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"Royal Marines commandos force US troops into a humiliating surrender" @ Twentynine Palms

KevinB

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KevinB, I appreciate your take in this, given your boots on the ground view at least with two of those orgs. KV was a tough go with a garrisoning focus, no doubt, and having a far more challenging (less forgiving?) patrol/presence environment in the valley. That said, no matter how well the Canadian soldier would perform, I don’t think the Govt would ever come close to having a cajones to commit general forces to theatres the likes of KV…
Definitely a brutal slog regardless.
But as far as looking which of the Militaries was better suited for what areas - which if we are honest is the point of a coalition - that the UK/CDN forces where better trained and equipped for that area - and the American forces better for the more open areas.
As much as I like to pick on the LAV Bn's I would pick them head and shoulders above the US Light and Mountain forces for doing Light and Mountain stuff - the same with the Brits.

Now I think the US Mil learned a lot from that journey - but I think all three militaries wasted a lot of resources in not going towards their areas of expertise.
 

KevinB

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I also believe the CA would have taken vastly different lessons learned - that probably (IMHO) would have been better for the CA as a whole.
1) Leo would never have come
2) More TACHEL - more focus on MedEvac - and AH Escorts
3) Cbt Spt Coy's being beefed up in the Mortar and Pioneer realm
4) Better Integration of SOF and Light Inf Recce
5) Real LI working group results
6) Differentiating Mechanized from Light Operations - and getting rid of the Symmetrical banana republics in the the Bde's
7) More FOO parties out with platoons and sections.

I suspect it would have been less bloody for the UK/CDN Forces as well - because by and large the Commonwealth also do better AO specific training and handovers.
 

Good2Golf

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For 1. Even if Leo wouldn’t have come over, I think there would have been great value in the caps brought by Armd Recce, even if dismounted in the KV. For 2. having a MERT capability like the 147s provided in Mali would have been a very valuable asset in the RC/whole AO…
 

KevinB

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147s provided in Mali would have been a very valuable asset in the RC/whole AO…
Every time you say 147 I need to google it - I can't seem to wrap my head around the CF nomeclature for the Hook this time around...
 

Good2Golf

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Every time you say 147 I need to google it - I can't seem to wrap my head around the CF nomeclature for the Hook this time around...
Does MH-47F+ work? 😉

Edit: ps. I know it doesn’t have a boom, but it does carry up to 7 bladder-busting hours of fuel and can travel up to 1000nm/1700km faster than a…..Bell 412… 😊
 

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KevinB

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Does MH-47F+ work? 😉
Much better - but isn't it missing Minigins, and a ATA Refuelling Probe.
C6/M240 has such a low rate of fire for such a fast bird.
I'm sure if you let Mike Dillon and some of his eye candy for a ride he'd give you a screaming deal.
 

Good2Golf

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Cunning plan I’m sure in the works. I think MikeD is part of it, just like he was for the….CH-(1)47D in AFG back in 09-11.
1636047147944.gif
 

Kirkhill

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Cunning plan I’m sure in the works. I think MikeD is part of it, just like he was for the….CH-(1)47D in AFG back in 09-11.
View attachment 67011
What happened to this kit?

1024px-CH-146ISAF.jpg
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Kirkhill

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The last section on logistics reminded me of this:

TWENTY-FIVE YEARS IN THE RIFLE BRIGADE.​

BY THE LATE

WILLIAM SURTEES,​

QUARTERMASTER.

CHAPTER IV.*

Our Author made Quartermaster-Sergeant of the 2d battalion, which he joins at Feversham, Kent—Expedition to Denmark—Embark at Deal—Land at Vedbeck, Zealand—Partial Engagements—Siege of Copenhagen—A division under Sir Arthur Wellesley advance to Kioge—Copenhagen capitulates—Amnesty between the Danish forces in the Island of Zealand, and the British—The British evacuate Denmark—Embark at Copenhagen—Arrive in the Downs—Land at Deal,

At three o'clock P.M., we started from the neighbourhood of Copenhagen, the troops making their way through the country to the left of the great road to Roskild. I had charge of the baggage, which was carried on light German waggons, the bodies of which are formed chiefly of wicker-work, and are so light and easy of draught that the natives travel in them in the same manner nearly of our coaches—they going sometimes at a considerable rate.

I found it impracticable to continue in the same direction the troops had gone, for they presently left all traces of a road, and struck right across the country—and as I knew I should be expected to have the baggage with them that night if possible, I determined to run all hazards, and proceed along the great high-road in hopes of afterwards being enabled to find them out—accordingly I moved forward, and presently passed the outposts of the German cavalry stationed in the direction of Roskild; the men, I doubt not, wondering at my temerity in pushing on with a few baggage waggons, where they were all on the alert with swords drawn, and with carbines and pistols loaded. I own it was a hazardous undertaking, for a very small party of the enemy would easily have captured both me and my baggage; but I knew my commanding-officer to be such a[65] person as to pay little attention to excuses of any kind when he wished a thing to be done, and withal he loved his comforts, and would not have been easily pacified had he been deprived of them. Fortunately, after advancing for some miles beyond the outposts of our army before mentioned, I fell in with a road branching off towards the left, apparently in the very direction the troops had taken.

Till I reached this point, I had advanced with considerable caution, and slowly; determined, if any enemy should appear in front, to endeavour to effect a retreat. But now, having left the great road, and taken that which I judged would bring me to the neighbourhood of those I was seeking, I accordingly ordered all my guards to mount, and set off at a brisk trot, keeping a good look-out to my right flank, for fear of surprise, and fortunately fell in with the division at the very moment it was entering the road by which I had come. I received great credit for my generalship, and was complimented by the officers of my corps, they being the only people in the division, I believe, who had the comfort of their baggage that night. The name of the village where we halted is Caughstrup.

Comforts are important. Roving Quartermasters. British expeditionary force, including the experimental Rifles, in Denmark 1807.


One of my favourite books of the period.
 
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Kirkhill

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So, Here is the whiners' version of history :devilish:

Apparently it was a USMC v USMC exercise with one conventional force v another.
One force was mounting a conventional attack against another ensconced in an urban defence.
The defending force seems to have included some Royal Marines, their Dutch mates who tag along with them everywhere they go, and some UAE types. They were working up to deploy as the Royal Navy's Littoral Response Group (South) operating out of Oman. Apparently, from the 10,000 foot view the Brits spent their time brewing up and scoffing American grub.

Some of the Brits apparently borrowed some American Humvees.
Some may or may not have acquired US uniforms at the PX
A couple might have taken the opportunity to sit in the back row during the attacking force briefings.

In their spare time some lads are rumoured to have made a run down to Radio Shack and purchased some over-the-counter trackers and radio monitors. The trackers seem to have ended up on the attacking force vehicles and the radio monitors seem to have allowed the HQ to be tracked.

The HQ and the attacking force vehicles seem to have had a hard time of it.

The exercise may or may not have had to go into extra-innings.

In any event it seems the attacking force is not claiming victory. By all accounts the defenders had the better experience. The attacking force seems to believe that the defending force rather stretched the rules. Although "rules in place to better simulate real-world scenarios."

It all seems to have been rather unconventional.

Not that any of that matters.

The world and the British public knows that the Royals beat the Yanks. The Daily Mail said so.


End Ex. :ROFLMAO::ROFLMAO::ROFLMAO:
 

daftandbarmy

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So, Here is the whiners' version of history :devilish:

Apparently it was a USMC v USMC exercise with one conventional force v another.
One force was mounting a conventional attack against another ensconced in an urban defence.
The defending force seems to have included some Royal Marines, their Dutch mates who tag along with them everywhere they go, and some UAE types. They were working up to deploy as the Royal Navy's Littoral Response Group (South) operating out of Oman. Apparently, from the 10,000 foot view the Brits spent their time brewing up and scoffing American grub.

Some of the Brits apparently borrowed some American Humvees.
Some may or may not have acquired US uniforms at the PX
A couple might have taken the opportunity to sit in the back row during the attacking force briefings.

In their spare time some lads are rumoured to have made a run down to Radio Shack and purchased some over-the-counter trackers and radio monitors. The trackers seem to have ended up on the attacking force vehicles and the radio monitors seem to have allowed the HQ to be tracked.

The HQ and the attacking force vehicles seem to have had a hard time of it.

The exercise may or may not have had to go into extra-innings.

In any event it seems the attacking force is not claiming victory. By all accounts the defenders had the better experience. The attacking force seems to believe that the defending force rather stretched the rules. Although "rules in place to better simulate real-world scenarios."

It all seems to have been rather unconventional.

Not that any of that matters.

The world and the British public knows that the Royals beat the Yanks. The Daily Mail said so.


End Ex. :ROFLMAO::ROFLMAO::ROFLMAO:

Oi, yon Septic Tanks.... ;)

No Crying Tom Hanks GIF
 

CBH99

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So, Here is the whiners' version of history :devilish:

Apparently it was a USMC v USMC exercise with one conventional force v another.
One force was mounting a conventional attack against another ensconced in an urban defence.
The defending force seems to have included some Royal Marines, their Dutch mates who tag along with them everywhere they go, and some UAE types. They were working up to deploy as the Royal Navy's Littoral Response Group (South) operating out of Oman. Apparently, from the 10,000 foot view the Brits spent their time brewing up and scoffing American grub.

Some of the Brits apparently borrowed some American Humvees.
Some may or may not have acquired US uniforms at the PX
A couple might have taken the opportunity to sit in the back row during the attacking force briefings.

In their spare time some lads are rumoured to have made a run down to Radio Shack and purchased some over-the-counter trackers and radio monitors. The trackers seem to have ended up on the attacking force vehicles and the radio monitors seem to have allowed the HQ to be tracked.

The HQ and the attacking force vehicles seem to have had a hard time of it.

The exercise may or may not have had to go into extra-innings.

In any event it seems the attacking force is not claiming victory. By all accounts the defenders had the better experience. The attacking force seems to believe that the defending force rather stretched the rules. Although "rules in place to better simulate real-world scenarios."

It all seems to have been rather unconventional.

Not that any of that matters.

The world and the British public knows that the Royals beat the Yanks. The Daily Mail said so.


End Ex. :ROFLMAO::ROFLMAO::ROFLMAO:
We always want to be adaptable, creative, flexible, and cunning when it comes to gathering intelligence & engaging the enemy in real life.

If the above is even kind of true, smart lads & good on them.


Rules are meant for 3 things, IMO:

- Ensure safety of persons (such as on a firing range, construction site, etc.)

- To ensure fair treatment of people when others have all of the power. (When you get arrested for example, rules/laws are in place to ensure you receive relatively fair treatment, and aren’t just locked up and forgotten about.) Or in war, to ensure enemy combatants are treated as humanely as war allows, and civilians are as safe as can be reasonably expected.

- To be broken, if it allows for a greater good.


I love how diabolical & cunning their plan was, whether that was actually the case or not 😈
 

Good2Golf

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Had an RSM of a regiment that fit somewhere in between 21 and 23 tell me “Doesn’t matter if it happened or not. Tell it with flair and conviction and they’ll all believe it!” 😉
 

daftandbarmy

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Had an RSM of a regiment that fit somewhere in between 21 and 23 tell me “Doesn’t matter if it happened or not. Tell it with flair and conviction and they’ll all believe it!” 😉

For those who know the Royal Marines, this fits well!

Their greatest fear has always been that the RN will want to trade them in for a couple of frigates, so their PR machine needs to be pretty slick.

Oh, and if you don't want to make them mad, don't point out that the original Commandoes were Army Commandoes until the RN staged a hostile takeover ;)
 

Infanteer

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What a tempest in a tea pot. I've been part of exercises that have suffered catastrophic defeat - and that's a good thing! Training to failure is how you learn.

The journalism is not helpful and really only feeds the chattering classes. Having worked with both RM and USMC in the past, I'm pretty sure that as true professional fighting forces, they are chuckling at this and getting on with the business at hand.
 

Good2Golf

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…as likely are the ODAs that may or may not have been hanging around the mobile DFAC.
 

Infanteer

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My understanding is that there were two elements to the troubles the British experienced in Helmand in 2006. First, they were riding high in institutional arrogance stemming from Iraq. The British Army was looking at the Sunni Insurgency in Iraq and the relative calm in Basra, where its forces were located, and was wagging its finger at the Americans who "didn't know COIN." This is evident when a British senior officer published an article in the US Army's professional journal telling them so.

The second is a bit of cap badge politics. The CGS at the time was Mike Jackson, a Para, and I've seen arguments (with sources) that there was a deliberate move to put the Paras in despite any other considerations that might indicate a different force. I'd have to dig around my notes a bit, but apparently there were some other COAs for the initial force.

In the end, these two led to an operational approach that assumed "ink blots" would be effective in winning hearts and minds, and that small light force "lily pads" would act as islands of counterinsurgent sentiment, enabling reconstruction. The reality is that (1) it ran smack into the Talban's 2006 campaign to re-enter southern Afghanistan in force (2) it put little isolated targets in the middle of territory hostile to both the Afghan central government and NATO and (3) it missed the fact that in Southern Afghanistan, the summer months turn an arid floodplain into a jungle, which will reduce the area of influence of a force to a few hundred yards or less.

This operational approach backfired quickly. You'll never read about it in most British popular histories, but the Canadian Task Force in Kandahar built on the 1 PPCLI BG (TF Orion) actually had to mount up and send a rescue expedition to Helmand to pull out a beleaguered para garrison. A first hand account I got from a member of that force was that the paras had been reduced to boiling ditch water in their small outpost and were really in tough.

Important to note is that this shouldn't cast shade on the resiliency of the British fighting soldier, who fought the good fight because he was put in a bad situation by leaders making poor operational decisions. Also important to note is that this is not a uniquely British phenomenon in Afghanistan. The Canadian Task Force did the same thing in Panjwayi district in 2007 and I remember a briefing by a senior officer alluding to how the extension of "tactical infrastructure" in the Horn of Panjwayi had pacified the district. Once the greenspace became green these were islands, and after a tough fight in 2008, they were abandoned in early 2009.

As for comparing the UK/Can AO to the US in RC(E), I've always found it an interesting one to consider. I don't think one can qualify Kunar province as better or worse than Helmand, or Kandahar for that matter. Kunar's proximity to the Federally Administered Tribal Areas and Helmand/Kandahar's proximity to Quetta both make them natural strongholds for the Taliban due to being near border sanctuaries and sharing a ethic identity with these sanctuaries (this is all "Pashtunistan"). The difference in terrain between the two, however, did make for two different tactical fights.

I also believe the CA would have taken vastly different lessons learned - that probably (IMHO) would have been better for the CA as a whole.
1) Leo would never have come
2) More TACHEL - more focus on MedEvac - and AH Escorts

Agreed.

3) Cbt Spt Coy's being beefed up in the Mortar and Pioneer realm

Most likely, yes. The open floodplain of Kandahar permitted more all-arms integration. One could assume that more compartmentalized fighting in a mountainous AO would have forced a Canadian BG to focus on these more decentralized support capabilities. That they would have been Infantry vice Artillery/Engineer capabilities is another question.

4) Better Integration of SOF and Light Inf Recce

Disagree. I get the sense that the SOF effort in Afghanistan was more political than operational. I have no doubt that SOF and conventional forces would have been fighting two wars on the same piece of ground in either RC(E) or RC(S).

5) Real LI working group results
6) Differentiating Mechanized from Light Operations - and getting rid of the Symmetrical banana republics in the the Bde's
7) More FOO parties out with platoons and sections.

Probably. I suspect it would have resulted in a different outlook for the Canadian Army in 2011. Kandahar, rightly or wrongly, reinforced the tank/infantry combat team DNA that the CA has.

I suspect it would have been less bloody for the UK/CDN Forces as well - because by and large the Commonwealth also do better AO specific training and handovers.

Debatable. See note at the top on the UK. I've worked with enough US units to see good ones and poor ones.
 
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