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Political impacts of Ukraine war

The Ukraine updates with Michael Kofman on the War on the Rocks podcast are really excellent and give some great insights and details on the war.


A couple of things they touched on in this episode:

Density of the front:
Compared to the approx. 1,000 soldiers per km of front in Ukraine during WWII, in many sections of the front the Ukrainians have only around 15 front line infantry troops per km (more in denser urban areas). He has even seen areas with 9 x infantry per km of front in three positions around 250m apart from each other. These handful of front line troops are supported mainly by drone units, other fire support units and logistics units.

Advances on the front aren't typically happening as a result of the infantry winning the close fight, they are happening when one side wins the counter-drone battle and this allows the winning side to advance into the "grey zone" because the enemy has lost their fire support.

Volume of FPV Drones being used:
He estimates that the Ukrainians are using in the range of 6,000-8,000 FPV drones along the front on a daily basis. He also noted that the success rate of these drones is a lot less than the videos of the war would suggest. It could take multiple drones to take out a single solder. AFV's are on average taking 15+ drones to be disabled and MBT's are in the 30+ range.

The "Donut Hole"
On earlier podcasts he had noted the issue that Ukraine had with their drones falling into two general range bands. They had plentiful and effective short range drones (the ones creating that 30km grey zone behind the front) and effective long range drones for taking out static targets in the up to 800-1.000lm range. This created what he called a "Donut Hole" where the Russians were still able to operate.

Apparently Ukraine is resolving this problem and has many more drones that are operating in that gap. This is important because the Russians typically disperse as they approach the front so you need many more drones to take out individual targets. Further back is where the Russians still concentrate and maintain their logistics, etc. Taking out targets when they are still concentrated - or taking out their logistics and supporting units - is much more effective than trying to deal with them at the front.

Air Defence
One of the biggest issues facing Ukraine is the massed Russian deep strikes taking place on a nightly basis. The Russians are getting very good at saturation attacks and simultaneous attacks by different types of munitions from different directions against a target.

The volume of the attacks is pretty massive. The Russians are launching large numbers of Geran (improved Shahed) type drones...600-800 per attack (with up to 50+ drones per target) mixed together with cruise and ballistic missiles. With that rate even if you get the vast majority of the incoming missiles you still have a significant number that leak through.

He also noted that while the Ukrainians have very good AD systems (including control and coordination systems) from guns, inexpensive domestically produced interceptors, C-UAV drones, helicopters and aircraft performing zone defence, etc. these systems are quite effective at taking down drones and cruise missiles, but the only effective counter to the ballistic missiles are the Patriot PAC3's which are in limited (and decreasing) supply. The Russians are increasing their ballistic missile production and only high-end defences are able to take them out.
 
Maybe in addition to the "Who needs sailors, anyway?" thread we also need a "Who needs infantry, anyway?" thread...




OK...so it may have to be scaled up a bit, but...

A bit more on developments...

There are apparently multiple units and they incorporate infantry.

 
If I were Taiwan I would be very worried. Beijing has got to be watching and learning. With the costs involved being relatively low China could easily put together a few thousand or more UAVs to lead the assault
Mind you Taiwan is also learning and adapting. China sees how the Russian navy has fared and is likely worried.
 
Mind you Taiwan is also learning and adapting. China sees how the Russian navy has fared and is likely worried.
Taiwan has a hell of a moat. They can probably build up enough mass of anti-ship missiles to protect against beach landings. The biggest challenge might be defending against airmobile landings intended to open airheads, supported by absolutely massive drone fires to support gaining lodgement.

It would be really interesting to know how China presently strategizes an assault on the island…
 
Taiwan has a hell of a moat. They can probably build up enough mass of anti-ship missiles to protect against beach landings. The biggest challenge might be defending against airmobile landings intended to open airheads, supported by absolutely massive drone fires to support gaining lodgement.

It would be really interesting to know how China presently strategizes an assault on the island…

Excellent video series if you're into what if scenarios. Taiwan is getting invaded right now in the series.

 
Taiwan has a hell of a moat. They can probably build up enough mass of anti-ship missiles to protect against beach landings. The biggest challenge might be defending against airmobile landings intended to open airheads, supported by absolutely massive drone fires to support gaining lodgement.

It would be really interesting to know how China presently strategizes an assault on the island…

China doesn't need to invade to get what it wants, most likely...

Why China remains unlikely to invade Taiwan​


Xi Jinping didn’t reach the top of Chinese politics by gambling.

Xi reached the pinnacle of the Party hierarchy through a career of careful positioning and quiet ruthlessness, not by taking grand gambles. Since then, he has shown a preference for grey-zone tactics. There is no convincing reason to expect him to rush to a military showdown over Taiwan.

 
Taiwan has a hell of a moat. They can probably build up enough mass of anti-ship missiles to protect against beach landings. The biggest challenge might be defending against airmobile landings intended to open airheads, supported by absolutely massive drone fires to support gaining lodgement.

It would be really interesting to know how China presently strategizes an assault on the island…
Remember those reports from a while back about thousands of Chinese fishing boats travelling in formation?


What if you deploy those 2,000 fishing boats as a physical shield around your invasion fleet and even equip some of them with AD weapons, EW emitters, multi-spectral decoy launchers, barrage balloons, etc.?
 
If I were Taiwan I would be very worried. Beijing has got to be watching and learning. With the costs involved being relatively low China could easily put together a few thousand or more UAVs to lead the assault
If I were China I would be very worried. Taipei has got to be watching and learning. With the costs involved being relatively low Taiwan could easily put together a few thousand or more UAVs to defeat the (costly, large, time-consuming-to-build-and-expensive-to-replace) assault (force).
 
What if you deploy those 2,000 fishing boats as a physical shield around your invasion fleet and even equip some of them with AD weapons, EW emitters, multi-spectral decoy launchers, barrage balloons, etc.?
You have 2,000 fishing boat skippers panicking and running around in the middle of your invasion fleet once they start taking effective fire?
 
[Recycle everything ever discussed here about airborne/airmobile operations against anything less than a wholly suppressed air defence network.]
Tens of thousands of drones can probably suppress the hell out of an air defence network. The Chinese would be more casualty tolerant than us too. I think the concern would be survivability of helicopters, not of soldiers.
 
Taiwan has a hell of a moat. They can probably build up enough mass of anti-ship missiles to protect against beach landings. The biggest challenge might be defending against airmobile landings intended to open airheads, supported by absolutely massive drone fires to support gaining lodgement.

It would be really interesting to know how China presently strategizes an assault on the island…

I am betting that Taiwan can build rockets, and the programmed chips to fly them, faster than the Chinese can build ships for them to sink and aircraft for them to knock down.
 
Interesting take by USSR 2.0's foreign ministry via FB. It's calling European companies in partnerships with UKR to make drones to use in the fight "creeping transformation of these countries into a strategic rear for Ukraine." And we all know what can happen to stuff in Ukraine's strategic rear, right?
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Or blockade.

A tried and true tactic with lots of solid historical recommendations.
Modern lawyers keep insisting that stuff like water, food, fuel and medicines pass through thereby extending the blockade to the disadvantage of the people mounting the blockade.
 
Slowly getting there.



"In January, the US-based magazine Newsweek reported that China had started dredging sand on an obscure feature in the Paracel Islands, the disputed archipelago known as Xisha by the Chinese and Hoang Sa in Vietnam.

"More recent satellite images suggest that China has significantly expanded its reclamation, with the once-submerged Antelope Reef appearing to have a substantially larger surface area.

"The reef, one of more than 30 islands that make up the Paracels in the South China Sea, is claimed by Beijing – where it is known as Lingyang Jiao – as well as Taipei and Hanoi. It is also called Da Hai Sam by the Vietnamese."


It sounds as if it has been a work in progress for a while. A sand bar that has become an island.
 
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