Maritime Coastal Defence Vessels (MCDVs)

[Rainbow1910]

The CCG does have a law enforcement ability through the use of their parent organization, the Department of Fisheries and Oceans with their Fisheries Officers. The CCG largely acts as a taxi service for bringing DFO Enforcement and sometimes RCMP to where they need to undertake their duties.

The CCG is a bit hard up on proper patrol vessels as their fleet is largely old and heavily worn. The two AOPS are coming to their fleet but otherwise, it’s a bit rough.

 

[Kirkhill]

Are there many (any) shipyards in Canada producing OSVs? I am unaware of any.

In time of war where would we find qualified suppliers of even simple vessels?

The RCN bought the Anticostis which were the prototypes for the MCDVs in 1973 from a Vancouver yard.
Nova Scotia subsidized the production of four OSVs in Halifax in 1998.

Beyond that, my impression is that OSVs employed in Canada are routinely purchased off shore.

 

[GR66]

From CDR.

So what is a "warfighting capability" that we can't produce quickly? Sidekick ship? Optionally crewed vessels? Tier two combatant (Mogami class sort of thing). Heavy sensored patrol ship (Ala Holland Class)? Modular fighting capability on a CMS 330 backbone? Arsenal ship?

I'd argue that there is likely no significant naval "warfighting capability" that can be produced quickly during a conflict. The supply chains for the weapons, sensors and major mechanical components will either require off-shore elements which may not be possible or practical to obtain during a conflict or have a lead time which is too long to have an impact in the timeline of a conflict.

The possible exception could be smaller, domestically produced un-crewed systems that would act as either sensor nodes or attack platforms rather than more complex multi-function manned platforms. These would be seen more as expendable "munitions" rather than persistent platforms. Even if you had pre-approved designs and a stand-by stock of long lead time items could you even produce a small OPV/OSV-type vessel within a useable timeframe during a conflict?

This is something I was thinking about myself. Sensors and weapon integration is something that you can't just create overnight quickly nor buy off the shelf like a ship with a crane on it (OSV as the CRNC puts it).

Things like Tier two combatants with high automation and low crewing are examples. Sometimes you just need a hull that can do stuff in a position to do it. This is starting to sound more and more like Destroyers + Frigates concept that we had 1993-2010, just with more weight onto the destroyer part.

So if I were to evalute the RCN doctrine on this, it would be 4 Destroyers + 1 AOR as an RCN Task group. This is the expeditionary team that does the stuff at the pointy end or perhaps the core of the Task Group.
Additional building blocks would be a submarine or Canadian Corvette to add tool box capabilities like the frigates were supposed to bring (boarding parites, ASW, increased sensor coverage etc...).

Sailing detached would be submarines and the Canadian Corvettes (ones and twos) to patrol, picket and provide information gathering in Canadian waters.

Australia's Tier Two combatants are supposed to watch the supply lines from the Middle East and Europe through the Indian Ocean (Australia is a massive oil importer). Their Tier One combatants (Hunter and Hobarts) will be watching the Sea/Air Gap between Indonesia and Australia or plugging the Straits of Malacca.

Canadian Corvette program vessels may be doing similar with watching supply lines to Korea/Japan while the RCN TG protects the terminus in Asia and the corvettes watch the start point in Canada up to the terminus.

(yes yes, no crew, hopium, not realistic... but fun to think about!)

What specific capabilities would a Canadian Corvette Tier Two combatant need in order to conduct the task you envision and how many would you need?

Canadian Corvette program vessels may be doing similar with watching supply lines to Korea/Japan while the RCN TG protects the terminus in Asia and the corvettes watch the start point in Canada up to the terminus.

As far as Canadian Corvettes supporting a Task Group, how many of the stated tasks could be performed by un-crewed platforms?

Additional building blocks would be a submarine or Canadian Corvette to add tool box capabilities like the frigates were supposed to bring (boarding parites, ASW, increased sensor coverage etc...).

Sailing detached would be submarines and the Canadian Corvettes (ones and twos) to patrol, picket and provide information gathering in Canadian waters.

 

[Swampbuggy]

The CCG does have a law enforcement ability through the use of their parent organization, the Department of Fisheries and Oceans with their Fisheries Officers. The CCG largely acts as a taxi service for bringing DFO Enforcement and sometimes RCMP to where they need to undertake their duties.

The CCG is a bit hard up on proper patrol vessels as their fleet is largely old and heavily worn. The two AOPS are coming to their fleet but otherwise, it’s a bit rough.

It’s assuming here that the HERO class would be unsuitable in that role and that CAPE ROGER/CYGNUS are too long in the tooth.

 

[YZT580]

I'd argue that there is likely no significant naval "warfighting capability" that can be produced quickly during a conflict. The supply chains for the weapons, sensors and major mechanical components will either require off-shore elements which may not be possible or practical to obtain during a conflict or have a lead time which is too long to have an impact in the timeline of a conflict.

The possible exception could be smaller, domestically produced un-crewed systems that would act as either sensor nodes or attack platforms rather than more complex multi-function manned platforms. These would be seen more as expendable "munitions" rather than persistent platforms. Even if you had pre-approved designs and a stand-by stock of long lead time items could you even produce a small OPV/OSV-type vessel within a useable timeframe during a conflict?


What specific capabilities would a Canadian Corvette Tier Two combatant need in order to conduct the task you envision and how many would you need?

As far as Canadian Corvettes supporting a Task Group, how many of the stated tasks could be performed by un-crewed platforms?

Would it not be possible though, and cost efficient as well, to stockpile the weapon systems that would be required. Hulls are not hard to build

 

[Rainbow1910]

It’s assuming here that the HERO class would be unsuitable in that role and that CAPE ROGER/CYGNUS are too long in the tooth.

The Hero class are small and somewhat questionable vessels, they'd be quite a poor fit for any uses abroad. They are even worse than the MCDV's in these regards, the current fisheries patrol vessels of the CCG are fairly busy with domestic work as well alongside being pretty dated yes.

 

[Czech_pivo]

Would it not be possible though, and cost efficient as well, to stockpile the weapon systems that would be required. Hulls are not hard to build

I think we might still have some 40mm Bofors sitting around waiting to leave port for the 3rd time in their life.

 

[Colin Parkinson]

The CCG does have a law enforcement ability through the use of their parent organization, the Department of Fisheries and Oceans with their Fisheries Officers. The CCG largely acts as a taxi service for bringing DFO Enforcement and sometimes RCMP to where they need to undertake their duties.

The CCG is a bit hard up on proper patrol vessels as their fleet is largely old and heavily worn. The two AOPS are coming to their fleet but otherwise, it’s a bit rough.

The Hero class was supposed to help fill that gap on the inshore and nearshore zones. CCG actively avoided the enforcement role for years and was dragged kicking and screaming to it with the merger of the 3 fleets. The NavAids look down on the SAR side and just want to fix Navaids and break ice on a nice regular schedule.

 

[Oldgateboatdriver]

The RCN bought the Anticostis which were the prototypes for the MCDVs in 1973 from a Vancouver yard.
Nova Scotia subsidized the production of four OSVs in Halifax in 1998.

Incorrect. While Moresby and Anticosti, in their first incarnation as oil-rig supply ships (then known As Joy Tide and Jeanne Tide), were indeed built in Vancouver in 1972 and 1973, they were never considered as prototype for the MCDV. They were purchased in 1988 by DND for the sole purpose of serving as test and training ships to develop the skills and equipment for later use on the MCDV's, so that reserve crews could become familiar with mine warfare and the gear that was going to be used on the MCDV's while they were being built - so as to be ready from day one.

As soon as the MCDV's entered service, they were both retired from service as warships. Moresby went back to her original life as an oil-rig support vessel, while Anticosti was retained for a while as a fleet auxiliary (CFAV) to do coastal towing duties of targets and other similar systems, as a replacement for CFAV St. Charles.

 

[Colin Parkinson]

I wonder which Navy is going to want to pick the MCDV's up? Chilean or Philippines?

 

[Rainbow1910]

I wonder which Navy is going to want to pick the MCDV's up? Chilean or Philippines?

I believe Vietnam was mentioned here sometime ago.

 

[Navy_Pete]

I wonder which Navy is going to want to pick the MCDV's up? Chilean or Philippines?

Some bright light will probably label a few bolts or the terrible diesels as ITAR and scupper it all.

Although seriously the number of random things that are ITAR or marked as ITAR makes it a nightmare; at one point there was serious discussion about having any ITAR equipment being avoided if possible on the non-combatants due to the support issues it can cause, and impacts on TDP and getting people cleared for level 2 when the equipment is COTs with ITAR labeling. I get crypto and comms, but the brush has been slapped on so broad it's crazy the amount of stuff that is categorized as ITAR. I've said before, but we tried challenging some bolts that were ITAR but available at any hardware store; it went off to some DOD black hole never to be heard of again. We simply catalogued basic cat 5 bolts to the same specs and substituted those for the NSN with the ITAR tag.

 

[lenaitch]

The CCG does have a law enforcement ability through the use of their parent organization, the Department of Fisheries and Oceans with their Fisheries Officers. The CCG largely acts as a taxi service for bringing DFO Enforcement and sometimes RCMP to where they need to undertake their duties.

That's for enforcing Canadian law in Canadian waters. The suggested use in international operations would likely require a lot of legislative and practical changes. Having said that, I'm not smart enough to know what authority tasks like OP Caribbe operate under.

 

[Kirkhill]

Incorrect. While Moresby and Anticosti, in their first incarnation as oil-rig supply ships (then known As Joy Tide and Jeanne Tide), were indeed built in Vancouver in 1972 and 1973,

Fair.

they were never considered as prototype for the MCDV. They were purchased in 1988 by DND for the sole purpose of serving as test and training ships to develop the skills and equipment for later use on the MCDV's, so that reserve crews could become familiar with mine warfare and the gear that was going to be used on the MCDV's while they were being built - so as to be ready from day one.

So they were platforms on which the RCN could develop skill, equipment and crews for the MCDVs....

As soon as the MCDV's entered service, they were both retired from service as warships. Moresby went back to her original life as an oil-rig support vessel, while Anticosti was retained for a while as a fleet auxiliary (CFAV) to do coastal towing duties of targets and other similar systems, as a replacement for CFAV St. Charles.

Fair.

 

[Cloud Cover]

What are thoughts of Canada moving beyond just MCM but also mine laying with recoverable sea mines. A tactical weapon which has strategic implications if used in the far North. A ship that can function as a patrol corvette, ASW platform ( with chopper and drones), deploy robotic mine hunting and mcm gear, and deploy -recover sea mines. South Korea built a one-off (actually 2 completely different “one off”, but the latest class ( Nampo) has some potential as a starting point for discussion. The 2 problems I see are size of crew (120), and a whole new capability for which we likely have no doctrine and would almost certainly run into friction with some of our allies (mine laying) who likely don’t always notify us when they are operating in the North.

Food for thought as a discussion point, not necessarily a design copy suggestion.

Wonsan and Nampo minelayer classes of the Republic of Korea Navy

Written by D-Mitch RoKS Nampo , one of the most advanced minelayers in the world today Today, some of the most advanced and most ca...

www.navalanalyses.com

 

[Pelorus]

What are thoughts of Canada moving beyond just MCM but also mine laying with recoverable sea mines. A tactical weapon which has strategic implications if used in the far North. A ship that can function as a patrol corvette, ASW platform ( with chopper and drones), deploy robotic mine hunting and mcm gear, and deploy -recover sea mines. South Korea built a one-off (actually 2 completely different “one off”, but the latest class ( Nampo) has some potential as a starting point for discussion. The 2 problems I see are size of crew (120), and a whole new capability for which we likely have no doctrine and would almost certainly run into friction with some of our allies (mine laying) who likely don’t always notify us when they are operating in the North.

Food for thought as a discussion point, not necessarily a design copy suggestion.

Wonsan and Nampo minelayer classes of the Republic of Korea Navy

Written by D-Mitch RoKS Nampo , one of the most advanced minelayers in the world today Today, some of the most advanced and most ca...

www.navalanalyses.com

What is the use case for sea mines in Canada? They are an area denial tool. Primarily used "defensively" to deny access to an area that you expect the enemy is about to forcefully enter, and in niche cases a submarine could lay them covertly in an enemy area "offensively" to disrupt marine traffic and force enemy resources to that area to clear.

I'm not convinced that the West is ready to accept the inevitable civilian casualties that would result from an "offensive" use of sea mines, and I don't think the Arctic is at enough risk of seaborne invasion to justify the investment in defensive mines.

The Arctic is incredibly inhospitable. Having listened to a number of strategists over the years give talks on the Arctic, none of them seem particularly concerned about the viability of a land forces invasion into northern Canada. I tend to agree, and struggle to envision a scenario where the cost of entry for Russia to invade with anything substantial into the Canadian North is better value for money than using their resources literally anywhere else.

 

[Underway]

What is the use case for sea mines in Canada? They are an area denial tool. Primarily used "defensively" to deny access to an area that you expect the enemy is about to forcefully enter, and in niche cases a submarine could lay them covertly in an enemy area "offensively" to disrupt marine traffic and force enemy resources to that area to clear.

I completely agree that it doesn't fit into our overall strategic requirements. Submarines are the preferred anti access/area denial tool that we need. Canada's military requirements for the RCN need to be more hockey (switch from defense to offence at a moments notice) than football (offensive and defensive line specialization). Mine laying doesn't really fit into this very well.

I'm not convinced that the West is ready to accept the inevitable civilian casualties that would result from an "offensive" use of sea mines, and I don't think the Arctic is at enough risk of seaborne invasion to justify the investment in defensive mines.

The west has plenty of mine layers. Finland, Sweden, Italy (who are the acknowledge world experts in sea mines by many), Denmark, Germany, Turkey, Greece. US can use air deployed mines (but considers it very inefficient when you can just hit something with a missile instead).

We should rely upon our allies for mine laying, and continue to work with them for mine removal.

 

[Rainbow1910]

That's for enforcing Canadian law in Canadian waters. The suggested use in international operations would likely require a lot of legislative and practical changes. Having said that, I'm not smart enough to know what authority tasks like OP Caribbe operate under.

DFO and the CCG actively works with Japan, Korea and the US to station Dash-8 patrol aircraft out of Hokkaido alongside doing high seas patrols yearly under Operation Northern Pacific Guard. This is an international operation on the high seas, CCGS Sir Wilfrid Laurier made a port call in Japan earlier this month after doing illegal, unreported and unregulated fishery patrols in the northern Pacific.

That being said, it is one thing to deploy the CCG and DFO Officers to international fisheries patrols and an entirely different thing to send them off on drug and smuggling interdiction missions abroad. That might be a major issue.

 

[lenaitch]

DFO and the CCG actively works with Japan, Korea and the US to station Dash-8 patrol aircraft out of Hokkaido alongside doing high seas patrols yearly under Operation Northern Pacific Guard. This is an international operation on the high seas, CCGS Sir Wilfrid Laurier made a port call in Japan earlier this month after doing illegal, unreported and unregulated fishery patrols in the northern Pacific.

That being said, it is one thing to deploy the CCG and DFO Officers to international fisheries patrols and an entirely different thing to send them off on drug and smuggling interdiction missions abroad. That might be a major issue.

My question was asked out of ignorance and partially rhetorical. It's one thing to surveil international waters, and maybe in regard to fishing in international waters there is some manner of international treaty. I was mainly wondering what the authority was of any nation to stop and board (or even shoot at) another vessel in international waters.