Maritime Coastal Defence Vessels (MCDVs)

[Oldgateboatdriver]

Do you reckon that your watchkeepers could have got her switched back on before she hit yon pier?

Yes.

Because, unlike merchant ships, when we are in harbour: (1) the secondary steering is fully manned - ready to switch in a moment's notice, (2) we have multiple (at least two) diesel generators up and running - so incredibly low probability of complete power failure, (3) the foc'sole is fully manned with the anchor at readiness for letting go and (4) we have all engines up and ready for immediate maneuvering - which is almost always more than one.

Unlike merchant ships that have a single main engine, a single generator running, no one manning secondary steering and, usually not enough personnel at the anchor windlass without requiring some more from the other end of the ship.

 

[Furniture]

Yes.

Because, unlike merchant ships, when we are in harbour: (1) the secondary steering is fully manned - ready to switch in a moment's notice, (2) we have multiple (at least two) diesel generators up and running - so incredibly low probability of complete power failure, (3) the foc'sole is fully manned with the anchor at readiness for letting go and (4) we have all engines up and ready for immediate maneuvering - which is almost always more than one.

Unlike merchant ships that have a single main engine, a single generator running, no one manning secondary steering and, usually not enough personnel at the anchor windlass without requiring some more from the other end of the ship.

All of those things plus a full Nav brief with all involved parties, and clearly delineated "Commmand Decision Points" with COAs for dangerous sections of the transit.

 

[Halifax Tar]

Yes.

Because, unlike merchant ships, when we are in harbour: (1) the secondary steering is fully manned - ready to switch in a moment's notice, (2) we have multiple (at least two) diesel generators up and running - so incredibly low probability of complete power failure, (3) the foc'sole is fully manned with the anchor at readiness for letting go and (4) we have all engines up and ready for immediate maneuvering - which is almost always more than one.

Unlike merchant ships that have a single main engine, a single generator running, no one manning secondary steering and, usually not enough personnel at the anchor windlass without requiring some more from the other end of the ship.

Another reason we need more people than the merchant navy.

 

[dimsum]

Another reason we need more people than the merchant navy.

Also, the Merchant Navy can be run with minimal crew bc they’re not expecting combat losses.

 

[Kirkhill]

Yes.

Because, unlike merchant ships, when we are in harbour: (1) the secondary steering is fully manned - ready to switch in a moment's notice, (2) we have multiple (at least two) diesel generators up and running - so incredibly low probability of complete power failure, (3) the foc'sole is fully manned with the anchor at readiness for letting go and (4) we have all engines up and ready for immediate maneuvering - which is almost always more than one.

Unlike merchant ships that have a single main engine, a single generator running, no one manning secondary steering and, usually not enough personnel at the anchor windlass without requiring some more from the other end of the ship.

Another way to look at your response would be to say that your watchkeepers would have been able to respond because they had a different ship than the one the actual crew had.

I suggest that the actual situation might have been improved if additional power sources had been available. Was the ship being tended by tugs as it manoeuvered into open water?

Also the actual situation might have been improved if the bridge piers had been able to withstand the impact by the ship. The ships of the era in which the bridge was built, the late 60s, early 70s, did they displace as much as the modern ships? The bridge was permitted as a connector by the Coast Guard only after the Corps of Engineers proposal for a tunnel had been determined to be too expensive.

We talk about infrastructure but rarely include canals in the discussion. The rise of super ships has strained the abilities of nautical infrastructure as the Evergreen-Suez situation demonstrated.

 

[YZT580]

Another way to look at your response would be to say that your watchkeepers would have been able to respond because they had a different ship than the one the actual crew had.

I suggest that the actual situation might have been improved if additional power sources had been available. Was the ship being tended by tugs as it manoeuvered into open water?

Also the actual situation might have been improved if the bridge piers had been able to withstand the impact by the ship. The ships of the era in which the bridge was built, the late 60s, early 70s, did they displace as much as the modern ships? The bridge was permitted as a connector by the Coast Guard only after the Corps of Engineers proposal for a tunnel had been determined to be too expensive.

We talk about infrastructure but rarely include canals in the discussion. The rise of super ships has strained the abilities of nautical infrastructure as the Evergreen-Suez situation demonstrated.

Would any bridge construction be able to withstand a direct hit? That is a lot of inertia? We witnessed the answer to the question of what happens when the immovable meets the irresistible. The designers would have taken the possibility of a hit into consideration but from working with aviation safety I can guess that the study had odds that fit it into the 1 in a 100 year category so they went for it.

 

[Halifax Tar]

Also, the Merchant Navy can be run with minimal crew bc they’re not expecting combat losses.

Or apparently need for engine room emergencies or emergency steering.

 

[Furniture]

Would any bridge construction be able to withstand a direct hit? That is a lot of inertia? We witnessed the answer to the question of what happens when the immovable meets the irresistible. The designers would have taken the possibility of a hit into consideration but from working with aviation safety I can guess that the study had odds that fit it into the 1 in a 100 year category so they went for it.

Bridges can be designed for it, but that bridge is likely old enough to have been designed when ships were much smaller.

I know in Hobart and Tampa they added protective dolphins around the bridge piers to prevent direct hits from ships.

 

[Kirkhill]

Would any bridge construction be able to withstand a direct hit? That is a lot of inertia? We witnessed the answer to the question of what happens when the immovable meets the irresistible. The designers would have taken the possibility of a hit into consideration but from working with aviation safety I can guess that the study had odds that fit it into the 1 in a 100 year category so they went for it.

I'm going to guess that you are right that the initial calculations would have been done on a balance of probabilities. In the 1960's, I believe, the balance of probabilities would have skewed downwards because ships of that era were generally smaller than the behemoths now in service.

Perhaps the harbourmaster needed to give some consideration to how the traffic was managed given the nature of the infrastructure and the nature of the traffic.

That essentially is what was necessary after the Exxon Valdez affair, new rules on traffic management.

 

[Kirkhill]

Or apparently need for engine room emergencies or emergency steering.

Which is why, I suggest, that harbours employ tugs and tenders.

 

[Navy_Pete]

I debated putting this in one of the "Drone" threads but every thread seems to becoming a "Drone" thread.

4 companies, contenders for major unmanned ship program, pass engine reliability testing - Breaking Defense

The milestone comes as the Large Unmanned Surface Vessel program faces steep budget cuts.

breakingdefense.com

So a 1500 tonne ship that doesn't require intervention in the engine room for 30 days. One way to use that is have an uncrewed vessel. Another way to use that is to have a lightly crewed vessel with a crew with reduced training requirements.

A crew more like an Orca crew than an MCDV crew.

It's interesting talking to other navies working on this how many people are actually on the 'unmanned' ships, and how frequently they are crewed. Some countries are now using 'optionally crewed' instead to differentiate.

For the collision, not sure how anyone could have engineered the bridge to sustain that kind of damage; it's a big piece supported at two ends, and if you take out one end it's going to collapse.

Lots of things built into commercial designs to stop this from happening, and sure they had a harbour pilot and other common things in place, so will wait and see what the reports say. From reading a lot of other incidents, they frequently seem to be a lot of little things vice one big failure, which is why big picture 'aggregate risk' is important when you have a lot of smaller defects; they can undercut each other so that overall your safety mitigations are not actually effective anymore. Actual crew is one big part of that for when equipment fails, but those ships are so big that the lead time required to avoid collision can be measured in minutes and sometimes miles. Even tugs aren't going to stop or divert them without a fair bit of warning, especially if it's not under it's own power and drifting in currents.

 

[Kirkhill]

It's interesting talking to other navies working on this how many people are actually on the 'unmanned' ships, and how frequently they are crewed. Some countries are now using 'optionally crewed' instead to differentiate.

You are right. I noticed that even the USNs USVs retained a skeleton crew of 4 to 6 watchkeepers. That kind of influences my thinking on the manning of things in general. I think an automated tank or howitzer should always have one person on board. The last person fired from the organization needs to be the Captain, whether she is the Gun Captain or the Ship's Captain.

WRT to the 720 hour unattended machinery - I put that into the same category as 10,000 MRBF - Mean Rounds Between Failure. Every system should be built to maximize those numbers so as to minimize the crew and maintenance requirements.

For the collision, not sure how anyone could have engineered the bridge to sustain that kind of damage; it's a big piece supported at two ends, and if you take out one end it's going to collapse.

Those structures would not be affected by dinghies or fishing boats. Somewhere between those and the Dali the risk becomes great enough that something needs to be done to mitigate the risk. On the Columbia, at Astoria, a bridge of similar design is shorter and higher and is anchored into shore rock on one end and a causeway on the other. Large ships like the Dali move past that bridge up river to Longview and Portland. Decisions were made. Perhaps other decisions could have been made. Regardless the bridge that was built had to be managed in accordance with changing circumstances.

Lots of things built into commercial designs to stop this from happening, and sure they had a harbour pilot and other common things in place, so will wait and see what the reports say.

Agreed.

From reading a lot of other incidents, they frequently seem to be a lot of little things vice one big failure, which is why big picture 'aggregate risk' is important when you have a lot of smaller defects; they can undercut each other so that overall your safety mitigations are not actually effective anymore. Actual crew is one big part of that for when equipment fails, but those ships are so big that the lead time required to avoid collision can be measured in minutes and sometimes miles. Even tugs aren't going to stop or divert them without a fair bit of warning, especially if it's not under it's own power and drifting in currents.

Agreed.

I believe in some harbours tugs are the prime movers.

 

[Navy_Pete]

The weapon systems one is interesting, it seems like there is zero appetite to have completely uncrewed at all when there are weapons and sensors, so there will always be some kind of force protection type component, as the actual legality of an uncrewed ship with weapons is still a bit up in the air. As soon as you do that you need hotel services, crew accommodations etc and very quickly you end up with a skeleton crew concept.

Things like engines are actually pretty straight forward as there are lots of completely remote generators etc that will run for weeks with no maintenance at all; I think it's all the unsexy things like piping between systems that is more of an issue for maintenance. There are proofs of concept for remote and automatic reconfigurable sea water and fuel systems, but in practice they cost an absolute fortune and are maintenance intensive, so even the USN didn't go down that route. Things that work fine on a land based system or oil platform tend to break down a lot sooner on a moving ship which has a lot more wear and tear from all the bouncing around and vibrations.

 

[Kirkhill]

The weapon systems one is interesting, it seems like there is zero appetite to have completely uncrewed at all when there are weapons and sensors, so there will always be some kind of force protection type component, as the actual legality of an uncrewed ship with weapons is still a bit up in the air. As soon as you do that you need hotel services, crew accommodations etc and very quickly you end up with a skeleton crew concept.

On land I would be counting on 4 people commanding 4 "autonomous/optionally-manned" vehicles to work with the vehicles and maintain a 24 hour watch programme. 1 person awake and commanding all 4 vehicles while the other 3 sleep or conduct other tasks. If fighting and comms are denied between vehicles then there is always an operator on board capable of conducting operations independently from the hardwired HMI.

At sea, maybe your crew looks more like an Air Defence Battery with a platoon of Marines for security and a Command Section.

Things like engines are actually pretty straight forward as there are lots of completely remote generators etc that will run for weeks with no maintenance at all;

Seen.

I think it's all the unsexy things like piping between systems that is more of an issue for maintenance. There are proofs of concept for remote and automatic reconfigurable sea water and fuel systems, but in practice they cost an absolute fortune and are maintenance intensive, so even the USN didn't go down that route.

I get what you are saying here but the engines actually include a lot of piping, water and fuel components and yet, as we both seem to be agreeing, it is possible to build a complex system of that sort and have it run for extended periods with minimal supervision. Millions of cars on the road will attest to that.

Things that work fine on a land based system or oil platform tend to break down a lot sooner on a moving ship which has a lot more wear and tear from all the bouncing around and vibrations.

I think the difference between the Navy's ships and a Oil Services truck is less the amount of bouncing they do than the operational live expected. Some flex and vibration issues can be managed. Others can't and result in pipes and hoses flexing to extinction while others corrode and erode. Wires vibrate loose from their screws and intermittent interruptions occur.

The difference, in my view, is that no rational fleet operator would expect his trucks to operate for 40 years. Even commercial ship owners tend to sell off their ships long before the Navy de-commissions theirs.

 

[Colin Parkinson]

Bridges can be designed for it, but that bridge is likely old enough to have been designed when ships were much smaller.

I know in Hobart and Tampa they added protective dolphins around the bridge piers to prevent direct hits from ships.

The same was done to the bridges in Vancouver circa 1990's to accommodate for the larger ships where the upper bow extends beyond bulbous bow.

 

[Oldgateboatdriver]

The MacDonald bridge in Halifax was modified in the 1980’s when stone piers were added to protect the legs against just this type of accident. It was done because of the expected increase in large container ships traffic when the new container terminal in Bedford basin was about to start operating. So age of bridge is not relevant.

 

[Furniture]

The MacDonald bridge in Halifax was modified in the 1980’s when stone piers were added to protect the legs against just this type of accident. It was done because of the expected increase in large container ships traffic when the new container terminal in Bedford basin was about to start operating. So age of bridge is not relevant.

Age is relevant, as is forethought....

 

[Colin Parkinson]

The MacDonald bridge in Halifax was modified in the 1980’s when stone piers were added to protect the legs against just this type of accident. It was done because of the expected increase in large container ships traffic when the new container terminal in Bedford basin was about to start operating. So age of bridge is not relevant.

You can see in this drone video that the bridge has minimal protection up and downstream by two small circular piles. Very inadequate. I don't doubt that during the lawsuits, it will surface that a report was done about the inadequacies of these protection piles and a recommendation and design was put forward, only to be shelved due to costs and who should pay for it. Expect to see federal money allocated to fix this issue here and other key bridges.