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Replacing the Subs

Korean Times reporter perspective....

"The trend that disturbs me most was the emergence of non-combat elements such as job creation and technology transfer as core factors in determining who will win the bid."


Canada being Canada

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The Koreans are showing their inexperience and naivety regarding very large scale and long term international defence sales, substantial offsets and pot sweeteners are common place everywhere and Canada is no different. Korea is a relatively new player in the international arms export game, with a lot of their sales being smaller scale but still impressive land system exports. There is a distinct difference between the sheer scale of effort and money at play between a few hundred armoured vehicles or rocket artillery going to Australia or Poland, and setting up a nation to nation cooperative effort to procure, build, operate and maintain a fleet of potentially 12 large conventionally powered submarines.

It sounds to me like sour grapes on the part of the Koreans, who just want to sell us something off the technical merits of the system alone instead of getting down into the nitty gritty of govt to govt procurement competitions. We're looking at something in the ballpark of a $60B~ procurement here, you don't get to win on technical specs alone.
 

Apparently some Canadians share the same concerns as the Korean reporter.
There may be some related concerns, but I would say they are “the same.” Canada’s approach is trying to balance a proportionately rapid build of defence capabilities while simultaneously seeking to increase financial prosperity in the context of a significant extant economic threat.

Wendy Gilmour captures that duality in the article:
“At the moment because of Canada's fiscal situation, there is a desire to use the investment in the reconstitution of the Canadian Forces as a driver for economic prosperity and to address some of the difficulties our economy is having because of the loss of the American market. We see in some other nations that they are very focused on delivering defense capability. The danger in Canada is that that message gets diffused.”
 
There may be some related concerns, but I would say they are “the same.” Canada’s approach is trying to balance a proportionately rapid build of defence capabilities while simultaneously seeking to increase financial prosperity in the context of a significant extant economic threat.

Wendy Gilmour captures that duality in the article:


Other nations have persistent reminders that there is a war on. We, in Canada, find it harder to maintain the aim.
 
I wonder if this will impact the likelihood of SK getting the contract. Wouldn't Germany be considered an "ally" and SK be considered "buying from abroad".

I'm pretty sure South Korea would be considered an "ally". From the United Nations Command website:
Canada contributed air, naval and ground forces to support the Korean War under the United Nations Command.

In July 1950 the Royal Canadian Air Force sent the No. 426 transport squadron which flew the first of 600 round trips to the Far East during the war, carrying more than 13,000 passengers and 3,000,000 kilograms of freight. Later, 22 fighter pilots were attached to the U.S. Fifth Air Force to fly combat missions. Canadair shipped 60 Sabre F86 Mk 2’s to USAF for the deployment to Korea during the war.

In July 1950, the Canadian destroyers, HMCS Cayuga, HMCS Athabaskan and HMCS Sioux, were dispatched to Korean waters and arrived on July 30, 1950. During the Korean War, the RCN deployed 8 different warships to Korea, typically there were three on station at one time, and in addition HMC Ships Crusader, Nootka, Huron, Iroquois, and Haida also saw service in Korea.

The 25th Canadian Infantry Brigade was formed as a special force to be sent to Korea. The 2nd Battalion Princess Patricia's Canadian Light Infantry (2 PPCLI) arrived in Korea in December 1950. The Canadian regiment joined the 27th Commonwealth Brigade in February 1951. In May 1951, 2 PPCLI withdrew from the Commonwealth Brigade to join the 25th Canadian Brigade. The new brigade formation rotated battalions from three major Canadian infantry regiments; PPCLI, Royal Canadian Regiment, and the Royal 22e Régiment. Additional troops included armored corps, artillery, engineers, signals, and service corps units.

The air squadron returned home in June 1954 followed by the pilots in December. The last Canadian navy destroyer to serve in Korea was HMCS Sioux and she departed on September 7, 1955. The ground forces remained in Korea until December 1954. The last to leave was the Canadian Medical Detachment, which sailed from Inchon on June 28,1957.

Between 1950 and 1953, over 26,700 Canadians served during the combat phase of the Korean War. Following the Armistice Agreement, almost 7,000 Canadians served as peacekeepers from July 1953 to mid-1957. Canadian casualties included 516 killed, approximately 1,200 wounded, 32 Prisoners of War (POW) (all of whom returned home), and 16 missing in action.

Canada has continuously maintained a liaison officer and NCO in UNC, since the war. Canada currently contributes Canadian Armed Forces members from the Royal Canadian Navy, Canadian Army, and Royal Canadian Air Force, assigned to UNC in a variety of roles. Canada has also deployed ships, aircraft and personnel to support operations, exercises and training. In 2018, Lieutenant General Wayne Eyre was selected to be the first non-US Deputy Commander of UNC.
 
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