RUMINT of Canada wanting more C-17's

[Cloud Cover]

Remember the USAF buys in numbers to do that and provide deep redundancy.

We have to start thinking beyond unit and school TO&Es.

You cant beat sea lift for mass delivery. But both air and sea lift are 100% requirements if we want to have a seriously deployable Army. I see sea lift as more strategic (future, staging and reinforcement) and air lift as more tactical (now).

Pre Positioning and forward logistics/maintenance facilities enters the chat.
Whatever options are undertaken, they will be expensive and require a candid defence white paper. What’s happening now with defence spending is unsustainable without clear and thoughtful disclosure.
Otherwise they’ll weld 1500 meters lane space on Asterix and sign a 10 year contract for that.

 

[MacNav63]

Yeah. The question goes to the CA. What do they believe would be vanguard element that needs to move quickly during a scenario of escalating tensions resulting in mobilization. The rest would/should go be sea and reach 2 weeks later.

I think the US Army, for example, has/had a requirement to be able to move a Stryker Brigade to Europe in 96 hrs. To that end, their C-17 and C-5 Wings are designed to meet that requirement.

Serious question, but given the number of times I've read the phrase "the CA needs to decide what it wants to be when it grows up" on other threads (apologies to @FJAG and @KevinB but not sure which of you coined it) has there ever been a time since the Second World War when the army articulated a clear vision for moving forces in mass to Europe, or anywhere else for that matter. I know the carriers were whipped into service for Suez and Cyprus and there was the one "proof of concept" exercise of the CAST brigade that ended the concept, but has there ever been any more of an in depth plan and strategy to resource it?

 

[KevinB]

Yeah. The question goes to the CA. What do they believe would be vanguard element that needs to move quickly during a scenario of escalating tensions resulting in mobilization. The rest would/should go be sea and reach 2 weeks later.

We’ve ‘argued’ this before, but I believe one needs to give up the idea of moving heavy equipment by air. Having ocean going RORO’s available for the CA is much more valuable to move Tanks etc. Your point about Ocean Ferries later is well stated.
But @Cloud Cover pointed out a major key being pre-positioned equipment.

To me the key is how to move the GRTF somewhere within the GoC mandated time frame, support other CAF operations, and maintain a reserve to all the above.
Of course that comes down to nailing down what the expectations of the GRTF is for both Areas of Operations, and the size of that entity. What CANSOF and other stakeholders need for lift in times of crisis as well as standing standard support.
Right now as I understand it the GRTF has three LIB taskings, that theoretically could be simultaneous requirements.

I think the US Army, for example, has/had a requirement to be able to move a Stryker Brigade to Europe in 96 hrs. To that end, their C-17 and C-5 Wings are designed to meet that requirement.

There are a few other requirements, moving a XVIII ABN Corps Division globally inside 48hrs is one.
The 82nd ABN is fairly easy, the 101st Airborne (Air Assault) is a lot less.
But 252 C-17 and 50 C-5M give one some decent depth especially when augmented by the C-130 fleet.

Also the Joint Forceable Entry requirement soaks up a lot of airframes, as combat loaded paratroopers and supplies take up a lot more room than standard passengers.

 

[KevinB]

I’m also of the opinion that Canada needs a stand alone JFE capability.
Mainly as recent events have shown that there may be times where Canada needs to conduct NEO/PR in a non permissive environment, that allies don’t have the same skin in the game.

 

[Kirkhill]

We’ve ‘argued’ this before, but I believe one needs to give up the idea of moving heavy equipment by air. Having ocean going RORO’s available for the CA is much more valuable to move Tanks etc. Your point about Ocean Ferries later is well stated.
But @Cloud Cover pointed out a major key being pre-positioned equipment.

To me the key is how to move the GRTF somewhere within the GoC mandated time frame, support other CAF operations, and maintain a reserve to all the above.
Of course that comes down to nailing down what the expectations of the GRTF is for both Areas of Operations, and the size of that entity. What CANSOF and other stakeholders need for lift in times of crisis as well as standing standard support.
Right now as I understand it the GRTF has three LIB taskings, that theoretically could be simultaneous requirements.



There are a few other requirements, moving a XVIII ABN Corps Division globally inside 48hrs is one.
The 82nd ABN is fairly easy, the 101st Airborne (Air Assault) is a lot less.
But 252 C-17 and 50 C-5M give one some decent depth especially when augmented by the C-130 fleet.

Also the Joint Forceable Entry requirement soaks up a lot of airframes, as combat loaded paratroopers and supplies take up a lot more room than standard passengers.

Are you sure about the 101st Kev?

One way of looking at te 101st is that it, like the 82nd, is just another light infantry division, complete with ISVs, but with an extra ration of helicopters. I believe all divisions, light and heavy, have an aviation brigade.

The 101st appear to have adopted the structure of three Mobile BCTs on ISVs, each comprising an HHC headquarters company and an MFRC multi-function recce company as well as three infantry battalions. The DivArty now consists of three field battalions and an air defence battalion.

And some of that helicopter support is self-deploying, at least over some distances. Especially in the Western Hemisphere.

 

[KevinB]

Extra extra ration of Helicopters.
Non SOF birds down here aren’t setup for AAR, so there are limits to self deployment. Plus crew rest and maintenance issues.
@Good2Golf can tell stories about 160th folks not being too thrilled about self deployment’s over long distances.

Sending the 82nd to jump in somewhere is vastly different than sending the 101st, as typically the 101st gets sent for the Air Assault option.
Now sometimes 101st Bde’s get send separately as Light Infantry, but if you task the Div, it’s generally with an eye for the Air Assault capability.

10th Mountain can get the nod generally if you just want Light Infantry.


However it can also depend on who the Div Commander is, as some deployments have been made solely due to the CG’s ‘past life’.

 

[FJAG]

Serious question, but given the number of times I've read the phrase "the CA needs to decide what it wants to be when it grows up" on other threads (apologies to @FJAG and @KevinB but not sure which of you coined it)

@KevinB coined it first and I've plagiarized it shamelessly and often since

has there ever been a time since the Second World War when the army articulated a clear vision for moving forces in mass to Europe, or anywhere else for that matter.

Back in the 1960s and into the 1980s we had 4 CMBG - a heavy mech brigade - with all its kit there albeit it was downsized in around 1970 (the year of the Trudeau slaughter). 4 CMBG was basically stand alone at first (together with the air arm). Back in Canada we had three light formations albeit fully equipped. 1, 2 and 5 Combat Groups (CG - i.e. bdes) and the Airborne Regiment. Around 1976 the Airborne moved to Petawawa and together with 2 CG formed the Special Service Force.

Throughout this time 2 CG had the ACE Mobile Force role to fly a battle group over to Norway (at times some of their equipment was prepositioned) We were pretty good at flyovers and practiced it frequently. The Airborne Regiment was quite good on air moves.

At the same time 5 CG had the role of the filling the Canadian Air-Sea Transportable (CAST) brigade group - initially also to Norway. That was only exercised once and the time involved in staging it and moving by RORO was clearly excessive. 5 Bde was then changed over to operating with 4 CMBG in Germany under a newly reformed 1 Cdn Div. Again, the exercising of that role - in full - never happened to the best of my knowledge - I'd transferred to the legal branch by then so didn't pay to much attention to it beyond flying over for the odd court martial. We were pretty good at staging a battlegroup but a brigade group was a bridge too far.

I know the carriers were whipped into service for Suez and Cyprus and there was the one "proof of concept" exercise of the CAST brigade that ended the concept, but has there ever been any more of an in depth plan and strategy to resource it?

Basically that's it. ACE Mobile was actually pretty adept and attuned to flyovers. The army did rotos to Cyprus and then after the Yugoslavia events we got pretty tied into doing rotos there until Afghanistan blossomed. Things pre the 1990s were better - we had equipment, roles, trained okay. After that things went to hell in a handbasket as money dried up, equipment wore out, training was curtailed. Yugoslavia wore the army out - rotos are killers and, IMHO should not be done. I favour prepositioned equipment with an OUTCAN command and maintenance team and frequent flyovers for exercises. It's a lot easier on the troops but expensive for equipment.

 

[MacNav63]

@KevinB coined it first and I've plagiarized it shamelessly and often since

Back in the 1960s and into the 1980s we had 4 CMBG - a heavy mech brigade - with all its kit there albeit it was downsized in around 1970 (the year of the Trudeau slaughter). 4 CMBG was basically stand alone at first (together with the air arm). Back in Canada we had three light formations albeit fully equipped. 1, 2 and 5 Combat Groups (CG - i.e. bdes) and the Airborne Regiment. Around 1976 the Airborne moved to Petawawa and together with 2 CG formed the Special Service Force.

Throughout this time 2 CG had the ACE Mobile Force role to fly a battle group over to Norway (at times some of their equipment was prepositioned) We were pretty good at flyovers and practiced it frequently. The Airborne Regiment was quite good on air moves.

At the same time 5 CG had the role of the filling the Canadian Air-Sea Transportable (CAST) brigade group - initially also to Norway. That was only exercised once and the time involved in staging it and moving by RORO was clearly excessive. 5 Bde was then changed over to operating with 4 CMBG in Germany under a newly reformed 1 Cdn Div. Again, the exercising of that role - in full - never happened to the best of my knowledge - I'd transferred to the legal branch by then so didn't pay to much attention to it beyond flying over for the odd court martial. We were pretty good at staging a battlegroup but a brigade group was a bridge too far.

Basically that's it. ACE Mobile was actually pretty adept and attuned to flyovers. The army did rotos to Cyprus and then after the Yugoslavia events we got pretty tied into doing rotos there until Afghanistan blossomed. Things pre the 1990s were better - we had equipment, roles, trained okay. After that things went to hell in a handbasket as money dried up, equipment wore out, training was curtailed. Yugoslavia wore the army out - rotos are killers and, IMHO should not be done. I favour prepositioned equipment with an OUTCAN command and maintenance team and frequent flyovers for exercises. It's a lot easier on the troops but expensive for equipment.

Thanks for that. And I guess, at least through the 80s with the Rendezvous exercised the army was also at least engaging in the mass movement of brigade level formations, if not to Europe at least across the continent.

 

[ytz]

We’ve ‘argued’ this before, but I believe one needs to give up the idea of moving heavy equipment by air. Having ocean going RORO’s available for the CA is much more valuable to move Tanks etc. Your point about Ocean Ferries later is well stated.
But @Cloud Cover pointed out a major key being pre-positioned equipment.

To me the key is how to move the GRTF somewhere within the GoC mandated time frame, support other CAF operations, and maintain a reserve to all the above.
Of course that comes down to nailing down what the expectations of the GRTF is for both Areas of Operations, and the size of that entity. What CANSOF and other stakeholders need for lift in times of crisis as well as standing standard support.
Right now as I understand it the GRTF has three LIB taskings, that theoretically could be simultaneous requirements.



There are a few other requirements, moving a XVIII ABN Corps Division globally inside 48hrs is one.
The 82nd ABN is fairly easy, the 101st Airborne (Air Assault) is a lot less.
But 252 C-17 and 50 C-5M give one some decent depth especially when augmented by the C-130 fleet.

Also the Joint Forceable Entry requirement soaks up a lot of airframes, as combat loaded paratroopers and supplies take up a lot more room than standard passengers.

Good points.

My wider point is simply that how this plays out if given the opportunity is entirely driven by the what the CA says they need and how that math pencils out in what the CA needs moved in a relatively short amount of time. We aren't going to get 20 C-17s like you have suggested before. But I do think something like 12-15 is definitely sellable to the government. But that high a number need a rock solid narrative on how much airlift is needed in a contingency.

If that line opens up before the CA can provide a good answer, highly likely we'll order a handful of frames and call it a day.

 

[YZT580]

Remember the USAF buys in numbers to do that and provide deep redundancy.

We have to start thinking beyond unit and school TO&Es.

You cant beat sea lift for mass delivery. But both air and sea lift are 100% requirements if we want to have a seriously deployable Army. I see sea lift as more strategic (future, staging and reinforcement) and air lift as more tactical (now).

would agree if we had enough airlift to do so. Two weeks for 60 vehicles by air plus additional flights to carry the self-loading cargo vs. 1 week by sea including personnel unless you purchase enough heavy lift aircraft. Personnel by air not so much as we have sufficient A330's to do the job provided we don't have two places to supply at once. Question: why go for a ferry style vessel instead of a proper RORO freighter? Flying your people over would mean that they were rested and ready to move away from the docks whereas sending them on a ferry would put most of them out of action for several days as they recovered from the ocean trip: especially if one is looking at gale force winds and seas. Both Paul Martin and Algoma would be delighted to have the government provide them with new hulls.

 

[daftandbarmy]

I’m also of the opinion that Canada needs a stand alone JFE capability.
Mainly as recent events have shown that there may be times where Canada needs to conduct NEO/PR in a non permissive environment, that allies don’t have the same skin in the game.

The possible body count involved in a NEO op 'non-permissive' would possibly bring down a Canadian government of the day as well as, you know, kill alot of people.

Nothing Canada has done foreign policy-wise would give any confidence that this option would be well supported, whether needed or not...

 

[ytz]

I’m also of the opinion that Canada needs a stand alone JFE capability.
Mainly as recent events have shown that there may be times where Canada needs to conduct NEO/PR in a non permissive environment, that allies don’t have the same skin in the game.

I wouldn't use a C-17 for this. There's a good argument here for the RCAF to follow the RAF and replace the Hercs with the Atlas.

 

[FJAG]

Thanks for that. And I guess, at least through the 80s with the Rendezvous exercised the army was also at least engaging in the mass movement of brigade level formations, if not to Europe at least across the continent.

Yeah. My last exercise before leaving the RegF (3 RCHA) for the ARes (QOCH - then legal) was RV 81 in Gagetown. From a gunner point of view it was a good get together - workup training into "fire missions division." Prior to that we did annual 1 CBG WainCons in Wainwright. By then 3 RCHA was an M109/Blowpipe regiment with one battery flyover augmentation task to 1 RCHA in Germany as its fourth gun battery - (G Bty 3 RCHA -> Z Bty 1 RCHA). We had both German and Canadian rail moves down pat (Hint- Germany's DB is much better organized than either Cdn railroad - on average it would take three times as long to load a Canadian train than a German one)

Road moves too are a bonus for training. We'd send the tracks by train and drive the trucks. This is why I tend to poo poo those folks who argue that units need to be on a RegF base to be trained efficiently. My argument is that a road or rail move from an urban home station to a rural base is a training exercise in its own right and not an imposition - its all a matter of organization and a decent training plan. If you don't do this stuff in peacetime how will you do it in wartime - There was over a decade in the 1990's when we stopped doing brigade exercises due to lack of funds. They restarted just at the beginning of Afghanistan.

Good points.

My wider point is simply that how this plays out if given the opportunity is entirely driven by the what the CA says they need and how that math pencils out in what the CA needs moved in a relatively short amount of time. We aren't going to get 20 C-17s like you have suggested before. But I do think something like 12-15 is definitely sellable to the government. But that high a number need a rock solid narrative on how much airlift is needed in a contingency.

If that line opens up before the CA can provide a good answer, highly likely we'll order a handful of frames and call it a day.

The problem in all this is the mission any air move is to accomplish. I think the army grossly overthinks what the air force is capable of accomplishing through basic airlift. And that holds true even for the USAF and all of its resources.

If one goes back in time to the transition from tracked heavy forces to medium-weight LAV or Stryker forces, the US Army's business model for Strykers was for rapid deployment on expeditionary ops (We had the same delusion vis a vis LAVs). For the deployment of a Stryker BCTs, the standard was that an SBCT was to be able to be delivered anywhere in the world in 96 hours, a division in 120 hours and five divisions in 30 days (the latter also using sea-lift). The USAF commissioned RAND to do a study of that and the result, in short, was Nope! We can't do that, but . . .! The report is here and it makes some interesting reading for the various factors involved and what expeditionary deployment entails.

 

[brihard]

Add to the above - redundancy - never underestimate the need for redundancy. By this I'm referring to having 'back-up' or 'alternative' options available.

Probably prudent to anticipate that if we get into a real scrap, or a state adversary gets really testy, a few of our existing C-17s could get Op Spiderwebbed on the ground

Distinct from that- as F-35 comes online, will it have a larger logistical:force protection tail if we deploy a six pack, that might necessitate more strategic airlift?

 

[KevinB]

Keep in mind the entire Stryker Bde concept came out of Somalia and ‘too light to fight’ mentality that the Light Divisions where viewed at.

The original Stryker was C-130 deployable, the Stryker 2.0 like the LAV 6 family is not.