As a former CO, I can tell you it is extremely easy to go well over your initial allocation. During my years as DCO, and later as CO, we were never given a sufficient initial allocation to achieve the must-do items in the annual CAPG from higher - the math just didn't work. We would be given about $950K to start (pay and O&M), but would routinely spend $1.2 - $1.5M. There would be the inevitable questions on why (you told me to grow the unit rapidly....). One year, I pissed off the HQ by zero-funding some mandated activities in my Business Plan, just to get a response that I could push back on. But, in my last year as CO, FY 25/26, we had all sorts of money available, we just had to ask with justification. My higher Comd never shut me down.
That said, I have come to believe that the overall system does not have a great knowledge of how much money and effort it takes to train and operate a Res F unit - the senior J8 and Business Planners were mostly either Reg F (who never see nor care about salary), ex-Reg F, or civilians who have never served. They do not understand the Reserves overly well. Typically, a Reg F Private was recruited by a CFRC and shows up at a unit with BMQ and their 3s already completed. We have to find people, attract them, process their recruiting files, and then coordinate or deliver all of their training.
I've pushed for years that in order to enable effective unit activities and training, we need about 10% of any unit's effective strength to be Cl B in the unit in Ops & Trg, OR, and RQ/Tn. Larger units need two full time Officers - Adjt and Ops O. Combat Medic RQ3 is 91 training days, and some of that can be locally taught - we need a fulltime cadre capable of delivering in-house training (this is slowly coming online).
By continually tightening the purse strings, we reduce the training and effectiveness of units, which causes frustration. By eliminating anything which leads to enhanced morale and cohesion, we do not build loyalty and dedication. These factors causes attrition.