New Canadian Shipbuilding Strategy

[Czech_pivo]

Was Irving not involved in the Ship design approval, knew the intent for the ship extension from the start design? They did what they do best and ask for more and more.
How I read it was Seaspan's initial bid, stated they would have to provide significant upgrades to their yard both in Vancouver and Victoria in order to build and maintain the new CSC Ships. They lost based on their probability to be able to provide the required services and site. Where Irving was more then capable to provide the required services and site to build the ships under their own funding.

lets face it, if Irving could have built all the ships AOPS, CSC, Fleet Aux etc they would have all the contracts. The Irvings are heavily in the pockets of many politicians both in Canada and the North Eastern US.

What surprises me is how the money flows with little to no accountability. The CSC build is being treated like a open pocket book by the prime contractor. They know we need the ships, they know we are to far into the process to back out, they know if we do back out they get paid anyways.
We need a better system.

"Many Politicians, both in Canada the North Eastern US, are heavily in the pockets of the Irvings".

Fixed it for you.

 

[Kirkhill]

Definitely could be delivered faster but for this proposed Svalbard build, Irving would still need time to build their yards up to a state where they can start production. It would depend when you put the proposed start date, AOPS had its definition contract and design period start around July of 2012. If we use that as a jumping off point, assume immediate construction and use known/approximate AOPS build times, we get:

AOPS 1 - Commissions on October 16, 2017
AOPS 2 - Commissions on February 17, 2019
AOPS 3 - Commissions on February 21, 2020
AOPS 4 - Commissions on February 18, 2021
AOPS 5 - Commissions on December 12, 2021
AOPS 6 - Commissions on November 24, 2022

Keep in mind these numbers are rough and I'd assume CSC would be smoother sailing and CCG AOPS isn't a thing. If we assume immediate CSC construction (November 25, 2022) with the Iver Huitfeldt design using the Halifax class build times (no yard upgrades to Irving, delays, modification changes), it would look like:

CSC 1 - Commissions on March 7, 2028
CSC 15 - Commissions on June 8, 2032

So taking this incredibly simplified, best case scenario and likely incorrect guesstimate at face value, Canada in this hypothetical would be commissioning their last CSC when we are projected to be commissioning the first of our class. There would likely be significant delays which are impossible to factor in. This is completely ignoring the fact that Svalbard and CSC have been/are being modified to properly fit the roles and operations we require of them and that Type 26 is a fairly heftier design than the Danish frigate.

Interesting thought experiment but I generally think taking the time to properly suit designs to our requirements is worthwhile, albeit a bit slow seemingly.

Continuing the what ifs - a fruitless but fascinating game -

Svalbard was built by Aker Langsten owned by Aker RGI, later STX and now Vard, I believe.
Its design was heavily influenced by the work of Kvaerner Masa Marine, also known as Aker Yards Marine of Vancouver. In fact, I believe, the original AOPS designs were validated by Dan McGreer's team out of Vancouver.
It always struck me as a no brainer to have the AOPS ships built on the West Coast by Seaspan with the Aker/STX team right there.

Meanwhile, Davie may have had financial problems but it seems to me it had the infrastructure that could have started to build T31/Arrowhead/Huitfeldts which, in 2011, were already in the water, unlike the Type 26s.

As for the smaller Coast Guard vessels, like the OFSVs and OOSVs, aren't there existing yards in Newfoundland and on the Great Lakes that could have managed those builds?

I see that Vard is now part of Fincantieri and, while leaning into its new OPV offering it is still touting its association with the Svalbard/AOPS design.

Offshore Patrol Vessels (OPVs) - VARD 7 Series - Vard Marine Inc.

Vard Marine is a leader in designing Offshore Patrol Vessels (OPVs) with global clients spanning navies, coast guards, and maritime security agencies.

vardmarine.com

A fruitless exercise now.

the design of Canada's new ships (the HdW AOPS) is based upon a Norwegian vessel whose design Ottawa has already bought for just $5 million.

The Norwegian ship, the Svalbard, was designed and built for less than $100 million in 2002.
Experts say the design price is normally 10-20 per cent of the total cost of the ships.

Another source with long experience in building combat ships said of the Irving design contract, "the numbers are staggering.… There is no rhyme or reason for such a vast amount of money, especially not without clarity" on where it's all going.

He said $10-15 million would be a reasonable amount, not $288 million.

A third expert with inside knowledge of the design work said of the Irving contract, "I'm choked on that number to say the least."

He said that the basic design for the Svalbard was bought by the federal government for only $5 million.

Although the Svalbard design would need extensive revisions to adapt it to Canadian purposes and produce final blueprints, the expert said those might drive the bill up to $20 million — certainly not to $288 million.

"I have no idea where you find another $200-plus million [just for the design.] That's more than the estimated value of building the ship. As a taxpayer, it doesn't make sense."

Another criticism of the project is that much of the design work – in a project meant to create Canadian jobs – is actually going overseas.
Although Irving will manage the design project in Nova Scotia, it has subcontracted the actual production of final blueprints to a Danish firm, OMT. Seventy Danish ship architects will work on those.

New Canadian Shipbuilding Strategy

Thanks, I was pretty sure it did, as I thought that's where I remembered seeing PRE up on blocks. That's when I learned what the term 'allision' means. A collision is two ships that are moving, an allision is when a ship hits something stationary. Yet another BOI buried via overclassification...

army.ca

Milewski was wrong to mix 1500 tonne Danish and Irish OPVs with the 6000 tonne Svalbard/AOPS but there was a point to be made about the cost of Canadianization in Halifax.

The other thing that intrigued me is that Irving contracted with the OMT team out of Odense in Denmark that designed and delivered the Absolon/Huitfeldts that became the Type 31/Arrowheads, notorious for their low price delivery. So Irving had the Arrowhead team available to them in 2013 after they had the NSPS contract but instead of being awarded the CSC contract right away they were gifted a design that they had no prior knowledge of but the West Coast was well familiar with and had the rights to.

Just imagine, if OMT had managed to build Arrowheads in Halifax at Danish prices... I am sure that HII and LM would have been thrilled.

 

[Navy_Pete]

Was Irving not involved in the Ship design approval, knew the intent for the ship extension from the start design? They did what they do best and ask for more and more.
How I read it was Seaspan's initial bid, stated they would have to provide significant upgrades to their yard both in Vancouver and Victoria in order to build and maintain the new CSC Ships. They lost based on their probability to be able to provide the required services and site. Where Irving was more then capable to provide the required services and site to build the ships under their own funding.

lets face it, if Irving could have built all the ships AOPS, CSC, Fleet Aux etc they would have all the contracts. The Irvings are heavily in the pockets of many politicians both in Canada and the North Eastern US.

What surprises me is how the money flows with little to no accountability. The CSC build is being treated like a open pocket book by the prime contractor. They know we need the ships, they know we are to far into the process to back out, they know if we do back out they get paid anyways.
We need a better system.

Look at the tonnage of the type 26 on wiki (6900);

Type 26 frigate - Wikipedia

Look at CSC (8080)

Canadian Surface Combatant - Wikipedia

Now look at the AUS hunter class, which also took the AEGIS, slapped it on the T26 at 10k tonnes, so outweighing an Arleigh Burke

Hunter-class frigate - Wikipedia

Sure, ISI was involved, but it was all Canada's decisions. Cumulatively making CSC bigger than the base design, so fair bit bigger on what the combat package bid was for. JSS is the same size as what is in the NSS package.

Don't get me wrong, I'm not an ISI fanboy, but we wanted a complicated, manpower intensive combat system, with a huge radar up high, so the only way that works is with a bigger hull.

Bigger hull means bigger assembly bays, bigger mega block assembly area, bigger launch requirements etc etc.

If you want an actual MOTS design for a ship, don't change anything (except domestic power to 110/60 Hz vice 220 50 hz, which is easy). If you want project cost increases, Canadianize the base design, select totally different combat systems, and select different parts for every widget onboard.

A lot of the Canadianization requirements are driven by GoC rules for Canadian content. A lot of delays (which lead to cost increases) is related to GoC oversight and accountability requirements that are also built into the contract.

Don't get me wrong, ISI won't lose money on any of this, but if we had stuck within the design envelope we specified, and didn't make major equipment selection items impacting that, ISI wouldn't be doing a major shipyard upgrade to build it.

CSC will give major capabilities (if we don't screw it up and cheap out on maintenance or training), and may allow us to credibly assist in BMD defence, which seems like a good thing, but none of this is cheap. The world is also a different place now compared to what it was 14ish years ago when the NSS tender was drafted, so does it make sense to consider significantly increase capabilites of CSC while we can? Once it's built it's pretty much fixed for the next 30 years.

 

[Kirkhill]

Look at the tonnage of the type 26 on wiki (6900);

Type 26 frigate - Wikipedia

Look at CSC (8080)

Canadian Surface Combatant - Wikipedia

Now look at the AUS hunter class, which also took the AEGIS, slapped it on the T26 at 10k tonnes, so outweighing an Arleigh Burke

Hunter-class frigate - Wikipedia

Sure, ISI was involved, but it was all Canada's decisions. Cumulatively making CSC bigger than the base design, so fair bit bigger on what the combat package bid was for. JSS is the same size as what is in the NSS package.

Don't get me wrong, I'm not an ISI fanboy, but we wanted a complicated, manpower intensive combat system, with a huge radar up high, so the only way that works is with a bigger hull.

Bigger hull means bigger assembly bays, bigger mega block assembly area, bigger launch requirements etc etc.

If you want an actual MOTS design for a ship, don't change anything (except domestic power to 110/60 Hz vice 220 50 hz, which is easy). If you want project cost increases, Canadianize the base design, select totally different combat systems, and select different parts for every widget onboard.

A lot of the Canadianization requirements are driven by GoC rules for Canadian content. A lot of delays (which lead to cost increases) is related to GoC oversight and accountability requirements that are also built into the contract.

Don't get me wrong, ISI won't lose money on any of this, but if we had stuck within the design envelope we specified, and didn't make major equipment selection items impacting that, ISI wouldn't be doing a major shipyard upgrade to build it.

CSC will give major capabilities (if we don't screw it up and cheap out on maintenance or training), and may allow us to credibly assist in BMD defence, which seems like a good thing, but none of this is cheap. The world is also a different place now compared to what it was 14ish years ago when the NSS tender was drafted, so does it make sense to consider significantly increase capabilites of CSC while we can? Once it's built it's pretty much fixed for the next 30 years.

But did we need to wait to try and figure out what the 15th hull would look like 40 years in the future?

Or could we have started by building 6 MOTS immediately, taken some strain off the CPFs and start adjusting designs to meet current real world requirements?

 

[SeaKingTacco]

But did we need to wait to try and figure out what the 15th hull would look like 40 years in the future?

Or could we have started by building 6 MOTS immediately, taken some strain off the CPFs and start adjusting designs to meet current real world requirements?

In point of fact, we don’t know what the 15th hull will look like.

The design will evolve.

 

[Navy_Pete]

But did we need to wait to try and figure out what the 15th hull would look like 40 years in the future?

Or could we have started by building 6 MOTS immediately, taken some strain off the CPFs and start adjusting designs to meet current real world requirements?

Something like AEGIS or the SPY radar drive the design. A smaller hull wouldn't allow you to drop that on later, and stopping production once it's rolling to upgrade the yard to accomodate a bigger ship would stop things for a few years. I doubt they would keep people on the payroll with no work so you'd lose your employees, and have to rebuild that too

They can always change the radars with something similar or smaller, change the weapon loadout etc but the hull and stability will always be the limiting factor.

 

[Stoker]

In point of fact, we don’t know what the 15th hull will look like.

The design will evolve.

My understanding is the initial order will be for three ships and subsequent flight after that with possibly different combat packages as technology evolves.

 

[Stoker]

In regards to Svalvard people keep quoting the 100M build price in comparison to the AOPS. Didn't I hear that figure was unproven when it was looked into by the PBO?

 

[Kirkhill]

100 MUSD was the 2002 price

Norway has since bought three more ice-class patrol ships for 550 Mio Euro (810 MCAD for the group or 270 MCAD each)
3x 9800 tonnes (136m x 22m x 6.2m) - complement of 100

Norway to build three large Coast Guard ships for Arctic

With a length of 136 meters, the three will be the largest Coast Guard vessels sailing the European Arctic. Norway’s Ministry of Defense on Monday signed contract with VARD Langsten yard for construction of the three ice-classed Coast Guard vessels. The contract has a value of 5,2 billion kroner (€

www.rcinet.ca

VESSEL REVIEW | Jan Mayen – Ice-capable patrol vessel delivered to Norwegian Coast Guard

The Norwegian Coast Guard has taken delivery of a new offshore patrol vessel (OPV). The future NoCGV Jan Mayen is the lead ship of a new class of three OPVs tha

www.bairdmaritime.com

Norway to build three large Coast Guard ships for Arctic

With a length of 136 meters, the three will be the largest Coast Guard vessels sailing the European Arctic. Norway’s Ministry of Defense on Monday signed contract with VARD Langsten yard for construction of the three ice-classed Coast Guard vessels. The contract has a value of 5,2 billion kroner (€

www.rcinet.ca

AWARDS 2022 | Best Ice-Class Patrol Boat – Jan Mayen – LMG Marin

This lightly armed offshore patrol vessel is unusual and market-leading in a number of respects. First, it is large – almost of frigate size – and second, and m

www.bairdmaritime.com

 

[Kirkhill]

Canadian government reports CA$780 million increase in project cost of new naval patrol ships - Baird Maritime

The Canadian federal government has confirmed that the cost of the acquisition of the Royal Canadian Navy’s Harry DeWolf-class Arctic and Offshore Patrol Ships (AOPS) increased by CA$780 million (US$582 million) in 2022. The government said the increase in the AOPS’ total project cost to CA$4.98...

www.bairdmaritime.com

Contract signed for CCG AOPS; budget grows – Canadian Naval Review

By Dr. Timothy Choi, 5 January 2023 Ottawa and Irving have signed the contract for the construction of AOPS 7 and 8 for the Canadian Coast Guard. These two will come in at a project budget of $1.6 billion, a $100 million increase over the last estimated project budget of $1.

www.navalreview.ca

 

[Rainbow1910]

It always struck me as a no brainer to have the AOPS ships built on the West Coast by Seaspan with the Aker/STX team right there.

Likely not an option as part of the point of the AOPS procurement was to help better transition Irving back into proper large scale military shipbuilding. Between the MCDV's and the AOPS, Irving's Halifax Yard built a number of civilian vessels and small patrol vessels for the CCG but nothing really of note.

Meanwhile, Davie may have had financial problems but it seems to me it had the infrastructure that could have started to build T31/Arrowhead/Huitfeldts which, in 2011, were already in the water, unlike the Type 26s.

I am unconvinced that it is a remotely wise idea to hand Davie, in its state at the time, something as complex and valuable as a frigate building contract. They had issues properly following through with civilian supply ship contracts at the time if I recall.

As for the smaller Coast Guard vessels, like the OFSVs and OOSVs, aren't there existing yards in Newfoundland and on the Great Lakes that could have managed those builds?

I am unaware of any yards in Newfoundland or Labrador able to build vessels of this size. Heddle exists in Thunder Bay but I think they specialize more in repair/refit than construction. Canada also wanted to concentrate the work in its larger and more capable existing yards instead of spreading it out and returning to the boom and bust cycle faster.

In regards to Svalvard people keep quoting the 100M build price in comparison to the AOPS. Didn't I hear that figure was unproven when it was looked into by the PBO?

Information archivée dans le Web | Information Archived on the Web

publications.gc.ca

As the previous paragraphs demonstrate, the Svalbard has aspects that would make it both less expensive (lower ice capability and less command and surveillance capability/integration) and more expensive (azipod propulsion) than the A/OPS. It also has the same displacement as the A/OPS at 6,400 tonnes.94 From a high-level, these differences might be considered inconsequential such that the Svalbard would be a useful data point for modeling the A/OPS. There are publicly available documents which put the cost for the Svalbard between $80 and $100 million.95 These costs are considered unreliable since they likely don’t include the full cost of the ship design, some equipment systems fitted in the ship and subsidies to the Norwegian shipyards.96 With no reliable costing data available for the Svalbard, it could not be used.

There has been public discussion on the Svalbard costing $100M CAD in 2001 dollars (Milewski (2013) and Public Works Government Services Canada (2013c). This cost is not representative due to large public subsidies of the Norwegian shipyards at the time (ibid.).

From Page 25

It is always difficult to compare procurements between nations as standards differ, it is also incredibly easy for governments to alter the program cost by adding or subtracting various costs. These figures are usually a mirage and change significantly even when the same baseline design is purchased between different nations, if domestic production is being used. For these reasons, I do not put much stock in what it costs one nation to build a certain ship when you are trying to compare it abroad.

 

[Kirkhill]

Likely not an option as part of the point of the AOPS procurement was to help better transition Irving back into proper large scale military shipbuilding. Between the MCDV's and the AOPS, Irving's Halifax Yard built a number of civilian vessels and small patrol vessels for the CCG but nothing really of note.


I am unconvinced that it is a remotely wise idea to hand Davie, in its state at the time, something as complex and valuable as a frigate building contract. They had issues properly following through with civilian supply ship contracts at the time if I recall.


I am unaware of any yards in Newfoundland or Labrador able to build vessels of this size. Heddle exists in Thunder Bay but I think they specialize more in repair/refit than construction. Canada also wanted to concentrate the work in its larger and more capable existing yards instead of spreading it out and returning to the boom and bust cycle faster.

Information archivée dans le Web | Information Archived on the Web

publications.gc.ca

From Page 25

It is always difficult to compare procurements between nations as standards differ, it is also incredibly easy for governments to alter the program cost by adding or subtracting various costs. These figures are usually a mirage and change significantly even when the same baseline design is purchased between different nations, if domestic production is being used. For these reasons, I do not put much stock in what it costs one nation to build a certain ship when you are trying to compare it abroad.

Perhaps Treasury Board could implement the same accounting rules employed by Norway and Denmark?

 

[suffolkowner]

Look at the tonnage of the type 26 on wiki (6900);

Type 26 frigate - Wikipedia

Look at CSC (8080)

Canadian Surface Combatant - Wikipedia

Now look at the AUS hunter class, which also took the AEGIS, slapped it on the T26 at 10k tonnes, so outweighing an Arleigh Burke

Hunter-class frigate - Wikipedia

Sure, ISI was involved, but it was all Canada's decisions. Cumulatively making CSC bigger than the base design, so fair bit bigger on what the combat package bid was for. JSS is the same size as what is in the NSS package.

Don't get me wrong, I'm not an ISI fanboy, but we wanted a complicated, manpower intensive combat system, with a huge radar up high, so the only way that works is with a bigger hull.

Bigger hull means bigger assembly bays, bigger mega block assembly area, bigger launch requirements etc etc.

If you want an actual MOTS design for a ship, don't change anything (except domestic power to 110/60 Hz vice 220 50 hz, which is easy). If you want project cost increases, Canadianize the base design, select totally different combat systems, and select different parts for every widget onboard.

A lot of the Canadianization requirements are driven by GoC rules for Canadian content. A lot of delays (which lead to cost increases) is related to GoC oversight and accountability requirements that are also built into the contract.

Don't get me wrong, ISI won't lose money on any of this, but if we had stuck within the design envelope we specified, and didn't make major equipment selection items impacting that, ISI wouldn't be doing a major shipyard upgrade to build it.

CSC will give major capabilities (if we don't screw it up and cheap out on maintenance or training), and may allow us to credibly assist in BMD defence, which seems like a good thing, but none of this is cheap. The world is also a different place now compared to what it was 14ish years ago when the NSS tender was drafted, so does it make sense to consider significantly increase capabilites of CSC while we can? Once it's built it's pretty much fixed for the next 30 years.

the wikipedia dimensions dont look different. Ours is a couple meters longer than the UK and AUS. Maybe just different displacements being quoted?

Keep in mind these numbers are rough and I'd assume CSC would be smoother sailing and CCG AOPS isn't a thing. If we assume immediate CSC construction (November 25, 2022) with the Iver Huitfeldt design using the Halifax class build times (no yard upgrades to Irving, delays, modification changes), it would look like:

CSC 1 - Commissions on March 7, 2028
CSC 15 - Commissions on June 8, 2032

There is no way any shipyard in Canada is going to produce 15 frigates in 4 years
The Halifax was laid down in March 1987 and the Ottawa was commissioned in Sept 1996 with 3 of the 12 built by Davie

I am unconvinced that it is a remotely wise idea to hand Davie, in its state at the time, something as complex and valuable as a frigate building contract. They had issues properly following through with civilian supply ship contracts at the time if I recall.

It wasnt just Davie though as they had joined up with Daewoo

 

[FSTO]

My understanding is the initial order will be for three ships and subsequent flight after that with possibly different combat packages as technology evolves.

Similar to how the St Laurent’s evolved into the Annapolis class.

 

[Stoker]

100 MUSD was the 2002 price

Norway has since bought three more ice-class patrol ships for 550 Mio Euro (810 MCAD for the group or 270 MCAD each)
3x 9800 tonnes (136m x 22m x 6.2m) - complement of 100

Norway to build three large Coast Guard ships for Arctic

With a length of 136 meters, the three will be the largest Coast Guard vessels sailing the European Arctic. Norway’s Ministry of Defense on Monday signed contract with VARD Langsten yard for construction of the three ice-classed Coast Guard vessels. The contract has a value of 5,2 billion kroner (€

www.rcinet.ca

VESSEL REVIEW | Jan Mayen – Ice-capable patrol vessel delivered to Norwegian Coast Guard

The Norwegian Coast Guard has taken delivery of a new offshore patrol vessel (OPV). The future NoCGV Jan Mayen is the lead ship of a new class of three OPVs tha

www.bairdmaritime.com

Norway to build three large Coast Guard ships for Arctic

With a length of 136 meters, the three will be the largest Coast Guard vessels sailing the European Arctic. Norway’s Ministry of Defense on Monday signed contract with VARD Langsten yard for construction of the three ice-classed Coast Guard vessels. The contract has a value of 5,2 billion kroner (€

www.rcinet.ca

AWARDS 2022 | Best Ice-Class Patrol Boat – Jan Mayen – LMG Marin

This lightly armed offshore patrol vessel is unusual and market-leading in a number of respects. First, it is large – almost of frigate size – and second, and m

www.bairdmaritime.com

View attachment 79486View attachment 79487View attachment 79488

Having been on both classes there is differences between both AOPS and its Norwegian counterpart. They are strictly a civilian build that don't have the capability to do much other than patrol in the Arctic, conducting fisheries and CG duties. If ours was just to do that then we should of built a carbon copy however we built in the ability to operate in warm climates and operate without much shore support for months on end, same as the comparison between AOPS and the Danish Kund Rasmussen class. People are all about making comparisons but really its apples and oranges.

 

[Kirkhill]

Having been on both classes there is differences between both AOPS and its Norwegian counterpart. They are strictly a civilian build that don't have the capability to do much other than patrol in the Arctic, conducting fisheries and CG duties. If ours was just to do that then we should of built a carbon copy however we built in the ability to operate in warm climates and operate without much shore support for months on end, same as the comparison between AOPS and the Danish Kund Rasmussen class. People are all about making comparisons but really its apples and oranges.

But why?

Why not buy two vessels of existing designs?

One for cold waters and one for warm waters? Did we gain anything by trying to create a uniquely Canadian camel?

 

[Stoker]

But why?

Why not buy two vessels of existing designs?

One for cold waters and one for warm waters? Did we gain anything by trying to create a uniquely Canadian camel?

More designs means double the trials, more resources looking after different classes etc, eats up resources. Same reason why the original concept to have three air defence destroyers and twelve follow on general purpose ships was abandoned to have 15 type 26's. Sure we could of built 6 stock Svalvards at an unknown price but then we would have to arrange greater support for them in our part of the Arctic and they would be sitting along side Halifax for months on end as we wouldn't of been utilizing the same as the Norwegians. Better to have one class that can do both in my opinion.

 

[Rainbow1910]

the wikipedia dimensions dont look different. Ours is a couple meters longer than the UK and AUS. Maybe just different displacements being quoted?

Ships of the same or relatively similar dimensions can differ in weight quite a bit due to the equipment, weaponry, sensors, stores, etc put aboard, an example would be Type 26's lightweight and lower capability radar compared to the much larger high capability SPY-7 and CEAFAR 2 systems of the CSC and Hunter classes.

There is no way any shipyard in Canada is going to produce 15 frigates in 4 years
The Halifax was laid down in March 1987 and the Ottawa was commissioned in Sept 1996 with 3 of the 12 built by Davie

Indeed, I forgot in my napkin math that Irving can likely only work on 2-3 ships at a time and isn't able to keep starting vessels themselves. The timeline would likely be pushed back quite a bit.

But why?

Why not buy two vessels of existing designs?

One for cold waters and one for warm waters? Did we gain anything by trying to create a uniquely Canadian camel?

@Stoker already made some great points above. Svalbard is a single ship designed to patrol around the Barents Sea and her namesake island, AOPS is an 8 ship class designed to be able to transit and operate in the remote Canadian Arctic as its primary purpose, with a secondary role of being able to undertake various missions overseas which vessels like the MCDV's do but might not be particularly well suited for. Due to the lack of activity in the Arctic throughout the winter season and the cost ineffectiveness of making AOPS into a heavy icebreaker, it only makes sense to have patrol vessels which are able to be deployed when the conditions better allow traffic and require patrolling in the first place. This navigable season is roughly from June to October as I've been told, having the ships be able to deploy for other duties elsewhere for those other months is the only way to make this purchase responsible.

 

[YZT580]

Likely not an option as part of the point of the AOPS procurement was to help better transition Irving back into proper large scale military shipbuilding. Between the MCDV's and the AOPS, Irving's Halifax Yard built a number of civilian vessels and small patrol vessels for the CCG but nothing really of note.


I am unconvinced that it is a remotely wise idea to hand Davie, in its state at the time, something as complex and valuable as a frigate building contract. They had issues properly following through with civilian supply ship contracts at the time if I recall.


I am unaware of any yards in Newfoundland or Labrador able to build vessels of this size. Heddle exists in Thunder Bay but I think they specialize more in repair/refit than construction. Canada also wanted to concentrate the work in its larger and more capable existing yards instead of spreading it out and returning to the boom and bust cycle faster.

Information archivée dans le Web | Information Archived on the Web

publications.gc.ca

From Page 25

It is always difficult to compare procurements between nations as standards differ, it is also incredibly easy for governments to alter the program cost by adding or subtracting various costs. These figures are usually a mirage and change significantly even when the same baseline design is purchased between different nations, if domestic production is being used. For these reasons, I do not put much stock in what it costs one nation to build a certain ship when you are trying to compare it abroad.

Heddle also took over Port Weller so they have the physical yard space required to build any ship that will fit through the canal. They are in the process of training up welders, machinists etc. and they could easily fabricate some of the lesser CG vessels. They tried to team up with Seaspan I believe for some of their modules.

 

[Underway]

And maybe JSS; that was updated and changed too.

Some were to bring it up to current code due to time lag, but wasn't actually mandatory for us to do. Would make sense to look at it and consider it though, because those code changes are usually because of some kind of disaster with loss of life or major costs.

A lot were kind of dumb, and then we can't get changes made to bring it within our current helo operating requirements because they don't want to make design changes, so at the moment looks like it's being delivered with a red deck.

There were lots of things that were left alone. The magazine requirements for example. German magazine safety/design vice RCN. Some of their fire fighting things were left as German. Different way of doing things but not necessarily wrong. But a lot was Canadianized because we have different or in many cases higher standards then the Germans, like minimum widths to stairwells. Apparently Germans like rat tunnels instead of proper flats... lol.

As far as the helo, if its a red deck its likely due to timing vice design. The Cyclone folks were heavily involved. Or it needs to actually have flight tests as part of the T&T process in order to validate the Flight Deck Mangement System programing. That involves a live bird. In that case it will be delivered first and then the RCN will do the work with the test pilots to make them happy. I'm telling you there was soooo much work that went into getting the helicopter people happy at a minimum. That entire hangar was planned to the most minute detail in conjunction with the Squadrons.

There are other things that were originally planned to have delivered with the JSS but it was decided otherwise as the project progress. CIWS is one of them. FMF will install CIWS mounts (though the control stations will already be in place internally), as they do that all the time and paying Seaspan to do it when we likely would have had to redo it anyways made little sense. Also all the security ITAR shenanigans to be able to qualify a Seaspan employee... just easier for FMF.