Ottawa's sluggish bureaucracy leaves critical gaps in Canadian military ammo supply: AG

[daftandbarmy]

I keep adding to my own thoughts, which is bad form, I suppose. Another thing that struck me was that the senior civil servants viewed ammunition as a depreciating asset, no different from a desk, computer terminal or a pickup truck. Most had been parachuted by PCO into DND from other Departments and had no Defence background. Another constant problem.

If only there was a very senior leader, like a CDS or something, who could have a crack at fixing that problem.

 

[SeaKingTacco]

If only there was a very senior leader, like a CDS or something, who could have a crack at fixing that problem.

The CDS does not “command” DND.

The CAF, which the CDS does command, is a component element of DND, which is functionally run by the MND and the DM.

 

[dapaterson]

If only there was a very senior leader, like a CDS or something, who could have a crack at fixing that problem.

It's not the role or function of the CDS to manage the institution of Defence.

I don't want a Deputy Minister dictating tactics, either.

 

[Cloud Cover]

It's not the role or function of the CDS to manage the institution of Defence.

I don't want a Deputy Minister dictating tactics, either.

We already had an architect and how did that work out.

 

[dapaterson]

We already had an architect and how did that work out.

That was the Minister, not the Deputy Minister.

 

[MilEME09]

That was the Minister, not the Deputy Minister.

The problem is even with these reports, no one sees a problem because at the office level everything works. We would need an actual conflict to break out involving us to have the perverbial poop hit the fan

 

[SupersonicMax]

We preach "unity of command" but our authorities are so dispersed throughout different L1s, that people making decisions have 0 stake in operations. It is normal for those people to take the least risk to themselves, with often little considerations to how it impact ops (current or future). There is no way in our system to keep people accountable because so many different organizations have authorities that have direct impact on operations. Give sufficient authorities to commanders (not ADMs), keep most authorities within CAF L1s and keep them accountable for their decisions.

 

[Halifax Tar]

Does anyone else remember when we almost ran out of ammo in Afghanistan ?

What the Thunder Said

Our Dry Cellar (New 2026)

All by Col John Conrad.

 

[MJP]

Does anyone else remember when we almost ran out of ammo in Afghanistan ?

I’d push back a little on “almost ran out.” We weren’t out of ammo. The stock existed. The consumption estimate was built on peacekeeping-era numbers, where the real worry was ammo going stale because nobody fired it, and then Kandahar turned into an actual fight. Bad planning? Absolutely. But the rounds were in the system, just not in theatre, and the emergency airlift worked precisely because the ammo was there to fly. That’s a forecasting and positioning failure.

That said the mindsets still exists, when you tell people how much ammo and fuel a division burns through in sustained combat, their eyes cross. We’ve just stood up our first real division in decades, and as an institution we still have a very poor understanding of logistics at that scale. Kandahar was a battle group and Latvia a Bde. A division is a different animal entirely, and the consumption numbers don’t scale gently.

I’ll add one quibble with Colonel Conrad, and I say this as someone who’s heard him speak and talked with him many times. When he wrote the book, he was proud of having made it all the way to lieutenant-colonel without a tour in Ottawa. Being tactically proficient is great. But Ottawa is where institutional problems get fixed, and his own book is largely about institutional problems: a logistics branch that was neglected and under-resourced long before we got to Kandahar. Somebody had to go to NDHQ and fight those fights. Being proud of avoiding that misses the point a bit.

Still a book worth reading, for what it’s worth. He saw firsthand where institutional neglect turns into risk on the ground.

 

[daftandbarmy]

I’d push back a little on “almost ran out.” We weren’t out of ammo. The stock existed. The consumption estimate was built on peacekeeping-era numbers, where the real worry was ammo going stale because nobody fired it, and then Kandahar turned into an actual fight. Bad planning? Absolutely. But the rounds were in the system, just not in theatre, and the emergency airlift worked precisely because the ammo was there to fly. That’s a forecasting and positioning failure.

It still exists, when you tell people how much ammo and fuel a division burns through in sustained combat, their eyes cross. We’ve just stood up our first real division, and as an institution we still have a very poor understanding of logistics at that scale. Kandahar was a battle group and Latvia a Bde. A division is a different animal entirely, and the consumption numbers don’t scale gently.

I’ll add one quibble with Colonel Conrad, and I say this as someone who’s heard him speak and talked with him many times. When he wrote the book, he was proud of having made it all the way to lieutenant-colonel without a tour in Ottawa. Being tactically proficient is great. But Ottawa is where institutional problems get fixed, and his own book is largely about institutional problems: a logistics branch that was neglected and under-resourced long before we got to Kandahar. Somebody had to go to NDHQ and fight those fights. Being proud of avoiding that misses the point a bit.

Still a book worth reading, for what it’s worth. He saw firsthand where institutional neglect turns into risk on the ground.

Which book?

https://49thshelf.com/Contributors/C/Conrad-John

 

[MJP]

If you are referring to him stating he never worked in Ottawa it was in What the Thunder Said. Near the start as he lays outs his bona fides. NVM I get what you are asking, same book though

 

[Halifax Tar]

I’d push back a little on “almost ran out.” We weren’t out of ammo. The stock existed. The consumption estimate was built on peacekeeping-era numbers, where the real worry was ammo going stale because nobody fired it, and then Kandahar turned into an actual fight. Bad planning? Absolutely. But the rounds were in the system, just not in theatre, and the emergency airlift worked precisely because the ammo was there to fly. That’s a forecasting and positioning failure.

That said the mindsets still exists, when you tell people how much ammo and fuel a division burns through in sustained combat, their eyes cross. We’ve just stood up our first real division in decades, and as an institution we still have a very poor understanding of logistics at that scale. Kandahar was a battle group and Latvia a Bde. A division is a different animal entirely, and the consumption numbers don’t scale gently.

I’ll add one quibble with Colonel Conrad, and I say this as someone who’s heard him speak and talked with him many times. When he wrote the book, he was proud of having made it all the way to lieutenant-colonel without a tour in Ottawa. Being tactically proficient is great. But Ottawa is where institutional problems get fixed, and his own book is largely about institutional problems: a logistics branch that was neglected and under-resourced long before we got to Kandahar. Somebody had to go to NDHQ and fight those fights. Being proud of avoiding that misses the point a bit.

Still a book worth reading, for what it’s worth. He saw firsthand where institutional neglect turns into risk on the ground.

Excellent insight. And correct.

Small quibble, I said almost. Not that we did run out of ammo. It's great that it was in Dundurn or wherever, but the implied is that we almost ran out in Afghanistan.

 

[dapaterson]

As I recall (it's been a while since I read his book) it was also an internal communications problem within the HQ. A new command team was looking at increased operations, and the second order increase in ammunition consumption wasn't caught on the '4 side, resulting in "enough ammunition on hand for the old rate of operations, but not for the current rate".

I believe he was also double hatted, performing both the NSE function and the tactical log functions. Saving a handful of sustainment positions is also, unfortunately common.

 

[MilEME09]

Even within Canada, much of the infrastructure we would need to support massive logistics moves arent there. Not all bases have rail heads, not enough trucks, people to drive them, not enough planes to deliver etc. Whats good havibg the ammo in Dundurn or anywhere else if we cant get it where it needs to be quickly or reliably

 

[Brad Sallows]

As an addendum: I once acted as a tour guide for very senior public service ADM (Mat) staff during a live fire range. The subject of ammunition came up. The ADM (Mat) folks were all of the firm opinion that stockpiling ammunition was a huge waste of money and resources, that could be better used elsewhere in the Department.

When the CAF is faced with that attitude within DND, what hope do we have convincing the rest of the Government of Canada that ammunition is the lifeblood of a military?

You keep the receipts, and let them know you're keeping the receipts, and clarify for them what will happen if Canada gets forces stuck in somewhere and ammunition becomes a point of failure that results in coffins coming home, and assure them that you will at that point make the receipts and the warnings very public. I would expect either more ammunition (stocks) to be forthcoming, or fewer risks taken with forces.