Justin Trudeau hints at boosting Canada’s military spending

I'll believe it when I see it.

 

[dapaterson]

I'm 100% on board with this but will throw in a small caveat.

I don't think that you can have a system where 100% of the training staff is in an institution and not augmented from the field force. We're too small a force to have a 365 days a year training requirement for each and every trade so that training staff would be fully employed year-round. We can't keep staff in an institution when there are large periods of downtime or a surge may be needed. Economically, augmentation from the field force is the most efficient way to deal with fluctuating training demands.

That said, if augmentation is economically inevitable then the system needs to be adjusted so that augmentation demands do not interfere with, or are well programmed into, the needs of the field force itself. I've discussed the temporary transfer of DP1 arty training to 2 RCHA in the mid seventies before and was roundly criticized of that concept by several serving members. Similarly we do incorporate numerous DP2 courses into "regimental schools" - usually in the winter months.

My gut tells me that it isn't augmentation itself which is the problem, but the failure of the training system and the field force to properly coordinate recruiting, individual training and field force collective training activities. That's not easy to do which is probably why it isn't done well - or at all.

Armies and Army systems do not exist for peacetime. A training system that can't train without augmentation can't train sufficient replacements in a war.

Systems to train soldiers aren't a nice to have that an Army can cheap out on. Unless it's an Army you'll never employ.

 

[The Bread Guy]

How else will PM Carney flash down to the Bahamas to meet his close friend Justin at the Aga Khan’s Caribbean retreat?

C'mon, now - just an honourary Canadian citizen (and Order of Canada recipient) wanting to offer a break from the grind, right?

Meanwhile, ya think?

Canada must take ‘responsibility’ for its sovereignty, defence chief says - National | Globalnews.ca

U.S. President Donald Trump's complaints about Canada's military spending and capabilities have underscored the need for Ottawa to prioritize defence, Gen. Jennie Carignan says.

globalnews.ca

 

[Good2Golf]

Good that she’s messaging that intent clearly enough.

 

[Kirkhill]

C'mon, now - just an honourary Canadian citizen (and Order of Canada recipient) wanting to offer a break from the grind, right?

Meanwhile, ya think?

Canada must take ‘responsibility’ for its sovereignty, defence chief says - National | Globalnews.ca

U.S. President Donald Trump's complaints about Canada's military spending and capabilities have underscored the need for Ottawa to prioritize defence, Gen. Jennie Carignan says.

globalnews.ca

If you want the privilege of going into your neighbour's living room and pissing on their rug (pace LBJ and Pearson) then you are going to have to pay for it.

 

[The Bread Guy]

If you want the privilege of going into your neighbour's living room and pissing on their rug (pace LBJ and Pearson) then you are going to have to pay for it.

As opposed to your neighbour threatening to piss on yours?

 

[Kirkhill]

As opposed to your neighbour threatening to piss on yours?

You want to be able to stop that too?

 

[FJAG]

Armies and Army systems do not exist for peacetime. A training system that can't train without augmentation can't train sufficient replacements in a war.

Systems to train soldiers aren't a nice to have that an Army can cheap out on. Unless it's an Army you'll never employ.

You've lost me there.

An army has to be established for peacetime and wartime situations. An army spends much more of its time in peacetime where it needs to regenerate itself continuously, develop the necessary skills at all rank levels, if necessary, conduct operations and prepare itself for going to war.

The later situation, going to war, generally will require a rapid expansion of the force.

There is no way that a peacetime army has the resources to maintain, during peacetime, a full-time training staff in training institutions capable of doing wartime expansion without augmentation. What it does need is a plan to rapidly expand its training infrastructure using already trained regular and reserve force soldiers who are ordinarily retained in the field force.

I agree the army should not "cheap out" on a training system. On the other hand it should not populate the training system with resources that will be substantially underutilized. IMHO, the field force should not be sacrosanct from fulfilling part of the army's ongoing peacetime and emergency wartime individual training mission. It just needs to be planned and organized, dovetailed if you will, so as to be an integrated part of the field force's roles.

Just for interest's sake, how would you see the army set up if one of it's mobilization mandates was to generate and sustain a force six brigades within 180 days?

 

[McG]

I don't think that you can have a system where 100% of the training staff is in an institution and not augmented from the field force. We're too small a force to have a 365 days a year training requirement for each and every trade so that training staff would be fully employed year-round. We can't keep staff in an institution when there are large periods of downtime or a surge may be needed.

The peacetime training system is the wartime mobilization training system. It must have capacity to meet 100% of peacetime throughput requirements or it will not be able to meet wartime surge requirements, and we certainly cannot plan to gut the field force to augment training systems at the moment we are mobilizing.

 

[FJAG]

I'm starting to think that we're talking apples and oranges here.

The peacetime training system is the wartime mobilization training system.

I don't think so. The peacetime training system is the "core of" the wartime mobilization system. It is not the entire system.

It must have capacity to meet 100% of peacetime throughput requirements

We agree on that.

or it will not be able to meet wartime surge requirements,

A system built to "meet 100% of the peacetime throughput," will be inadequate "to meet wartime surge requirements" by itself. It will need augmentation.

and we certainly cannot plan to gut the field force to augment training systems at the moment we are mobilizing.

I think the problem we have here is that the CA thinks continuously in the context of what B-GL-300-008 "Training Canada's Army," calls Mobilization Stages 1 and 2 (unit to brigade limited sustainment), View 2 type of operations (mix of combat and non combat e.g. Rwanda to Afghanistan and peace time Latvia). Effectively, these were and are brigade (-) level, limited sustainment rotations utilizing the 3 stage (now 2 stage) force generation cycle. If that was all that is needed to be planned for then, in those those circumstances, I would agree that the RegF field force is caught up in their own training cycles and the individual training system should be set up to primarily handle all initial and continuing training requirements for individuals. There will be circumstances, however, where mini surges will require field force augmentation and that possibility should be foreseen and built into the force generation cycle.

The reality is that there is also contemplation in the CA's doctrine of the less likely View 1 operations (intense combat and general war e.g. Korea and WW2) in the framework of Mobilization Stages 3 (brigade sustained) and 4 (brigade and echelon above). Stages 3 and 4 "envision the commitment of forces beyond current capabilities and would see significant expansion of the Reserve component." Clearly, the peacetime training system is inadequate to meet Stages 3 and 4, View 1 operations and needs augmentation to be able to surge to wartime outputs. That means part of any current field force structure and any mobilization plan requires that during planning, a slice of the field force's personnel and equipment are designated to "be left out of battle" to augment the training system.

Effectively, the size and structure of any army should include: a) a training cadre designed to supply 100% of the army's Stage 1 and 2 mobilization peacetime training throughput; b) a field force designated as the maximum deployable force for peacetime Stage 1 and 2 View 2 operations up to the outbreak of View 1 hostilities; c) a further trained portion of the field force designated to i) provide immediate sustainment and enhancement of the deployed field force; ii) augment the training system to generate continuous replacements needed by the deployed field force; and iii) to augment the training system further to expand the overall size of the deployed field force over time under Stage 3 and 4 mobilization.

You do not "gut" the field force; you structure it beforehand to have very specific components and tasks for all four stages of mobilization.

During the 1990s, and up to 2014, it was quite appropriate to prioritize for Stage 1 and 2, View 2 operations, however, it was, IMHO, negligent on the part of the CA to almost totally ignore emplacing plans and structures to cater for Stage 3 and 4, View 1 operations. With the current world outlook since 2014, that continued neglect, IMHO, borders on the criminal.

 

[McG]

A system built to "meet 100% of the peacetime throughput," will be inadequate "to meet wartime surge requirements" by itself. It will need augmentation.

Eventually yes, but the peacetime training system must be able to absorb the initial surge of mobilization individual training requirements. A training system that is dependent on augmentation from operational units to meet peacetime production requirements is a system that will immediately fail during mobilization.

The field force exists to go to war at the moment of mobilization.

 

[FJAG]

The field force exists to go to war at the moment of mobilization.

This is the point of our disagreement. It turns on the definition of "field force."

Is it:

1) the entire army less its training establishment and headquarters components?

2) the four RegF brigades?

3) the brigade-sized elements that constitute our ready and contingency forces during the force generation cycle?

If the definition is based on 1) and the army needs to go "all in" then I agree that the training establishment needs to be able to conduct the full gamut of regeneration and expansion tasks. That's a structure that I can't see being affordable during peacetime so as to exist at Day 1 of a war.

If the definition is 2) then the reserve force automatically fills the role of a) augmenting the deploying RegF brigades and b) being available for regeneration and expansion (albeit in my view the ResF as currently configured and equipped would have issues fulfilling these tasks).

If the definition is 3) then the "field force" is restricted to only a fraction of the RegF and the bulk of the RegF and the ResF is available for regeneration and expansion.

In this discussion I have taken the view that the definition of "field force" corresponds to definition 1). IMHO, there always needs to be portion of the force set aside that does not "go to war." Think of the British experience with the BEF where the mostly RegF elements were designated to be deployed on expeditionary operations but the reserves were initially set aside for regeneration and expansion. In my mind, if the definition of "field force" is the entire army then there needs to be a portion of the "field force" which does not "go to war" but is kept back to augment the training system to regenerate and expand the deployed force.

Maybe the common ground here is in definition 2) where the four RegF brigades exist as the "field force;" the CA's training system exists in its peace-time format; and the ResF (with its inherent RegF support staff and select other RegF staff) constitutes a reserve to enhance and augment both the "field force" and the "training system." Regardless, the roles must be clearly defined, assigned and exercised.

 

[Grunt_031]

There’s no ‘reform’ needed. TB is five cabinet ministers acting on the PM’s order. ‘Do it!’ = things like C-17, C-130, CH-147D/F, CH-178, Leopard 2, etc. in less than a year.

There also needs to be the political will. Money talks and when Canadian businesses are not getting a cut of the pie, the pressure will start on the MPs.

 

[Halifax Tar]

There also needs to be the political will. Money talks and when Canadian businesses are not getting a cut of the pie, the pressure will start on the MPs.

Canadian business should be told to F right off or make a competitive product.

Canadian Defence procurement should not be beholden to Canadian business.

And we perpetuate this negative cycle when we continually buy their shitty products.

 

[Good2Golf]

There also needs to be the political will. Money talks and when Canadian businesses are not getting a cut of the pie, the pressure will start on the MPs.

The PM is the political will in Canada’s bastardized version of Westminster Parliament.

PM wants it, it happens. It is that simple.

Chretien wanted new Bombardier business jets, even though the Air Force said they weren’t require. Shut up RCAF, you’re getting them…and just like that, two Challenger 604s were bought for 1/10 Billion dollars in less than a week and a half.

Existing VIP jets were fine, Fraser report says

Purchase of two Bombardier planes completely ignored purchase rules

www-theglobeandmail-com.translate.goog

 

[TangoTwoBravo]

This is the point of our disagreement. It turns on the definition of "field force."

Is it:

1) the entire army less its training establishment and headquarters components?

2) the four RegF brigades?

3) the brigade-sized elements that constitute our ready and contingency forces during the force generation cycle?

If the definition is based on 1) and the army needs to go "all in" then I agree that the training establishment needs to be able to conduct the full gamut of regeneration and expansion tasks. That's a structure that I can't see being affordable during peacetime so as to exist at Day 1 of a war.

If the definition is 2) then the reserve force automatically fills the role of a) augmenting the deploying RegF brigades and b) being available for regeneration and expansion (albeit in my view the ResF as currently configured and equipped would have issues fulfilling these tasks).

If the definition is 3) then the "field force" is restricted to only a fraction of the RegF and the bulk of the RegF and the ResF is available for regeneration and expansion.

In this discussion I have taken the view that the definition of "field force" corresponds to definition 1). IMHO, there always needs to be portion of the force set aside that does not "go to war." Think of the British experience with the BEF where the mostly RegF elements were designated to be deployed on expeditionary operations but the reserves were initially set aside for regeneration and expansion. In my mind, if the definition of "field force" is the entire army then there needs to be a portion of the "field force" which does not "go to war" but is kept back to augment the training system to regenerate and expand the deployed force.

Maybe the common ground here is in definition 2) where the four RegF brigades exist as the "field force;" the CA's training system exists in its peace-time format; and the ResF (with its inherent RegF support staff and select other RegF staff) constitutes a reserve to enhance and augment both the "field force" and the "training system." Regardless, the roles must be clearly defined, assigned and exercised.

In the army, when we refer to the "Field Force" in a conversation we are referring to the deployable regular force brigades/units. I don't know if this is written down in a doctrine book, but you can find the term being used this way for a long time. So at a meeting we might talk about "how is the field force doing?" when talking about the people in the CMBGs and CCSB. I don't think that anyone would refer to the Schools as being in the field force (even if they go to the field). We generally call those "the training system" "the schools" or "schoolhouses" (a US colloquial term), "CTC", CADTC etc etc. I have not heard of the reserve units being referred to as "the field force." They get referred to as "the reserves."

We also talk about the "institutional army" when referring to those in static HQs/units/bases/CDSG.

The training system should be resourced to produce soldiers/officers to sustain the field force (and institutional army) with minimal augmentation. The practice of tasking instructors from the field force on a large scale to the schools leads to burn-out. There are, of course, exceptions. Some low-density highly-technical occupations should rely more on augmentation, especially if they only run a course one a year and its fairly short. Otherwise, NCOs and officers should cycle through the field force, training system and institutional army as part of postings as opposed to short-term taskings. The schools certainly have busy calendars - I don't see a lot of "white space."

The schools had many of their people taken in the mid-90s as part of the resurrection of the 3rd battalions. I saw paperwork about how the field force would send augmentation to the schools/training centres to make up for it. The training centres used to have Demonstration Platoons that provided soldiers to be enemy force etc and enough NCOs to have Sect Comds and 2ICs. By the late 90s they were down to just the WOs and Sgts with all the MCpls coming from the field force. Demo Sections/Platoons had to come from the field force.

Mobilization of the Canadian Army would take the training system, the field force working and the reserves working together. Some field units would likely have to take on the role of teaching new soldiers with their Cpls (and maybe one-hook Ptes) become MCpls overnight. I think that most see the reserves as having a big role to play in this. The reserves provide a "mobilization base", even if the plan is not fully fleshed-out.

 

[daftandbarmy]

Mobilization of the Canadian Army would take the training system, the field force working and the reserves working together. Some field units would likely have to take on the role of teaching new soldiers with their Cpls (and maybe one-hook Ptes) become MCpls overnight. I think that most see the reserves as having a big role to play in this. The reserves provide a "mobilization base", even if the plan is not fully fleshed-out.

The best thing about the reserves it that it exists in its current format at all.

If the 'Balloon went up' you could drag in and recruit thousands of Canadians across the country pretty quickly. You might even be able to give them some preliminary training..

Like WW1 and 2.

 

[OldSolduer]

Mobilization of the Canadian Army would take the training system, the field force working and the reserves working together. Some field units would likely have to take on the role of teaching new soldiers with their Cpls (and maybe one-hook Ptes) become MCpls overnight. I think that most see the reserves as having a big role to play in this. The reserves provide a "mobilization base", even if the plan is not fully fleshed-out.

I studied the history of a soldier in the Patricias when I was employed in the Archives (where the real history is) and he was a Corporal just before WW2. When war was declared he became a Staff Sergeant the next day.

 

[Brad Sallows]

To be clear, I'm not advocating we don't export products; I'm just not a fan of exporting non-value-added products.

I don't know the industries. Maybe there are good reasons why we ship raw products, but it just strikes me as part of sitting back on our historic 'hewers of wood and drawers of water' mentality. Adding value to a product is jobs and profit.

As I wrote, comparative advantage. Someone else can do the processing more cheaply.

If we can't do value-add as cost-effectively as someone else, it makes no sense to force the issue - it just reduces our ability to consume.

 

[McG]

This is the point of our disagreement. It turns on the definition of "field force."

Is it:

1) the entire army less its training establishment and headquarters components?

2) the four RegF brigades?

3) the brigade-sized elements that constitute our ready and contingency forces during the force generation cycle?

If the definition is based on 1) and the army needs to go "all in" then I agree that the training establishment needs to be able to conduct the full gamut of regeneration and expansion tasks. That's a structure that I can't see being affordable during peacetime so as to exist at Day 1 of a war.

If the definition is 2) then the reserve force automatically fills the role of a) augmenting the deploying RegF brigades and b) being available for regeneration and expansion (albeit in my view the ResF as currently configured and equipped would have issues fulfilling these tasks).

If the definition is 3) then the "field force" is restricted to only a fraction of the RegF and the bulk of the RegF and the ResF is available for regeneration and expansion.

In this discussion I have taken the view that the definition of "field force" corresponds to definition 1). IMHO, there always needs to be portion of the force set aside that does not "go to war." Think of the British experience with the BEF where the mostly RegF elements were designated to be deployed on expeditionary operations but the reserves were initially set aside for regeneration and expansion. In my mind, if the definition of "field force" is the entire army then there needs to be a portion of the "field force" which does not "go to war" but is kept back to augment the training system to regenerate and expand the deployed force.

Maybe the common ground here is in definition 2) where the four RegF brigades exist as the "field force;" the CA's training system exists in its peace-time format; and the ResF (with its inherent RegF support staff and select other RegF staff) constitutes a reserve to enhance and augment both the "field force" and the "training system." Regardless, the roles must be clearly defined, assigned and exercised.

Your answer as to composition of the field force has been provided above. If we are mobilizing, the field force is going to war and not surging into the schools. The institutional army and the reserve force are also not going to provide giant pools of instructors. The institutional demands on the CA institutional structures will substantially increase/accelerate commensurate to the acceleration in the rate of train, equip, deploy, sustain of the Army as a whole. Meanwhile, the PRes will need to be forging platoons and companies in collective training. Yes, some reservists will reinforce training systems, field force, and institutional army. But this individual augmentation is filling vacancies or growing capacity to long war requirements.

 

[Fabius]

A minor point of interest, I believe the Army Modernization Team is currently viewing the Army as made up of four armies;

1. Institutional Army - Army HQ, Div HQs, CDSGs, CADTC (to include all the IT and CT elements)
2. Regular Field Army- CMBGs and CCSB
3. Reserve Field Army- CBGs
4. Rangers - CRPGs