quadrapiper
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I don't get the impression the Russians, who aren't shy about bolting armament to things, have armed their icebreakers to any great extent.
New Canadian Shipbuilding Strategy
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GR66
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Russia's new combat icebreaker built for Arctic dominance - Asia Times
Russia's new combat icebreaker, known as the Project 23550 Ivan Papanin, has embarked on factory sea trials, signaling Russia’s intensified strategic
asiatimes.com
Edit to add: Nothing really significant...actually similar to many of the suggestions made here for the AOPS...larger main gun and containerized missile capability.
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Russia's new combat icebreaker built for Arctic dominance - Asia Times
Russia's new combat icebreaker, known as the Project 23550 Ivan Papanin, has embarked on factory sea trials, signaling Russia’s intensified strategic
Edit to add: Nothing really significant...actually similar to many of the suggestions made here for the AOPS...larger main gun and containerized missile capability.
Well....
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Project 23550 patrol ship - Wikipedia
and the Kalibr missiles ...
3M54E (export anti-ship version): 220 km
3M54E1/3M14E (export anti-ship version): 300 km
3M54K/3M54T: 660 km (domestic anti-ship version, estimate)
3M14K/3M14T: 1,500–2,500 km (domestic land-attack version, estimate)
Not exactly unprepared to manage both the unexpected aerial and surface attack and targets of opportunity. Even if they stick with the 3M54s in the containers and don't graduate to the 3M14s they have significant areas of influence. And are considerably more mobile than a fixed land base.
...
Consider the prospect of one of those based at Nagurskoye, Russia's "Trefoil Base" on Alexandra Land.
It is within sailing distance of Svalbard, the island group Russia shares with Norway and to which it has invited to share facilities for research. An AOPS with a 660 km SSM missile like the 3M54K/3M54T would essentially choke off traffic between the Arctic and the Atlantic at the GIUK Gap.
And those containers on the back deck might contain missiles or they might just contain supplies and research gear for the Russian settlement on Svalbard.
Equally, they might contain the 3M14s in which case the entirety of Scandinavia, the UK as far south as Nottingham, the Faroes, Iceland, the entirety of Greenland, all of the islands of the Canadian Archipelago, the entirety of the North Warning System, Point Barrow and the Pribiloffs, would all be held at risk. Or not.
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GR66
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Like I said, nothing substantially different than what many people are suggesting for the AOPS.Well....
[td]Armament[/td]
- 1 × 76.2 mm AK-176MA naval gun[8]
- 4 × 12.7 mm Kord machine guns
- 2 × 30 mm AK-630M CIWS ("Ermak" type)
- 8 × 3M-54 Kalibr missiles ("Arktika" type)
Project 23550 patrol ship - Wikipedia
en.wikipedia.org
and the Kalibr missiles ...
3M54E (export anti-ship version): 220 km
3M54E1/3M14E (export anti-ship version): 300 km
3M54K/3M54T: 660 km (domestic anti-ship version, estimate)
3M14K/3M14T: 1,500–2,500 km (domestic land-attack version, estimate)
Not exactly unprepared to manage both the unexpected aerial and surface attack and targets of opportunity. Even if they stick with the 3M54s in the containers and don't graduate to the 3M14s they have significant areas of influence. And are considerably more mobile than a fixed land base.
...
Consider the prospect of one of those based at Nagurskoye, Russia's "Trefoil Base" on Alexandra Land.
It is within sailing distance of Svalbard, the island group Russia shares with Norway and to which it has invited to share facilities for research. An AOPS with a 660 km SSM missile like the 3M54K/3M54T would essentially choke off traffic between the Arctic and the Atlantic at the GIUK Gap.
And those containers on the back deck might contain missiles or they might just contain supplies and research gear for the Russian settlement on Svalbard.
Equally, they might contain the 3M14s in which case the entirety of Scandinavia, the UK as far south as Nottingham, the Faroes, Iceland, the entirety of Greenland, all of the islands of the Canadian Archipelago, the entirety of the North Warning System, Point Barrow and the Pribiloffs, would all be held at risk. Or not.
The main gun is bigger (76mm) but not likely to get into a gun fight with an enemy naval ship so perhaps upgrading AOPS to the same 30mm Lionfish as the River-Class would be sufficient.
They have 2 x 30mm CIWS and something similar (or a light AD missile launcher) have been suggested for the AOPS as well for C-UAS/AD.
The Kalbr missiles are a containerized version and presumably the AOPS could deploy something similar as well.
The main question I'd have is does it have the sensors required to make it an effective combatant? Having the weapons on board is one thing...effectively using them in combat is another (see the Moskva for reference)
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I think one of the biggest questions going just now is whether sensors and effectors have to be collocated. Much of the western planning seems to be based on the USN's experience with its Co-Operative Engagement Capability which is morphing over into Integrated Air Missile Defense, Battle Management Systems and Joint All Domain Command and Control as well as Multi Domain Task Forces. The best example, to my mind, is the Typhon battery developed by the USMC and employed by the US Army.
As you know those same launch pods have been employed on the heli-decks of LCS ships and the cargo decks of autonomous OSVs.
Distributed Command and Control and Effects are being demonstrated in Ukraine with their "Uber" system of fire control.
...
In some senses I feel that the modern push has historic parallels in both the West and the East. The East has always centralized control and relied on dispersed effectors that were not as bright as their Western counterparts. Air Defence Fighters were vectored by central control stations with their own radar networks. The Western predecessor was the RAF fighting the Battle of Britain with Spitfires and Hurricanes. The aircraft were dispersed and not particularly intelligent (.... I'll leave the role of the pilot for debate...).
....
For a ship, to my mind, the question is how much control over available weapons does the ship need to manage its own defence? How much can it rely on its sisters in the local Task Force? How much can it rely on the umbrellas of support available from other services operating in its operational area?
It seems to me logical that the Russian AOPS CO will have control over his local, self-defence assets but may be constrained from, or even barred from, employing the missiles he is transporting on his after deck.
...
A Canadian AOPS skipper could have exactly as much control over the missiles on his deck as an RRCA Coastal Artillery, or Air Defence Artillery, commander might have over those under his care.
Oldgateboatdriver
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First of all, it clearly states that the ships "could" be armed with missiles, not that they would. Second of all, nobody mentioned anything about how they think they can make such missiles work in the Arctic conditions, where equipment fails well before humans.
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