure for tank maintenance was also allegedly inadequate. For example, neither of the two usable training areas for tanks in Canada — Wainwright and Gagetown — had the facilities needed to maintain Leopard 2s in large quantities. As such, storage facilities were allegedly retrofitted into de facto work bays, leading to tanks being stored outside while repair work was done in cramped storage buildings, further exacerbating maintenance issues.

By Maj. Johns’ 2018 estimation, only 15-20 per cent of Canada’s Leopard 2 tanks were typically usable (if needed, a maximum of 30 per cent could be put into service). “The current approach to managing and employing the Leo 2 FoV is institutionally unsound, logistically unsupportable and rapidly approaching obsolescence,” he wrote.

Adam Zivo: How Canada sabotaged its own fleet of tanks

Maybe the reason we can't provide tanks to Ukraine is because a decade of neglect has rendered a significant portion of our tanks inoperable

nationalpost.com

Major Johns knows his shit. The state of the Leopards is abysmal. A big problem was the lack of a unified maintenance plan because we had to maintain 2A4s, 2A6 and 2A4M all at the same time with our severely understrength tech pool.