Raytheon launches Stinger missile from Javelin launcher

Raytheon has successfully demonstrated firing a Stinger missile from a Javelin Lightweight Command Launch Unit (LWCLU) in a test that saw the missile engage and defeat an uncrewed aerial vehicle (UAV).

This could have potential for the CF. In addition to hand-held Javelin launchers they are also found mounted on various Remote Weapon Stations. This could see both an ATGM and short range GBAD solution for both dismounted troops and light vehicles (TAPV?) using a single launch unit.

 

[Weinie]

I agree with both of you. I think Colin is looking at this from a practical system & practical use perspective -- whereas you are perhaps looking at this from a larger IADS perspective?

However, in the practical & useful sense of the capability, I have to go with Colin on this one, big time. Otherwise we end up with the same capability that we did in Afghanistan where we bought into Iron Dome for the radar capability, but didn't bother to buy into the engagement capability. So we can sense incoming threats, but we just can't do anything about it... not entirely useless, but not entirely helpful either.

By acquiring a capable MANPAD system & pushing it to the reserve force - we do acquire a very useful and effective capability which would be an absolute game changer for our forces, for a minimal financial investment. Easily purchased, easily trained, easily deployable, and useful everywhere. I'd say it's a fantastic investment and idea.


For a larger and more capable IADS, such as that would be found in a coalition environment, the focus on proper C2 may be more appropriate, as that system would include layers of different radars and weapon systems all working together.

For a simple MANPAD system that could sense & engage hostile helicopters, drones, and low flying targets -- getting a good system, getting the troops trained on it and having the system absorbed into our capabilities -- would absolutely be a significant capability boost, without needing to overthink it.

You folks are much more informed in this realm than I am. But I can imagine a scenario where successive, loitering AI enabled drones/UAV's completely overwhelm any GBAD/IADS system deployed. And then, the games begin.

 

[GR66]

Determining where MANPADS fit into the overall AD system is obviously an important conversation. My initial comment however was more about the logistical side of things.

We need an advanced ATGM and Javelin fits the bill. We need an AD missile and Stinger fits the bill. We're a country though with a limited budget however so maybe there is an opportunity here to simplify our logistics with a single launcher.

AT teams can use the Javelin launch unit with Javelin missiles. Since Javelin missiles cost around $100k it would be a huge bonus if the same launcher could also be used to launch a less advanced projectile in the $3k/round range (similar to a Carl-G round) for use against light vehicles, bunkers, etc.

AD teams could use the Javelin launch unit with Stinger missiles.

Kongsberg's Protector RWS (among others) can mount the Javelin launcher which we could use for both AT and AD roles. This could be used on our Reserve Armoured (AT) and Artillery (AD) units on the TAPV again leveraging equipment commonality.

Our Reg Force LAV units could use the same turret as the IM-SHORAD on the Stryker vehicle...which again uses the Stinger missile.

Standardize. Keep it simple. Have multiple munitions that can be used from the same launcher. If there is a major armoured threat but we have air superiority then your AD units could take up the AT role. If the air threat is dominant the AT units can augment the AD units. You run out of one type of ammo and the launcher doesn't become useless. Your launch unit is damaged and you can use one from another unit/role when required.

 

[Weinie]

Problem is that you can paralyze yourself into inaction by waiting for the next big thing. Most of these ideas we saw in the Armenia-Azerbaijan conflict are not that new, but it did showcase how effective they can be. Much of the actual destruction was caused by artillery, which is another utter failure point of our High Command (It's a long list).
Armenia had a somewhat robust AD system in regards to actual systems, but did a terrible job at locating and using them. That sort of stuff comes down to training and practice. There are tons of lessons to be learned. Problem is people talk about (in a metaphoric sense) the university level stuff, while our forces aren't even at the Grade 1 level yet. You need to get started on basics before you can do advanced stuff.
I add that armed UAV 's in Syria wrecked havoc till properly manned AD systems were introduced.

The sad bit is that we had the technology and the desire to have a robust AD system, but we did what Canada does best......

Perhaps the bigger problem is not understanding/accepting what is the next big thing, or introducing the next big thing, such that " I add that armed UAV 's in Syria wrecked havoc till properly manned AD systems were introduced." becomes a footnote.

 

[FJAG]

Currently our AD is at the same level as our forces were at at the beginning of WWII, the only effective AD we have is the leopard II ability to engage Attack Helicopters. Nothing in my idea precludes working on command and control, in fact I will argue that my idea will force the army to get off it's arse and actually do something for real and not more tokenism. Sorry but until I see some sort of ability to actually engage and destroy hostile flying devices, it's all a large circle jerk. I am sure there are people in the army that want to move this ahead, but it's all theoretical until you can reach out and kill something. The army has had ample time since ADATS to think about command and control of AD assets and clearly if your worried that we don't have that at the moment, then they have utterly failed at protecting their forces from real and evolving threats. Maybe we should frame AD as a means to protect and improve diversity and inclusion in the forces?

Sorry for the rant but I find our responses to this threat an utter failure of command and leadership, which is why I push bottom up solutions, because I seen more bottom up solutions work than top down.

We're not a hundred percent dead. 4 Regt (GS) does maintain the ASCC capability and the Medium Range Radar while primarily a counter rocket, gun, mortar system (and a good one) also has aerial surveillance capabilities against a host of aircraft. So we do have some Sense and Command capability while our Act capability is zero.

There is a real Revolution in Military Affairs happening, as we speak. Many traditional platforms, notwithstanding history, pundits, or futurists, are already obsolete.

The advances in weaponry, that we are aware/apprised of, are mind-boggling. Just in the last 12 months, when speaking of known weapons systems that are coming on-line, defy my comprehension of warfare. Imagine what the next 36 months will do.

That there is a real revolution happening is crystal clear. That many traditional platforms are obsolete is not so clear. Offensive armoured capabilities are still very necessary, perhaps more so than ever. The primary question is what will those look like in the future? The secondary question is: what do we do in the meantime?

It's really kind of interesting. In WW2, the Germans in six years went from the tiny and lightly armed Panzer I and II to Panthers and Tigers. The next sixty years saw improvements which were more a slow evolution rather than a revolution but essentially we were still working on almost a century old combined arms blitzkrieg concept of warfare. Yes. We're standing on the edge of a new revolution which is highly dependent on electronics. Makes me wonder what EMPish Shield systems are in the mill out there and how resistant much of this stuff will be to it. I'll put money on the fact that there will be a place for the rumbling treads of heavy metal crewed by wetware being covered by high explosive fired from an armoured ground based gun/launcher for quite some time to come.

 

[Weinie]

We're not a hundred percent dead. 4 Regt (GS) does maintain the ASCC capability and the Medium Range Radar while primarily a counter rocket, gun, mortar system (and a good one) also has aerial surveillance capabilities against a host of aircraft. So we do have some Sense and Command capability while our Act capability is zero.


That there is a real revolution happening is crystal clear. That many traditional platforms are obsolete is not so clear. Offensive armoured capabilities are still very necessary, perhaps more so than ever. The primary question is what will those look like in the future? The secondary question is: what do we do in the meantime?

It's really kind of interesting. In WW2, the Germans in six years went from the tiny and lightly armed Panzer I and II to Panthers and Tigers. The next sixty years saw improvements which were more a slow evolution rather than a revolution but essentially we were still working on almost a century old combined arms blitzkrieg concept of warfare. Yes. We're standing on the edge of a new revolution which is highly dependent on electronics. Makes me wonder what EMPish Shield systems are in the mill out there and how resistant much of this stuff will be to it. I'll put money on the fact that there will be a place for the rumbling treads of heavy metal crewed by wetware being covered by high explosive fired from an armoured ground based gun/launcher for quite some time to come.

And I will put money on the fact that any real "war" that happens in the next decade (no proxie crap) will be fought in a realm (with a determined outcome) that will be decided well before any deployment of heavy metal is possible and/or required.

 

[childs56]

Back a few years ago the Navy on the west coast asked if the Local Reserve Artillery unit could put together a Air Defense troop to support their operations. The intent that the Navy would pay for the equipment and training costs. While the Reserves supply the troops. It was a good thought. that is as far as it went due to the limited ability of the Field Artillery old boys club to wrap their mind around a operational Reserve unit. How dare they try to take away our guns.
The idea was simple to run manpacks on the frigates and smaller vessels as a harbor protection/ along with being able to deploy a small rotating detachment aboard two to three ships at a time for patrols in hotspots. The idea fell to the wayside because the COC in the Reserves did not want a New Air defense unit because they did not want to loose being Field Artillery. Instead they pissed away what could have been a awesome tasking for the Reserve unit. One that was viable., made sense and provided a good solid structure for the future.
There was some head scratching as to why a Navy ship needed a man pad air defense weapon because they had a big radar, a few missiles and that nice gun. Those systems work well but do not work very well for smaller targets and the one target that does get in close.
It disappeared and not discussed afterwards. At the time the Navy was pretty disappointed about the whole thing. This was a time when they were trying to bring their base defense force in full force. Were looking for other outside the box thinking.

I agree man pads and the Avenger turrets would be a awesome level assets to units. They can can be cheap to train and very effective for AD along with anti armour.

 

[GK .Dundas]

Jesus wept!
seriously ?
I sometimes wonder at how someone that stupid can actually reach a command postion.

 

[Kirkhill]

While you're debating what air defence looks like..... here's what the air threat looks like circa Dec 2020.

The video shows a synthetic run .... and then a real run with real drones through real trees. Targets a couple of hundred bucks a piece? What price the Anti-Drone Missiles? How effective are line of sight weapons?

Science | AAAS

www.sciencemag.org

 

[FJAG]

Back a few years ago the Navy on the west coast asked if the Local Reserve Artillery unit could put together a Air Defense troop to support their operations. The intent that the Navy would pay for the equipment and training costs. While the Reserves supply the troops. It was a good thought. that is as far as it went due to the limited ability of the Field Artillery old boys club to wrap their mind around a operational Reserve unit. How dare they try to take away our guns.
The idea was simple to run manpacks on the frigates and smaller vessels as a harbor protection/ along with being able to deploy a small rotating detachment aboard two to three ships at a time for patrols in hotspots. The idea fell to the wayside because the COC in the Reserves did not want a New Air defense unit because they did not want to loose being Field Artillery. Instead they pissed away what could have been a awesome tasking for the Reserve unit. One that was viable., made sense and provided a good solid structure for the future.
There was some head scratching as to why a Navy ship needed a man pad air defense weapon because they had a big radar, a few missiles and that nice gun. Those systems work well but do not work very well for smaller targets and the one target that does get in close.
It disappeared and not discussed afterwards. At the time the Navy was pretty disappointed about the whole thing. This was a time when they were trying to bring their base defense force in full force. Were looking for other outside the box thinking.

I agree man pads and the Avenger turrets would be a awesome level assets to units. They can can be cheap to train and very effective for AD along with anti armour.

The key element of your case is the term "a few years ago". Those years matter as in the early 2000s the Army did have an air defence arm including two reserve regiments and an additional battery. These were total force units with a significant number of reg f members. More importantly, there was an infrastructure behind that including the requisite training needed at the school of artillery.

When that capability was stupidly stood down across the board for financial reasons in the latter part of that decade, the whole infrastructure more or less collapsed with all the Reg F folks going to what is essentially surveillance and target acquisition (and a little bit of air space coordination) and the reservists going back to gun batteries.

Afghanistan caused a major restructuring within the artillery which would have made it pretty close to impossible to train and sustain a single air defence battery, especially one far away on the West Coast. I'm not so sure as to whether the folks that put the kibosh to this initiative was the reserve force CoC or the Army in general but, notwithstanding that this could have been a good opportunity, it undoubtedly was seen as much more challenging then the artillery could handle.

 

[Colin Parkinson]

If you can't sustain a Troop of AD gunners with the entire Reserve Artillery, then we have utterly failed.

 

[FJAG]

If you can't sustain a Troop of AD gunners with the entire Reserve Artillery, then we have utterly failed.

Well, its really not that simple but yeah, we have utterly failed, IMHO. Not because we can't sustain a single troop but because we can't sustain a critical capability across the entire Army.

I don't want to get shirty about the whole thing but we could easily continue on doing what we're doing with eight infantry battalions rather than nine so that those eight could operate under a decent air defence umbrella. With 561 Reg F PYs and four or five res f arty regt's you could create several sizeable hybrid regf/resf air defence and rocket launcher regiments. But hey, that's just me.

 

[childs56]

The key element of your case is the term "a few years ago". Those years matter as in the early 2000s the Army did have an air defence arm including two reserve regiments and an additional battery. These were total force units with a significant number of reg f members. More importantly, there was an infrastructure behind that including the requisite training needed at the school of artillery.

When that capability was stupidly stood down across the board for financial reasons in the latter part of that decade, the whole infrastructure more or less collapsed with all the Reg F folks going to what is essentially surveillance and target acquisition (and a little bit of air space coordination) and the reservists going back to gun batteries.

Afghanistan caused a major restructuring within the artillery which would have made it pretty close to impossible to train and sustain a single air defence battery, especially one far away on the West Coast. I'm not so sure as to whether the folks that put the kibosh to this initiative was the reserve force CoC or the Army in general but, notwithstanding that this could have been a good opportunity, it undoubtedly was seen as much more challenging then the artillery could handle.

The key in the whole process was the Navy was going to pay for the training and equipment, not the Army. That was around when the Army was standing down the AD units. Which I think made a few people bitter about the idea of a full on Reserve unit taking over what they felt was their role, especially when the Army choose to not support the role anymore said it was not needed.

 

[brihard]

Well, its really not that simple but yeah, we have utterly failed, IMHO. Not because we can't sustain a single troop but because we can't sustain a critical capability across the entire Army.

I don't want to get shirty about the whole thing but we could easily continue on doing what we're doing with eight infantry battalions rather than nine so that those eight could operate under a decent air defence umbrella. With 561 Reg F PYs and four or five res f arty regt's you could create several sizeable hybrid regf/resf air defence and rocket launcher regiments. But hey, that's just me.

Without a decent air defense umbrella, you don’t get to keep nine infantry battalions for very long...

 

[FJAG]

Without a decent air defense umbrella, you don’t get to keep nine infantry battalions for very long...

You see that's exactly the way I think about it. And the same goes for mortars and anti-armour and numerous other key combat elements.

I can well understand a senior leadership mentality that says we have a budget issue and we need to cut back. And I can even see an attitude that says there are certain skills we do not need many of in a peacetime environment and we should realign the full time force accordingly.

What I simply cannot fathom is a military that refuses to turn necessary capabilities into a proper, less expensive reserve status that can be called up when needed. Instead it ashcans the equipment, disperses the people and completely trashes the capability so that it would take years and hundreds of millions or even billions to revive it.

To my way of thinking that crosses the border to criminal stupidity.

 

[Colin Parkinson]

Meanwhile back in the 90's when we at least had something.....

 

[CBH99]

Raytheon has successfully demonstrated firing a Stinger missile from a Javelin Lightweight Command Launch Unit (LWCLU) in a test that saw the missile engage and defeat an uncrewed aerial vehicle (UAV).

This could have potential for the CF. In addition to hand-held Javelin launchers they are also found mounted on various Remote Weapon Stations. This could see both an ATGM and short range GBAD solution for both dismounted troops and light vehicles (TAPV?) using a single launch unit.

Simple solution that would drastically enhance both of those capabilities. Let's hope.

 

[BdaDug]

Isn't the (or maybe just one of) the fundamental problems that CAF have allowed "niche" capabilities to degrade because political/DND leadership only planned to fight as part of a coalition force where more capable partners (cough, USA) would provide the niceties like AAW? Is there clear direction now that Canada intends to provide land forces capable of operating self-sufficiently?

 

[daftandbarmy]

Meanwhile back in the 90's when we at least had something.....

I know a Royal Marine who used one of those during the Falklands War, based at San Carlos water.

He said they probably took them out of service because the British were too cheap to award a VC to every AD gunner that had to stand and deliver, head on, during an air attack

 

[Cloud Cover]

You folks are much more informed in this realm than I am. But I can imagine a scenario where successive, loitering AI enabled drones/UAV's completely overwhelm any GBAD/IADS system deployed. And then, the games begin.

Apologies to focus on an old post but … look what has happened since Weinie posted this. He was 100% correct.

Hundreds of thousand of Drones and UAC, SM strike drones etc. in Ukraine war. AD systems are hunted relentlessly and destroyed almost every hour of daylight.

On October 7, Hamas used hundreds of drones to attack fixed border emplacements of sensors and weapons - all within a 30 minute time span - before breaching the “walls”. The next wave of drones attacked and destroyed tanks, IFV and other vehicles along with individual and group concentration of civilians, security and military forces.

What an even uglier business it has all become since most drone kills are recorded and many publicly posted within minutes or hours. At full scale warfare, that’s as new an effect as the machine gun.

 

[daftandbarmy]

Apologies to focus on an old post but … look what has happened since Weinie posted this. He was 100% correct.

Hundreds of thousand of Drones and UAC, SM strike drones etc. in Ukraine war. AD systems are hunted relentlessly and destroyed almost every hour of daylight.

On October 7, Hamas used hundreds of drones to attack fixed border emplacements of sensors and weapons - all within a 30 minute time span - before breaching the “walls”. The next wave of drones attacked and destroyed tanks, IFV and other vehicles along with individual and group concentration of civilians, security and military forces.

What an even uglier business it has all become since most drone kills are recorded and many publicly posted within minutes or hours. At full scale warfare, that’s as new an effect as the machine gun.

Dude...