Question re: German invasion of Poland, Sept 1939

[redleafjumper]

A colleague of mine recommends the book "Mila 18" by Leon Uris.  In it he tracks the life of a Polish cavalry officer.  As my previous post indicates I am in agreement with PBI that Guderian's brief mention of tanks vs. cavalry is not very credible.  There is certainly a Masters or PhD waiting for someone in an examination of the Polish Campaign.

 

[geo]

jump...
If you can read polish, am certain that extensive writings can be found in the coutry where it happened.

 

[JackD]

I'm a Cannuck, now living and teaching in Poland. While the place exasperates me - because to tell you the truth the government doesn't give a damn about the people - they and I must include the new aristocracy - I admire the Polish - there is something about Poland. i want to say thanks to those who in this column that have pointed out some of the truths about the 1939 invasion of Poland. Poland's history is a sad and tragic one and magnificent too. The Wikipedia articles by the way, are a good start for information about this land. I would gladly furnish you with more information but I live on a Polish salary - as a colllege level teacher my salary is roughly 400 dollars a month - think about that... And be glad you live in Canada

 

[JackD]

Oh.. and come the 11th, raise a glass to those who served and those who serve Canada and countries that have been and are friends to Canada - including Poland. I'm going to and my students are going to. Appreciate what you've got but also try to make the homeland what it could be... After-all, be it Canada or in my case be it Canada and Poland, the land, the history, the heritage belongs to us - not to the government but to us

 

[redleafjumper]

Many a Pole served in World War two with honour and tenacity after the fall of Poland.  Witness the efforts of Poles in the Air Force, armoured units, and in Operation Market Garden.  It was a sad betrayal of these noble warriors than many were forced to return to a Poland that was occupied by the USSR after hostilities ceased and the Cold War began.

 

[JackD]

I agree - my wife's great uncle was jailed until 1956 and he was a member of 303 squadron. His brothers were not so lucky as he - both were murdered in Katyn. One neighbour of mine, now diseased, was a partisan, captured, spent a year in Majdanek, survived, escaped during the transfer westward, felt freedom for about a week, ended up in Majdanek again - with guards of a different nationality, and disappeared into Siberia until 1958. Interestingly, you would think him a bitter, angry man yet he was not. he was an artist and painted only two subjects, flowers and songbirds - symbols of beauty and freedom? I wonder if some psychologist ever did a study on that if those who are in the arts - including architects - survive trauma better than others?

 

[Michael Dorosh]

Having said that, the entire Polish Campaign bears serious and detailed re-looking. In my opinion, so much of what passes for "conventional wisdom" or "received knowledge", and appears in pop histories, is just the repetition of hoary old myths and propaganda (from both sides...) that has lingered till today.

Cooper demolished a lot of myths back in 1976 with is book THE GERMAN ARMY.  He painted Poland as a very near-run thing - much closer than the propagandists would have had us believe in the post war years.

 

[pbi]

Cooper demolished a lot of myths back in 1976 with is book THE GERMAN ARMY.   He painted Poland as a very near-run thing - much closer than the propagandists would have had us believe in the post war years.

Yes: from what I have read in various places I agree. My impression is the Germans were not the "invincible war machine", nor the Poles the hapless peasants, that usually compose the popular image of this campaign. The Germans (keeping in mind, a force most of whose junior members had not been in combat before) faced some rather unpleasant surprises. The Poles showed some rather impressive successes, albeit mostly tactical and never enough to turn the strategic tide.

In particular the Germans were (IIRC) dangerously short of ammunition of all natures (that wretched German war industry again...) and the Luftwaffe did not quite get the free ride it had been expecting.

Overall a very interesting campaign: I agree that it would be a good MA thesis subject: I just wonder how much Polish primary source stuff survived. Not much, I bet. Anybody know of any stuff?
Cheers.

 

[George Wallace]

There may be some hope, as the Germans in most instances were meticulous Recordkeepers.

 

[redleafjumper]

Even though the Germans were meticulous record keepers, a lot of material was destroyed or sanitized during the war.
This campaign does look like an interesting one for an M.A. in RMC's War Studies programme.  (I applied there once, but no luck... most disappointing.)

 

[larry Strong]

Cooper demolished a lot of myths back in 1976 with is book THE GERMAN ARMY.   He painted Poland as a very near-run thing - much closer than the propagandists would have had us believe in the post war years.

I might have a different book here, and I do admit that I only have Vol ll. The German Army 1933 - 1945 Vol ll Conquest. by Matthew Cooper.

He says the opposite..."It is difficult to conceive just how any force could have benefited more from the weakness and mistakesof it's enemy than the German Army did from those of the Poles in 1939"....."Although well-trained, and aggressive, the Polish soldiers were armed mainly with equipment from the 1914-18 War; they possessed little motorised transport and only a few companies of tanks, amounting to no more than 225 machines in all. Indeed, in modern military equipment and tactical thought the Poles were alarmingly deficient; they possessed only a few obsolete aircraft and anti-tank and anti-aircraft guns, and continued to maintain their belief in the efficiency of the cavalry charge and the attack a l'ourance. Page 11 of the above mentioned book

 

[Michael Dorosh]

I might have a different book here, and I do admit that I only have Vol ll. The German Army 1933 - 1945 Vol ll Conquest. by Matthew Cooper.

He says the opposite..."It is difficult to conceive just how any force could have benefited more from the weakness and mistakesof it's enemy than the German Army did from those of the Poles in 1939"....."Although well-trained, and aggressive, the Polish soldiers were armed mainly with equipment from the 1914-18 War; they possessed little motorised transport and only a few companies of tanks, amounting to no more than 225 machines in all. Indeed, in modern military equipment and tactical thought the Poles were alarmingly deficient; they possessed only a few obsolete aircraft and anti-tank and anti-aircraft guns, and continued to maintain their belief in the efficiency of the cavalry charge and the attack a l'ourance. Page 11 of the above mentioned book

You ought to see what he says about the Germans though - I was referring to another book, I wasn't aware he had written more than one, now I have more reading to do.   I meant the single volume book -

http://www.amazon.com/gp/product/0812885198/002-4519670-0947214?v=glance&n=283155&n=507846&s=books&v=glance

I may be misremembering too, I'll dig out my volume and see what he says.   He does demolish the idea that the Germans used "blitzkrieg" (whatever that is) in 1939 and that the infantry actually led much of the time rather than slashing moves by the armour.   He mentions severe shortages of ammunition and motor transport that would have hampered a prolonged campaign had Poland been able to stick it out, and things of that nature.  EDIT - I see pbi mentions ammunition shortages on page 2 already.

 

[Michael Dorosh]

It is difficult to conceive just how any force could have benefited more from the weakness and mistakesof it's enemy than the German Army did from those of the Poles in 1939

Oh, and I think the second half of his point was something to the effect that despite a great potential to benefit (read your sentence again carefully), they didn't in many ways.

 

[larry Strong]

thanks for the link to the book, looks like I got some more reading too

he does say prior to that in my book that:
"....should not obscure 2 fundamental truths of the Polish campaign; that against an enemy as deficient in the military art as the Poles then were, the invaders were bound to win; and that the German Army gave no demonstration of Blitzkreig but practised instead s traditional form of war Veernichtungsgedanke. From the outset, the armoured idea was still-borne."

And yes they were restricted to:

enough forage for only 120 miles,
could not come up with enough ratins for 10 days in the field,
only had enough ammo for, 90 rds of rifle ammo, 3,750 rds MG, and 300 rds for the Arty.

 

[Michael Dorosh]

thanks for the link to the book, looks like I got some more reading too

he does say prior to that in my book that:
"....should not obscure 2 fundamental truths of the Polish campaign; that against an enemy as deficient in the military art as the Poles then were, the invaders were bound to win; and that the German Army gave no demonstration of Blitzkreig but practised instead s traditional form of war Veernichtungsgedanke. From the outset, the armoured idea was still-borne."

And yes they were restricted to:

enough forage for only 120 miles,
could not come up with enough ratins for 10 days in the field,
only had enough ammo for, 90 rds of rifle ammo, 3,750 rds MG, and 300 rds for the Arty.

Yup. I took that to mean that no matter how bad the Germans were, they Poles would still lose.

 

[JackD]

The Polish forces at the time were going through a re-equipment phase - I suggest you find material of that nature - it is available - i am referring to their new aircraft. Among outside purchases - not delivered in time were hurricane fighter aircraft. Much of their soldiery buried their equipment - to retrieve them as partisans. The intent of the intact formations were to withdraw to the south west - The Soviet stab in the back put paid to that. Poland suffered in that their thinking was that the 1939 war was to be just another occupation - not a war of extermination. Had they known - Nazi forces would have had far, far higher casualty levels. As for deficiency in military art... The actions of the Polish airforce in the French campaign and the Battle of Britain, the Polish navy and merchant marinein the Battle of the Atlantic, and the Polish Army in in the Battle of France, the Italian campaign, Normandy, Holland, Poland and Germany in 1944-45 shows the error in that statement.

 

[Michael Dorosh]

As for deficiency in military art... The actions of the Polish airforce in the French campaign and the Battle of Britain, the Polish navy and merchant marinein the Battle of the Atlantic, and the Polish Army in in the Battle of France, the Italian campaign, Normandy, Holland, Poland and Germany in 1944-45 shows the error in that statement.

Those forces were trained and completely equipped by the British so are irrelevant to the subject of prewar Polish military training, though, no?

 

[larry Strong]

The Polish forces at the time were going through a re-equipment phase - I suggest you find material of that nature - it is available - i am referring to their new aircraft. Among outside purchases - not delivered in time were hurricane fighter aircraft. Much of their soldiery buried their equipment - to retrieve them as partisans. The intent of the intact formations were to withdraw to the south west - The Soviet stab in the back put paid to that. Poland suffered in that their thinking was that the 1939 war was to be just another occupation - not a war of extermination. Had they known - Nazi forces would have had far, far higher casualty levels. As for deficiency in military art... The actions of the Polish airforce in the French campaign and the Battle of Britain, the Polish navy and merchant marinein the Battle of the Atlantic, and the Polish Army in in the Battle of France, the Italian campaign, Normandy, Holland, Poland and Germany in 1944-45 shows the error in that statement.

No one is arguing about the valor and military skills of the Poles later in the war. They also had a problem with over 3000 miles of common border with the Reich and German occupied Czechoslovakia, the terrain there being flat and except for the Vistula and it's tributaries, possessed few natural obstacles, and even fewer fortifications.
The fact that they had to station half their limited resources   to face their traditional enemy the Soviet's did not help either. The Polish generals also had to decide wether to hold the frontier and their industrial base, or wait behind the frontier and let the blow fall on empty ground, and possibly lose the industrial base, but would have tried the German logistic tail to the limit.

 

[JackD]

it was a time of difficult decisions - Witness the fact of the contingency plans - successfully carried out - to send their navy and their merchant marine to England. As for military skill - a general officer is not trained overnight - and such generals as General Maszek of the 1st Polish Armoured Division acquainted themselves well. General Sikorski himself was a notable leader and theorist as was Sosabowski. General Anders was also recognized as brilliant. All handled their forces in a superior manner to many more familiar western general officers. The talent was there. One major problem in 1939 was the Polish nation was divided politically ( a perennial problem I might add) and in 1939, the political generals were in the fore-front - not the military generals. In addition, a vastly destructive war was fought only 18 years before (The Polish-Soviet War) and prior to that, the First World War - Eastern Front). There were no Marshall Plans then - hard to get reconstruction capital in the thirties. As for strategic and tactical short-comings - fighting the previous war rather than the current one - is that not the problem current western militaries are trying to overcome? The Poles faced a no-win situation - hence their coordination of plans with western forces - France, which were not fullfilled. Truly a fascinating but tragic time - one neglected in geo-political studies and military strategy and tactics studies.

 

[larry Strong]

Thanks for the information Jack There's no doubt they were between a rock and a hard place.