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RUMINT of Canada wanting more C-17's

Looks like the last C-17's have been spoken for:

http://www.strategypage.com/htmw/htairmo/articles/20150404.aspx

Air Transportation: The Last C-17 Is Arabian
   
April 4, 2015: The UAE (United Arab Emirates) is buying another two American C-17 air transports for $310 million each. The 290 ton C-17 is an intercontinental transport that the UAE uses to move commercial as well as military cargo. The UAE already has six and ordered the first four in 2009. These latest C-17s for the UAE may be the last ones ordered, with total production ending at 279.

The C-17 first flew in 1991, entered service in 1995 and there are now 255 in service. C-17s have spent over 2.5 million hours in the air, which equals nearly 2.5 billion kilometers travelled. The C-17 fleet passed a million flight hours in 2004, when there were 152 in service. Despite the heavy use, the C-17 has been very reliable, with a current readiness rate of 85 percent. The 290 ton C-17 can carry up to 100 tons (including one M-1 tank) anywhere in the world because of in-air refueling. The C-17 alone costs about $250 million each but with spares, technical assistance and other services that can go another 20 percent of so. Britain is the largest foreign user of the C-17. Australia and Canada each got four. The U.S. Air Force operates 173.

Despite the high reliability C-17s are being worked very hard since September 11, 2001.  The problem is that the C-17 was more in demand during the war on terror than air force combat aircraft. At the peak of the fighting only the two dozen AC-130 gunships, and a hundred or so A-10 ground attack aircraft and F-16 fighter-bombers plus a few dozen heavy bombers were getting steady work. But their workload is nothing compared to the C-17s, which were in constant demand to deliver personnel and material to American troops in Iraq, Afghanistan, and many other places where the war on terror is being fought. Right behind the C-17s in the workload was the aging fleet of K-135 aerial refueling aircraft and a few dozen intelligence collecting aircraft.

After the C-17 entered service in 1995 those first few aircraft quickly compiled 3,000 flight hours supporting peacekeeping operations in Bosnia. Each C-17 has a useful life of 30,000 flight hours, but the current force is flying such long, and hard (landing on rough fields) flights that many of the early model C-17s are already wearing out. This attrition is accelerated by the fact that the early model C-17s are structurally different, and weaker, than the later model C-17s. The basic problem was that wing box in the center of the fuselage was insufficiently strong for the loads placed on it. This was corrected later in the production run, but those early planes are wearing out faster than later model planes of the same flight hours.  The air force has flown a lot of C-17s into northern Iraq, Afghanistan, Pakistan and a bunch of other stans with rough/short strips in 2001 and 2003. The C-17 was built for this sort of thing, but lots of these landing come at the price of shorter useful life.

Despite all this demand and popularity with users it's always been an uphill fight getting new air transports built. There were so many delays in the C-17 program that, when the 1991 Gulf War came along, the C-17 was not available and the C-141 transports, that was supposed to keep flying until 2010, were basically worn out and had to be retired early. Now the C-17s are doing more work to make up for the missing C-141s. Originally there were to be 120 C-17s (at $135 million each) with production ending in 2004. After September 11, 2001, it was realized that more air transports would be needed and the production run of the C-17 was increased to 180. But logistics planners insisted that 300 were needed if wartime needs were to be met. Moreover the rapid deterioration of the early model C-17s means that eventually 350 or more would have to be built to maintain a fleet of 300 transports. That never happened.

The major problem is that the air force is run by combat pilots. Although they recognize the importance of the C-17, they tend to focus on getting warplanes built. Additional C-17 construction comes at the expense of building new combat aircraft, and that's a hard sell inside the air force. Usually, it's lobbying by the army, and other branches of the government, that compels Congress to strong arm the air force generals to build the needed C-17s. It's an ugly, messy and time consuming way to get aircraft built, but it works.
 
Unless they reopen the production line, there might be enough demand to run another 15-20 aircraft
 
Since the Air Force Generals seem to hate helicopters, CAS and Transport aircraft maybe they should give all a/c and money to the Army who seem to really care and need these assets.

 
Colin P said:
Unless they reopen the production line, there might be enough demand to run another 15-20 aircraft

Long lead items are no longer in production. Cost to ramp up again would be prohibitive.
 
seems this has been kicked around

Barring unforeseen changes to the C-17A program, production will end in 2014 or 2015. Once
C-17A production in Long Beach ceases, any resumption of production would incur sizable
costs. Even Table S.1’s most optimistic C-17A restart case would have at least $2.1 billion in
nonrecurring costs. The magnitude of the cost of restarting C-17A production or starting up
production of a variant gives pause with respect to tooling retention. One could interpret these
sizable cost estimates to suggest the probability of a future production restart is quite small.
Without some probability of eventual C-17 restart, there would be no value in retaining C-17
production-only tools.

http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/technical_reports/2012/RAND_TR1143.pdf
 
Colin P said:
seems this has been kicked around
there would be no value in retaining C-17
production-only tools.

And here I disagree -

Warehousing may be expensive - and it may not be in Boeing's economic interest to be able to restart a defunct line on short notice - but it is in the strategic interest of the US and partner nations. 

At very least the tooling should be bound over in proper storage for a defined period of time (10 to 15 years perhaps - the time necessary to design a new solution and get it into production).

The US Government maintains massive depositories for the storage of all sorts of things of strategic value.  This tooling would, IMO, qualify as a strategic asset.
 
Not my words, frankly I think they were to quick to shut this down, I think they anticipated a market crowded with Airbus and Ukrainian aircraft. In reality they and the C130J pretty much own the market in the west.
 
Colin P said:
Not my words, frankly I think they were to quick to shut this down, I think they anticipated a market crowded with Airbus and Ukrainian aircraft. In reality they and the C130J pretty much own the market in the west.

Seen Colin.  I understood you were only quoting Rand.

Cheers.
 
FSTO said:
Since the Air Force Generals seem to hate helicopters, CAS and Transport aircraft maybe they should give all a/c and money to the Army who seem to really care and need these assets.

Pretty broad statement with no justification...
 
SupersonicMax said:
Pretty broad statement with no justification...
Just an observation and my opinion.

Maybe you should get some thicker skin. ;D
 
Doesn't bother me, just pointing out the last of substance to the claim!
 
FSTO said:
Since the Air Force Generals seem to hate helicopters, CAS and Transport aircraft maybe they should give all a/c and money to the Army who seem to really care and need these assets.

Chinooks, Globemasters, and CF18s bombing in Iraq and  Syria.  Not sure exactly what else can be said.

:2c:
 
Eye In The Sky said:
Chinooks, Globemasters, and CF18s bombing in Iraq and  Syria.  Not sure exactly what else can be said.

:2c:

I was commenting on the article that was talking about the US Air Force, not ours.
 
The C-17 problem is two fold, really.

The unit cost is so high that air forces balked at purchasing the numbers needed.

The demand for C-17s seems not to have been anticipated by the users.

In the article it suggests that over 300 C-17's should have been built, but the actual production run has been about half of that figure. If Boeing had pressed ahead or the governments had bit the bullet there may have been an opportunity to gain economies of scale by rolling out the full 300-350 rather than stop now. Restarting the production line and building the next 150 C-17s is an option who's window is rapidly closing, and the real issue now is that while the current fleet of C-17s will probably wear out more quickly than anticipated, there is no program in place to design and build the next generation of transport aircraft for the West.
 
Unless they start to build a C17C (B being the tactical airlifter version) The C would incorporate recommended changes from the A
 
Thucydides said:
The C-17 problem is two fold, really.

The unit cost is so high that air forces balked at purchasing the numbers needed.

The demand for C-17s seems not to have been anticipated by the users.

In the article it suggests that over 300 C-17's should have been built, but the actual production run has been about half of that figure. If Boeing had pressed ahead or the governments had bit the bullet there may have been an opportunity to gain economies of scale by rolling out the full 300-350 rather than stop now. Restarting the production line and building the next 150 C-17s is an option who's window is rapidly closing, and the real issue now is that while the current fleet of C-17s will probably wear out more quickly than anticipated, there is no program in place to design and build the next generation of transport aircraft for the West.

The C130 entered service in the 1950s, according to Wikipedia anyways.

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Lockheed_C-130_Hercules

Could we not extend the useful life of the C17 in a similar fashion?

 
daftandbarmy said:
The C130 entered service in the 1950s, according to Wikipedia anyways.

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Lockheed_C-130_Hercules

Could we not extend the useful life of the C17 in a similar fashion?
C130 production lines stayed open.  New planes replaced old.
With the C17 production lines closed, this is not an option.
 
what does "closed" mean in this particular case, is the line being re-purposed for another airframe?

It would seem the factory is not yet fully closed, although some production areas have shut down  http://www.nbclosangeles.com/news/local/Boeing-C17-Production-Ends-Long-Beach.html
 
Colin P said:
what does "closed" mean in this particular case, is the line being re-purposed for another airframe?

It would seem the factory is yet fully closed, although some production areas have shut down  http://www.nbclosangeles.com/news/local/Boeing-C17-Production-Ends-Long-Beach.html

Essentially it means with no new orders, the production line is beginning a slow shut down from the start of the line until the last one leaves the line and they shut her down.
 
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