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New Canadian Shipbuilding Strategy

Are you sure chief?

I am rather hoping someone will smarten up and the BAE Mk38 25 mm gun destined for the HARRY DeWOLF class will also be installed on the MCDV as main gun.
 
It would make a huge amount of sense from both a logistics and training POV.

Therefore, it will never happen.
 
Oldgateboatdriver said:
Are you sure chief?

I am rather hoping someone will smarten up and the BAE Mk38 25 mm gun destined for the HARRY DeWOLF class will also be installed on the MCDV as main gun.

I believe it is this one https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nanuk_Remotely_Controlled_Weapon_Station
 
Just throwing this out there for discussion because I've found that you can learn a great deal from the experienced forum members when they talk about the pros and cons of platforms and equipment suggested by others.

I have seen two different "up-gunned" versions of the LCS floated by Austal (builder of the "Independence" trimaran LCS design).  The first, the "International" LCS had two 8-cell Mk.41 VLS systems on the fore deck and two quad-harpoon launchers on top of the hanger.

The more recent "Multi-Mission Combatant" version has two 8-cell Mk.41 VLS systems on either side of the superstructure (32 cells total) and the 8 x harpoons on the fore deck.

What if you combined those two designs to have a ship with 48 x VLS cells (16 on fore deck and 16 on each side of the superstructure) and the 8 x harpoons above the hanger.  The Mk.41 VLS is modular so you could arm the ships for a wide variety of missions.  For anti-air you could have the front 16 cells each with a quad-pack of Evolved Sea Sparrow Missiles for short range defence and the remaining 32 cells with SM-2 missiles for longer range defence.  Other missions could use some of the cells for ASROC torpedoes for ASW.  Making a couple of the VLS launchers the deeper "strike" version (instead of the shallower "tactical" version) would give the option of using some of the cells for Tomahawk cruise missiles or BMD capabilities.

The LCS has a huge flight deck and a large hanger which could support both a helicopter and possible UAVs.  There is also a 11,000 sq ft mission bay.  Since current Canadian doctrine doesn't really plan for using our CSCs for delivering vehicles and troops, perhaps you could cut the size in half to support a larger crew and still have 5,000 sq feet available to support things like mine clearing mission modules, humanitarian supplies, extra RHIBs for boarding missions, a couple of vehicles for disaster relief, etc.

Here's a link to the MMC data sheet on Austal's website:  http://www.austal.com/Resources/PromotionSlides/dd47585d-170b-4e43-a80c-2d849e065b2d/mm-brochure-horiz2011.pdf

A design like this could benefit from commonality with the USN's LCSs and the same basic design could be used for both the anti-air destroyer and corvette versions of the CSC.

We could go even further and eventually replace the Kingston-class with Austal's Multi-Role Vessel which is basically a smaller version of the LCS design.  That ship would (I'm guessing) have some mechanical commonality with the LCS.  The data sheet on the MRV is here:  http://www.austal.com/Resources/Deliveries/4a74c8d1-9ece-4ea8-8693-bcf8493e31cf/mrv-80-data-sheets-sml.pdf
 
Yup, that's pretty much how it's done.  Modular, just like that.  But without the inspiring music (that was deemed too expensive).
 
Our friend Michael O'Leary posted this, from 1934, on his blog, "The Regimental Rogue." It is germane today:

http://regimentalrogue.tripod.com/blog/index.blog/2356806/canadian-navy-will-continue-with-few-ships/
The Regimental Rogue
Canadian Navy will Continue with Few Ships

No programme of Naval Construction Planned
Arms at Minimum
Dominion to Keep Land and Air Forces at Skeleton Strength


The Gazette, Montreal, Que., 2 January 1934
(By the Canadian Press)

Ottawa, January 1.—Canada contemplates no programme of naval construction for 1934, as so far as any Government policy concerns itself with matters of defence the Dominion will embark on no lines of expansion in any branch of the service it was learned here. The four destroyers and three minesweepers which constitute the Royal Canadian Navy will continue to do so; the skeleton strengths of the permanent force units will be so maintained, while whatever is done for the Royal Canadian Air Force will be in the way of replacement only.

Some years ago the naval branch of the Defence Department had under consideration the laying-up of the minesweepers and building some sloops of the Valerian class to take their place. The advent of the depression however, killed this project, and those 17-year-old drifters remained in commission.

Of the four drafted into service during the war and given names reminiscent of Canadian military achievement on the west front — "Ypres," "Festubert," "Thiepval," and "Armentieres" — three remain. Thiepval was lost in the Pacific seven years ago. Ypres has now become a "depot ship." Only Festubert and Armentieres continue active.

Two of Canada's destroyers, "Skeena" and "Saguenay," are at the top of their class as modern warships of that type. They are only three years old, as equipped with every modern device that makes for efficient vessels and are in every respect formidable men o'war. The others, "Champlain" and "Vancouver," are still technically on loan to this country from the Royal Navy, but the Admiralty said good-bye to them long ago and does not expect to get them back. They are 16 years old. Within the next three of four years plans will have to be drawn up for their replacement, and the likelihood is that this will be achieved by constructing two more destroyers of the Saguenay class.

Shortly after the war, the British Government presented Canada with a small flotilla comprising one light cruiser, "Aurora," and two destroyers, "Patriot" and "Patrician." The cruiser was laid up in 1922. The destroyers continued to serve until almost five years ago when they followed their parent ship to the scrap-heap.

Canadian naval policy envisages a fleet owned, controlled and manned by Canadians. The first two elements are accomplished facts, the last is being gradually achieved, for the vast majority of the personnel are now natives of this country and, for the first time since naval activities assumed any importance in the Dominion, the Director of Naval Operations—Captain Percy W. Nelles, R.C.N.—is a Canadian.

Naval policy, however, does not by any means contemplate a "big" navy. It conforms to the resolution of the 1923 Imperial Conference which set forth that "the primary responsibility of each portion of the Empire represented at the conference is for its own local defence." A writer in a recent issue of an English military journal crystallized this in the following terms:

"With respect to the role of Canada's sea forces, it must be understood that whereas the security of her sea-borne commerce is recognized as a national responsibility, there are certain considerations which must not be lost sight of. At the outmost limits of the sea-lines of communication in the Mediterranean, Indian Ocean, South America or Africa, etc., an individual Canadian cargo is perhaps hard to find; but at the focal point of the cone, in the vicinity of Canadian waters, these cargoes become, so to speak, congested, and operation against Canadian trade in these limited areas would have an adverse effect on Canadian industry.

"It must be remembered, however, that Canada is peculiarly well situated. Geographically and strategically, vis-à-vis trans-oceanic power. Our vulnerable focal point lies 5,000 miles on one side and 3,000 miles on the other from any possible overseas adversary. In any maritime conflict it is difficult to conceive of any major forces of possible enemies being detached to attack Canadian trade at these distances, at its most vulnerable point. It is, of course, possible that minor or improvised forces might well be available for such an objective if no defences were maintained to oppose them."

Reduced to its simplest terms, this means that Canadian naval policy is to guard the sea-lanes which fan out from the mouth of the St. Lawrence, from Halifax and Saint John on the Atlantic, and from Victoria and Vancouver on the Pacific. Beyond that, naval responsibility is regarded as resting elsewhere.

Whether Canada's present forces are adequate to deal with whatever situation may arise that would demand a practical application of this policy is the concern of the naval experts working in collaboration with the Treasury Department. Warships are expensive, and Canada's financial resources are employed to their limit in taking care of railway deficits, interest on war loans and the national debt, unemployment relief, unbalanced budgets and the administrative services. Having regard to the demands of the Treasury for the maintenance of those features of national existence that are urgent and immediately necessary, any possibility of naval expansion in the near future is so remote as to be ruled out of the picture.

OK, there's no "great depression" going on, but the recovery from the recent "Great Recession" has been, is being anaemic, at best. The Globe and Mail reports that "The $1.4-billion surplus predicted by the Conservatives for the current fiscal year: poof, gone. It’s now a $3-billion hole. The same goes for next year’s $1.7-billion surplus. It’s now a nearly $4-billion shortfall, and so on. And that’s before tallying up the cost of the Liberals’ numerous election promises, which include roughly $5-billion a year worth of additional infrastructure spending." The National Shipbuilding Procurement Strategy was not about ships, and it certainly wasn't a strategy; it was a statement about the limits of a financial support (subsidy) programme for one sector of the Canadian economy. The Liberals have committed to "meeting the commitments that were made as part of the National Shipbuilding and Procurement Strategy," but I suspect that's in dollar terms, not numbers (or even types) of ships. As recently as two years ago, the Auditor General said that "it's unclear how many ships the strategy will produce, particularly with such cost restrictions in place — meaning the navy could be forced to reduce the fleet size below its needs."

I'm willing to give Prime Minister Justin Trudeau and Finance Minister Bill Morneau all the available benefits of all my many doubts about their platform and the recent financial forecast: I suspect that Minister Morneau has asked his officials to "low ball" the forecast so that the Trudeau regime will be able to deal with low expectations, and maybe even exceed them. I believe that Prime Minister Justin Trudeau does plan "to invest in strengthening our Navy," to the tune of the $34 Billion promised by Prime Minister Harper (some of that being for the CCG); I'm just not sure that will procure what Canada really needs ~ not just what the RCN and CCG want, but what Canada needs. The Conservative "fudged" the numbers to make themselves look good; I am pretty sure the Liberals are "fudging" them again, to give themselves the benefits of low expectations. But nothing alters the fact that $34 Billion will not build the civil and military fleets Canada needs in the 21st century and there is nothing on the horizon ~ no promises of spending priority changes or tax increases to fund defence procurement, for example ~ to suggest that the Government of Canada wants or feels any need to invest in national defence. In other words: welcome to the 1930s.

 
E.R. Campbell said:
Our friend Michael O'Leary posted this, from 1934, on his blog, "The Regimental Rogue." It is germane today:

http://regimentalrogue.tripod.com/blog/index.blog/2356806/canadian-navy-will-continue-with-few-ships/
Like they say, everything old is new again - good catch!
 
Irving Shipbuilding trying to get Davie's contract?

CBC

Irving Shipbuilding fires back at shipbuilding association criticism
Shipbuilding Association of Canada says Irving is trying to delay Davie contract


By Jennifer Henderson, CBC News Posted: Nov 23, 2015 6:37 PM AT Last Updated: Nov 23, 2015 6:41 PM AT


The association that represents some Canadian shipbuilders says it's "surprised and disappointed" Halifax's Irving Shipbuilding Inc. is urging the Trudeau government to stall a contract previously awarded to a Quebec shipyard.

Chantier Davie Canada Inc. of Lévis, Que., wants to convert a civilian cargo ship into a badly needed military supply vessel that would provide fuel, food and ammunition to Royal Canadian Navy ships at sea.

CBC News reported last week that Irving Shipbuilding had sent letters for four cabinet ministers asking the new Liberal government to delay final approval of the $700-million Davie contract. The deal had been awarded by the Harper government during the October federal election campaign.

(...SNIPPED)
 
Lumber said:
Irving not considering the impact on sailors.

To be fair, no company really thinks of the end user as the reason they do things - it's for profit (or to keep employees working).  I'd doubt that Lockheed-Martin or Northrop Grumman would, in their corporate (not PR dept) hearts, really care about the impact of their products on aircrews/maintenance crews.
 
Dimsum said:
To be fair, no company really thinks of the end user as the reason they do things - it's for profit (or to keep employees working).  I'd doubt that Lockheed-Martin or Northrop Grumman would, in their corporate (not PR dept) hearts, really care about the impact of their products on aircrews/maintenance crews.

With respect, that is an incorrect statement. While I acknowledge that it is true of many companies, and in my experience it is more true of small companies than large, any company that loses sight of its first loyalty, to its clients, is destined to fail miserably and spectacularly.

Companies succeed by delivering products that people do not complain about. 

Companies do not succeed by moaning about their competition and criticizing their clients' decisions.  That is a surefire guarantee of losing the next contract.

Irving is being idiotic.
 
Companies have, above all else, a fiduciary duty* to the shareholders to care, again above all else, for the shareholder's investments. More than one CEO and member of a board has found himself/herself in real, legal trouble when shareholders think the corporation is acting in the best interests of anyone, including the workers or the government, rather than in theirs. Courts have somewhat different interpretations in  various jurisdictions throughout Canada, America and the rest of the world, but the principle is the same.

_____
* Fiduciary Duty
  Definition


  A fiduciary duty is a legal duty to act solely in another party's interests. Parties owing this duty are called fiduciaries. The individuals to whom they owe a duty are called principals. Fiduciaries may not profit from their relationship with their principals
  unless they have the principals' express informed consent. They also have a duty to avoid any conflicts of interest between themselves and their principals or between their principals and the fiduciaries' other clients. A fiduciary duty is the
  strictest duty of care recognized by the US legal system.

  Examples of fiduciary relationships include those between a lawyer and her client, a guardian and her ward, and a director and her shareholders.

  Source: https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/fiduciary_duty
 
Chris Pook said:
With respect, that is an incorrect statement. While I acknowledge that it is true of many companies, and in my experience it is more true of small companies than large, any company that loses sight of its first loyalty, to its clients, is destined to fail miserably and spectacularly.

Companies succeed by delivering products that people do not complain about. 

Companies do not succeed by moaning about their competition and criticizing their clients' decisions.  That is a surefire guarantee of losing the next contract.

Irving is being idiotic.

Sadly, it hasn't stopped Irving from getting contract after contract.  I think they have a deal with the Devil or something similar.  They are almost universally loathed and hated by most of the fleet for being a bunch of asshats.
 
This, a report that the UYK will cut its frigate order and build some smaller, presumably cheaper ships, too is something I have been asking about for some time.

I understand that the institutional Navy wants major combatants, frigates that, at about 7,000 tons, displace nearly as much as our last light cruiser (HMCS Ontario (1944-58). But I suspect that the policy centre in Ottawa (PCO, Finance and Treasury Board) might not share that desire. The centre approved, and the new Liberal centre seems inclined to support, the National Shipbuilding Procurement Strategy which, as I have pointed out, is, really, a budget (<$35 Billion) for an industrial subsidy programme that hangs it hat on the RCN and CCG because "national security" projects are exempt from the rules of international trade law that, generally, prohibit industrial subsidies.

I wonder if we can get 15 major surface combatants (frigates) from the money allocated. I still wonder if something like eight to 10 frigates and six or eight or even 10 corvettes ~ less than, say, 2,000 tons, less than 50 crew, less than 30% of the cost of a frigate, but with 60+% or so of the capability ~ might not be a politically better "fit" for Canada.
 
E.R. Campbell said:
I still wonder if something like eight to 10 frigates and six or eight or even 10 corvettes ~ less than, say, 2,000 tons, less than 50 crew, less than 30% of the cost of a frigate, but with 60+% or so of the capability ~ might not be a politically better "fit" for Canada.

This is why we need a new white paper, and we need to stick to it. Things in the world have changed a bit since 2006, including the economy. While I would love to see a modest fleet of AA destroyers, frigates, and a pair of assault carriers, we just can't afford it. If we don't get the number of ships originally promised, and our Defence Strategy remains the same, then I feel the Navy is going to be extremely handicapped in its ability to execute its mandate.
 
jollyjacktar said:
Sadly, it hasn't stopped Irving from getting contract after contract.  I think they have a deal with the Devil or something similar.  They are almost universally loathed and hated by most of the fleet for being a bunch of asshats.

That would suggest that the Fleet is not their client.  Politicians or PWGSC may be their client.  Consider it the Naval version of the single payer health care system.  You get what you are given, not what you need.

ERC:

I accept the fiduciary responsibility of the corporation - but that in no way diminishes the fact that companies will not exist without customers.  And revenues do not flow unless customers are satisfied.

And workers and the government are not in the same basket as customers.  Customers supply revenues.  Workers and the Government are pure costs. Except when the Government is the customer - as is the case with Irvings.
 
E.R. Campbell said:
Companies have, above all else, a fiduciary duty* to the shareholders to care, again above all else, for the shareholder's investments. More than one CEO and member of a board has found himself/herself in real, legal trouble when shareholders think the corporation is acting in the best interests of anyone, including the workers or the government, rather than in theirs. Courts have somewhat different interpretations in  various jurisdictions throughout Canada, America and the rest of the world, but the principle is the same.

I feel compelled to point out that this is not a correct statement of the law with respect to fiduciary duties, at least in Canada.  I do hear statements from people from time to time, that "the company owes a fiduciary duty to its shareholders" or, more commonly, that "the directors of a company owe a fiduciary duty to the shareholders".  Neither statement is correct as a rule.

There is a rule that directors of a corporation owe a fiduciary duty to the corporation itself, not to the shareholders.  As the Supreme Court of Canada said in BCE Inc. v. 1976 Debentureholders, [2008] 3 S.C.R. 560, 2008 SCC 69 (link: http://canlii.ca/t/21xpk ):

37    The fiduciary duty of the directors to the corporation originated in the common law. It is a duty to act in the best interests of the corporation. Often the interests of shareholders and stakeholders are co-extensive with the interests of the corporation. But if they conflict, the directors' duty is clear -- it is to the corporation: Peoples Department Stores.

38    The fiduciary duty of the directors to the corporation is a broad, contextual concept. It is not confined to short-term profit or share value. Where the corporation is an ongoing concern, it looks to the long-term interests of the corporation. The content of this duty varies with the situation at hand. At a minimum, it requires the directors to ensure that the corporation meets its statutory obligations. But, depending on the context, there may also be other requirements. In any event, the fiduciary duty owed by directors is mandatory; directors must look to what is in the best interests of the corporation.

39    In Peoples Department Stores, this Court found that although directors must consider the best interests of the corporation, it may also be appropriate, although not mandatory, to consider the impact of corporate decisions on shareholders or particular groups of stakeholders. As stated by Major and Deschamps JJ., at para. 42:

        "We accept as an accurate statement of law that in determining whether they are acting with a view to the best interests of the corporation it may be legitimate, given all the circumstances of a given case, for the board of directors to consider, inter alia, the interests of shareholders, employees, suppliers, creditors, consumers, governments and the environment.

As will be discussed, cases dealing with claims of oppression have further clarified the content of the fiduciary duty of directors with respect to the range of interests that should be considered in determining what is in the best interests of the corporation, acting fairly and responsibly."

40    In considering what is in the best interests of the corporation, directors may look to the interests of, inter alia, shareholders, employees, creditors, consumers, governments and the environment to inform their decisions. Courts should give appropriate deference to the business judgment of directors who take into account these ancillary interests, as reflected by the business judgment rule. The "business judgment rule" accords deference to a business decision, so long as it lies within a range of reasonable alternatives: see Maple Leaf Foods Inc. v. Schneider Corp. (1998), 42 O.R. (3d) 177 (C.A.); Kerr v. Danier Leather Inc., [2007] 3 S.C.R. 331, 2007 SCC 44. It reflects the reality that directors, who are mandated under s. 102(1) of the CBCA to manage the corporation's business and affairs, are often better suited to determine what is in the best interests of the corporation. This applies to decisions on stakeholders' interests, as much as other directorial decisions.

...

66    The fact that the conduct of the directors is often at the centre of oppression actions might seem to suggest that directors are under a direct duty to individual stakeholders who may be affected by a corporate decision. Directors, acting in the best interests of the corporation, may be obliged to consider the impact of their decisions on corporate stakeholders, such as the debentureholders in these appeals. This is what we mean when we speak of a director being required to act in the best interests of the corporation viewed as a good corporate citizen. However, the directors owe a fiduciary duty to the corporation, and only to the corporation. People sometimes speak in terms of directors owing a duty to both the corporation and to stakeholders. Usually this is harmless, since the reasonable expectations of the stakeholder in a particular outcome often coincide with what is in the best interests of the corporation. However, cases (such as these appeals) may arise where these interests do not coincide. In such cases, it is important to be clear that the directors owe their duty to the corporation, not to stakeholders, and that the reasonable expectation of stakeholders is simply that the directors act in the best interests of the corporation.

A court will examine the specific facts of each case to determine whether one person (natural or juridical) owes another person fiduciary duties on an ad hoc basis, but there is no general rule that corporations or directors owe fiduciary duties to shareholders.
 
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