Multi Domain Task Force - Canada

[Kirkhill]

Influence

It gets me in the feels.

....

I used the word influence. Influence, like deterrence, ia a matter of emotions and not facts on the ground. It relies on emotions, most notably fear. Its counter is hope.

People change their behaviour when they are fearful. When they perceive they are under threat and their city is at risk of looking like the pictures @GR66 posted then their fear influences their behaviour and the behaviour of their government.

Hope also influences behaviour. Hope can be generated by having friends show up. Hope can also be generated if it is felt that there are the means to reduce the likelihood of thse dire images occuring.

I believe this is a driving force behind the present interest in the IAMD/GBAD/C-RAM/CUAS battle. Governments fear the reactions of fearful populations who want to believe their cities will be spared that devastation.

....

I don't contest the validity of the value of the conventional army on the battlefield and its utility in taking and holding ground.

I don't even contest that fear and influence alone don't win wars. I do contend that influence, fear and hope are key to deterrence and managing the risk of war in the first place.

....

I believe that we can supply influence, hope to our friends and fear to our enemies, through technology, a lot more effectively than through boots on the ground. Boots tat they already have in numbers greater than us and more proximate to their battles. Boots that are readily filled by their citizens in their reserves because they maintain limited numbers of full time soldiers because those soldiers, in peacetime are more useful to society in productive labour.

A nation with a large peacetime army has an unemployment problem. The army as an alternative to welfare.

‘Influence’ can also mean tangibly impacting the adversary’s options through tangible impacts on their capabilities or constraints imposed on their options that aren’t necessarily a game changer, but will still factor into their overall calculus on their military efforts. Sure, ‘fear’ - or perception of the potential tangible impact of an enemy’s capabilities - is part of this… Just don’t think that ‘influence’ solely means psychological. Killing people and breaking their stuff can influence larger ops without achieving outright neutralization.

3000 km influence

Ukraine’s New Drones Hit Russia’s Largest Oil Refinery in Record 3,000 Km Strike Into Siberia

Ukraine’s new long-range drones reportedly struck Russia’s largest refinery for the first time after flying 3,000 kilometers into Omsk.

www.kyivpost.com

“I approved a 40-day influence operation for the Service against the aggressor state aimed at compelling it to end the war,” Zelensky wrote.

Zelensky Orders 40-Day SBU Campaign to Pressure Russia

Ukraine’s security service is stepping up pressure on Russia as its Alpha unit reports leading drone warfare results at the front.

www.kyivpost.com

Ukraine’s SBU Hits Warplanes in Hangars at Crimea’s Saky Air Base

Ukraine’s SBU said it hit fighter aircraft stored in unprotected hangars at Crimean military airbase as part of 40-day “influence operation” campaign.

www.kyivpost.com

 

[Kirkhill]

The postioning of the 1st MDTF as a brigade within the 7th ID loked strange to a bunch of us. Especially as it was originally marketed as a Theater asset. At the same time IndoPacCom/PacCom/Western Hemisphere (hard to keep up) was retaining 3rd MDTF.

I thought that maybe the allocation to 7ID was a peacetime adminstrative move (7ID has history as a holding div). Justifying that was the retention of the 3rd ABCT in 4ID with a pair of SBCTs.

But now I see that 4IDs 3rd ABCT has been converted to an SBCT.

I Corps now has 4 MBCT (1 Abn), 5 SBCT, 4 Avn Bdes, and an assortment of Artillery organizations including traditional battalions, DivArties and an MDTF.

And no Abrams or Bradleys.

U.S. Army’s Iron Brigade exits Abrams era at Fort Carson as Stryker transition aligns division for Pacific operations

The U.S. Army’s 3rd Armored Brigade Combat Team, 4th Infantry Division, has sent the final remaining M1A2 Abrams tank from Fort Carson, Colorado, to Fort Irwin, California.

defence-industry.eu

 

[FJAG]

Under Army 2030, 4 ID and each of 1 ID, 3 ID, and 36 ID were scheduled to become an armoured division with two ABCTs and one SBCT each. That changed last year when 4 ID was changed from III Corps to the Pacific focused I Corps. 3 ABCT was the last heavy brigade in 4 ID going into 2026.

At this time 1 and 3 ID have their two ABCTs each but no other BCT. 36 ID has two ABCTs and will also have two MBCTs.

Initially the US Army fielded 9 SBCTs two of which, 56 and 81 SBCTs were ARNG. 56 SBCT, 36 ID recently converted to MBCT while 81 SBCT, 36 ID, Texas ARNG is still an SBCT. Interestingly, until 2022 81 SBCT had been part of 7 ID. It is scheduled to convert to an MBCT by 2028.

There is one SBCT currently in S Korea with 2 ID, I Corps and which is rotationally manned by personnel from US units.

There are five SBCTs now in I Corps - 3 with 4 ID, 2 with 7 ID (plus of course the prepositioned SBCT with 2 ID in Korea)

That accounts for six of the 9 SBCT sets of equipment. It certainly appears that the SBCTs are all slowly being targeted on the Pacific theatre. It will be interesting to see if any of the additional 3 SBCT sets will be assigned to units aligned with 1 Corps. It also raises the question of whether any additional divisions will be converted to multi-domain commands.

As a complete aside, but somewhat MDF related, one should note that the British army has formed two additional deep recce strike brigades (DRS).

The existing 1st DRS, with 3 (UK) Div has been renamed 3rd DRS.

A new 1st DRS has been formed with 1 (UK) Div. It will throughout this year pick up 4 RA, 103 RA and 105 RA (already in 1 (UK) Div) and has already received 3 RHA, an MLRS regiment, from 3 (UK) Div. Not sure where things stand with 7 Para RHA currently with 16 Air Aslt Bde, 1 (UK) Div. Also not sure what recce units will be cut over to 1st DLRS from the various brigades in 1 (UK) Div. What makes this interesting is that 1 (UK) Div was not really structured to deploy as a div but rather force generate up to brigade groups. Forming a DRS not only provides the UK with the ability for force generate a DRS but also could lead to 1 (UK) Div deploying as a light infantry division.

In addition Headquarters 9th DRS has been formed with the UK-based NATO Allied Rapid Reaction Corps headquarters. It has no assigned Brit arty or recce units but presumably will be allocated artillery resources from various NATO forces.