Justin Trudeau hints at boosting Canada’s military spending

I'll believe it when I see it.

 

[dapaterson]

So by calling a military general/admiral an ‘ADM’ equivalent, you believe that CAF personnel should be slowed down into a significantly longer HR cycle like the decade+ previous ADM(IM)? Should they also be more truly ADM-like and report to the DM, not a CDS? How far do you want the military senior leadership to ape act like civilian public service executives?

I used "ADM" to compare the responsibilities to those of Commanders - not to imply that they should be subordinate to the DM.

The CAF creates individuals who want to Command. But command is a today thing. The important role that the most senior individuals in the CAF perform is that as institutional leaders, and institutional stewards - making decisions for the long-term health of the CAF, not short-term parochial "we must keep 12 FFH regardless the cost or RoI" or "The answer to all problem sets is nine infantry battalions" directions / decisions.

CAF individuals in senior positions of responsibility (note that I am not using the term "leaders") have, in many cases, failed to effectively communicate a vision within the formation they are responsible for and this failed to effectively ensure continuity, failed to effectively communicate risk to the government, and failed to effectively manage the resources the institution is assigned to ensure readiness, choosing to spend money for tomorrow's readiness on today's pet projects.

 

[daftandbarmy]

I used "ADM" to compare the responsibilities to those of Commanders - not to imply that they should be subordinate to the DM.

The CAF creates individuals who want to Command. But command is a today thing. The important role that the most senior individuals in the CAF perform is that as institutional leaders, and institutional stewards - making decisions for the long-term health of the CAF, not short-term parochial "we must keep 12 FFH regardless the cost or RoI" or "The answer to all problem sets is nine infantry battalions" directions / decisions.

CAF individuals in senior positions of responsibility (note that I am not using the term "leaders") have, in many cases, failed to effectively communicate a vision within the formation they are responsible for and this failed to effectively ensure continuity, failed to effectively communicate risk to the government, and failed to effectively manage the resources the institution is assigned to ensure readiness, choosing to spend money for tomorrow's readiness on today's pet projects.

Ethics has 'generally' left the building in favour of job security it seems, and the impact on the organization is apparent in a variety of quarters ...


What is ethical leadership and why is it important?

Errors, bad behavior, and poor judgment in leadership can negatively impact a company’s brand and reputation. For business success, it’s critical for organizations to fill their C-suite with ethical leaders.

Ethical leadership involves leaders and managers making decisions based on the right thing to do for the common good, not just based on what is best for themselves or for the bottom line.

While profits are important, ethical leaders take into consideration the needs of customers, communities, and employees in addition to company growth and revenue when making business decisions.

Ethical leaders encourage their team members to model this behavior, too. They help to build a workplace culture that values transparency, collaboration and inclusion, and where everyone feels safe to share their voice.

They can also help organizations recruit and retain top talent. Professionals are increasingly seeking out companies whose leaders strive to do the right thing. Generation Z, who will make up 25 percent of the workforce by 2025, demands leadership ethics more than generations that came before them.

“Gen Z is not going to negotiate. They have really strong values and ethics, and they don’t bend them because of intimidation or because they are just getting a paycheck,” said Michael McCarthy, instructor at Harvard Division of Continuing Education’s Professional & Executive Development and host of the “Happy at Work” podcast. “The idea of letting harmful or hurtful behavior slide is not acceptable.”

Leaders who weigh ethical considerations before making key business decisions drive a company’s long-term success.

What is Ethical Leadership and Why is it Important? - Professional & Executive Development | Harvard DCE

Leaders who weigh ethical considerations before making key business decisions drive a company’s long-term success.

professional.dce.harvard.edu

 

[childs56]

You can blame the scandals, but most people are just completely unaware about the CAF, which doesn't help much.

An older article but this still holds true, largely:

Military is off the radar of most Canadians: DND poll​

Most Canadians seem only vaguely aware they have a military and are decidedly confused — or uncertain — about what it does, according to new research conducted for National Defence.

The biennial report, carried out this year by Earnscliffe Strategy Group, found that while general and specific knowledge was low, appreciation for individuals who serve was high.

The report, dated July 4, examined what sort of public perception remained following the release of the Liberal government's marquee defence policy last year.

https://www.cbc.ca/news/politics/dnd-canadians-military-poll-1.4754083

Most people's experience/ knowledge of the Military is based off news articles. Those have not been the best for the past 10 or more years.

Those public and school engagements are so important to making the Military visible to the public..

The report said young people are unaware.
Who's fault is that?
If I am recruiting and my ideal demographic is not aware of what I offer. Is it their fault for not knowing,or my fault for not spreading the news of who we are,what we do and we are hiring?

 

[Kirkhill]

Salesforce? If anyone in gov uses that, good luck we ain't getting useful metrics from it. If it's the software I'm thinking off, coka cola has used it for 5 years, still doesn't work as intended, and switching to it cost such a nightmare at my company a VP got fired for launching it ahen it wasn't ready

I received my first company issued computer in 1982. It was a Commodore 64. From that time until I retired, last year, there was a constant "refreshing" of sales and contact software. It seemed as if every year started with transferring all my contacts from last year's forever solution to this year's forever solution, usually by hand because the two systems were incompatible and gaps were common.

Let's just say that after 40 odd years my view is jaundiced.

I trust that things are going to improve for you youngsters, and perhaps AI will be your salvation.

Although, I am inclined to suspect that all AI will do is increase the number of monkeys dancing on the keyboard while I search for Shakespeareian sonnets.

Best of luck.

 

[suffolkowner]

Do we need one?

seems like it would be good to know the who, what and why of the process

 

[Kirkhill]

The raison d'etre of the CAF is readiness.

The CAF must manage itself and prepare itself for the future. Today's commander is stuck with decisions, actions and inactions of their predecessors framing their ability to respond. Their vital role is in ensuring the future readiness of the institution.

That's too narrow a focus. "Readiness" is the state of being fully prepared for something. Without a clear definition of what that something is, readiness is merely an elusion or, worse, merely a shell game played by the institution.

That I agree with as a principle but the deck is stacked against them.

FTFY.

Here's a brief comment from a former CDS (who I won't identify on this board)



The argument is that DND spends over half of it's budget on costs which are fixed and tied to the establishment's size without a clear objective. The portion to be spent on capital assets - primarily equipment that would determine (or support) its raison d'etre or its state of readiness - is made up of mostly disjointed one-off decisions by the government which may, or may not be funded, and even when they are funded, sometimes take decades to implement. In a system that takes a decade or more to roll out the equipment needed for readiness, the cycle of musical chairs of the commanders is merely a minor inconvenience because for the most part they are unable to make valid decisions for the future. The best they can do is ride the pony they are on nudging the reins a little bit.

I'll be the first guy to hammer on the CAF's commanders as not doing enough, but the system is set up to fail. And if you don't agree with that then I'll reduce the statement to: the system is not set up to succeed.

The CAF job is readiness. Defining the “for what” is the responsibility of the civilian authority under which the CAF is subordinated.

....

Readiness....

My problem here is whether the force should be ready in principle or ready in detail.

As has been mentioned above it is hard to know what the future will bring and yet we expect our leaders to "future-proof" our country. It is unfair, I think, to dump the entire load on to the politicians and pre-emptively lay the blame on them for what may or may not occur in the future.

My own thought is that it is incumbent on both the politicians and the soldiery to stay light on their feet and anticipate everything and nothing.

One thing that has become apparent is that once an enemy is engaged futures (in the plural) start changing fast and frequently. And often, to belabour a fencing analogy, you will be dragged off-piste, and no ref to save you.

The fencer needs to be ready in principle, en garde, but can't lean into any course of action. They have to rely on years of drill and muscle memory to respond quickly and effectively, often with just a twitch, but they can't lean in too much for fear of being caught off balance and have the enemy strike where undefended.

....

A problem with writing down every play, every possible course of action, is that it inculcates a degree of deliberation that time and circumstances may not permit.

There has to be room for experimentation, for free-play, for initiative, for error.

 

[McG]

DND should be there to support Commanders to enable readiness. I find DND holds way too much power that should be held at the Command level (often indirectly).

DND is there to support the minister, including in the development of policy and conduct of civilian oversight.

 

[FJAG]

....

Readiness....

My problem here is whether the force should be ready in principle or ready in detail.

Mine too.

That's why I declined to accept "readiness" without further qualification as a raison d'etre.

IMHO - @SupersonicMax' position that

We exist to defend Canada’s interest with the use of Force.

isn't quite right either. The words "use of force" leaves out the concept of "serving Canada's interest through deterrence by the threatened use of force."

Let's leave the theoretical for the practical for a moment.

To me, the term "readiness" is a word that has real meaning but within DND has become a meaningless buzzword. Have you ever looked at the DND website - this is how "ready forces" are described for the 2022-23 departmental plan.

Field combat-ready forces able to succeed in an unpredictable and complex security environment in the conduct of concurrent operations associated with all mandated missions.

If that isn't vague enough, look at the bull shit that follows. I won't even comment about the nonsense that the GBA Plus and UN 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development have to do with anything.

The website for the 2024-2025 departmental plan changed its form but not the definition of ready forces.

This time it highlighted statistics that showed that the CAF was anything but ready. When I throw aside the word salad that follows the only thing that I see is an utter failure at a communication plan. What, for example is a "% of key fleets?" No one! I repeat no one except the authors involved in generating this crap understands what the objectives are and what is going on. Certainly not the political leaders who are only given a two-minute briefing on all this crap.

To me - in the practical sense, readiness could be defined as simply as e.g. "the army will be capable of generating for domestic operations: 3 light battalions on 48 hours notice; and a further three light battalions on 7 days notice. Concurrently, the army will be capable of generating for expeditionary operations: one light battalion on 7 days notice; one mechanized brigade on 30 days notice; and one mechanized division on 90 days notice" (and similar Navy, Air Force, SOF Mission statements). That provides clear qualifications as to what defines readiness as well as objective standards that readiness could be measured against.

Canada is bound up in meaningless bureaucratese aimed of baffling brains with bull and to provide an illusion of managerial activity.

Rant off.

 

[Kirkhill]

Mine too.

That's why I declined to accept "readiness" without further qualification as a raison d'etre.

IMHO - @SupersonicMax' position that

isn't quite right either. The words "use of force" leaves out the concept of "serving Canada's interest through deterrence by the threatened use of force."

Let's leave the theoretical for the practical for a moment.

To me, the term "readiness" is a word that has real meaning but within DND has become a meaningless buzzword. Have you ever looked at the DND website - this is how "ready forces" are described for the 2022-23 departmental plan.

If that isn't vague enough, look at the bull shit that follows. I won't even comment about the nonsense that the GBA Plus and UN 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development have to do with anything.

The website for the 2024-2025 departmental plan changed its form but not the definition of ready forces.

This time it highlighted statistics that showed that the CAF was anything but ready. When I throw aside the word salad that follows the only thing that I see is an utter failure at a communication plan. What, for example is a "% of key fleets?" No one! I repeat no one except the authors involved in generating this crap understands what the objectives are and what is going on. Certainly not the political leaders who are only given a two-minute briefing on all this crap.

To me - in the practical sense, readiness could be defined as simply as e.g. "the army will be capable of generating for domestic operations: 3 light battalions on 48 hours notice; and a further three light battalions on 7 days notice. Concurrently, the army will be capable of generating for expeditionary operations: one light battalion on 7 days notice; one mechanized brigade on 30 days notice; and one mechanized division on 90 days notice" (and similar Navy, Air Force, SOF Mission statements). That provides clear qualifications as to what defines readiness as well as objective standards that readiness could be measured against.

Canada is bound up in meaningless bureaucratese aimed of baffling brains with bull and to provide an illusion of managerial activity.

Rant off.

I accept a bunch of what you are ranting about there.

But Rumsfeld...

You go to war with the army you have

Known knowns, known unknowns.... uknown unknowns

Let me stipulate that the army we have is designed to cover the known knowns and, with a bit of luck can be adapted to manage the known unknowns. Is that the 80% solution?

How do we manage the unknown unknowns? Can we adapt to them quickly? And is that going to be covered by 20% of the existing budget? Or are we going to have to invest 100%, or even 200%, or more, of the current budget in countering whatever it is the enemy has decided to throw at us?

PS

Here is the opportunity for @KevinB 's small teams of specialists - eccentrics with strange notions.

 

[Kirkhill]

Eating raw onions. Nude O-Groups. Religious sermons.

Why a Bible-toting, onion-eating British officer remains a hero in Israel 75 years after his death - Jewish Telegraphic Agency

Orde Wingate led reprisals against Arabs opposed to Israel's independence and helped train what became the Israel Defense Forces.

www.jta.org

Chindits - Wikipedia

en.wikipedia.org

 

[Fabius]

To me - in the practical sense, readiness could be defined as simply as e.g. "the army will be capable of generating for domestic operations: 3 light battalions on 48 hours notice; and a further three light battalions on 7 days notice. Concurrently, the army will be capable of generating for expeditionary operations: one light battalion on 7 days notice; one mechanized brigade on 30 days notice; and one mechanized division on 90 days notice" (and similar Navy, Air Force, SOF Mission statements). That provides clear qualifications as to what defines readiness as well as objective standards that readiness could be measured against.

An interesting aspect of that definition is that it’s in line with how the CA defines readiness; it’s basically effort based readiness.
Key issue is that effort based readiness has almost no anchor in comparison to threat based readiness.

A force that is “ready” in an effort based system may be completely unequipped and with insufficient mass to win against various threats. Case in point; our LiBs are “ready” but not for a theatre that involves any significant armoured vehicle threat. Hence why we have issues understanding the “with what” and “for what”parts of readiness.

Effort based systems also don’t really have a solid anchor in terms of time and space, “for when” Ie. what is the duration that the forward deployed forces can hold until they need to be reinforced and/or replaced. That time minus the deployment time from the North America based units is the time we have to get follow on forces ready. That time then drives the equipment scaling and training requirements for those follow on forces.

In the Cdn context why 48hrs, 10 days, 90 days etc. It’s not threat driven, it’s effort driven and it’s generally not tied into readiness across the joint force, just because the Army has units on X days readiness doesn’t mean the other services have the same readiness in the elements that would be needed to deploy and support them.

 

[Navy_Pete]

I think how we are struggling to build up a forward presence is Latvia is pretty indicative of overall CAF readiness; sure, there are people on the ground, but getting basics like quarters, infra for equipment, permanent field kitchens, etc set up has been a bit of a mess, and even basics like paying people TD so they can afford to live on the economy is a shit show. That's in peacetime, in a friendly nation, and we're fucking it up at the institution level.

This is why I still think Leslie's 'more tooth, less tail' vision was short sighted and frankly wrong. He never once suggested streamlining the BS so the tail could do more actual work with the same amount of people, just cutting people on the support side.

 

[dapaterson]

This is why I still think Leslie's 'more tooth, less tail' vision was short sighted and frankly wrong. He never once suggested streamlining the BS so the tail could do more actual work with the same amount of people, just cutting people on the support side.

If a clerk can't get platinum on FORCE why are they even in the CAF?

 

[Good2Golf]

I used "ADM" to compare the responsibilities to those of Commanders - not to imply that they should be subordinate to the DM.

The CAF creates individuals who want to Command. But command is a today thing. The important role that the most senior individuals in the CAF perform is that as institutional leaders, and institutional stewards - making decisions for the long-term health of the CAF, not short-term parochial "we must keep 12 FFH regardless the cost or RoI" or "The answer to all problem sets is nine infantry battalions" directions / decisions.

CAF individuals in senior positions of responsibility (note that I am not using the term "leaders") have, in many cases, failed to effectively communicate a vision within the formation they are responsible for and this failed to effectively ensure continuity, failed to effectively communicate risk to the government, and failed to effectively manage the resources the institution is assigned to ensure readiness, choosing to spend money for tomorrow's readiness on today's pet projects.

Adam’s bureaucratically manage.

Generals/Admirals both lead and manage.


To try to equate generals/admirals to ADMs may perhaps give people a warm fuzzy when they complain that generals and adrenals are failing to manage the administrative elements of the CAF, but in doing so fails to acknowledge the leadership (command being closely related to…) element of a military office vice a senior bureaucrat.

@dapaterson, are you not one who lamented the trend over the years of more and more CAF officers filling ‘ADM’ positions? Should not the trend be ADMs Should be civilians reporting to the DM, and officers can be in command and military administration reporting to the CDS?

 

[Good2Golf]

If a clerk can't get platinum on FORCE why are they even in the CAF?

How about instead of extremist bombast (why ‘platinum’ being the standard for retention in the CAF), you say “if a clerk can’t pass the FORCE test, which is the physical fitness standard for universality of service, why should they still be in the CAF?”

 

[Navy_Pete]

Adam’s bureaucratically manage.

Generals/Admirals both lead and manage.


To try to equate generals/admirals to ADMs may perhaps give people a warm fuzzy when they complain that generals and adrenals are failing to manage the administrative elements of the CAF, but in doing so fails to acknowledge the leadership (command being closely related to…) element of a military office vice a senior bureaucrat.

@dapaterson, are you not one who lamented the trend over the years of more and more CAF officers filling ‘ADM’ positions? Should not the trend be ADMs Should be civilians reporting to the DM, and officers can be in command and military administration reporting to the CDS?

From observing them, I'd say the ADMs are leading and managing as well, in the same kind of context military officers in the same kind of support organizations lead teams. A number of the ADMs are former military officers. No one is charging into battle, but frankly none of the elemental commanders are either, and they are doing mostly management.

It's a different context for sure, but getting people to struggle through bureaucracy isn't just management of resources. On the flip side, some leaders could do a lot better at basic management as well.

 

[Navy_Pete]

How about instead of extremist bombast (why ‘platinum’ being the standard for retention in the CAF), you say “if a clerk can’t pass the FORCE test, which is the physical fitness standard for universality of service, why should they still be in the CAF?”

I think this is a bit besides the point that we don't have enough clerks to do basic things like make sure people were getting TD while deployed in Latvia and were a few months pay in TD.

Doesn't really matter if they are CAF or civilian, we don't seem to have adequate support for basic admin required for a relatively small foreign deployment of troops.

 

[dapaterson]

Adam’s bureaucratically manage.

Generals/Admirals both lead and manage.


To try to equate generals/admirals to ADMs may perhaps give people a warm fuzzy when they complain that generals and adrenals are failing to manage the administrative elements of the CAF, but in doing so fails to acknowledge the leadership (command being closely related to…) element of a military office vice a senior bureaucrat.

@dapaterson, are you not one who lamented the trend over the years of more and more CAF officers filling ‘ADM’ positions? Should not the trend be ADMs Should be civilians reporting to the DM, and officers can be in command and military administration reporting to the CDS?

The point I am trying to make is that the responsibility set of senior institutional CAF leaders has areas that are more like those of ADMs than they may like to admit, and that they are failing in those areas. The incessant focus on today over an overarching vision for the future, for example. Most seem more comfortable in commanding over leading.



I do like "adrenals" in place of "admirals" though

 

[dapaterson]

How about instead of extremist bombast (why ‘platinum’ being the standard for retention in the CAF), you say “if a clerk can’t pass the FORCE test, which is the physical fitness standard for universality of service, why should they still be in the CAF?”

I obviously left out the /s, of some folks (mostly Army, to be fair) who are more obsessed with support trades being PT beasts over, you know, actually doing their jobs. I will acknowledge that the RCAF, more often than not, understands the importance of support functions much better than the Army.

 

[Good2Golf]

The point I am trying to make is that the responsibility set of senior institutional CAF leaders has areas that are more like those of ADMs than they may like to admit, and that they are failing in those areas. The incessant focus on today over an overarching vision for the future, for example. Most seem more comfortable in commanding over leading.

Commanding is leading AND managing. The two components are not exclusive, or at least shouldn’t be. Heck, there are some ADMs who even lead, not with a military capital L-Leader, but lead nonetheless, but that doesn’t mean ADM’s should be considered commanders of their respective organizations.

I do like "adrenals" in place of "admirals" though

Yes, some admirals are glands…some even a glans…