New Canadian Shipbuilding Strategy

[Underway]

Going back to cost, the costs to rebuild the industrial capacity should be cleaved off the cost of actually building the ships, so everyone know what is what. That industrial rebuilding should be costed against Public works or a similar department and the actual ship construction and outfitting costs to the DND.

This is what Europe does, and is why their ships are often so much cheaper.  Also you need to include the discount from subsidizing weapons industries/programs directly which we also don't do here in Canada.  Hence why I'm sure it costs more to by FCS in Canada than it does in France.

:bravo:

But wasn't there some debate a while back about how that would play with WTO rules?  Could a publicly funded shipyard compete internationally for commercial contracts?  If it were a nationalized shipyard devoted to military procurement could it sell to anybody other than its own and other national governments?  I believe that is part of the weird calculus that sees up building a capability on the back of very small Navy.

Take a look at the AORs.  Davie, Seaspan and Irving all have yards that could manage the conversions, and I am willing to bet, increase the delivery rate once the kinks have been worked out, but the government is only willing to supply the cash to build 1 to 2 ships a year.  That burn rate has permitted ISY and Seaspan to figure out a business plan that will amortize their initial capital outlay over the life of the NSPS. 

They could build more, faster, if the money was there faster.  But the money is/was coming at the planned rate and that rate had to accommodate the need to create the industry.

Don't get me wrong.  No sarcasm here.  I agree entirely with the sentiments.  I am just not sure about the practicalities after the international trade lawyers and the government accountants get through describing the rules of the game.

This may very well be true as most other countries major subsidized yards were created and put on the dole well before these WTO rules came into place.

 

[suffolkowner]

For sure a proper accounting would consider foreign subsidies as well as the return to the treasury from the money spent in Canada. That's got to be a third of the total project? I think it's been posted numerous times regarding the Halifax class what the substantial offsets were.

 

[CougarKing]

NSPS architect and top Public Works bureaucrat Thomas Ring passes the torch to Lisa Campbell:

National Post

Michael Den Tandt: One bureaucrat’s $26-billion sign-off on new Canadian naval fleet

Michael Den Tandt | January 7, 2016 | Last Updated: Jan 8 8:33 AM ET
More from Michael Den Tandt | @mdentandt

A sole-source deal involving naval shipbuilding contracts worth $26 billion was signed on behalf of the government of Canada by a single federal bureaucrat at the end of his tenure, after his successor had assumed her duties.

An eight-page outline, entitled Agreement on Principles Between Canada and Irving Shipbuilding Inc. (“ISI”) For The Canadian Surface Combatant Project, obtained by the National Post, describes terms of an agreement between Ottawa and ISI naming the latter “prime contractor” on the federal plan to build a new Canadian naval fleet, budgeted to cost $26 billion.

The document does not appear to be a formal, final contract and contains no fixed fee estimates, delivery schedules or dollar figures to be paid to Irving for rendering this service, which is akin to a construction firm acting as general contractor on a home renovation project, while also bidding on parts of the work itself.

In a prepared statement late Tuesday, Public Services  and Procurement Canada (formerly Public Works and Government Services Canada) confirmed no overarching contract has yet been signed. “Canada has designated Irving Shipbuilding as the Prime Contractor for the Definition and Implementation Phases of the CSC project. While three preliminary services contracts have been awarded to ISI for work relating to the CSC project, the Definition Contract for CSC has not yet been awarded. It is Canada’s intention to award the Definition Contract to ISI following the completion of the competitive selection of the Combat Systems Integrator and Warship Designer subcontractors.”

Dated Jan. 22, 2015, the “agreement on principles” is signed on behalf of Irving Shipbuilding by co-chief executive James D. Irving, vice-chairman Ross Langley, president Kevin McCoy, and vice-president of programs Scott Jamieson.

Thomas Ring, a former senior bureaucrat at the Defence and Public Works departments who played a leading role in framing the former Conservative government’s national shipbuilding procurement strategy in 2011, is the sole signatory for the government of Canada. His signature is dated Jan. 21. No job titles are included with his or the other four signatures.

Ring is now a senior fellow in the University of Ottawa’s graduate school of public and international affairs. His retirement from his last federal post as assistant deputy minister (acquisitions) at Public Works became public in late August 2014, nearly six months before the Irving deal was signed.

According to a defence industry source, Ring served his final days at Public Works in mid-to-late January 2015. He did not respond to a telephone request Tuesday for an interview. His successor and the current ADM (Acquisitions) at Public Works, Lisa Campbell, formally assumed the role Jan. 16, 2015, according to an internal Public Works memo reported by the Ottawa Citizen at the time.

In its prepared response, Public Services and Procurement Canada added: “On January 21, 2015, (the) date of the signature of the agreement on principles between Canada and Irving Shipbuilding, Mr. Ring was the assistant deputy minister responsible for Acquisitions Branch. To ensure that there was a smooth transition in Acquisitions Branch, Ms. Campbell joined the department prior to Mr. Ring’s retirement.”

News of ISI’s appointment as prime contractor broke last Jan. 20, a day before the memorandum was signed by Ring and two days before it was signed by ISI. It set Ottawa officialdom abuzz due to the arrangement being sole-sourced — meaning it was awarded without formal bids — and because of the staggering sum of public money involved.

The National Post’s John Ivison reported Jan. 21, 2015, that the arrangement had been run by the ministerial working group responsible for procurement, but not the cabinet, because, according to an unnamed source at Public Works, it was an “administrative contractual decision.”


    Like the vast majority of current federal military procurement projects, the Canadian surface combatants program is behind schedule and plagued by ballooning costs. An initial commitment to build 16 warships was scaled back to 15, then “up to 15,” and most recently downgraded to possibly as few as 11.  The selection of a combat systems integrator and warship designer for the project has yet to be made.

Irving’s dominant role in managing the CSC project has important implications for the ultimate disposition of the systems and design work, which comprises upwards of 60 per cent of the cost of building a modern warship. ISI has long-standing ties with U.S. defence giant Lockheed-Martin. Several other global defence firms, including Thales Group and DCNS Group, are also expected to bid on parts of the work.

The CSC program forms the backbone of the previous government’s shipbuilding initiative, unveiled with great fanfare in October 2011. It is also central to the new Liberal government’s promise to reform and improve byzantine military procurement practices that have bedeviled every Canadian administration since the Brian Mulroney era.

During the recent federal campaign, Prime Minister Justin Trudeau promised to set aside once and for all the star-crossed F-35 fighter-jet purchase, find a lower-cost fighter for the Royal Canadian Air Force, and plow any savings into rebuilding the Royal Canadian Navy.

 

[dapaterson]

Irving shipyard is in the news over a large number of warranty claims for the new Coast Guard vessels: http://www.cbc.ca/news/politics/coast-guard-irving-ships-1.3422997

New mid-shore patrol ships have been the subject of numerous warranty claims by the Canadian Coast Guard, including for faulty wiring, polluted water tanks, premature corrosion and a gearbox failure, which could endanger the safety of the crew, Radio-Canada has learned.

 

[Colin Parkinson]

Surprised we are not

The last CCG contract that I am aware of that no failures were the 1100 class built on the west coast and the Matsumoto shipyard contract for the 41' cutters which was the result of a cancelled failed east coast contract.

 

[jollyjacktar]

Typical Irving quality we've come to expect and dread.

 

[Oldgateboatdriver]

Surprised we are not

The last CCG contract that I am aware of that no failures were the 1100 class built on the west coast and the Matsumoto shipyard contract for the 41' cutters which was the result of a cancelled failed east coast contract.

Do you mean that the Pearkes and the Black were OK but the other four type 1100 had problems?

 

[Colin Parkinson]

I cannot comment on them as I have no knowledge of their build. I can say that every ship we got from the East Coast was (in the words of my Bosun) a Sh*t pit. The Laurier apparently need a lot of work when she came out here. The Narwhal and Barlett where good ships, just badly worn, the Norman McLeod Rogers, came out here, Asbestos was seen floating from the deckheads, the cost of removal combined with all the other repairs caused her to be surplussed. I should add the Hovercraft contract did go fairly well.

Other major contract failures that I know of
Landing craft fuel barges (terrible design and terrible build quality)
first 41' cutter contracts (first one rejected, contract given to west coast yeard)
70' Point class (only 2 of the 9 built due to poor workmanship)
47' Lifeboat (After testing the first one, the Kingston yard lost the contract, the remaining boats were built by Nanimo shipyards) 

 

[Underway]

Is it just me are are all ship building contracts a disaster waiting to happen?  When I'm looking around the internet and talking to other sailors it seems like almost all military ship projects are managed badly, have tonnes of problems and never seem to sort themselves out until years after the ship has been in operation.  Every country has their issues.  Just a few examples:  the LCS, the Type-45, Hobart Class... Also in speaking to my NATO friends they all have gripes and bitches about their "builders" and cost overruns/shoddy work.  Just a fact of life perhaps?  Warships are the most complicated engineering task a society can embark on, even more than a space program.  Should we not expect a lower standard overall?

 

[Kirkhill]

Meanwhile civilian hulls are turned out at a high rate and serve their masters well until they are replaced.

Personally I think a big part of the issue is the high rate.  Practice makes perfect and the civilians producing civilian vessels for civilian purposes understand their trade, their craft and their clients.

None of that seems to be true in the military world.

 

[CBH99]

Chris Pook - with the possible exception of the USN...just based on the fact that their military shipbuilders are constantly building new ships & new blocks of ships, and seem to have the process pretty well practiced.

 

[Kirkhill]

I would argue that the USN is in the same boat - your pardon.

They can build multiples but they have difficulty with the first of class - San Jose, Independence and Freedom, immediately come to mind.

The LCS types they are still debugging.  And Zumwalts have been a long time coming and likely to be few in number. 

 

[jollyjacktar]

I would argue that the USN is in the same boat - your pardon.

They can build multiples but they have difficulty with the first of class - San Jose, Independence and Freedom, immediately come to mind.

The LCS types they are still debugging.  And Zumwalts have been a long time coming and likely to be few in number.

All true.  I was speaking with men who were involved in the San Antonio.  The costs and mistakes were epic.  She cost $20B just to bring from plan to jetty, so much so they could not afford to install her VLS in the bow.  The company that won the contract for the gearboxes and associated parts went under halfway through the design and build.  The USN was forced to find another company to start from the beginning and finish that part of the build.  Very expensive.

 

[Kirkhill]

Gearboxes.  Powerplants.  Hull.  Navigation gear.  Engine Rooms and Mechanical services. Even Platform Management Systems .... Surely those are all portable from the civvy world to the naval world?  With the ready expertise?

Or does everything have to be re-engineered every time?

 

[CBH99]

I was thinking more along the lines of classes of vessels already in service, i.e. Alreigh Burke class - that tend to have fairly predictable build schedules.

But when it comes to new classes of vessels, your right - definitely can't argue.  And the amount of money paid definitely seems to be a premium.

 

[Monsoon]

Gearboxes.  Powerplants.  Hull.  Navigation gear.  Engine Rooms and Mechanical services. Even Platform Management Systems .... Surely those are all portable from the civvy world to the naval world?  With the ready expertise?

Or does everything have to be re-engineered every time?

Gearboxes and powerplants - Not at all. You won't find civilian ships with the complex CODAG sort of arrangements that are common (and necessary for redundancy) on warships.

Hull - Nope. Naval hulls these days are optimized for radar cross-section reduction, which isn't even remotely a civilian consideration.

Navigation gear - The nav systems on a warship need to be integrated with the combat systems, which for a variety of reasons means they need to be developed as military grade from scratch.

Engine rooms and mechanical services - Again, these arrangements tend to look very different on warships due to the need to optimize for survivability (so, a higher degree of compartmentalization and redundancy, etc).

Platform Management Systems - The civilian requirement doesn't have to address the need to "float-move-fight": naval systems are heavily geared towards shipboard fire fighting and damage control. Where civilian ships sometimes to use the same IPMS as military ones (for example, the former CAE/now L3 system), that's because the systems were designed specifically for military use and can be "down-graded" to fit the civilian requirement.

 

[Karel Doorman]

Is it just me are are all ship building contracts a disaster waiting to happen?  When I'm looking around the internet and talking to other sailors it seems like almost all military ship projects are managed badly, have tonnes of problems and never seem to sort themselves out until years after the ship has been in operation.  Every country has their issues.  Just a few examples:  the LCS, the Type-45, Hobart Class... Also in speaking to my NATO friends they all have gripes and bitches about their "builders" and cost overruns/shoddy work.  Just a fact of life perhaps?  Warships are the most complicated engineering task a society can embark on, even more than a space program.  Should we not expect a lower standard overall?

From what i read on the internet,the T-45's have big problems (electrical),when all the power(electrical)is needed the lights go out(wartsillas trip themselves out)
Looks strange to me(has to do,in my mind,with all the government cutting on the project)

So it seems that the T-45 need a lot more electrcal power(maybe a solution is to put a 3rd wartsilla in), but then "our" DZP's  use the wartsillas too,no problems there.but offcourse we use 4 and they are 1.7MW each,so that's why no probs there.

here's a short piece of the story:

THE former head of the Royal Navy has said the government needs to act immediately to refit the engines of Britain’s most advanced warships.

The calls come as the Ministry of Defence (MoD) revealed that the £6bn fleet of six Type 45 destroyers will be fitted with new engines because the keep breaking down.

However, Admiral Lord Alan West said the reliability of the warships – which are all based in Portsmouth – had been on-going issue for the past few years and should have been dealt with sooner.

Speaking to The News today, Lord West said: ‘Clearly this is a pervasive, systemic problem that needs to be resolved as quickly, as it can,

‘These are not just teething problems.

‘It was quite clear, certainly two years ago, that this was systemic.

‘We have got 19 frigates and destroyers and if six have engine problems then we have only 13 – that’s unacceptable.’

He criticised the MoD for not taking action sooner to resolve the issue and urged the Treasury to provide cash to fund the refit programme sooner rather than later.

Read more: http://www.portsmouth.co.uk/news/defence/update-former-navy-head-says-type-45-s-engine-woes-are-systemic-1-7187230#ixzz3yjIz2qFZ

gr,walter


Here's a bit more(so it'll be clear it's electrical)

http://www.bbc.com/news/uk-35432341

here's the answer of Voldakov(DT-forum),looked a bit deeper into the problems;


Quote:
Originally Posted by John Fedup View Post
If not building enough ships is the root cause of the U.K.'s naval building program then Canada and the RCN have an even worse problem.
I covered this on the RAN thread, the issue is apparently not the propulsion system but under power diesel generators, i.e only two Wartsilas of only 1Mw each, verses the Type 23 with four DGs of 1.5Mw each. When trawling along on station the ships would be running on DGs only to save fuel, when the required power exceeds what the DGs can provide the whole thing (or specific systems) trip out as there is insufficient power.

 

[GR66]

Gearboxes and powerplants - Not at all. You won't find civilian ships with the complex CODAG sort of arrangements that are common (and necessary for redundancy) on warships.

Hull - Nope. Naval hulls these days are optimized for radar cross-section reduction, which isn't even remotely a civilian consideration.

Navigation gear - The nav systems on a warship need to be integrated with the combat systems, which for a variety of reasons means they need to be developed as military grade from scratch.

Engine rooms and mechanical services - Again, these arrangements tend to look very different on warships due to the need to optimize for survivability (so, a higher degree of compartmentalization and redundancy, etc).

Platform Management Systems - The civilian requirement doesn't have to address the need to "float-move-fight": naval systems are heavily geared towards shipboard fire fighting and damage control. Where civilian ships sometimes to use the same IPMS as military ones (for example, the former CAE/now L3 system), that's because the systems were designed specifically for military use and can be "down-graded" to fit the civilian requirement.

I'm curious as to how many of these items have to be completely re-designed for each and every new class of warship.  Cannot any of these militarized designs be re-used from class to class, or are there not major western manufacturers that supply these items to an array of ship builders?  What I'm trying to understand is if we are making these problems ourselves by the way we are contracting our warship construction (each nation doing it's own thing...each new class in each nation to it's own shipbuilder or shipyard, etc.) rather than the problems being actual technical problems.

 

[FSTO]

I'm curious as to how many of these items have to be completely redesigned for each and every new class of warship.  Cannot any of these militarized designs be reused from class to class, or are there not major western manufacturers that supply these items to an array of ship builders?  What I'm trying to understand is if we are making these problems ourselves by the way we are contracting our warship construction (each nation doing it's own thing...each new class in each nation to it's own shipbuilder or shipyard, etc.) rather than the problems being actual technical problems.

Our "Cadillac" that were built in the 50's and 60's were basically the same hull and powerplants. Instead of giving them different names they could have been called "flight 1, 2, 3, 4.
The USN did the same with the Spruances and Ticonderongas. Many of the ideas from those two were incorporated into the Arleigh Burkes.

 

[GR66]

Our "Cadillac" that were built in the 50's and 60's were basically the same hull and powerplants. Instead of giving them different names they could have been called "flight 1, 2, 3, 4.
The USN did the same with the Spruances and Ticonderongas. Many of the ideas from those two were incorporated into the Arleigh Burkes.

Thanks for the reply.  I'm certainly not dismissing the differences between civilian and military shipbuilding noted by Hamiltongs, but are his points a little overstated only because that level of difficulty is based the Canadian-specific reality of OUR shipbuilding industry?  If we handled the purchase differently would these SYSTEMS related problems be less?  Is picking mature, proven (in other classes of active ships) systems even an option in the world shipbuilding market? 

I guess what I'm getting at, is it possible to choose a series of proven systems (the Gearboxes and powerplants from this ship, the Navigation gear from that ship, the mechanical services from this ship, and the Platform Management Systems from a different ship) and shift all of the design and development issues strictly into the hull design and systems integration?