Maritime Coastal Defence Vessels (MCDVs)

[Cloud Cover]

Many years ago the CF was allowed, maybe even encouraged, to talk about their requirements in public and the Navy, at least actually published a shiny paper (does Leadmark ring a bell with anyone?) - sure, maybe it looked a bit like the Sears Christmas Wish Book, but my memory says that it made pretty cogent case for a fleet of 10 to 15 major surface combatants - destroyers/frigates - and as many minor combatants - corvettes? - and some submarines and oilers and training vessels and so on.

I think the authors were pretty level headed and many of their conclusions still seem, to me, to stand up 30 years after the fact.

RCN and Canadian government never hit a single milestone of Leadmark 2020 despite it being written in 1999. In fact they still haven’t done so.

 

[GK .Dundas]

RCN and Canadian government never hit a single milestone of Leadmark 2020 despite it being written in 1999. In fact they still haven’t done so.

But according to the many press releases....any day now....

 

[Kirkhill]

But according to the many press releases....any day now....

 

[Halifax Tar]

Other navies have much bigger support groups; when I was an LCMM the RN had about 12 people doing the same scope of work. That was probably an outlier, but we could easily have many more LCMMs and supply managers for the existing fleet and the ones coming down the pipe. Every time you add another class there can be a step increase in work, and small batches of separate classes are a nightmare.

Even if they look similar, the systems will all be different enough that it's a lot to learn. That's the same for coastal support and repairs, where things will be slightly different, and they'll just need more people across the board. When you get down to detailed planning, and component level support those changes really make a difference.

Could be a tentacle of unification ? What if the RCN was funded to provide its own material support ?

Right now we have to fly an FLS member to a 3rd country in Europe to pick up a part that we (the ship) are buying over the phone, because the LCMM "has no budget". Disgusting. Shakes head an furious logistician

Why are we paying the salaries of people we wont resource to do their jobs ? Dissolve those positions and give those funds (salaries) to the units and be done with a façade they 1st line units are not funded to supply their own spares. Fund me and I will do it myself, that seems to be the CoA now anyways.

 

[Pelorus]

Could be a tentacle of unification ? What if the RCN was funded to provide its own material support ?

Right now we have to fly an FLS member to a 3rd country in Europe to pick up a part that we (the ship) are buying over the phone, because the LCMM "has no budget". Disgusting. Shakes head an furious logistician

Why are we paying the salaries of people we wont resource to do their jobs ? Dissolve those positions and give those funds (salaries) to the units and be done with a façade they 1st line units are not funded to supply their own spares. Fund me and I will do it myself, that seems to be the CoA now anyways.

Have you captured this issue in a Briefing Note, specifically focusing on a cost comparison between what you've described above (i.e., staff hours to source the part, cost of the part itself, TD costs for your FLS to travel to a 3rd location to procure, etc.) vs what it would have cost for the part to have been dispatched to you under normal HPR processes if the part was in stock within the CAF supply system?

Unlikely that this results in a near-term solution for you, but it would likely be worthwhile data for ADM(Mat) or whomever when they make a broader pitch for additional funding from DND or TB. Arguments relating to operational impacts often don't land outside of CAF operational lines, but being able to provide concrete data to say that "HMCS X buying this part on short notice as an Urgent Operational Requirement was X% more costly than if it had been available within the CAF supply system" could possibly register with the right people.

 

[Halifax Tar]

Have you captured this issue in a Briefing Note, specifically focusing on a cost comparison between what you've described above (i.e., staff hours to source the part, cost of the part itself, TD costs for your FLS to travel to a 3rd location to procure, etc.) vs what it would have cost for the part to have been dispatched to you under normal HPR processes if the part was in stock within the CAF supply system?

I have not, and it never crossed my mind! But now you have given me the idea. Honestly the CDS is visiting soon, it was going to be a question I was going to pose to her.

Unlikely that this results in a near-term solution for you, but it would likely be worthwhile data for ADM(Mat) or whomever when they make a broader pitch for additional funding from DND or TB. Arguments relating to operational impacts often don't land outside of CAF operational lines, but being able to provide concrete data to say that "HMCS X buying this part on short notice as an Urgent Operational Requirement was X% more costly than if it had been available within the CAF supply system" could possibly register with the right people.

Very valid.

 

[suffolkowner]

Have you captured this issue in a Briefing Note, specifically focusing on a cost comparison between what you've described above (i.e., staff hours to source the part, cost of the part itself, TD costs for your FLS to travel to a 3rd location to procure, etc.) vs what it would have cost for the part to have been dispatched to you under normal HPR processes if the part was in stock within the CAF supply system?

Unlikely that this results in a near-term solution for you, but it would likely be worthwhile data for ADM(Mat) or whomever when they make a broader pitch for additional funding from DND or TB. Arguments relating to operational impacts often don't land outside of CAF operational lines, but being able to provide concrete data to say that "HMCS X buying this part on short notice as an Urgent Operational Requirement was X% more costly than if it had been available within the CAF supply system" could possibly register with the right people.

my experience with the purchasing management system and personnel in a large private company suggests that this is not a problem unique to the CAF or easily remedied

 

[Navy_Pete]

Could be a tentacle of unification ? What if the RCN was funded to provide its own material support ?

Right now we have to fly an FLS member to a 3rd country in Europe to pick up a part that we (the ship) are buying over the phone, because the LCMM "has no budget". Disgusting. Shakes head an furious logistician

Why are we paying the salaries of people we wont resource to do their jobs ? Dissolve those positions and give those funds (salaries) to the units and be done with a façade they 1st line units are not funded to supply their own spares. Fund me and I will do it myself, that seems to be the CoA now anyways.

It's not that the LCMMs have no funding; it's just extremely limited and for parts there is a huge NICP fund crunch, so part buys are getting prioritized by 'float, move, fight', and ran out somewhere around 'move'. MEPM was asking for a $200M increase for the next few FYs to pay for the DWPs but instead ate a $100M cut, and doesn't look like a top up is coming. So aside from NICP funds being limited, expect the DWPs to be spread out longer and some work just not done.

Pretty demoralizing to have to argue why you need basic things like air filters, FF nozzles, hoses, gaskets etc, and then watch it sit on a pile for six months before it even gets ordered because the SM are covering 4-6 jobs, so they can barely keep up with HPRs. When you then have a 6M+ delivery time anyway so it's in completely different FYs so the prioritization for the NP funding didn't matter anyway. We have tried SAFing money to units to support local purchases, but that falls apart pretty quickly for anything over $25k.

When we get to 'annual review' we have now bumped up the numbers to 3 years worth of stuff for the 'annual buy' because we figure that's a more realistic number on how often they get a chance to buy stuff.

I'm glad to be out of MEPM completely now, and would be happy to stay away from ADM(Mat) for the rest of my career with the impact of the funding cuts that are coming. Even if they bump up funding later, we'll never catch up to the maintenance deficit or empty bins unless there is a major change in how they are letting us do business. THere is a proposal going through for essentially a part supply and obsolescence management ISSC to get the CPFs to end of life but it's stalled in red tape, and would probably cost north of $1B so don't see it getting the green light.

 

[Kirkhill]

my experience with the purchasing management system and personnel in a large private company suggests that this is not a problem unique to the CAF or easily remedied

Interesting point that.

In private companies each plant is responsible for its own operations. Generally each maintenance department sources its own parts and solutions even if there is a company wide supply of capital plant. By and large, in my experience, the maintenance manager at the end user facility goes to corporate for funding, not for parts.

Corporate may have guidelines for preferred suppliers, they may even have arranged a discount schedule with some of those suppliers, but the actual supply of the part comes from a PO issued by the facility to the manufacturer or its agent.

I believe I have heard some of you folk talk about victualling coming out of the Purser's budget. You buy your own coffee from Tim for example?

Is that an extendable concept?

...

Armed forces around the world seek commonality and uniformity on solid philosophical grounds. They have an aversion to micro-fleets.

But.

In the greater scheme of things even the US forces largest fleets are very small parts of the international market. The vast majority of the market operates on the premise that the end user has a need and the end user initiates the demand. That end user will then take the time available to find the supply chain that best fits the requirement at the time.

...

There might be something to @Halifax Tar 's notion of just sending him the money.

....

Probably not the answer for delivering missiles and 155mm shells, or even spare barrels.

 

[Navy_Pete]

For the record, units already get sent money for a lot of things normally (that's what a SAF is) as well as money from CJOC etc while deployed to top up their budget, but their purchasing power is limited by dollar value, so only really works for lower dollar value things.

A single valve can easily be $100k, and the big pumps are $500k-$1M, so those have to be centrally managed.

But parts getting left on the jetty to rust, after being partially disassembled (which doesn't work when it's been balanced as a unit) or cut with a torch doesn't help keep the whole fleet going either, so there are a lot of things the fleet could do to help maintain part supplies by getting things back to the R&O lines in a repairable state.

 

[Halifax Tar]

For the record, units already get sent money for a lot of things normally (that's what a SAF is) as well as money from CJOC etc while deployed to top up their budget, but their purchasing power is limited by dollar value, so only really works for lower dollar value things.

A single valve can easily be $100k, and the big pumps are $500k-$1M, so those have to be centrally managed.

But parts getting left on the jetty to rust, after being partially disassembled (which doesn't work when it's been balanced as a unit) or cut with a torch doesn't help keep the whole fleet going either, so there are a lot of things the fleet could do to help maintain part supplies by getting things back to the R&O lines in a repairable state.

I haven't met an LCMM yet who knew what a SAF was or was willing to provide one. It's always, 100% of the time a struggle.

 

[Kirkhill]

For the record, units already get sent money for a lot of things normally (that's what a SAF is) as well as money from CJOC etc while deployed to top up their budget, but their purchasing power is limited by dollar value, so only really works for lower dollar value things.

A single valve can easily be $100k, and the big pumps are $500k-$1M, so those have to be centrally managed.

But parts getting left on the jetty to rust, after being partially disassembled (which doesn't work when it's been balanced as a unit) or cut with a torch doesn't help keep the whole fleet going either, so there are a lot of things the fleet could do to help maintain part supplies by getting things back to the R&O lines in a repairable state.

That sounds like an "authorization" issue.

Once upon a time I worked for a Co-Op whose VP Finance was constantly complaining about how overworked he was. The issue came to a head over a tire for a truck. The company had, IIRC, 15 separate plants scattered around a prairie province. It also had a large fleet of trucks (tankers, reefers, semis and home delivery etc).

The authorization levels were set so low that the VP FInance had to sign off on every tire replacement. In fact the authorization levels had been set far enough in the past that local authority extended to buying pencils and not much more.

100 k may look like a lot to an accountant but if it is preventing one of 12 multi-billion dollar plants from operating then it is a no brainer. That plant needs to come back on line. Likewise for the million dollar pump.

The time to argue the toss is at the end of the year when, in the private sector, people make decisions on increasing the maintenance budget, or taking the plant off line and spreading the work load, or building a new plant.

....

If the TB/PSPC/DND/CAF/RCN accountants don't get that then, in my opinion, they are not committed to the notion that that particular vessel is critical for the defence of Canada and its interests.

And frankly, that is not an argument that a CPO in a ship should be forced to try and make.

...

PS - VP Finance at the Co-Op reduced his work load. He raised authorization levels to reflect market pricing of critical components like engines and transmissions, as well as pumps and valves for the production plant equipment.

 

[Navy_Pete]

@Halifax Tar, not sure what to say, we used them regularly.

@Kirkhill Authorization levels and associated processes at the different levels are set by TBS, and flows down from the Minister of the department down to the minions. The levels haven't changed my entire career for the units, and only recently increased delegation down to MND and L1s for DND (which is still much less restrictive compared to any other department). So, no, they don't get it, and proposals have been in for a few years to boost it, but until the Financial overlords bless us minions with increased authority, we have to make do.

 

[Underway]

Serious question: is the Heddle proposal a logical solution?

There hasn't been an RFI or CONOPS released so we don't know really. It's an interesting platform concept but nothing special.

Heddle OPVs are built fully to civilian standards (that is quite litterally their selling point) and all indications for an MCDV replacement point to a proper warship to some extent.

 

[Underway]

CANADIAN MULTI-MISSION CORVETTE

CDR: You have mentioned that the Navy has needed to prioritize the Halifax-class over the MCDVs. Is that still the case and what does that mean for the Maritime Coastal Defence Vessels (MCDV’s)?

VAdm Topshee: I think what it means is we need to get out of the old ship business as quickly as we can. You may have seen some remarks by the Minister a couple of weeks ago where he says he’s waiting for me to deliver a recommendation with respect to the future of the MCDVs. When you look at that class, the reality is that they were designed to last 25 to 30 years. We’re at that window and they have been absolutely fantastic. They’ve got a new lease on life right now with the off-board systems and technology that we’ve got for Mine Counter-Measures. In fact, I’m really proud of the fact that HMCS Shawinigan and Glace Bay are deployed right now with the Standing NATO Maritime countermeasures group in Europe, so it’s fantastic to see that that platform can still be relevant today. But when you step back, and you look at what it is, a Maritime Coastal Defence Vessel is effectively an offshore support vessel. It’s the type of vessel that is used routinely around the world to support the offshore industry. It is something that, if we really needed to get more of them, we can do so quite quickly. They’re not heavily armed nor are they designed to survive a massive conflict. MCDVs have a couple of machine guns and some sophisticated communications systems. We can replicate that quite quickly, and we’re really confident in the offboard systems. I think our number one question is whether or not we need to be out of the MCDV business? Should we make sure that we are transitioning to the future fleet, that we are embracing autonomy, uncrewed systems, remotely operated things, and all sorts of other systems that can go on to vessels of opportunity that are not necessarily part of the Navy fleet.

CDR: Is there going to be a follow on to the class? People have been talking about a Corvette type ship.

VAdm Topshee: The nuance that I would offer is that the MCDV replacement will not be an MCDV. We have started some theorizing around what would a Canadian Multi-mission Corvette look like? It’s a nod to our history — I love the fact that we were a corvette and destroyer navy in the Second World War. What we’re probably building is something that’s going to be more capable than what might come to mind with a corvette because it has to be a real warship. The driving philosophy behind whatever comes is that it needs to be what we could not quickly replicate in a time of war. I think what we need to make sure we do with what’s being called the Canadian Multi-mission Corvette, is figure out the core sort of warship systems that we need to have, the type of thing that you can’t build quickly in wartime. The first part of any project is always that sort of initial identification of requirements, and that’s very much the phase of the thinking that we’re at right now.

From CDR.

So what is a "warfighting capability" that we can't produce quickly? Sidekick ship? Optionally crewed vessels? Tier two combatant (Mogami class sort of thing). Heavy sensored patrol ship (Ala Holland Class)? Modular fighting capability on a CMS 330 backbone? Arsenal ship?

 

[Swampbuggy]

Strange question, that I’ll stipulate right away is probably a no go for any number of reasons, but is there any situation where a CCG vessel could do an MCDV style task, like OP CARIBBE, for example? I know there’s no enforcement authority given to CCG personnel, but that aspect of the gig would be handled by a LEDET, as seems to be standard practice. What got me thinking about it is reading how recently the CCG has been working in conjunction with other foreign authorities (recently Japan) in areas of common interest, like fish stock research/protection.

I do also realize that most of the CCG ships that could be considered for this sort of thing are old and in need of replacement, but if there’s a personnel and equipment shortage in the RCN, I wondered if this would work?

 

[CBH99]

Strange question, that I’ll stipulate right away is probably a no go for any number of reasons, but is there any situation where a CCG vessel could do an MCDV style task, like OP CARIBBE, for example? I know there’s no enforcement authority given to CCG personnel, but that aspect of the gig would be handled by a LEDET, as seems to be standard practice. What got me thinking about it is reading how recently the CCG has been working in conjunction with other foreign authorities (recently Japan) in areas of common interest, like fish stock research/protection.

I do also realize that most of the CCG ships that could be considered for this sort of thing are old and in need of replacement, but if there’s a personnel and equipment shortage in the RCN, I wondered if this would work?

This is my uneducated take on your question...

Simple answer? Yes - it could work

It would require some obvious legislative changes be done by the government to grant CCG personnel enforcement authority (peace officer status) and the subsequent training of CCG personnel in conducting tactical boarding operations, evidence handling, and all of the proper procedures & paperwork. Plus you'd need to buy their weapons, kit, uniforms, radio, etc etc + the supply of all of the administrative stuff

It sounds like a lot, but I imagine it's quite doable. If they did it with CBSA, I don't see why they can't do it with the Coast Guard.

One challenge would be equipping the CCG with the proper ships for such a task. I don't know what the current state of the CCG fleet is like, other than I know one shipyard started building ships for the CCG a few years ago & the order book is quite long.

But I'd argue it's doable, and could even be done fairly prudently IF all the players worked together to make it happen.



As things currently stand tho?

Without am embarked LEDET than no, absolutely not. The crew wouldn't have a trained & armed boarding party, and wouldn't have the physical or legislative means to do so.

With a LEDET?

Probably not a desired solution to have a CCG ship w/ LEDET be used as a substitute for a Navy MCDV - but I don't see whv not...

It's Government of Canada personnel, deployed on a Government of Canada vessel, operating under the same mandate, with the same SOP's that would govern a Navy crew.

With the LEDET you'd end up having experienced personnel who do law enforcement full time, which I'm sure has some benefits.


...


But I don't know if the final product would look a whole lot different other than the GoC ship bring primarily red compared to off-white


My very ignorant 2 cents

 

[CBH99]

From CDR.

So what is a "warfighting capability" that we can't produce quickly? Sidekick ship? Optionally crewed vessels? Tier two combatant (Mogami class sort of thing). Heavy sensored patrol ship (Ala Holland Class)? Modular fighting capability on a CMS 330 backbone? Arsenal ship?

I would argue a warfighting capability that we can't quickly produce is actually a simple worship with a competent crew.

All of those other options, I would think, could be built fairly quickly. And if the vessels are uncrewed, or remotely operated by a small team on shore somewhere, then arsenal ships or even sensor heavy patrol ships could be produced as quickly as industry could get them in the water...

But a true warship - built rugged and tough, with armoured hulls, and that can slice through the water at good speed - bristling with high tech sensors and weapons systems - those take a while to build. And then have all of the systems installed and integrated.

And then have a crew trained on operating a warship & then trained on how to use all of those high tech systems in the most effective ways possible, trained on damage control, replenishment at sea, how to operate with a helo det aboard, then trained in operations where the ship and help coordinate with each other, etc etc

The list goes on - but it's qualified people operating a sophisticated warship - that is what is impossible to produce quickly in wartime

 

[Navy_Pete]

I would argue a warfighting capability that we can't quickly produce is actually a simple worship with a competent crew.

All of those other options, I would think, could be built fairly quickly. And if the vessels are uncrewed, or remotely operated by a small team on shore somewhere, then arsenal ships or even sensor heavy patrol ships could be produced as quickly as industry could get them in the water...

But a true warship - built rugged and tough, with armoured hulls, and that can slice through the water at good speed - bristling with high tech sensors and weapons systems - those take a while to build. And then have all of the systems installed and integrated.

And then have a crew trained on operating a warship & then trained on how to use all of those high tech systems in the most effective ways possible, trained on damage control, replenishment at sea, how to operate with a helo det aboard, then trained in operations where the ship and help coordinate with each other, etc etc

The list goes on - but it's qualified people operating a sophisticated warship - that is what is impossible to produce quickly in wartime

Simple and warship aren't complimentary. Even commercial ships are relatively complex, and take a few years to design and build. Buying a complete design will still take a few years to do the procurement of things to build it, as well as do the production engineering and planning for the build at the actual yard (unless you just buy a completed ship).

Producing a competent crew is also time consuming, as there is a lot of individual, team, and collective training required.

Navy-ing is hard and there aren't any real shortcuts. A lot of key positions have 10+ years of development to be competent at as well, so you can't just surge and hope for the best. The WW2 plan won't work anymore just because of how fast things move and how much expertise is needed to do things well.

 

[Underway]

I would argue a warfighting capability that we can't quickly produce is actually a simple worship with a competent crew.

All of those other options, I would think, could be built fairly quickly. And if the vessels are uncrewed, or remotely operated by a small team on shore somewhere, then arsenal ships or even sensor heavy patrol ships could be produced as quickly as industry could get them in the water...

But a true warship - built rugged and tough, with armoured hulls, and that can slice through the water at good speed - bristling with high tech sensors and weapons systems - those take a while to build. And then have all of the systems installed and integrated.

And then have a crew trained on operating a warship & then trained on how to use all of those high tech systems in the most effective ways possible, trained on damage control, replenishment at sea, how to operate with a helo det aboard, then trained in operations where the ship and help coordinate with each other, etc etc

The list goes on - but it's qualified people operating a sophisticated warship - that is what is impossible to produce quickly in wartime

This is something I was thinking about myself. Sensors and weapon integration is something that you can't just create overnight quickly nor buy off the shelf like a ship with a crane on it (OSV as the CRNC puts it).

Things like Tier two combatants with high automation and low crewing are examples. Sometimes you just need a hull that can do stuff in a position to do it. This is starting to sound more and more like Destroyers + Frigates concept that we had 1993-2010, just with more weight onto the destroyer part.

So if I were to evalute the RCN doctrine on this, it would be 4 Destroyers + 1 AOR as an RCN Task group. This is the expeditionary team that does the stuff at the pointy end or perhaps the core of the Task Group.
Additional building blocks would be a submarine or Canadian Corvette to add tool box capabilities like the frigates were supposed to bring (boarding parites, ASW, increased sensor coverage etc...).

Sailing detached would be submarines and the Canadian Corvettes (ones and twos) to patrol, picket and provide information gathering in Canadian waters.

Australia's Tier Two combatants are supposed to watch the supply lines from the Middle East and Europe through the Indian Ocean (Australia is a massive oil importer). Their Tier One combatants (Hunter and Hobarts) will be watching the Sea/Air Gap between Indonesia and Australia or plugging the Straits of Malacca.

Canadian Corvette program vessels may be doing similar with watching supply lines to Korea/Japan while the RCN TG protects the terminus in Asia and the corvettes watch the start point in Canada up to the terminus.

(yes yes, no crew, hopium, not realistic... but fun to think about!)