Justin Trudeau hints at boosting Canada’s military spending

I'll believe it when I see it.

 

[lenaitch]

Yup. The first few weeks listening to the waves crashing on the shore is quite romantic, the next five years having to wear earplugs at night - not so much. We live inland now.

And no doubt cheaper property taxes.

 

[Kirkhill]

We’re looking at the wrong places. The Yanks can guard their own border. What we need to do:

• Bring back the Port Police to stop the pre-cursors from getting into the country
• Get better at going after the money laundering. That is where Canada is really falling down. We’ve become a playground for the global money launderers.
• Bring in “RICO” type legislation to effectively crackdown on these criminal organizations.
• Fix our “intelligence->evidence” problem.
• Invest in the types of police units that can deal in these area, along with Crown prosecutors, judges, court staff and court space so the justice system can be less of a bottleneck than it currently is, and would become more of one if we invested in all of the other items.

Adding more CBSA/border patrol won’t help with the Americans’ problem. I’ll post an article on an interview with a “Trum-friendly” law enforcement official who discussed this.

This article broadly agrees with you.

Who qualifies as a Canadian?
Casinos.
Money laundering.
Difficulties prosecuting.
Drugs seen as a health issue and not a national security issue....

Election interference.

Canada needs more than drones, helicopters to ease cross-border drug crime concerns, advisers to Trump say

U.S. President-elect Donald Trump has pledged 25-per-cent tariffs on goods from Canada and Mexico until they halt an ‘invasion’ of powerful narcotics and immigrants

www.theglobeandmail.com

 

[lenaitch]

Alberta

Alberta LEOs patrol highways, control traffic, enforce blockades on interprovincial trade and keep rats out.

They can patrol the border or backstop a federal patrol.

I don't see any interference.

All of those activities are either enforcing federal law they are empowered to enforce (i.e. Criminal Code) or provincial statutes).

If the plan is to 'team up with' CBSA/RCMP members, then they are simply assisting peace officers; that is already happening, at least in Ontario and, I think Quebec, with IBET.

This assumes there will be patrolling CBSA/RCMP members to team up with. I'm sure the federal members will appreciate the help.

One of the articles I read stated they would be able to stop people within 2km of the border (or something) 'suspected' of crossing illegally. I wondered what the authority for that is. We don't live in a 'papers please' society. Perhaps federal members appointed for the Act have that authority, I don't know but, working alone, I doubt they would have the authority.

 

[YZT580]

If you stop them coming in, you have no requirement to stop them leaving. Check passports, visas at the gate as they exit the airplane. If they either don't have one or it is invalid, turn them around.

 

[lenaitch]

We’re looking at the wrong places. The Yanks can guard their own border. What we need to do:

• Bring back the Port Police to stop the pre-cursors from getting into the country
• Get better at going after the money laundering. That is where Canada is really falling down. We’ve become a playground for the global money launderers.
• Bring in “RICO” type legislation to effectively crackdown on these criminal organizations.
• Fix our “intelligence->evidence” problem.
• Invest in the types of police units that can deal in these area, along with Crown prosecutors, judges, court staff and court space so the justice system can be less of a bottleneck than it currently is, and would become more of one if we invested in all of the other items.

Adding more CBSA/border patrol won’t help with the Americans’ problem. I’ll post an article on an interview with a “Trum-friendly” law enforcement official who discussed this.

I'm not sure trying resurrect a defunct federal police service and all the backoffice and bureaucracy that would go with it is the way to go. Better to stff/equip up the CBSA. Neither option has a next-week solution.

 

[RangerRay]

This article broadly agrees with you.

Who qualifies as a Canadian?
Casinos.
Money laundering.
Difficulties prosecuting.
Drugs seen as a health issue and not a national security issue....

Election interference.

Canada needs more than drones, helicopters to ease cross-border drug crime concerns, advisers to Trump say

U.S. President-elect Donald Trump has pledged 25-per-cent tariffs on goods from Canada and Mexico until they halt an ‘invasion’ of powerful narcotics and immigrants

www.theglobeandmail.com

Yep, exactly. This is what the Yanks want us to do. We’re too wrapped around the axle talking about border patrols and drones and helicopters. They’re important, but important for us, not the Yanks. They don’t care who or what comes into Canada.

I forgot to say we need to focus more on who we’re letting in, beefing up our capabilities at airports, where most of these criminals come into our country from.

 

[Kirkhill]

And the Alberta process started before Trump's Tariff Talk. Smith's government has been working on this patrol since July 2023 - 18 months ago.

Interdiction Patrol Team

51 Uniforms
10 Support Staff (Dispatchers and Analysts)
10 Drones - Cold Weather
4 Drug Patrol Dogs
4 Narcotics Analyzers

29 MCAD per annum

Border length - 298 km
Control Zone - 2 km
Interdiction Area - 596 km2

....

Extrapolation across Canada

Canada US Border

Boundary Facts | International Boundary Commission

8891 km / 298 km = 29.8 Factor ~ 30

30 x 29 MCAD = 870 MCAD
30 x 51 Uniforms = 1530 Uniforms
30 x 10 Support = 300 Support
30 x 10 Drones = 300 Drones
30 x 4 Dogs = 120 Dogs
30 x 4 Analyers = 120 Narcotics Analyzers.

One thing that I didn't see included in the shopping list was the helicopters.

Assumption - the Alberta Border Zone, 298 km subtended by 51 uniforms, would require a flight of 3 LUH/UTTH type helicopters. Let's call them Gryphons just to make @KevinB happy.

If the same density were applied along the border then that could suggest a fleet 90 new Gryphons.... or a number equivalent to the number already in service with the RCAF.

 

[RangerRay]

Another article from The Bureau about a CBSA whistleblower on where the Americans’ real concerns lie and how CBSA has dropped the ball or is complicit.

Whistleblower Alleges Systemic CBSA Failures Behind U.S. Tariff Threats, Terror Concerns

Key to Luc Sabourin’s allegations is a Canadian record that reveals a catastrophic theft of over 300,000 travel documents.

www.thebureau.news

 

[Good2Golf]

Another article from The Bureau about a CBSA whistleblower on where the Americans’ real concerns lie and how CBSA has dropped the ball or is complicit.

Whistleblower Alleges Systemic CBSA Failures Behind U.S. Tariff Threats, Terror Concerns

Key to Luc Sabourin’s allegations is a Canadian record that reveals a catastrophic theft of over 300,000 travel documents.

www.thebureau.news

I wish I could say I’m surprised.

Brought to you by the same senior bureaucratic mentally that approved Phoenix. Better to meet a timeline with ‘issues to resolve’ than check progress until the issues are properly addressed…

 

[FJAG]

A UOR is a project. But it is a project that delivers only the immediate operational quantities & capabilities. There is no mechanism to initiate a UOR and convert it to institutional quantities & capability mid-way through implementation. Your easy- button “just do this” proposal is to just do everything twice.

I fully understand the difference between the two and if it wasn't for the calcification of our procurement system I wouldn't even dream of doing what I suggested, but let me give you a multi-part example of how things can work if you go by the UOR first route.

In 2005 the artillery was faced with a major dilemma. It had been stripped of its M109s, left with two, by now, second rate 105mm guns and actually gone to war in Afghanistan with mortars transferred to it by the infantry. There were several projects at DLR for gun replacement on the books as well as nascent projects for counter mortar radars and UAVs by way of the ISTAR DLR 8 office. All were unfunded.

When Athena 1 ramped up for Kabul DLR quickly UORed Sperwer purchases and ARTHUR radar leases which were procured within weeks and given to the artillery to train on. They deployed operationally to Kabul. Subsequently more UORed UAVs and radars were brought into play until eventually "projects" for MMRs and BlackJack SUAVs were acquired for 4 RCA(GS). It took around a decade or more for those projects to deliver, but in the meantime, the UOR'd kit enabled the army to develop the organizational structure, and the doctrine and TTPs, to utilize the final kit. On top of that we learned the logistics needs that that type of equipment (which hadn't been in our system for many decades, needs.

The same situation occurred with the M777. While DLR2 had a project on the books for the replacement of the M109 medium calibre guns in 2005 it was unfunded and it was estimated there would be a 10-year capability gap until the precision, medium calibre system would eventually enter service. When Athena 2 was ramped up six M777s were acquired by UOR at the beginning of that guns initial production line by the good graces of the USMC. When six guns were inadequate to both deploy to Afghanistan and provide a training ca[ability in Canada, another 6 were UOR'd the following year. The M777 and its electronic gun management system were revolutionary for Canadian gunners and again, the period served as a vehicle for developing doctrine, TTPs and the maintenance and logistics structure to employ them in a counterinsurgency role. By the time the army agrred that there was enough value to equip at least a portion of the RegF with them under a proper "project" in 2009 almost all the building blocks were in place. I say almost because there were some critical project gaps for the vehicles needed to properly support a regiment (people kept thinking in battery level - and badly at that)

Currently we've been out of the air defence business for over a decade. There has been a GBAD project slowly weaving its way through the system but is far short from delivering even though funded. Luckily there is a need for air defence in Latvia and we have stood up UOR projects for both a SHORAD and C-UAV element. Once again we have the opportunity to learn how to train, operate, and maintain systems that will allow us to more rapidly deploy the final "project" when it is ready.

There is a tremendous benefit at the user and maintainer level to start "playing" with new and novel capabilities. I would suggest that if we were less anal about the hoops we have to jump through when acquiring off-the-shelf capabilities we could easily incorporate buy-and-try concepts. Currently we have a serious operational deployment going on. It needs new systems now. DLR has numerous unfunded projects under development and does have a pretty good understanding of what is out there and what is needed by the force. Pushing some of those out the door as UORs provides a tremendous leg up in delivering the final product even when it turns out to be a different item than what was used under UOR.

There is one thing that I've been noticing. All of our actual "projects" do not seem to be delivering what I would consider a quantity sufficient for the army as a whole. We seem to be limiting it to current operational needs and a modest stock for training and perhaps contingency ops. Canada does not seem to be reequipping the whole army. Again, I look at the artillery because that is what I'm most familiar with. Close support regiments have two batteries of four guns each. That is not due to a tactical evaluation. Its based on a zero PY transfer of gunners from the gun line to create bigger FSCCs, more FOO parties and a surveillance and target acquisition capability. As a result nine six-gun batteries (54 detachments) were reduced to six six-gun batteries. When the M777 was acquired it was again at a zero PY change which ignored the fact that an M777 had a ten man detachment vice a seven man one. That, and some other minor adjustments meant that a battery could only effectively operate two troops of two guns each which leaves the regular force artillery with a grand total of 24 gun detachments vice the 54 it had in 2004. We bought a few more M777s than we had RegF detachments (37) to provide spares, ones for the RCAS and ones to deploy operational, but the strategic theory is that we use reservists to augment detachments on operations (which is a good idea) but that realistically we plan on operationally deploying no more than two gun batteries of six each at a time (which is a bad assumption).

In short, our procurement strategy is extremely short sighted and based on serendipitous decisions too often based on branch-based PY infighting, funding constraints and allocation priorities rather than a master plan or vision.

 

[Czech_pivo]

Another article from The Bureau about a CBSA whistleblower on where the Americans’ real concerns lie and how CBSA has dropped the ball or is complicit.

Whistleblower Alleges Systemic CBSA Failures Behind U.S. Tariff Threats, Terror Concerns

Key to Luc Sabourin’s allegations is a Canadian record that reveals a catastrophic theft of over 300,000 travel documents.

www.thebureau.news

That would be egg on our face for certain.

The timeframe of 2014-2015 of the thefts points to the fact that any of these passports would be expired or just about expired by now - so it begs the question if any of them have been renewed....that would be an even bigger issue.

 

[McG]

let me give you a multi-part example of how things can work if you go by the UOR first route.

These are not what success looks like. When you launch a UOR to deliver the same capability as an existing major project, the your project director, project management staff, and procurement team all stop working on the main effort to deliver the bandaid. And because project team salary is costed against the project, you consume massive amounts of money by doing work twice … that means the real capability is not only delayed, but it will likely be further reduced as the overall CAF equipment budget is is more heavily consumed by pay.

Not only can the UOR result in two completely different fleets when the main contract delivers, the UOR fleet may not even be suitable for use in Canada. We still have ongoing projects to upgrade kit urgently bought for the Afghan mission so that it is usable in Canadian winter. We have divested other Afghan equipment for lack of being able to use it in Canada despite enduring operational requirements.

There is one thing that I've been noticing. All of our actual "projects" do not seem to be delivering what I would consider a quantity sufficient for the army as a whole. We seem to be limiting it to current operational needs and a modest stock for training and perhaps contingency ops. Canada does not seem to be reequipping the whole army.

Despite ministers publicly suggesting we might move quicker to get to 2% GDP, the department cannot spend beyond its budget. Most projects continue to deliver lesser quantities than are required because all projects are constrained by budget.

 

[Good2Golf]

A good example of UORs are CH-147D Chinooks and CH-178 Hips in AFG, procured rapidly for a very finite period and mission and with no expectation of retaining either fleet after use in AFG.