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Mine Warfare

Kirkhill

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I thought this deserved a thread of its own.

Do we really need an MCM capability?

Are we worried about mines in our waters? Not really, and if there are mines in our waters, they will be few in numbers; send the CLDs.
Are we worried about heavy mining in other peoples waters? Possibly. Either stay outside the mine field and launch Tomahawks and/or long range NSMs, or, tell the country we're there to help it's their responsibility to make the Q-routes and/or clear the harbour entrance.

I just can't envision a scenario where we really need a highly capable MCM capability. Right now, IMO, our MCM capability serves nothing more than a diplomatic purpose. We send MCM units to our NATO partners to show we are "helping, friendly, and committed". But if a war actually broke out and the "enemy" established a significant threat, we're not sending an AOPS to clear the mines; it would just get blown up by a long range ASCMs the second it showed up near the minefield.

Sure, ask industry to develop a mine clearing capability that can be strapped onto the CDC; BUT, do not sacrifice a single ounce of core warfighting capability to "make it work".

End rant.

Yes a HDW can do what the KIN Class does for MCM. Eventually a HDW will be used as a flagship for Op Reassurance supporting the remaining KIN Class and I suppose eventually alone. Been looking at what that will look like engineering wise as part of my day job. As said lots of space. A couple of things though, one KIN Class can embark the dive POD, decompression chamber and the REMUS, its been done to give each Kingston Class the same capability. The second point is that HDW doesn't have degaussing, a minor point I suppose these days and how their utilized but a legitimate one. The final thing is do we want to send a 6600 tonne billion dollar ship with a gigantic magnetic signature to do a job where the whole point of MCM is to use small, cheap, disposable ships? I would say the same thing for any other vessel as well at least for now.

As one of the few around here that's been on MCM missions as part of the NATO group yes what your saying is probably correct and very well may go that way. For the time being and in the immediate future no.

HDW can carry more mine removal gear and pers than the MCDV's could. They have already trialed the ship with the decompression chamber, Dive gear and UAV gear all loaded on a single ship (normally that was two or three MCDV's together). The only disadvantage is that its a long way to the water from the ship for the divers. But if they use the ships boats its much easier.

But I get your point. I do have some concerns about mine warfare, but from how I've seen the Clearance divers work they don't need very fancy ships to do their jobs

I'm not sure "small, cheap and disposable ships" are as relevant in the evolving world of mine countermeasures. Many of the old, smaller fibreglass/metal hulled physical minesweepers are still around however, navies have already moved away or are in the process of moving towards an unmanned, standoff strategy from increasingly larger vessels.

You are correct that an AOPS would not be used in a real MCM scenario and frankly, I hope it never is, because it shouldn’t be but that's part of our answer for the lost of capability of the Kingston with not direct backup. That observation, however, actually reinforces the case for a dedicated and credible MCM capability rather than weakening it.

In your rant you make a lot of assumptions here. Before a single MCM vessel sails on Op REASSURANCE, we already exercise scenarios where Canadian ports are mined, Halifax, Esquimalt, approaches, choke points, anchorages. We do this because the threat is credible, cheap for an adversary, and disproportionately disruptive. Sea mines remain one of the most cost effective naval weapons ever devised, and no serious navy assumes “there won’t be many” or that CLDs alone solve the problem particularly against influence mines, buried mines, or deliberately complex denial fields. The risk will even escalate in the future with the introduction of AI in the new generation of smart mines.

MCM is not about having lightly armed ships into missile envelopes. It is about access, assurance, tempo, and freedom of manoeuvre, clearing approaches, opening Q routes, and enabling follow on forces and logistics. That capability is also perishable. The planning, classification, disposal skills, and command and control expertise cannot be surged once a crisis starts. This is exactly why NATO maintains standing MCM groups and why sailors in those formations remain deeply committed to the mission they understand that if you let the skill weaken, you don’t suddenly regenerate it when ports suddenly need to be opened.

Reducing MCM to “just diplomacy” also misses the point. Yes, deployments reassure allies and it helps meet our NATO commitments, but they also ensure Canada can operate in mined environments alongside NATO, rather than relying on others to clear the very harbours and sea lanes we intend to use. Telling a partner nation “it’s your responsibility to clear the harbour” while we sit offshore launching long range weapons assumes a lot. It assumes permissive access, unlimited standoff options, and zero political constraints none of which are guaranteed.

Finally, framing MCM as something that competes with “core warfighting capability” is not really valid. Access is warfighting. Sustainment is warfighting. Modular MCM solutions on future platforms make sense but only if they are built on an existing, practiced MCM culture and that comes with a dedicated MCM capability. Without that foundation, you are not fielding a capability; you are bolting equipment onto a hull and hoping the skill appears when needed and hope for the best.

I think its safe to say that we all hope we never have to do serious MCM at home or abroad. But hope is not a plan and mines remain cheap, effective, and likely. Ignoring that reality is how navies relearn old lessons the hard way.
 

If you know how many mines, and the types of mines, and presumably the location of the mines, how much of a threat are the mines?


Task Force 59 (TF 59) is a specialized unit within the U.S. Naval Forces Central Command (NAVCENT) and the U.S. Fifth Fleet, established in September 2021 to rapidly integrate unmanned systems and artificial intelligence (AI) into maritime operations in the Middle East. Its primary focus is increasing maritime domain awareness in critical choke points, particularly the Strait of Hormuz, the Gulf of Oman, and the Red Sea.
www.navy.mil +1
Key Aspects of Task Force 59 in the Strait of Hormuz:
  • Mission: To deter malicious actions, enhance surveillance over 5,000 miles of coastline, and provide real-time data to command centers by utilizing unmanned surface vessels (USVs) and aerial vehicles (UAVs).
  • Operational Capability: The task force reached full operational capability by March 2023,, accumulating over 30,000 operational hours in the region, with goals to integrate over 100 unmanned systems.
  • Technological Integration: TF 59, which includes the specialized "Task Group 59.1," partners with regional allies, such as Bahrain and the UAE, to operate USVs (like the Mantas T-12 and Saildrone Explorer) and UAVs (like the Aerovel Flexrotor).
  • Significance of the Strait: The area is a vital choke point where 20% of the world's oil supply flows, making it a high-tension area for maritime security.
  • Operational Successes: The task force has successfully conducted patrols in the Persian Gulf and transited the Strait of Hormuz with unmanned surface vessels supported by U.S. Coast Guard cutters.
    Fleet Forces Command (.mil) +4
As of March 2026, the region faces renewed tensions, with reports of Iran, in conflict with the US/Israel, causing interruptions in the Strait of Hormuz, making the surveillance capabilities of Task Force 59 critical for maintaining maritime awareness.

Key Technologies and Operations
  • Unmanned Systems: TF 59 has worked with over 23 different unmanned systems (aerial and surface).
  • Task Group 59.1: Established in January 2024, this group ("The Pioneers") specifically focuses on the operational deployment of unmanned systems and AI to bolster security, including anti-submarine and mine-related tasks.
....





July 21, The Canberra recently moored at Qatari Emiri Naval Forces Base in Hamad Port, near Mesaieed, for a scheduled visit.

August 9, The Rotational LCS Crew 22? (Gold) assumed command of the Canberra during a crew exchange ceremony in the ship's pilot house at Mina Salman Port.

January 22, 2026 USS Canberra transited the Strait of Hormuz soutbound, escorting the Heavy Load Carrier Seaway Hawk with four decommissioned Avenger-class mine countermeasures ships on board.


Key Mine Clearance UUVs and Systems

The U.S. Navy uses the Atlas Elektronik SeaFox as an expendable, fiber-optic guided unmanned underwater vehicle (UUV) for mine identification and neutralization, often designated as the AN/SLQ-60 system. It is a "one-shot" system that carries a shaped charge to destroy mines, providing a safe, rapid, and efficient method to clear underwater ordnance.
Naval Technology +4
Key Aspects of USN SeaFox Operations
  • Purpose: Primarily used for identifying and neutralizing moored, ground, and floating mines in "one-shot" operations.
  • System Components: The system includes a SeaFox I (identification) variant for inspection and the SeaFox C (combat) variant for destruction.
  • Deployment Platforms: SeaFox is versatile and can be deployed from surface combatants, mine countermeasure vessels, Rigid Hull Inflatable Boats (RHIBs), and unmanned vessels.
  • Performance: It can reach speeds of 6 knots and has a range of 1 km, guided via a thin fiber-optic cable for real-time video feedback.
    vanguardcanada.com +1
The SeaFox is in operation with several navies worldwide, including the U.S. Navy, to provide effective mine countermeasure capabilities.
Naval Technology +1


....

Task Force 59, UxV specialists, stationed at Manama, Bahrain
Task Group 59.1, focused on minewarfare
LCS-30 - USS Canberra - potential MCM package been hanging around Manama since July of last year, transited the Strait of Hormuz southbound in January with the retiring conventional Avenger MCMs hitching a ride on a large carrier.
Capable of deploying the Knifefish UUV (16 hr endurance to detect and identify mines)
Capable of deploying autonomous RIBs (GARCs - 40 kts, 700 NM)
Capable of deploying Sea Fox UUVs - single shot mine disposal device (1 km, 4 kts)


....

Meanwhile:


One of the RN's handful of minehunting drones.

View attachment 99328

View attachment 99329

This was the carrier with the Avenger MCMs that USS Canberra (Independence class LCS-30) escorted out of the Persian Gulf in January.

There are two more similarly equipped LCS parked in Singapore.


And the requisite nay-sayer has been found

 
And some more from the Brit side of things



















 
With 1000 km uncrewed RHIBS capable of platforming and launching towed arrays, ROVs, USVs, UUVs and UAVs of their own; with XLUUVs available; with a portable ops control centre that looks, to this untrained eye, indistiguishable from a Predator, or NASAMS air and/or coastal defence control station, or any other station in a Combat Information Centre, how close to the threat does the mothership have to be?

Indeed, in coastal waters, like the Gulf, do you even need to risk a ship at all?
Couldn't the entire effort be managed from shore stations?

....

Britain is hurting politically because Cyprus was attacked because it host two British bases. The politicians want to be seen as doing something and nothing draws headlines more than a big ship sailing into harm's way.

Except, perhaps, a big ship being harmed.

Questions were asked about carriers and destroyers. Until someone said that the UK has a couple of concrete carriers in the region. They just need a few more aircraft and a RAF Regiment redeployment with their new kit.

New RAF Air Defence system based on the Martlet LCMM missile (8 km)


Less majestic than parking a carrier off Cyprus, or an LSDA off Hormuz, but probably more effective and less risky.

All the government needs is a better spin doctor and to start handing out medals

 
Canadian offerings in the UUV range

Cellula Robotics of Burnaby, BC (Offices in Dartmouth, the US and the UK)


1774815073922.png

Guardian, previously known as Solus-XR - 45 days, 5000 km, hydrogen fuel cell - 2500 l mission bay

...

Porter - An AUV for installing subsea refuelling stations

"The Porter AUV is equipped with a spacious payload bay, designed to carry various cargo, including equipment for the installation and replenishment of remote subsea power stations. These subsea power stations allow in-field assets and resident vehicles to operate continuously without the need for refueling onshore or resurfacing, thereby enhancing operational uptime and reducing costs by minimizing dependence on resupply vessels."

...


1774815419102.png

Envoy (Previously known as DRDC project Solus-LR - 15 days, 2000 km, hydrogen fuel cell - 500 l mission bay

and a couple of sensor node systems

Subsea Sentinel

A cableless array of long-endurance, autonomous seabed sensors collects and communicates critical real-time ocean information. The node is configurable with custom sensor packages, ranging from acoustics for military detection to marine mammal detection and environmental sensing.

The system monitors, detects, and characterizes mobile objects, both anthropogenic and natural, using advanced in-situ processing built on proven technology. This enables real-time analysis, classification, and response to detected objects, enhancing situational awareness and security

The system offers a 10-kilometer range between nodes for inter-node communication. It can be deployed by a vessel or a large AUV and boasts a one-year operating life. Sensor expansion options, including turbulence detections or environmental sensors, are available, offering versatility and adaptability.

Subsea Warden

The system features a digital hydrophone, a 3-axis self-compensating magnetometer, and STANAG 1136 compatibility. It offers encrypted data storage, autonomous operations, hovering control, wireless data transfer, inter-vehicle communication, and 8-hour endurance.

A fleet of three Subsea Wardens assesses vessel underwater signatures in open ocean and littoral environments. Simultaneous measurements from the port, starboard, and under the keel provide comprehensive data. The system is designed for ease of operation within a 20-ft ISO container.

The operator loads a pre-set scan path, deploys the drone fleet, and communicates the plan to the bridge. Drones autonomously configure, submerge, and collect data. Between vessel passes, drones transmit data. Upon recovery, data is downloaded and analyzed.

....

Presumably the direction of travel is to link the AUVs, Sentinels and Wardens with the Porter refuelling system.
 
Adding some scale to this talk of 1000 km speed boats and 5000 km subs

1774818663442.jpeg

990 km from Hormuz to Kuwait City
340 km wide at its widest point - 170 km to mid point
55 km at its narrowest in the Straits
Manama, the base in Bahrain is almost exactly half way between Hormuz and Kuwait City - ~500 km each way - and 200 km from Iran

And the basin is only 35 to 50 m deep.

And it is littered with these things

1774819178335.jpeg


Task Force had a 2023 goal of 100 drones operating in their area.
 
This article points to the USN deploying guided missile destroyers to hunt mines and questions the tactic.


I suggest that the older system with crewed mine sweepers and hunters would still havw seen a couple of destroers deployed (in the absence of adequte frigates) to provide overwatch to the mine clearance vessels and their crews during operations.

In my view what has changed is that mine clearance no longer requires crews parked on top of mines. It can be performed with joysticks from some kilometers away from the mines. The operators may not even be onboard a vessel at all. They could be in a shore base, in an aircraft or a helicopter. Their actual actions will be directing and supervising the operations of UxVs of multiple types.

The clearance crews might be on the destroyers. Equally they might be in Bahrain or Oman.

The article skims over this possibility. It also refers to the possibility that operations may ultimately result in the employment of Littoral Combat Ships who have been developed as MCM Command ships that can deploy a large number of UxVs from their Mission Bays and Hangars.

1776174755550.jpeg

There is one in the area and two in Singapore
 
You still need marine assets to deploy the unmanned systems. In places like the Strait, you could use docks and cranes if you are using systems like the UK is starting to use. Basically a 35-20' unmanned vessel to deploy the ROV to hunt the mines.

 
You still need marine assets to deploy the unmanned systems. In places like the Strait, you could use docks and cranes if you are using systems like the UK is starting to use. Basically a 35-20' unmanned vessel to deploy the ROV to hunt the mines.


Deployment can be from any place you can back in a trailer and launch any other 11 m boat.
Sprint speed of 40 knots
Patrol speed of 8 knots while towing
Endurance of 18 to 24 hrs depending on duties and fuel consumption

Max distance from control station 60 NM

But the launch point and the control station don't have to be collocated. The controls are containerized and can be deployed on any flat surface.

The ARCIMS can also hunt subs in shallow waters.



...

In WWs 1 and 2 Coastal Defence forces kept capital ships at bay with a mixture of mines, launches with torpedoes and depth charges, fighter-bombers with more torpedoes and bombs of all sorts as well as rockets, and submarines with still more torpedoes.

No need to waste capital ships patrolling the shores.

Today there is still no need for capital ships to patrol shores. The big difference is now there is no need to put people at risk in those as all of those tasks can be performed by uncrewed machines. And the absence of crews means that the machines can be smaller and harder to detect, can endure on station longer, and use fuel more efficiently. They can also be more aggressive in that their commanders no longer have to worry about killing the crew.

In many senses the result looks more like a minefield but with mines that operate under, on and above the water and can be constantly relocated.

But.

The problem is that of Caesar's wife and effective governments: appearances.

A good wife for Caesar and effective governments do not get noticed.

That is a problem if you want to get noticed.

It is hard to generate the attention an aircraft carrier generates. An underwater campaign, especially an effective one is not going to garner the same press.

The same is true of any campaign counducted out of sight. An ancillary problem is that any resulting debate becomes one of "he said - she said" and both sides believing whatever they like.

...

The American destroyers sailing through the Straits are likely not there to clear the Straits but rather to demonstrate that the Straits are clear and they can't be touched. Literally there to show the flag.

Whatever has happened to this point the USN has again demonstrated that it retains Freedom of Navigation in the Straits.

Now the next challenge is to demonstrate that it can maintain that freedom and supply that freedom to all others using those Straits.

...

One of the other advantages/disadvantages is the amount of deniability these types of operations give governments. Governments can ship a dozen containers to a distant cargo dock with a handful of operators and conduct an effective campaign, all the while proclaiming their purity and screaming about all the nasty people they are forced to associate with.
 
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