In my days the regimental QM was a LogO and the QM staff were Sup techs. The Bty QMS and his staff (usually one other guy) were gunners.
You didn't need to repeat the fact that working in a warehouse has many jobs. I understood that from square one and was focusing on the shelf stacking and pulling jobs - the repetitive and not highly skilled jobs - specifically as the ones that could use change. As to the rest of what goes on in a warehouse - let's just say that much of that could also change because Amazon also has to deal with those issues (admitedly some more than others) and it wouldn't hurt to at least look at how they manage them. Some CAF processes may very well be found to already be optimal and therefore left as is.
In the same vein, MJP, I'm not understating how warehousing in the CAF or in general works. I fully understand it is a very complex system. I was merely focusing on one element as an example.
The only point I'm making is that when the system is subpar, you need to critically examine every aspect of it because a system is the product of it's constituent parts. Nothing can be left "off-the-table". More importantly you have to examine it in light of other more successful systems and determine if those can and/or should be replicated. There's lot of how Amazon etc does things that applies to a military supply system but other elements don't fit in. We shouldn't, however, consider ourselves so unique that we dismiss other concepts out of hand. We also need to be very careful of how we implement change if we decide we need it. As I mentioned before, Target is a perfect example how one company attempted to clone it's very successful US system into Canada and failed miserably. That's a cautionary tale but should not discourage us from trying to improve things.
IMHO, the development of a highly functional supply and maintenance system is an essential requirement for a military force that should receive every bit of the same attention as the acquisition of a new and essential weapon system because, eventually, that weapon system will either succeed or fail based on the capability of the supply and maintenance system to keep it operating. I expect you and I agree violently on that point. Quite frankly, the supply and maintenance systems are more important because they support the entire gambit of weapons systems across the board and ultimately will result in the success or failure of our force on operations. Anyone can cobble together a system that will function tolerably under peacetime or low stress operations. The system, however, needs to be able to function well and scale up to support full war commitments or it is simply not worth having. That's the challenge.