Light vs Medium forces

[Kirkhill]

No actually I am talking about regrouping what you have.

Move the Infantry types currently crewing LAVs over to the Cavalry establishment to continue driving the same vehicles but with a different cap-badge.  The "Scale of issue" of dismounts in an independent Squadron would be 48 (following the Aussie model) or 144 per Regiment (1 Coy equivalent) or 432 per Armoured Corps.

By my rough reckoning each Squadron would require about 200 to 250 bodies, excluding the Mortar guys which I would attach from Arty.  Assuming 250 bodies per that means a total of 2250 for 9 Squadrons.  Lets say the Armoured Corps can come up with about half those bodies from their existing structure.  The other half would come from the New 5000.  That leaves 3500-4000 to parcel out amongst the infantry battalions.

For the Infantry, if we used Big Bad John's old mob as a model then 9 lightish battalions require, at about 650 each, 5850 bodies all told, including HQ and CSS types.  Lets say that we have to allocate all 3500-4000 New non-armoured bodies to the Infantry, that would mean that we would have to find 1800 - 2200 bodies from the existing infantry battalions.  Or roughly 200-250 people per battalion.

Now I understand you have manning issues just now, but please, otherwise I will cry, don't tell me that our current 9 battalions are down to an all up strength of less than 250 each.

 

[Kirkhill]

This is why I proposed that the any Light Formation have its own organic transport (BVS10, tac air) if the mission requires it

So, you are suggesting that a separate Light Brigade have its own Transport, either Helo or something else.  Fair enough, but what do you mean by "if the mission requires it".  Does the transport get attached for the mission, is it permanently attached or do you create an all singing all dancing Transport Coy where the drivers will drive trucks one day and BVS10 the next?  Does the transport get attached permanently at the Unit or Formation level?

I was responding to McG's point that the Light Force is going to be expected to pick up the slack in all those operations that our general purpose Mech/Cavalry forces couldn't operate.  And from where I sit that means that the Light forces are going to be awfully busy and have to be extremely talented, switching from one mode to the other in time for the particular deployment.

What I am suggesting instead is that the structure be built from the Infantry Section up with transport treated as a separate entity.  Depending on the transport mode it could be a section per platoon or company, a platoon per battalion or a company per Brigade. 

At the same time the Cavalry will concentrate on the Patrol with whatever Direct and Indirect Fire Support organization fits their needs.

 

[big bad john]

Kirkhill

That sounds a bit like The 1st Canadian Armoured Carrier Regiment, (the Kangaroos) of WW II.

GW

Panzer Grenadiers

 

[Kirkhill]

I suppose actually both BBJ and GW ARE right to some extent. 

I actually was thinking about incorporating a Section of Bisons in each Cavalry Squadron that would primarily be used to supply logistic support to the Squadron in its primary duties but could be used, as the Aussie suggested, "in a pinch" to be able to boost the carrying capacity of the Squadron so that it might be able to transport a light company with it for a short period.  eg Shift the 4 scouts out of their dedicated PC and stuff them 2 each into the back of the LAV-25s, leaving the PC in the patrol to carry 8 Light Infanteers. With 12 Patrols and 12 PCs  that would be 12x8 or 96 infanteers, with an additional 8 Logistics Bisons then room could be found for say another 64 bodies.  96+64 =160 and a light company is expected to be on the order of 130-140 bodies.  Enough to relocate a company if required.

Again, this is not a desired evolution, this is a possible evolution. 

The Cavalry should have the ability to meet their own dismount needs internally.

The Infantry will practice doing their job by what ever means of transport is available.

Having said that maybe there is a role for a dedicated Bison Troop in a Cavalry Regiment, designed primarily to operate with the infantry.

 

[McG]

Now I understand you have manning issues just now, but please, otherwise I will cry, don't tell me that our current 9 battalions are down to an all up strength of less than 250 each.

I'm a bit concerned with your math.  You are increasing the number of manoeuvre units by 50% and dumpping all increasing the manpower by at least 30%.  But you've not considered the increased that would be required for the Engr, Arty, and CSS units to support this.

Would your Cavalry Sqn have enough infantry to gets its own AOR on a deployed operation?

The Infantry will practice doing their job by what ever means of transport is available.

Having said that maybe there is a role for a dedicated Bison Troop in a Cavalry Regiment, designed primarily to operate with the infantry.

No! No! No!

Your mechanized force needs mechanized infantry.   Those infantry should be trained and organized for mechanized operations.   Your Cavalry Bn requires Mech Rifle Coy(s).   This should not be something thrown together on the way overseas.

 

[Zipper]

Wow. All that sounded very cool. And I like you idea's Kirk. They do sound very "old school" dragoonish, or even as BBJ said, PGish.

Well, its seems that MCG asked the same thing. But I'll post it anyway.

However can I ask if you thought about the numbers well enough? I think you assuming that those 5000 are going to just combat arms and "army" allocation? Are they not getting spread out amoung all the branches? As well as the need to fill in alot of the CS and CSS holes?

By the sounds of it, it may take quite a few years to build up to such a set of formations, and is probably where you are thinking. But I thought I'd ask.

 

[PPCLI Guy]

Kirkhill,

Very thought provoking - even if the whole idea does give me the willies.

Basically, much like we the infantry can whistle up choppers from the AF to get us to where we are going, we could whistle up LAV 111's from the Armoured?  Either for transport to the dismount area, or as direct fire support vehicles? 

Help me out here...

Dave

 

[Kirkhill]

That's basically where I am going Dave.

And McG, Infanteer and Zipper, I accept the concern over the advantages of dedicated Mech Infantry.  But as to the question of "enough" infantry - 48 "dismounts" per squadron is comparable to what you would find in a US Mech Inf Coy.  The number of vehicles and number of personnel that I am contemplating in an Independent Squadron reinforced with a Mortar Troop from Arty would be comparable in span to a US Combat Team of a Mech Inf Coy, a Tank Coy, with mortars, FOO, Scout platoon and logistics with about 40 to 50 dismounts.  If you prefer, think of my Independent Squadron as being larger than a current Squadron but smaller than a Regiment, a Squadron Combat Team if you like.

These Squadrons could be employed together as a Regiment in their own AOR,  with or without Infantry support,  as Independent Squadrons in support of an Infantry Battalion in a Task Force, or even as independent Troops where only very light scales of support are required/possible.

Infantry would be built much along the lines of BBJs Marines.  I know you'll jump in when I screw up here BBJ but as I understand the Cdo21 formula the Commando is split into 5 coys with 8 rifle troops/platoons divided amongst them.

The HQ coy comprises recce troop with sniper section, a GPMG troop, an ATGM troop and the mortar troop.
There is a Landrover based patrol company with an MG troop, an ATGM troop and a rifle troop
There is a Viking based reaction company with an MG troop, an ATGM troop and a rifle troop
There are two Close Combat companies, each foot, helo, boat or truck borne with 3 rifle troops.

The section and troop structure is common regardless of mode of transport.  TTPs are presumably common to all members of the Commando.

What I am saying is that you build from the common section/platoon architecture so that the infantry can be utilized as widely as possible and "close with and destroy the enemy, by day or by night, regardless of season or terrain".  We only have 9 battalions with a total of 27 companies.  If the toothfairy comes we might end up with 36.

The Government wants to supply 2 Task Forces, and sustain them. That means that we need to have at least 8 Battalions, 10 would be better, in order to maintain that level of effort.  If we have specialized units then we end up having to constantly renegotiate our role in any allied effort. 

If we build around 9 General Purpose Battalions, after the fashion of the Royals, and add 9 Independent Squadrons then we CAN maintain the pace and continue with the same taskings.

Conversely the 3 Cavalry Regiments could act in concert with one another and possibly with an Infantry battalion in support.  Maybe it is rooted in place to defend an operating base or airfield. Maybe it is conducting heliborne ops in support of one or two Cavalry Regiments.  Maybe the infantry are required to move with the Cavalry.  In that case the Cavalry could be responsible for finding the armoured transport - or maybe the transport in the Infantry Battalion is organized separately from the rifle elements but integral to the battalion and they can change over from driving GWagens to LSVW, to Bv206s to Bisons.  I don't know honestly.

In any event they would not be Mechanized Infantry.  They would not be out following Panzers around the countryside. 

There would be somethings we could not do.

But in a large number of situations we could seize ground, hold it and dominate the surrounding area over a very large area. 

Now on the issue of transport generally,  which is easier? To train 1 driver to drive a number of vehicles tactically - in which case I would suggest that if you want your infantry to keep up with the Cavalry then have the Battalion transport platoon practice driving Bisons along with their Bv206s and LSVWs.  On the other hand if there is a different set of skills necessary to operate and maintain different vehicles then perhaps it would be better if all the LAV/Bisons were crewed and maintained by one organization, the Cavalry and their only role with respect to the Infantry would be to supply armoured infantry carriers.  The infantry in the back would have nothing to do with the mounted fight.  That is strictly a Cavalry job.  If the want the infantry in on the game they are going to have to let them get out.

As you say Dave, just like a TacHel Sqn.  Transport by the experts. Nothing else.

Canada could still contribute across a wide spectrum of conflicts, up unto the "flanking, screening, rear area security, lines of communications or economy of effort" activities described in the DFS squadron paper. Two Armd Regiments with a light infantry battalion, either road or helo or both transported, would have made a highly credible addition to Iraq.  Likewise a battalion organized along the lines of the Royal Marines with an Independent Cavalry Squadron attached would be a very useful core on which to build a taskforce for Kabul, or Kandahar or Darfur.

For the life of me, with the limited number of units we have I don't see how you can support a variety or specialties with a high degree of capabilty in all fields and at the same time meet standing commitments that are going to require you doing the same thing over and over again.  It seems virtually unanimous that the plug'n'play system is being panned as being detrimental to unit cohesion.  You want to be able to see your families on occasion, NDHQ wants to be able to plan on the longterm not on an ad hoc basis and the government wants to know what you can do for them.

Short answer for me is you can't afford a high degree of specialization.  Also Mech Forces are useless across most of Canada, you can't get them there and can't support them.  And in fact they don't address any credible domestic risk.  If we can't deploy them in Canada then we sure as heck can't deploy them overseas.

Light, well trained, general purpose forces, after the fashion of the RM, backed up by a useable Cavalry force and suitable helo support would serve Canada exceptionally well across a broad, broad spectrum.  And as to para capability - teach one battalion in three how to fall out of aeroplanes.

As Dave said, in terms of the helo discussion, Air Assault is a lot different than just jumping out of the back of a helicopter onto some unoccupied ground.  Likewise parachuting onto unoccupied ground is not an airborne assault.  But in Canada's case, the Assault capability is a lot less critical than just the ability to get people into remote locations rapidly.

9 GP Infantry battalions built on light scales - vehicles in the 3 to 7 tonne range to allow for air transport or helo transport.  3 of them jump qualified.  May 3 are tasked for Naval Cooperation and 3 tasked for Cavalry cooperation but all of them built and trained to the same standard with respect to ground combat.

And along with that 3 Cavalry Regiments that can form 9 Independent Squadrons.

Joint exercises with Infantry would be the norm.

If organized identically to the RM in Cdo 21 then each battalion would be 692 all ranks, 9 battalions would be 6228 infanteers. A few less if we continued to detach the Mortars, maybe a few more if you increased the number of platoons or adopted a more traditional triangular structure. Either way a very effective general purpose unit could be built around 650-700 all ranks.  The Cavalry Squadrons would be about 200 to 250 all ranks.  Lets say 700+250 for 950.  The core of a Task force.  Add another 150 engineers, 150 gunners and 250 CSS and you have a 1500 person task force.

9x1500 =13,500 all ranks

Engineers and arty, like the Cavalry would form Regiments at brigade level just as they do now but each regiment would be split to form dedicated teams that would train with a particular infantry battalion and Cavalry squadron.

CSS handled likewise.

Air support, as currently, outside of the Brigade command structure but permanently attached.

^-^"If I ruled the world, every day would be the first day of spring......"

 

[Zipper]

Wow and Wow!

How long have you been thinking about this? And do you get any work done during the day? ;D

I like it. I may be only an arm chair soldier now, so it probably means sh!t. But it makes sense, and if you combine the ideas that are in the works on the Light forces thread posted by Eyre with this model for the Cavalry sqns, it would be a very useable plan.

What do you guys think of the chances of us once again getting airborne capabilities? Especially a regiments worth of them? Is this a feasable idea? Could we afford the extra vehicles this plan asks for?

 

[Kirkhill]

I believe this plan could be done now, with the vehicles in inventory.

Continue to use the Leo or the Cougar until the MGS comes on line.

A lot of the kit, like trucks, needs upgrading, but the job could be done.

 

[Infanteer]

So, you are suggesting that a separate Light Brigade have its own Transport, either Helo or something else.   Fair enough, but what do you mean by "if the mission requires it".   Does the transport get attached for the mission, is it permanently attached or do you create an all singing all dancing Transport Coy where the drivers will drive trucks one day and BVS10 the next?   Does the transport get attached permanently at the Unit or Formation level?

Yep.   I was implying that at the Formation Level, a Light Brigade possesses a pool of transport that could be attached to a Battlegroup upon deployment.   If they need LUVW's for a PSO or, like the RM, BVS10's for Iraq, they can have them attached.   Since these vehicles will not be integral in combat tactics, I figured we can use an "all singing-driver" (if not the Light Force soldier himself) because he, unlike a LAV crewman, doesn't have to learn to fight with the dismounts as a Zulu callsign.   The vehicles fulfill more of an admin function.

As for the proposal idea above, good and cohesive, but I will dispute a few things.

First off, I'm not really liking the numbers, especially relying on a huge portion of the 5,000 soldiers that the government keeps waving around.   Even if these 5,000 were likely to appear in the pipeline, they need to be spread Forces wide and not concentrated in the combat arms.   If you're going to make the proposal off of what is on hand (which is a very good way to go about starting things), then you need to focus on the numbers we roughly have, not what we are promised.

As well, you predicate the need for "lowest common denominator" Infantry Battalions (that's what I'm going to call them   ) based upon the fact that we can't afford to specialize for both fiscal reasons (no resources) and for readiness reasons (too much strain if general capability is lost).   I'm going to argue to opposite.   With our small army, we need to focus and hone our efforts to make the best out of what we got.   The "Generalist" approach to Infantry (doing everything but nothing well) isn't really what is needed in today's operations.

I'm going to argue that putting our highly trained soldiers, our "center of gravity" as some have termed it, into specialized capabilities is what we must do to ensure that we get the "most bang for our buck" with our defence dollars.   Although the following quote pertains more to general defence issues, I think that much of it applies to the notion of designing Army Forces to hang around waiting for every and all possibilities:

"The reality is that "Canada has never had a full range of flexible defence capabilities."...Perpetuating the idea that a balanced force defeats uncertainty simply robs Parliament of its responsibility to make choices among competing institutions and encourages planners to sing "the siren song of the status quo."

The idea behind a general-purpose force presents Canadians with other dangers for national defence besides usurping the responsibilities of governments.   It can misdirect funds to unwanted to unwanted tasks and capabilities and reinforce institutions, missions, and organizations whose purposes have passed.   A defence policy based on a general-purpose force is impossible to define in terms of capability and equipment.   It is an idea that encourages and rewards bottom-up planning and the status quo, while punishing decision and change.   Most deadly of all, general-purpose force planning acts as a slow poison to government policies of restraint by loading ever increasing demands onto the defence program in the name of the ever elusive balanced force.

The point is that Canada's uniquely secure geopolitical situation presents governments with every opportunity to choose where and when the CF will be deployed and what missions they will accept.   Furthermore, these choices can be made largely before any crisis occurs.   Therefore, deciding what missions the CF will accept and what military capabilities the Canadian people should pay for is the essence of Canadian defence policy.   Any government accepts unconditionally recommendations for a so-called general-purpose force is allowing itself to be pre-empted by military opinion often founded on the special interest of the services."

Douglas Bland, Chiefs of Defence: Government and the Unified Command of the Canadian Armed Forces - pp 270-271

There are many capabilities that we can't do.   Deep battle, due to our lack of any weapons systems (MLRS, Attack Hel, etc), is chasing a pipe-dream; we are a Close Battle Army.   Heavy Forces have been off the menu for longer then we'd care to admit - no point keeping Mech Infantry around for Combat Team attacks if the other three parts of the Combat Team are gone.   By leaving some skimpy mechanized force (going from 9 mech units to 3 beefy ones) and putting all our guys on their boots waiting for anything that comes around (most likely some boring PSO) will only lead to capability loss and lack of any sense of mission.   It will just give our Government the ability to say "gee, we don't have that capability - sorry" the next time the flag goes up.  

If we focus our maneuver forces (and behind them, our support) onto capabilities, then we can assuredly say that "yes, we can do this and we can do it well".   As the quote states, we are blessed in Canada with the ability to pick and choose where to commit our resources.   We may as well pick and choose spots where we can best tailor our Forces to provide maximum impact.   Sure, this may be niche rolling, but as Bland points out, we simply can't afford to chase the "All singing, all dancing" force structure like the US for a variety of reaons.   Your proposal is one way to get around this this - it is one I don't really like.   Turn the Infantry into "general purpose" soldiers and keeping a small mechanized capability to back them up - to me this leads down the path to "Constabulary" or "Rental Army".   The other is to niche - not stupidly by chasing "missions" like "Peacekeeping", but niche our limited forces into capabilities that will be in demand across the spectrum of conflict.

I'm going to go out on a lark here and promulgate my ideas on what I can see being done to maximize the resources we have on the ground right now (with a wee bit of fudging) and how we can dedicate these forces to capabilities that will ensure that they have a place "alongside the best, against the best".

Light Forces:   These are in demand.   The 3PPCLI Battlegroup was an excellent "Light Force" addition to TF Rakkasan and performed extremely well in fighting a non-contiguous battle against Al Qaeda/Taliban forces in multiple operations.   As well, Light Forces are able to "pony up" with their own organic transport to conduct PSO's, as was witnessed with the first two rotations to OP ATHENA by 3 RCR and 3 VANDOO.   Clearly, with "4th Generation Warfare" on the rise, highly trained, physically fit and lethal Light Forces will be the "soup de jour" for some time to come.   As LtCol Eyre pointed out on the other thread:

The biggest difference between light and medium forces in my mind is not equipment but training.   Much like in a LAV battalion where the individual training is greatly focussed on LAV qualifications, I believe that every light soldier should be qualified Basic Mountain Ops, Basic Urban Ops (course forthcoming), and, depending what we do with the para capability, Basic Para qualified.   As available and necessary, jungle ops should be included.   As well, reflexive shooting, familiarity with airmobile ops, HUMINT gathering, and a mastery of patrolling are all a must.

This is where the Light Forces will focus.   Because they have focused on "Light Capability", figuring out what is needed is much more obvious then if we leave Infantry in the "General Purpose" doldrums (again, LtCol Eyre gives us a good overview of the immediate "needs" to achieve this capability; training, firepower, and transport.  

Cav Force:   These forces are also in demand.   Reading LtCol Roger Noble's article "Australian Light-Armoured Vehicles (ASLAV) as Mounted Cavalry: Vanguard for the Hardened Army (http://www.defence.gov.au/army/lwsc/Publications/AAJ_Winter_2004.pdf) breathed new life into the concept that we've been buzzing about for a few months on these boards.   I really like how the article attacks two key myths of a LAV based Cavalry force:

1) The Myth that they are unprotected and useless.
2) The Myth that they are only useful in the Recce role.

To me, this spells out the fact that their is so much more that we can accomplish by "honing in" our mechanized capability into a "LAV CAV" force.   LtCol Noble points out that the US Marines used their LAV equipped LAR's to great success in Iraq while the Stryker Brigades managed to successfully rotate through there as well.   He points out that LAV CAV was put to work successfully by Australia in East Timor.

Clearly, LAV CAV has utility beyond Reconnaissance (or being parceled out as glorified transport for Infantry) and is in demand in missions that are cropping up around the world.   Since we have a hard time strategically transporting our stuff, the LAV makes a good mechanized platform as it is relatively light.   Like a "Light Force", a "Cav Force" is suitable for expeditionary forces projection into missions throughout the spectrum of conflict.

I would like to see the Armoured Units (which are focussing on Armoured Recce) and the Mechanized Infantry units (which have no more combat team) to form a sort of "hybrid" Cav capability - much like we've discussed on the Armoured Cav thread.   A unit would consist of a Cav squadron (something like the Aussies with 3 LAVs/4 Dismount Patrol bricks), a Recce Squadron (based around Coyote/LUVW 7 car patrols), and a Support Squadron which consists of Cav Arty (Mortars) and Cav Engineers (Assault Troops).

These two capabilities together should give Canada an Army that is "honed" into a specific niche of combat power - the Cav Forces should be capable to contribute to "Son of Iraq" type missions while Light Forces are demanded for "Step-Child of Chechnya" operations (as LtCol Eyre said, "Complex environments entail not only complex terrain (mountains, jungles, etc) but also complex population and information aspects.").   Clearly, we won't be able to do everything with "niched forces" in either of these types of conflicts - we can't throw Cavalry into the maw of the Hammurabi Republican Guard Division and we can't expect our Light Forces to perform independent Air Assault missions (as PPCLI Guy caught me, Air Assault and Air Mobility are Apples and Oranges) - but we will be able to contribute, to "punch above our weight" on a variety of missions and conflicts.   As well, if required, both types of Force capabilities can "Gear Down" (or "Pony Up") for Bosnia/Haiti/Kabul type PSOs.   Clearly, these capabilites give us flexibility across the spectrum of conflict.

How to go about gaining these two capabilities in a manner that provides depth and sustainability?

As touched on before, 3 additional Infantry battalions would be re-rolled as "Light Infantry".   The remain 3 Mech Battalions would be merged with the 3 Armoured Battalions (with swapping of soldiers and vehicles back and forth) to give us 6 Hybrid Cavalry Battalions.   How we want to organize these formation-wise and with regards to Regimental affiliation is up in the air, but for now, until more troops and resources come down the pipeline, we can have each Brigade Group manage 2 Light Force and 2 Cave Force maneuver units.   Ideally, I would like to see extra resources dedicated to forming four Brigades (2 Light/2 Cav) with the appropriate support - this wouldn't be a huge hurdle because the Maneuver units already exist and would be better as the integral Engineer/Artillery, CS and CSS assets can also hone in on either "Light" or "Cav" doctrine, tactics, and support.

This should give us 6 Light Force maneuver units and 6 Cavalry Maneuver units.   Putting each capability in an 18 month readiness-rotation cycle, you would see:

Work Up      Readiness/Deployed                Draw Down
2 Light                            2 Light                          2 Light
2 Cav                              2 Cav                            2 Cav
(If we were to gain more units, I would like to see a 24 month readiness cycle that gives the Army a strategic reserve to fall back on; another discussion)

This gives us four potential battlegroups in the breach - it also ensures that both capabilities we've decided to niche into (Light/Cav) have equal forces at all stages of the readiness cycle.   You can put one maneuver battalion of each capability as the "Go" unit and one as the "Ready Reserve" if something comes up.   If only a sub-unit is required from each to form a mini-battlegroup, then so be it (we still maintain two full units ready to go).   Pending that we don't deploy more then two battlegroups at a time, this should mean that in a 3 year period of two readiness cycles, a maneuver unit can expect to be deployed once.   I don't think leaving Canada for 6 months out of 36 is too much to ask in the current climate.   Granted, there will be times when we need to deploy more then 2 Battlegroups, but this Force Structure and Readiness cycle allows for it.   If the demand is straining this simple setup, then the problem is political (with a commitment-capability gap) rather then organizational.

Anyways, enough postulating from me.   These are just some ideas that have been bouncing around in my head from discussions in the last few days.   To conclude:
1)   We have to niche, its the only way to maintain relevance.   It's all about picking the right Niche (which I feel Cav/Light is)
2)   This should be fairly "doable" with the troops the Army has on hand at this current moment.
3)   This promotes light and flexible forces suitable for expeditionary abilities across the spectrum of conflict.   By focusing on both Cav and Light capabilities, we are ensuring that there is a roll to play in multiple types of conflict (from low to high intensity).

Cheers,
Infanteer

 

[McG]

Infanteer,
Well said.  This brings us back to the 6:6 ratio which was one of the acceptable end states that I spoke of at the begining of the thread.

How very convenient that this force structure would also mesh nicely with the new regimental system that has been proposed on this board.
http://forums.army.ca/forums/threads/24461/post-174236.html#msg174236

 

[Infanteer]

Yes.  I think the Regimental structure you proposed is one very suitable way of organizing this capability split (There are a few others on my mind as well).  I would wager that most of the Army's share of the promised 5,000 spots would, aside from filling out maneuver TO&E's, be focused on CS and CSS troops to ensure that both capabilities can be sustained through the readiness cycle above - no point having fancy maneuver battalions if your signallers and cooks are burnt out.

As well, Enfield and I decided, in the effort to avoid petty regimental squabbling with regards to Force Transformation, that all Regiments and battalions of the Army will be "Rocky Mountain Rangers" - either that or "1", "2", "3"....

 

[pbi]

Infanteer: great work. At the beginning of all of this Cavalry/Light Inf/etc discussion, I was against the concept. Now, in particular as a result of the work that you and others have done on this site, I have swung around to being more or less a supporter. I still remain skittish about "niche" forces but I agree wholeheartedly that high quality Light Infantry (as we now envision our Canadian LIBs today-as SOC forces not just "Mech Lite") are probably just about the best kind of niche forces to have: they are likely to be useful in every type of op, and capitalize on our greatest strength: people.

Now it is time for you to graduate from Army.ca and get this idea onto the pages of the CAJ. You have done the core work already, and there are some other great thinkers here as well who can help you assure a quality product: Army.ca functions as a kind of informal "murder board" for ideas. Go ahead and get a draft together and get it in. I am pretty sure that the new editor, Maj Andrew Godefroy, would be happy to give it a run.  Good Luck!

Cheers.

 

[big bad john]

Infanteer: great work. At the beginning of all of this Cavalry/Light Inf/etc discussion, I was against the concept. Now, in particular as a result of the work that you and others have done on this site, I have swung around to being more or less a supporter. I still remain skittish about "niche" forces but I agree wholeheartedly that high quality Light Infantry (as we now envision our Canadian LIBs today-as SOC forces not just "Mech Lite") are probably just about the best kind of niche forces to have: they are likely to be useful in every type of op, and capitalize on our greatest strength: people.

Now it is time for you to graduate from Army.ca and get this idea onto the pages of the CAJ. You have done the core work already, and there are some other great thinkers here as well who can help you assure a quality product: Army.ca functions as a kind of informal "murder board" for ideas. Go ahead and get a draft together and get it in. I am pretty sure that the new editor, Maj Andrew Godefroy, would be happy to give it a run.   Good Luck!

Cheers.

I agree Infanteer, it is time that you published!

 

[Kirkhill]

Infanteer and McG:

From where I sit - the only real difference I see between your prescription of 6 Light Infantry  and 6 Cavalry Units and the my offer of 9 Light Infantry and 3 Cavalry Units is the ratios involved.

All of us fundamentally agree with the viability of the two types of force. That they are useful, viable, valuable and possible.  That they have a role to play across a wide spectrum of conflict.

One grey area really revolves around the amount of infantry that the Cavalry force needs to do its job, how that infantry integrates into the force and what type of training it needs to do the job.

The other point of contention seems, in my mind, to revolve around the definitions of Light, Infantry and General Purpose.

I understand in the Canadian context that Light is coming to be synonymous with an American Ranger type of structure, or possibly a British Parachute Regiment.  From my understanding these are essentially raiding forces that hold ground, if at all, only for limited periods of time.  The Paras are a bit "heavier" than Rangers, having more vehicles and thus are capable of acting in stability operations for an extended period of time, as any other infantry unit can.

At the Heavy end of the scale we have "Panzer Grenadiers" dedicated to their Bradleys, Warriors, Marders and the like and the Cavalry troopers - in the Aussie case tied to their LAVs.  These are assault forces that take ground and are most valuable in High intensity conflicts They seem to be valuable in stability operations as reaction forces but, again, seem to be light on bodies to get out and interact with population.

Between those two extremes we have just plain Infantry, delivered by a variety of means, some by helicopter, some by boat, some in trucks - light, medium and armoured, some of them even tracked.  They may be optimized for different environments but at heart they are all Infantry.  They dismount and do their job on foot, whether it be fighting, patrolling or holding ground.

The American Army formed itself around Light Raiders and Heavy Assault Forces.  They have precious little of the force in the middle - standard infantry.  That is the gap the Stryker brigades are trying to fill.  But there are still on 6 of them planned out of a force of 43 Brigades (70 or so if you include the reserve brigades).

The British Army, and one of the reasons that the Americans keep inviting them to the game, has Raiders and has Heavy forces but the strength of the force is the 20 or Infantry battalions that supply the depth of manpower need to sustain a Northern Ireland type of deployment and are exceptionally useful in the rest of the world doing the same type of job.  They also contribute greatly to Kosovo, Bosnia, Sierra Leone, Iraq and many other places in all phases of war.

Now here I will tread carefully and try not to upset BBJ over much.  The Royal Marines are not Special.  They don't have much in the way of Special kit.  Their Commandos aren't manned, organized or equipped much different much different than any other British Infantry battalion.  They take their turn in rotation in Northern Ireland and Iraq, Kurdistan and Bosnia.  They operate in mountains and deserts and jungles just as much as on beaches.  They are capable of mounting assaults just as well as holding ground or securing a country.  And they can mount raids. They are not Special.  They are Generalists.  Generalists that retain particular skills in amphibious operations in addition to all their other capabilities.

However being Generalists does not mean they are inferior or even average.

They may be the best, no doubt BBJ would say are the best, Generalists, in the world.  This is accomplished through selection and training and instilling confidence.

So when I am arguing for a Generalist infantry this is the notion that I am arguing for.  Rather than create a Canadian Force based on Light raiding capability and a Light Cavalry force with little capability in the heart of your light/heavy envelope I am saying start from a force that is positioned right smack dab in the middle of the envelope and build its capabilities out from there as budget allows.

The RM sits squarely in the middle of the envelope - all singing, all dancing.  It can do many tasks for the British Government on its own.  It can operate in high intensity conflict with or without armour support (light or heavy). It can perform raids or it can act along with dedicated raiders like the Paras and with Special Forces.  

Now if you are offering me, the Canadian taxpayer , a choice between 6 Ranger Battalions and 6 Lt mechanized infantry Battalions operating as Cavalry or  6 Royal Marine Commandos and 6 Lt Mech Inf Bns operating as Cavalry then I'll take the 6 Cdo option and say fill your boots.

My own preference, as stated, would be otherwise.  9 Commandos and 3 Cavalry Regiments.  Perhaps there is a need for additional boots in the Cavalry and manning limits don't allow the 9:3 structure to produce viable sized units.

Then maybe the answer is to transfer and additional company's worth of bodies from the Commandos to each of the Cavalry and give them an integral infantry company, in addition to their 3x48=144 Scouts/Dragoons/Dismounts/Assault troopers.

That would leave 8 Commandos and 3 Cavalry Regiments capable of producing 9 Squadrons each of which would have a hundred or so dedicated dismounts - or a full company. 1 Commando + 1 Squadron would supply 4 coys with a lot of fire power, range and mobility as well as quick reaction capability.

So, at heart, when we are looking at this discussion, as in all others it is necessary to define terms and expectations.

I use the term Light in contrast to Heavy.  You appear to be using the term Light in a sense that it gaining popularity over on this side to define a Special Forces type of Raider force.  

If that is the case then I can understand why you wish to focus so much manpower on the Mechanized force.

Personally I think that is wrong. That the net result will be tailoring your force too narrowly to meet the needs of today.  IMHO a Generalist force will cover both much of today's needs and be in a better position to deal with the unexpected.  One of the reasons we are having this discussion today is that Canada withdrew from a Generalist approach and ended up specializing as a Mech Infantry force.  Now we find that the Mech Infantry force doesn't meet the needs of the situation and you are having to jump through hoops reinventing yourself.  And it is not just a money thing.  When the Forward Edge of the Battle Area moved away from the Gates at Lahr and Baden-Baden to everywhere else the old structure became obsolete.

The reason I keep harping on about the Royal Marines is because they are living proof that a Generalist force does not have to be a sub-standard force.   Although, in the past Conscripts have been shoved into Generalist forces and thus given the concept a bad name, the Marines prove that a Generalist force can also be an "Elite" force.

 

[Infanteer]

Infanteer and McG:

From where I sit - the only real difference I see between your prescription of 6 Light Infantry   and 6 Cavalry Units and the my offer of 9 Light Infantry and 3 Cavalry Units is the ratios involved.

All of us fundamentally agree with the viability of the two types of force. That they are useful, viable, valuable and possible.   That they have a role to play across a wide spectrum of conflict.

My main point of contention with what you proposed is based on two factors:

1)   The "General Capabilities" framework in which you expect both forces to operate in - the Infantry kick around waiting for a job that may or may not require them to "mech up" with the Cavalry (which many Infantry types have said isn't tactically sound with an IFV) while the Cavalry kicks around looking for any job - in the process designating a significant chunk of its resources to driving around Infantry (meaning sacrifice of "Cavalry" capability at the expense of a taxi tasking).

2)   The uneven capabilities mean that the Cavalry side is liable to burn out faster then the Infantry if both are required on a consistent basis.   You've attempted to address this by making 9 independent squadrons available for Infantry assignments.   Having only a squadron of Cav available for a reasonable readiness-rotation cycle doesn't do us much good if a significant mechanized capability is required (say, Kosovo).

One grey area really revolves around the amount of infantry that the Cavalry force needs to do its job, how that infantry integrates into the force and what type of training it needs to do the job.

The other point of contention seems, in my mind, to revolve around the definitions of Light, Infantry and General Purpose.

I understand in the Canadian context that Light is coming to be synonymous with an American Ranger type of structure, or possibly a British Parachute Regiment.   From my understanding these are essentially raiding forces that hold ground, if at all, only for limited periods of time.   The Paras are a bit "heavier" than Rangers, having more vehicles and thus are capable of acting in stability operations for an extended period of time, as any other infantry unit can.

At the Heavy end of the scale we have "Panzer Grenadiers" dedicated to their Bradleys, Warriors, Marders and the like and the Cavalry troopers - in the Aussie case tied to their LAVs.   These are assault forces that take ground and are most valuable in High intensity conflicts They seem to be valuable in stability operations as reaction forces but, again, seem to be light on bodies to get out and interact with population.

Between those two extremes we have just plain Infantry, delivered by a variety of means, some by helicopter, some by boat, some in trucks - light, medium and armoured, some of them even tracked.   They may be optimized for different environments but at heart they are all Infantry.   They dismount and do their job on foot, whether it be fighting, patrolling or holding ground.

I cannot fathom how you've come to this outlook.   As many of the Infantry Officers and NCO's have pointed out in the Infantry forum, Light and Mech are Apples and Oranges.   As the Falklands showed, there is a difference between training and maintaining a "Bergen Soldier" and a "Mounted Soldier".   The "Bergen Soldier" fights on his own, taking support from man-portable or Joint force assets if possible, but ultimately he is responsible through tactics, fitness, and tactical ability to get on top of his objective.   The "Mounted Soldier", of which Infantry skills forms a vital part of the whole, is an all-arms battle in which a dismounted forces serve only as one platform in which firepower is delivered from.   There are different degrees in weight of both firepower and protection, but the principle is the same.  

Looking back on history, I think the last of the "Plain Infantry" went out of style with the Wehrmacht and its 75% Horse-Drawn units or with elimination of National Service/Draftee soldiers in Britain, France, America and Germany.

The American Army formed itself around Light Raiders and Heavy Assault Forces.   They have precious little of the force in the middle - standard infantry.   That is the gap the Stryker brigades are trying to fill.   But there are still on 6 of them planned out of a force of 43 Brigades (70 or so if you include the reserve brigades).

No.   Strykers are not meant to fill some "Standard Middle Ground" between "Light Raiders and Heavy Assault Forces" - it is an interim Table of Organization and Equipment that the US Army is using as it transitions from "Legacy Era" Heavy Forces meant for high-intensity, total war between superpowers to a light and flexible expeditionary capability based around the FCS.   At least this is what I got from reading General Shinseki's mission statement with the Interim Brigade Combat Team.

The British Army, and one of the reasons that the Americans keep inviting them to the game, has Raiders and has Heavy forces but the strength of the force is the 20 or Infantry battalions that supply the depth of manpower need to sustain a Northern Ireland type of deployment and are exceptionally useful in the rest of the world doing the same type of job.   They also contribute greatly to Kosovo, Bosnia, Sierra Leone, Iraq and many other places in all phases of war.

Again, I'll disagree - the British Army has always maintained "specializations" or "niche capabilities" (not Niche Roles).   Their Infantry would rotate through various "capability sets" such as Jungle, Mountain, Armoured Infantry (Warrior), Mechanized Infantry (Saxon), Airborne, etc, etc.   As was mentioned on a thread on these boards, the Brits are moving away from rotation to a fixing "niche specialities" amongst units in the Army due to the problems associated with skills loss in constant reroling.

So, sure the Brits would rotate a unit to a "general purpose" or "constabulary" role, especially for units rotating through North Ireland.   But with our small resource base, this is not something I want to see us "niche capabilied" with, rather I'd focus on the two tasks (Light/Cav) which a far more relevent to combat capable forces.

Now here I will tread carefully and try not to upset BBJ over much.   The Royal Marines are not Special.   They don't have much in the way of Special kit.   Their Commandos aren't manned, organized or equipped much different much different than any other British Infantry battalion.   They take their turn in rotation in Northern Ireland and Iraq, Kurdistan and Bosnia.   They operate in mountains and deserts and jungles just as much as on beaches.   They are capable of mounting assaults just as well as holding ground or securing a country.   And they can mount raids. They are not Special.   They are Generalists.   Generalists that retain particular skills in amphibious operations in addition to all their other capabilities.

However being Generalists does not mean they are inferior or even average.

They may be the best, no doubt BBJ would say are the best, Generalists, in the world.   This is accomplished through selection and training and instilling confidence.

I will whole-heartedly disagree here. The Royal Marines are in no way "General Purpose" - they are specialized as a SOC capable, strategically deployable Light Force.   As I've stressed many times, putting a RM Commando in Warriors and expecting them to do a Combat Team attack is foolhardy - they are "Bergen troops".   They didn't do this in Iraq, it was left to Heavy Force units to fight with Challenger IIs and Warriors.

The RM is a "niche capability", all-arms unit focused on Light Amphibious Ops.   Their extremely rigorous "Commando Course" is demanding enough that, along with a Focus on Light Force capabilites (Commando 21 reflects this) and their intimate support of British Tier II and Tier I SOC units (the SAS, the SBS, and the 3 Cdo Bde Recce Troop) would qualify them as as a Tier III Special Operations Capable Unit (akin to US Army Rangers).   The latest edition of the CMJ has good overview of SOC capabilities

http://www.journal.dnd.ca/engraph/home_e.asp

Clearly, stating that their "Generalists" is selling the RM short on what they can do and attributing to them things they can't do.

So when I am arguing for a Generalist infantry this is the notion that I am arguing for.   Rather than create a Canadian Force based on Light raiding capability and a Light Cavalry force with little capability in the heart of your light/heavy envelope I am saying start from a force that is positioned right smack dab in the middle of the envelope and build its capabilities out from there as budget allows.

The RM sits squarely in the middle of the envelope - all singing, all dancing.   It can do many tasks for the British Government on its own.   It can operate in high intensity conflict with or without armour support (light or heavy). It can perform raids or it can act along with dedicated raiders like the Paras and with Special Forces.

Clearly, as the article by LtCol Wayne Eyre (which I linked to in the other Light Force thread) points out, there is a middle area where Light Force and Mech/Heavy Force capabilites can be complement eachother in the tactical or operational setting.

However, this doesn't mean that we should mix and match these two unique and seperate capabilites.   As I argued above, the RM in no way sits on some middle ground - they, like other Light Forces (such as the US Rangers in Mogadishu) can use vehicles for a administrative purposes (to move soldier, kit, weapons systems, or supplies if possible) but they in no way rely on the vehicles as a vital factor for tactical employment.

Now if you are offering me, the Canadian taxpayer , a choice between 6 Ranger Battalions and 6 Lt mechanized infantry Battalions operating as Cavalry or   6 Royal Marine Commandos and 6 Lt Mech Inf Bns operating as Cavalry then I'll take the 6 Cdo option and say fill your boots.

1)   As I've stressed above, RM and Rangers would both be Tier III SOC units, so they're one in the same.

2)   I'm not offering "Lt Mech Inf Bns" - as I said before, Mechanized Infantry, with the loss of the tank and the combat team, really has no utility for us anymore; we can't fight the heavy battle.   I'm argueing for a hybrid Cavalry force that performs a different set of tasks and offers us a different capability set then "Mech Inf".

3) I really don't want to offer the Canadian Taxpayer a "general purpose" force that does a bit of everything but nothing well.   I believe this will only marginalize our capabilities towards "Constabulary", which is clearly undesirable to the professional soldier.   As per the Bland quote I put in above, Canada would be better served by choosing an area we can best contribute and going from there.

My own preference, as stated, would be otherwise.   9 Commandos and 3 Cavalry Regiments.   Perhaps there is a need for additional boots in the Cavalry and manning limits don't allow the 9:3 structure to produce viable sized units.

Again, what happens if the need arises for a significant mechanized/cavalry requirement?   This uneven allotment will just burn the Cavalry out.   As well, we will face undesirable skill loss if we cram our Infantry into LAV's for any period of time and insist that our Light Force Engineers, Artillery, and CSS get involved in Mechanized battle.

Then maybe the answer is to transfer and additional company's worth of bodies from the Commandos to each of the Cavalry and give them an integral infantry company, in addition to their 3x48=144 Scouts/Dragoons/Dismounts/Assault troopers.

That would leave 8 Commandos and 3 Cavalry Regiments capable of producing 9 Squadrons each of which would have a hundred or so dedicated dismounts - or a full company. 1 Commando + 1 Squadron would supply 4 coys with a lot of fire power, range and mobility as well as quick reaction capability.

Now we're just getting helter-skelter with regards to organization, cohesion, capability, and sense of mission.   Pulling parts from around the Army to prepare for any inevitability will just create the same problems as plug-and-play (ruining us at the unit level) and throw a wrench into a simple and easy Readiness cycle (which is one of the factors in my logic of making the proposal in this way).

So, at heart, when we are looking at this discussion, as in all others it is necessary to define terms and expectations.

I use the term Light in contrast to Heavy.   You appear to be using the term Light in a sense that it gaining popularity over on this side to define a Special Forces type of Raider force.  

If that is the case then I can understand why you wish to focus so much manpower on the Mechanized force.

Personally I think that is wrong. That the net result will be tailoring your force too narrowly to meet the needs of today.   IMHO a Generalist force will cover both much of today's needs and be in a better position to deal with the unexpected.   One of the reasons we are having this discussion today is that Canada withdrew from a Generalist approach and ended up specializing as a Mech Infantry force.   Now we find that the Mech Infantry force doesn't meet the needs of the situation and you are having to jump through hoops reinventing yourself.   And it is not just a money thing.   When the Forward Edge of the Battle Area moved away from the Gates at Lahr and Baden-Baden to everywhere else the old structure became obsolete.

The reason I keep harping on about the Royal Marines is because they are living proof that a Generalist force does not have to be a sub-standard force.    Although, in the past Conscripts have been shoved into Generalist forces and thus given the concept a bad name, the Marines prove that a Generalist force can also be an "Elite" force.

I can't for the life of me figure out where you got this "Average Infantry that does a bit of everything and holds the ground" concept from.   Perhaps it was relevent in WWII or holding the Fulda Gap as a Heavy Force, but other then that, I see no relevence of the principle to what is required today as either Light Force or Cavalry are capable of "holding ground" in today's come-as-you-are, non-contiguous battlefield.   For example:

UNPROFOR: Cav Forces would have been very suited to this, probably more so then our guys who cruised around in dinky M-113's.   A more flexible and heavily armed Cavalry unit (as I've sketched out earlier) could project much greater combat power in the area.

IFOR/SFOR: Being a PSO, any force would have really did the trick - boots on the ground is the key.   My company cruised around in LPV's while the other company used the LAV III (with no dismounts) to patrol.   This is a contingency (like other PSO's) that either capability I wish to see us "niche" towards could fulfill.

Kosovo:   Clearly, a Cavalry capability could have fit in well here.   Perhaps, it could have been augmented with airmobile Light Force capability to allow for rapid shifting in a very rugged AO.

Op Apollo:   No denying that Air-Assaults into the Pashtun mountains to battle it out with insurgents and terrorists required a Light Force "Bergan Soldiers".   The other task of securing the base at Khandahar was ably aided by "ponyed up" Light Force soldiers in Humvees and an attached Recce Squadron.

Op Athena:   Like UNPROFOR, this is a dangerous PSO that requires boots on the ground, like UNPROFOR it can, and has been, sustained by both capabilites.   PSO is a mission, not a capability.

If we wished to dedicate forces to the Invasion of Iraq, a Cavalry Force as presented here would be extremely useful - it could have been added to the USMC as an additional LAR battalion or it could have served with a US Army or British Formation in the LAR function.   A light force added to this could have grouped up with US forces that dropped into Northern Iraq and linked up with the Kurds.

If we are going to move out of the ISAF PSO mission to either a PRT or with OEF in Khanadar, the Light Forces would be suited to the dispersed and non-contiguous tasks that would be required.   Again, to quote Mr Eyre (who did wonders in reinforcing my outlook), "High-density populations with a multitude of actors (joint, interagency, and multinational) all present challenges.   Extrapolating here a bit, this definition points light forces (in my opinion) towards our greatest contemporary challenge â “ counter-insurgency â “ a task that has historically fallen to light forces."

You are right, the definition of capability is important.   Basically, we can look at capability in terms of what it can accomplish in a View 1 Conflict (War).   Operations in View 2 Conflicts (OOTW) really don't need any force kicking around for it - all that is required is well-trained soldiers which in Canada is one of the things we've been lucky to retain.   So, we should hone in on View 1 capabilites knowing that we can "gear down" if required, but still be ready to enter a warfightin situation.   There are a wide variety of capabilities that could be required in a View 1 conflict - for example:

- Air Assault
- Mountain Ops (Alpinejager - sorry, had to find a spot for the Germans somewhere   )
- Jungle Ops
- Armoured Heavy Battle
- Stand-Off Deep Battle
- Mechanized/Cavalry Combined Arms
- Counter-Insurgency
- Littoral Warfare
- Direct Action/Raiding/Combat Patrolling

You get the point.   Since we can't, like the Americans or the British, hope to give each unit its own specialization, we must pick a few of these and work on them.   Perhaps my term of "Niche Capabilities" is a bit misleading - when I look over these and look on my proposal, we will in essence be retaining the "spirit" of the generalist approach that Canada has always maintained as our Light Forces and our Cav Forces will still have to focus on a variety of roles and tasks in their respective fields as they cannot afford to specify tasks like "Airborne" or "Mountain" and maintain reasonable readiness and sustainability.   So yes, the Light Soldier will still be a bit of a generalist in the spectrum of Light Force tasks, but he will in no ways be a pure "Raider" as you're assuming.   For example, the ideal requirements of an all-arms Light Force were layed out earlier:

every light soldier should be qualified Basic Mountain Ops, Basic Urban Ops (course forthcoming), and, depending what we do with the para capability, Basic Para qualified.   As available and necessary, jungle ops should be included.   As well, reflexive shooting, familiarity with airmobile ops, HUMINT gathering, and a mastery of patrolling are all a must.

Likewise, our Cavalry will specialize in winning the ISTAR battle, mounted patrolling, gunnery, heavy weapons, screening and flanking larger formations, DFS to Light Forces in a multi-capability envioronment, rapid reaction, and scout infiltration.

Capabilities cannot be "general purpose" and decided from the ground up.   Especially when restricted by resources, we must look down from the top and decide where we can best employ our forces in View 1 type conflicts (anything will do for View 2 policing).   I've claimed that the two most likely forms of View 1 conflicts that we should prepare for are "Son of Iraq" and "Step-Child of Chechnya".   The Cavalry capability fits comfortably in the first one and the Bergan-carrying Light capability fits nicely in the second.   Both of these Force Capabilites suit Canada's needs as they are Light, Flexible, well suited to the tasks they will adopt, tactically and strategically mobile and expeditionary in nature.  

Sure, there is much that we will be unable to do on our own (Air Assault, Littoral Warfare, Deep Battle, Armoured Heavy Battle), but within the coalition environment that we tend to gravitate towards, I'm sure we'll find a spot for our "niched capabilities".

Whew, that was alot.   I guess I really want to underline the fact that finding "Niche Capability" for our combined arms teams, as opposed to trying to whip up a "one size, fits all" lowest common denominator force, is the way to go.   There is alot of opposition to the idea of "Niche Roling", whether it be towards "Peacekeeping" or "Special Operations - and opposing this can be a very valid complaint.   However, it is clear that we must adopt some form of specialization if we want to remain relevent in the highly demanding environment of non-contiguous, come-as-you-are wars that demands the services of a fully professional force.   The spectrum of capabilites, missions, and requirements in View I conflicts is vast and Canada can simply not afford to cover all the bases.   We can try, meaning mediocrity in the end (like trying to do a Combat Team attack with a Light, wheeled vehicle and no tanks) but I feel we'll be better off to pick a few and put our eggs in those more effective baskets.

 

[McG]

Kirkhill,
It seems we are all taking the approach that our forces be created in order to achieve a defined spectrum of tasks through the full spectrum of conflict.  We need to specialise, but not over specialise.

As Infanteer stated, the infantry are our centre of gravity.   That is, they are the element that gives us the flexibility to perform in a broader spectrum of roles under a braoder spectrum of conditions.   I see your proposed Cavalry force as being the overly specialised entity that you've suggested mech infantry is.   Its narrow scope of operation has even been identified in the Armd Cav thread (security to a higher formation in war fighting, and security or reaction force in stability and peace support operations).   However, by including mechanized infantry sub-unit(s) (with a structure optimized to that role), you greatly increase the flexibility of the cavalry organization to take on broader tasks.   These dual-arms mechanized units would be permanent constructs that train together, establish strong unit cohesion and interoperability below the sub-unit level.

Another thing that you are not doing is looking beyond the pointy end at the tails of each organization.   Support elements designed to meet the needs of light forces will not meet the needs of mech forces.   Conversely, the support elements of mech forces cannot meet the needs of light forces deployed in a light role.   In many of these roles it it not simply a matter of "today you are light, and now tomorrow you will be mech."   You've asked about the light force drivers being qualified on the spectrum of potential vehicles.   Consider the conundrum of the dual force sappers that must maintain currency on an incredible amount of kit in one roll alone.   You'll be asking gunners to maintain readiness on both light and medium systems at the same time.   Maintainers need to be current on both medium weight armoured vehicles and light air deployable vehicles.   The service battalions will have to be proficient in logistical operations of both the medium force and an air inserted force which cannot be reached by trucks integral to the force.   The other option is that you maintain parallel CSS systems in Canada with one optimised to support the infantry in a light role and the other optimised to support the infantry when in a medium role.

 

[Kirkhill]

All right then.   It is time to get up off the canvas here....

Quote from: Kirkhill on Today at 09:06:16

Infanteer and McG:

From where I sit - the only real difference I see between your prescription of 6 Light Infantry   and 6 Cavalry Units and the my offer of 9 Light Infantry and 3 Cavalry Units is the ratios involved.

All of us fundamentally agree with the viability of the two types of force. That they are useful, viable, valuable and possible.   That they have a role to play across a wide spectrum of conflict.

My main point of contention with what you proposed is based on two factors:

1)   The "General Capabilities" framework in which you expect both forces to operate in - the Infantry kick around waiting for a job that may or may not require them to "mech up" with the Cavalry (which many Infantry types have said isn't tactically sound with an IFV) while the Cavalry kicks around looking for any job - in the process designating a significant chunk of its resources to driving around Infantry (meaning sacrifice of "Cavalry" capability at the expense of a taxi tasking).

2)   The uneven capabilities mean that the Cavalry side is liable to burn out faster then the Infantry if both are required on a consistent basis.   You've attempted to address this by making 9 independent squadrons available for Infantry assignments.   Having only a squadron of Cav available for a reasonable readiness-rotation cycle doesn't do us much good if a significant mechanized capability is required (say, Kosovo).

Ok.   At what point did I say anything about the Infantry and the Cavalry kicking around looking for jobs.   My basic premise is that working in a vehicle with a turret is fundamentally different than working on your feet.   I also accept that close co-operation between guys on their feet and turreted vehicles requires constant practice and training.   That is precisely the reason that I AGREE with you that the Mech force needs to be distinct from the Light force.   For traditions sake I felt that the Mech Force is arguably a Dragoon Force and a Dragoon Force is a Cavalry Force and the Cavalry became the Armoured so let's back up and let the Armoured do its original job.   So we agree on that.   I think.

The next issue is numbers. You say 6 + 6. I say 9+3.   You want to take 3 regiments with 9 miscellaneous squadrons and combine them with 3 battalions with 9 companies.   I want to take 3 Regiments with 9 Squadrons and add a useable dismount force.    The Aussies say for their cavalry operations they can get away with only 4 dismounts per patrol or 48 dismounts per Squadron.   An American Armoured Infantry company gets the job done with 54 men according to Bolger in Death Ground.   If we supplied these new bodies from the New 5000 we would still only be using up some 450 of those bodies.   At the end of the day I want to have created 9 Independent Squadrons of if you like 9 Permanent Combat Teams?   How many combat teams do you get out of combining 9 companies and 9 "tank" squadrons? 9 Isn't it?

So after all our hemming and hawing I want 9 combat teams and you want 9 combat teams.   Or do you want 18 mech infantry companies?  

As to the availability of the Cavalry, I accept that at some point in the greater scheme of things we are going to run out of bodies.   No matter how you organize this that day will come.   And with the small number of bodies available it will come sooner rather than later.

You say you needed the mech capability, as in Kosovo.   Correct me if I'm wrong but weren't the Paras and the Marines in Kosovo as well?   And the Paras were doing patrols on Supacats of all things.   Just because we might be out of suitable mech/cav forces, doesn't mean that we couldn't make a useful and welcome contribution with "Light" forces.

Quote
One grey area really revolves around the amount of infantry that the Cavalry force needs to do its job, how that infantry integrates into the force and what type of training it needs to do the job.

The other point of contention seems, in my mind, to revolve around the definitions of Light, Infantry and General Purpose.

I understand in the Canadian context that Light is coming to be synonymous with an American Ranger type of structure, or possibly a British Parachute Regiment.   From my understanding these are essentially raiding forces that hold ground, if at all, only for limited periods of time.   The Paras are a bit "heavier" than Rangers, having more vehicles and thus are capable of acting in stability operations for an extended period of time, as any other infantry unit can.

At the Heavy end of the scale we have "Panzer Grenadiers" dedicated to their Bradleys, Warriors, Marders and the like and the Cavalry troopers - in the Aussie case tied to their LAVs.   These are assault forces that take ground and are most valuable in High intensity conflicts They seem to be valuable in stability operations as reaction forces but, again, seem to be light on bodies to get out and interact with population.

Between those two extremes we have just plain Infantry, delivered by a variety of means, some by helicopter, some by boat, some in trucks - light, medium and armoured, some of them even tracked.   They may be optimized for different environments but at heart they are all Infantry.   They dismount and do their job on foot, whether it be fighting, patrolling or holding ground.

I cannot fathom how you've come to this outlook.   As many of the Infantry Officers and NCO's have pointed out in the Infantry forum, Light and Mech are Apples and Oranges.

I AGREE.   See above.  

As the Falklands showed, there is a difference between training and maintaining a "Bergen Soldier" and a "Mounted Soldier".   The "Bergen Soldier" fights on his own, taking support from man-portable or Joint force assets if possible, but ultimately he is responsible through tactics, fitness, and tactical ability to get on top of his objective.   The "Mounted Soldier", of which Infantry skills forms a vital part of the whole, is an all-arms battle in which a dismounted forces serve only as one platform in which firepower is delivered from.   There are different degrees in weight of both firepower and protection, but the principle is the same.

 

I AGREE. See above.

Looking back on history, I think the last of the "Plain Infantry" went out of style with the Wehrmacht and its 75% Horse-Drawn units or with elimination of National Service/Draftee soldiers in Britain, France, America and Germany.

Here I disagree.   Field Marshall Slim had it right mate.   And the proof of that is to be found in 82nd Airborne and the 101st Airborne and the Stryker Brigades, in the USMC MEU (SOC) and in the entire British infantry corps.  

The British Infantry Corps is built on a standardised Infantry Battalion structure
http://www.armedforces.co.uk/army/listings/search.cgi?search=1&perpage=30&sort_order=1,abc,forward&marknew=1&lfield2_keyword=THE%20INFANTRY

The baseline battalion in peacetime is 620 all ranks, sufficient for Light Role tasks and for Security duties (if fully recruited).   When that unit is converted to MECHANIZED in the British sense it is issued with an armoured truck and allocated an extra 47 bodies to man them and maintain them.   These are just trucks, transport, not fighting vehicles, not LAVs.   In the terms of what BBJ was saying earlier in the thread they are what the Soviets would have called Motorized.   When they get to the far end, they get out and go to work on foot.   In the Brits case the Transport Platoon of 47 bodies is incorporated right into the battalion.

In the case of the USMC MEU the battalion is allocated a platoon of 13 Amphibious Armoured Carriers, enough to lift a company at a time, if the company isn't being transported by helicopter, landing craft, truck or Shank's Mare.

So there is precedent for having a separate facility to lift light troops, under armour so that they can keep up with an armoured force.  

When the Brits reroled as Armoured Infantry, with Warriors, then the authorised strength of the Battalion jumped from 620 All Ranks to 771.   They effectively had to add a company and a half to their structure and as you point out fighting in association with a fighting vehicle is not going to be the same as fighting with what you have on your back.   This leads to again say that I AGREE with you on the need to keep those that serve vehicles with their vehicles. And God Bless 'Em.

However the Brits have created Heavy (Armoured), Medium (Mechanized) and Light brigades.   Their Armoured Brigades are all tracked.   Their Light Brigades are the Marines, 16 Air Assault and a new one forming.  

I want to focus on the Medium or Mechanized Brigades. They comprise 1 Armoured Regiment, 1 Armoured Infantry Battalion in Warriors and 2 Mechanized Battalions or Light infantry in armoured trucks.   Their TO&E is identical to the footborne troops.   They are Light troops and with their trucks they can maintain a reasonable rate of advance with the tracks.   In fact the probably deploy faster than the tracks and have to wait for them to catch up.

This is just to demonstrate that Light Forces, may operate to advantage with Heavy Forces.  

If you were to create 9 Independent Squadrons, what is to prevent the creation of a lift element, after the fashion of the Marines Amphibious Assault platoons to give a Light Force a lift and let it keep up with the Cavalry. No turrets. No guns.   Just protected transport.

The reason that I included the 82nd, 101st and Strykers is that these too are all Light Infantry - the Stryker Brigades describe themselves as such and Gen'l Shinsecki described them as such.   At the section and platoon level they all work from the same structure.   82nd and 101st are the same up to battalion level.

Getting back to the Brits with their 620 person Infantry Battalions for light roles, I agree that working in different environments requires different skills and training - but we went through that every year practicing for Winter Exercises.   A lot different that operating in the Summer. But we didn't have to change the entire structure.

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The American Army formed itself around Light Raiders and Heavy Assault Forces.   They have precious little of the force in the middle - standard infantry.   That is the gap the Stryker brigades are trying to fill.   But there are still on 6 of them planned out of a force of 43 Brigades (70 or so if you include the reserve brigades).

No.   Strykers are not meant to fill some "Standard Middle Ground" between "Light Raiders and Heavy Assault Forces" - it is an interim Table of Organization and Equipment that the US Army is using as it transitions from "Legacy Era" Heavy Forces meant for high-intensity, total war between superpowers to a light and flexible expeditionary capability based around the FCS.   At least this is what I got from reading General Shinseki's mission statement with the Interim Brigade Combat Team.  

I believe you are right with respect to Gen'l Shinseki's comments.   But with respect to the way that Gen'l Schoomaker is using them, the way that he is reorganizing as a more "infantry centric" force, the way that he is calling for all units to be able to put more boots on the ground, the way that he has put the entire FCS on indefinite hold, suggests that current policy is not what it was.   They need infantry.   Not necessarily Special Forces Tier 1,2, 3 or whatever.   They just need infantry and the only infantry they have is some pretty high priced help - 10th Mountain, 82nd Airborne, 101st Air Assault - it has cost an awful lot to train just those troops.   Gen'l Shinseki, IMHO, was trying to reverse a trend that occured with Clinton's downsizing - all of the Light Forces like the 7th ID were considered too light to fight.   And Armour was preserved.   Armour and specialist Infantry.   25th ID was probably next on the chopping block unless he could come up with a specialization for it.   He found it in the Stryker.   And preserved some pretty valuable Light Infantrymen

 

[Zipper]

Kirk - you go BOY! ;D

These are all great thoughts. And with my basic thought patterns, they do seem rather close together in many areas.

But once again I have a question.

All of these theory's sound great. But what is the reality of it?

It seems to me that the Armoured Regiments are going recce (Coyote/Gwagon) and DFS (MGS/TUA/ADATS). The infantry seems to me at present to be trying to stay mechanized (LAV III). And God knows what the Arty boys are doing except teaching the Armoured kids to play with their toys. So how could your ideas of Cavalry work with the MGS included? With the TUA and ADATS? Would you hand them to the Arty to use as DFS?

As well. The idea of us going to light forces and thus having 3 battalions as air droppable (is that a word?) again seems like it flys in the face of the government. Wouldn't you be just recreating the Airborne regiment again? And is going to fly in Ottawa.

So I ask. What are the chances that any of these ideas will make it beyond journal status? Because I like these concepts much more then the way we seem to be headed. They make more sense and they make us into a faster, more deadly force in my opinion.