Russia in the 21st Century [Superthread]

[a_majoor]

Actually, getting into space is easy (the WWII era V2 brushed the edge of space), staying in space is difficult because of the need for a vast amount of speed (@ Mach 25 to hit orbital velocity). These Soviet era ASATS and their modern descendants are very sophisticated, but shooting a sounding rocket straight up in the path of a satelite and releasing a bucket of ball bearings will also do the job. Interestig to see how far back the roots of space warfare really go.

As a counterpoint, the US X-37 spaceplane may well have been designed with these things in mind, having a very large reserve of fuel and the ability to make large changes in orbital parameters, as well as remain in space for extended periods of time before returnign to Earth:

http://www.popularmechanics.com/technology/military/satellites/the-hidden-history-of-the-soviet-satellite-killer-16108970?click=pm_news

The Hidden History of the Soviet Satellite-Killer

As soon as the Space Age got under way, the Soviet Union was trying to build antisatellite weapons—and kept trying for decades.
By Anatoly Zak

RussianSpaceWeb
November 1, 2013 11:32 AM

Half a century ago, on Nov. 1, 1963, the Soviet Union launched the first prototype of the "killer" satellite—what we would call today an antisatellite system, or ASAT. Officially announced as Polyot-1 (or Flight-1), this highly maneuverable spacecraft was intended to test whether the Soviets could approach an "enemy" satellite and blow it in smithereens. This mission set off a decades-long race to develop and deploy offensive weapons in space that culminated in the 1980s with Ronald Reagan's famous Star Wars program.

Although a nuclear standoff between East and West subsided soon thereafter and the Cold War thawed, the danger of weaponization of space flared up again recently with the emergence of new space powers, such as China and Iran.

With the world dependent more than ever on satellites for communications, navigation, and other daily needs, the very possibility of orbital warfare could trigger a domino effect of costly measures and countermeasures—as the history of the Soviet killer satellite effort vividly illustrates.

Origin of the Soviet Satellite-Killer

The Space Age had hardly begun when Soviet engineers were already busy drawing blueprints of satellite killers. Following the famed 1960 Soviet shoot-down of an American U-2 spy plane, Kremlin leader Nikita Khrushchev was determined to do the same with the emerging "threat" from spy satellites, particularly the American Satellite Interceptor, or SAINT project, developed at the end of the 1950s and publicly disclosed in 1960.

Like their American counterparts, Soviet engineers initially considered piloted space fighters armed with missiles. Prominent leaders of the Soviet aviation industry including Vladimir Myasishev and, later, Vladimir Chelomei proposed orbital space planes, but their ideas were too far-fetched for that era. In the interim, the USSR settled on a remotely controlled robotic spacecraft.

The father of the Soviet space program, Sergei Korolev, pushed for his flight-proven R-7 ICBM to carry an interceptor that would be sent on an exact collision course with its target. However, Chelomei argued for a self-guided orbital vehicle that would enter the proximity of an enemy satellite, explode, and pierce its target with shrapnel.

In 1960, the Kremlin chose Chelomei's concept. Dubbed Istrebitel Sputnikov (for the Satellite Destroyer), the barrel-shaped spacecraft would sport 17 thrusters to make any conceivable maneuver in orbit. It would be supported by a complex network of ground stations spread over several time zones across the Soviet Union for tracking enemy satellites and guiding the killer to its target. The top-secret command post for the system was located in the Moscow suburb of Noginsk. A pair of guidance stations were deployed in the Siberian town of Irkutsk and near Lake Balkhash in Kazakhstan.

By 1962, while Soviet newspaper headlines proclaimed the great successes of cosmonauts and called for peaceful exploration of space, the USSR was focusing much of its space effort on a killer satellite. According to Vladimir Polyachenko, a leading engineer in the IS project, Chelomei led daily meetings on the status of its development. On February 11, 1963, the Kremlin leadership, including Nikita Khrushchev and Leonid Brezhnev, appeared in Moscow's suburb of Fili, where Chelmei's engineers labored on the first killer satellite. Polyachenko showed Khrushchev a huge terrestrial globe covered by a web of blinking satellite orbits designed to illustrate how the interceptor would work. Khrushchev liked what he saw.

After the successful first launch in November 1963, clandestine flight tests of Soviet killer satellites continued for most of the 1960s. Exactly 45 years ago, on Nov. 1, 1968, the USSR succeeded with an actual intercept and the destruction of a specially designed target satellite in orbit. However, it would take another five years before the antisatellite system entered experimental service, and another whole decade before it was fully operational. By 1978, a converted R-36 ICBM topped with the IS interceptor reportedly could be rolled out to the launchpad from its bunker in Baikonur Cosmodrome in Kazakhstan, propped into vertical position, loaded with propellants, and blasted off toward its target in just an hour and a half.

But on August 18, 1983, the Soviet leader Yuri Andropov suddenly declared an end to the tests, apparently as a gesture of goodwill in the midst of the escalating Cold War. Yet behind the scenes, engineers continued working on further improvements to the operational killer satellites, as well as on much bigger and frightening projects—frightening plans to employ orbital battle stations and even laser weapons.

The upgraded antisatellite system, code-named IS-MU, was capable of chasing enemy satellites even if they tried avoidance maneuvers. It was declared operational in 1991. Just two years later, though, as the Cold War wound down, the cash-strapped government led by the Russian president Boris Yeltsin pulled the plug on the system. Around the same time, the first photo showing the IS satellite was finally published, taking the official veil of secrecy off the project.

New Generation of Russian Killer-Satellites

After more than a decade-long hiatus, the Russian antisatellite program showed signs of life again in the 2000s , as the United States and China vividly, even if unofficially, had demonstrated their capability to attack and destroy satellites in space. No longer toying with the ideas of expensive and vulnerable battle stations in orbit, the Russian military banked on converted ballistic missiles placed in well-protected silos and equipped with maneuverable satellites capable of sending missiles on a collision course with enemy satellites at a minute's notice.

In March 2009, then deputy minister of defense Vladimir Popovkin told journalists that Russia had "retained basic assets" in Naryad-VN and Naryad-VR (or Sentry) systems. "We can't sit and watch others do it. I can only say similar works are done in Russia too," Popovkin said. Popovkin did not elaborate as to what Naryad-V was all about. However, a number of Russian sources recently shed some light on its design.

The Naryad-V, which apparently also has the military designation 14F11, consists of an orbital space tug, whose civilian version is known today as Briz-K (Breeze). Its engine can fire up to 75 times during one mission. This highly maneuverable rocket stage serves as a launch platform for multiple missiles developed at a highly classified KB Tochmash design bureau. Each missile initially receives guidance from its orbital launch platform and homes in on its target with the help of powerful thrusters facing in four different directions. The missile's warhead, developed at KB Geofizika in Moscow, eventually locks onto its target, and the missile's own minicomputer takes over the flight control.

The Naryad-V spacecraft is launched by a lightweight Rockot booster, which is converted from the UR-100NU ballistic missile, once the most numerous ICBM in the Soviet nuclear force. As a space launcher, Rockot can place under 2 tons of cargo into orbit.

In the waning days of the USSR, Rockot flew two suborbital test missions with prototypes of the Naryad-V spacecraft. In 1994, the third test vehicle actually made it into orbit, before the missile's firing crew in Baikonur was finally disbanded in the wake of the Soviet collapse.

The Rockot did survive the economic turmoil of the 1990s, in part thanks to a joint European–Russian commercial venture aimed to haul lightweight foreign satellites into orbit from the Russian military launch site in Plesetsk. In 2002, when President Vladimir Putin visited Khrunichev space center in Moscow, which built both Naryad-V and Rockot, the company's leaders reportedly assured him that the antisatellite system had been ready for a revival.

In January 2010, the commander of the Russian space forces, Oleg Ostapenko, told the official ITAR-TASS news agency that Russia would be able to respond to threats from space. "The USSR was developing inspection and strike spacecraft," Ostapenko said. "Our policy—there should be no war in space, but we are military people and should be ready for everything. Our activities in this direction would be dependent on others, but, trust me, we would be able to respond quickly and adequately."

After half a century of roller-coaster rides for one of the most controversial developments in space, the world still faces a considerable probability of satellites blowing each other up in space. Not coincidentally, far below the Earth orbit, in the atmosphere, remotely controlled flying robots capable of shooting missiles at targets on the ground had already become a reality.

Anatoly Zak is the editor of RussianSpaceWeb.com and the author of Russia in Space: The Past Explained, The Future Explored.

 

[a_majoor]

Russia's economy is in far worse shape than perhaps anyone realized. This should put the brakes on further adventurism in the Middle East and other places, while new developments in offshore gas exploration, fracking and oil shale put pressure on Russia's main source of revenues. In the much longer term, Russia will be forced to retreat back to the European Russian "heartland", with its Easternmost boundary at the Urals and most of her attention focused on the "Near Beyond" as a huge non Russian demographic wave threatens from the South and the East becomes too expensive in terms of manpower and resources to maintain a hold on. This is a prediction for the 2100's:

http://pjmedia.com/blog/putinomics-has-the-russian-economy-in-a-tailspin/?print=1

‘Putinomics’ Has the Russian Economy in a Tailspin
Posted By Kim Zigfeld On November 20, 2013 @ 12:28 am In economy,Europe,Money,Politics,Russia,World News | 13 Comments

The bad economic news has rolled over Russia this month in a manner as devastating in a financial sense as the tsunami that struck the Philippines was in the physical. No matter where you turned, if you were a Russian there was only a gigantic wave of red ink rushing at you full speed.

In a move some called unprecedented [1] in Russian history, Economic Development Minister Aleksei Ulyukayev openly admitted that over the next fifteen years the Kremlin expects Russian economic growth to be over 25% less than the world average, with the result that by 2030 Russia’s share of the world economy will have declined by at least a stunning 15%, from 4% today  to just 3.4% fifteen years from now.

The stunned editors of the leading Russian newspaper Nezavisimaya Gazeta stated in an editorial: “Neither the tzars, nor the Bolsheviks, nor the statists ever once told the population that their country did not have greater prospects.” It was jarring indeed to realize that things might be so bad that not even the Kremlin would take the chance of lying about them.

In other words, the days of Vladimir Putin strutting about the world stage boasting of his economic achievements have come to an abrupt and ignominious end.

Then came the Economist magazine, with a hard-hitting feature item on the collapse of Putinomics provocatively titled “The Crumbling Kremlin [2].”  The piece almost seemed to be mocking Putin, the former KGB spy, taunting [3] him with the dreaded word “stagnation” that wrought so much despair in Soviet times.

The magazine’s data show that the Russian economy never recovered from the 2009 global economic meltdown. Its post-crisis growth level is consistently a pale shadow of what it knew before.  The magazine shows that Russia experienced nearly $50 billion in capital flight in just the first three quarters of this year alone, and posits that Russia is facing a collapse of a state pension system which it can no longer afford to fund.

And worst of all it notes: “The oil price at which Russia can finance budgeted spending without borrowing has increased from just $34 a barrel in 2007 to above $100 for the years ahead.”

Putin’s country stands totally at the mercy, in other words, of a world oil price over which it has no control.  Ironically, Putin’s main foreign policy objective seems to be undermining the economies of the West, a policy which if successful would only lead to reduced demand for oil with brutal consequences for Russia.

Already beleaguered by illness of every kind imaginable, including a horrific AIDS crisis, Putin’s Russia is not prepared to sustain the type of draconian cuts to pensions and social services that are clearly now in the offing.  A major demographic debacle is inevitable.

Finally, the boot was put in by the financial consulting firm Z/Yen, which annually prepares a listing of world cities [4] ranked by their financial clout.  In 2011 Z/Yen put Moscow at #61 on its list of about 80 major metropolises. Pretty feeble stuff.  But for wretched Moscow, now it’s the good old days.  The 2013 study places Moscow #69, after falling to #64 in 2012.  Despite Putin’s bold pronouncements that Moscow would soon become a leading financial center, backed up by massive skyscraper construction projects, the capital city is going backwards not forwards.  One Western banker working there told the New York Times [5]: “Moscow was never going to be an international financial center. That was a joke.”

The tone in all this adverse reporting is crystal clear:  The neo-Soviet arrogance and even petulance which Putin has adopted towards the outside world was not just unjustified, it was fraudulent.  Putin benefited from the accidental spiking of the price of oil and a temporary uptick in childbirth, neither of which had anything at all to do with his policies. Now, the neo-Soviet chickens have come home to roost. The world now sees Putin’s Russia for what it truly is, like the infamous emperor without his “new clothes [6],” and the world is jeering.

A good case study for understanding the sorry plight of the Putin economy is tourism.  Putin’s English-language propaganda screed Russia Beyond the Headlines recently touted [7] a UN report showing that Russia was in ninth place worldwide for visitation by tourists. But as is so typical for RBTH, one of the worst sources of information about Russia that there is, the real story, extremely negative for Russia, was left out of its pages.

Russia does not rank anywhere remotely close to the top 10 when it comes to receipt of tourist dollars.  It had a paltry $12 billion [8] in tourist receipts compared a whopping $30 billion by Australia, which rounds out the top 10 list (the USA tops the list with $125 billion in tourist receipts, ten times more than Russia has and five times more per capita).

The reason for this is simple:  The “tourists” who visit Russia have little or no money, mostly coming from the impoverished nations of the former USSR.  When it comes to competing for the attention of sophisticated tourists who do have money and the PR clout that goes with it, clout that might influence international attitudes towards Russia, Russia doesn’t compete, it simply fails.

This is confirmed by the World Economic Forum [8], whose most recent data show that Russia ranks an anemic #63 in tourism competitiveness.  Sophisticated tourists are going to tend to shy away from the horrific issues that plague Russian society, from rudeness to corruption to illness and safety risks. And without genius-level marketing, they’re not going to find Russia’s relatively modest attractions very beguiling.

But Putin’s response to all this will be the RBTH response:  deception and diversion.  He will not seek reform, but he will put a great deal of energy, just as in Soviet times, into creating the illusion of success and liquidating anyone within Russia who tries to tell a different story.

Article printed from PJ Media: http://pjmedia.com

URL to article: http://pjmedia.com/blog/putinomics-has-the-russian-economy-in-a-tailspin/

URLs in this post:

[1] unprecedented: http://windowoneurasia2.blogspot.com/2013/11/window-on-eurasia-will-russians-react.html
[2] The Crumbling Kremlin: http://www.economist.com/blogs/freeexchange/2013/11/russias-economy
[3] taunting: http://www.economist.com/news/europe/21589455-will-stagnating-economy-bring-about-much-needed-structural-reform-s-word
[4] listing of world cities: http://dyingrussia.wordpress.com/2013/11/14/moscow-in-financial-free-fall-under-putin/
[5] New York Times: http://www.nytimes.com/2013/04/04/business/global/moscow-tries-to-remake-itself-as-financial-center.html?_r=1&
[6] new clothes: http://en.ria.ru/photolents/20131113/184683984_6/Putin-Earns-Honorary-Grandmaster-Title-in-Taekwondo.html
[7] touted: http://rbth.ru/international/2013/11/07/russia_enters_list_of_top_10_travel_destinations_31503.html
[8] $12 billion: http://dtxtq4w60xqpw.cloudfront.net/sites/all/files/pdf/unwto_highlights13_en_lr_0.pdf

 

[a_majoor]

The Ukraine sits at the intersection between Russia and Europe. It looks like they are trying to play both sides against the middle, but for now, it is still a small nation caught between a large federation on one side and a jealous, much larger nation on the other. (The Ukraine may be natrually divided between a Catholic "European" Ukraine west of the Dnieper, and an Orthodox, Slavic Ukraine east of the Dnieper, which makes the position of the country even more difficult):

http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/blogs-echochambers-25128329

Yanukovych's Ukrainian calculus: Power at all costs
Nataliya Jensen

BBC Ukranian Service

Tens of thousands have taken to the streets in Kiev to protest Ukraine's decision to back away from an EU agreement
On the eve of the European Union (EU) summit in Vilnius, Lithuania, on 28-29 November, Europeans said the door is still open for Ukraine to sign a historic agreement with the EU.

Kiev, meanwhile, is putting the signing on hold and asking for financial compensation from the EU for trade losses due to economic pressure from Russia.

In August, three months before a scheduled deal-signing with the EU, Russia stopped all Ukrainian imports. Seventy-five percent of Ukraine's machine-building production is exported to Russia. Experts say the losses from Moscow's actions could cost up to $2.5bn (£1.53bn) for just the second half of 2013.

"As soon as we reach a level that is comfortable for us, when it meets our interests, when we agree on normal terms, then we will talk about signing," President Viktor Yanukovych told Ukraine's TV channels on Tuesday. He said that he is still planning to go to the summit to explain Ukraine's position.

In Mr Yanukovych's mind, at least, he may not have closed the door on joining the EU. Many observers were surprised by the news that he told Lithuanian President Dalia Grybauskaite in a telephone conversation last week that Russian economic pressure and blackmail is the reason that Kiev cannot sign the agreement.

Every Ukrainian president since the fall of the Soviet Union has found himself on a complicated geopolitical chessboard between East and West. Each has had to decide how to balance and where to lead the second-largest country in Europe - toward Brussels, which is likely to be the best guarantor of Ukraine's long-term economic prosperity and political development, or toward Moscow, to which Ukraine has cultural and historical ties.

While Ukraine's Baltic and Central European neighbours fully realised their ambition to be in the EU, Belarus sought close ties with Russia. Ukraine, by contrast, has still not made its choice. It remains a country on hold.

Its refusal to sign the agreement (combined with departure of President Mikheil Saakashvili in Georgia) likely means the end of the dream of many Western policymakers of a Europe whole and free. It also probably will encourage the Kremlin more assertively to reintegrate the former Soviet space under Russian authoritarian rule, as many in Kremlin believe Europe is in decline and US power around the world is in retreat.

Yanukovych is less afraid of Brussels than of Moscow, one commentator has said "The US always believed that democratic freedoms are universal values and events that happen in Europe influence us," said Kurt Volker, former US ambassador to Nato and now executive director of the McCain Institute of International Leadership in Washington DC. "Ukraine is a part of Europe, and it's important not to allow those who want to separate Ukraine from it to do this."

Ariel Cohen from the Heritage Foundation writes: "It is in the national interest of the United States to prevent Ukraine from becoming a Russian satellite and a key member of a Moscow-dominated sphere of influence. Ukraine is more democratically oriented than Russia. Historically, it has closer ties with Europe; and geopolitically, it can provide a necessary check on Russia's imperial ambitions."

There are several conclusions we can draw from the current status of the EU-Ukraine negotiations:

-Ukrainian leadership may not yet be ready either to democratise the country or integrate Ukraine into European economic and security institutions. However, the Ukrainian population - even in the Russian-speaking east of the country - is increasingly supportive of Ukraine joining the EU.

-Mr Yanukovych, who is supported by less than half the population, wants to ensure he stays in power. Many Ukrainian experts believe that he tried to play off Russia and the EU in order to maximise his chances of re-election in 2015. To achieve this he needs either a successful agreement with the EU, which would broaden his political base, or Russian President Vladimir Putin's help in consolidating his authoritarian rule.

-While Ukraine has for now picked the short-term benefits of improving trade ties with Russia over the long-term benefits of association with Brussels, it still refuses to join Mr Putin's Customs Union, which could lead to further integration with Moscow.

Serhiy Rahmanin of the Ukrainian newspaper Mirror Weekly writes: "Yanukovych is less scared of Brussels than [of] Moscow." Mr Putin wants to build a new USSR, he contends, which would cost Mr Yanukovych real power.

For now Mr Yanukovych will attend the Vilnius gathering this week, where he hopes to discuss possible "three-way consultations" among Ukraine, the EU and Russia, and conduct talks that would be "in the best interests of Ukraine".

Whether EU representatives are prepared to listen after months of frustrating negotiations is another matter.
[/quote]

 

[CougarKing]

How Putin benefits from Ukraine's backing away from the EU...

Reuters

Ukraine holds key to Putin's dream of a new union
Reuters
By Timothy Heritage


MOSCOW (Reuters) - Ukraine's refusal to sign a trade pact drawing it into Europe's orbit marked a victory for Vladimir Putin, winning him time to lure Kiev into a project for a trade and political bloc stretching from the frontiers of China to the edge of the EU.

The Russian president sees his "Eurasian Union", in which Ukraine would play a central role, as a future rival to China, the United States and the European Union. Some say he sees it as the president's personal political legacy - a strong force emerging from the ashes of the old Soviet Union.

"The Eurasian Union is a very important project for Putin. Without Ukraine, he will lose all enthusiasm for it," said Gleb Pavlovsky, a former Kremlin spin doctor who has also worked in Ukraine. "Without Ukraine, Putin's project is impossible."

Putin also hopes to woo several other former Soviet republics that were being courted by EU leaders at a summit in Lithuania on Friday. But none is more important to Putin than Ukraine, a huge market and the cradle of Russian civilization.

(...)

 

[Brad Sallows]

In surprising news, a European country with a long history of being a regional power and occasional global power wishes to continue doing so.  Film at 11.

 

[a_majoor]

How this ends will have long term implications for Russia's ability to remain relevant. Attempting to stand between the EU and Russia is not tenable. If the Ukraine moves to Russia, it strenthens Russian power for a generation, while if the protestors are successful and move to the EU, it will weaken Russia far more than most people probably realize (looking upthread at Russian economic statistics and the questions about Russian demographics don't put them in a good place):

http://www.csmonitor.com/World/Europe/2013/1203/Is-Ukraine-s-unrest-a-new-Orange-Revolution-in-the-making-video

Is Ukraine's unrest a new Orange Revolution in the making? (+video)
Despite parallels to 2004's peaceful democratic revolution, the current upheaval in Kiev is unlikely to settle the EU-Russia tug-of-war over Ukraine.

By Monika Rębała, Contributor, Michał Kacewicz, Contributor / December 3, 2013

WARSAW; AND KIEV, UKRAINE
As protesters dig in to Kiev's Independence Square, establishing barricades of cars, bringing in television monitors, and erecting a small tent city in the heart of Ukraine's pro-European Union demonstrations, there is much talk of forcing the government to change – indeed, of revolution.

With Ukraine's president out of the country and his opponents still boiling with anger, the country's political tensions appeared mired in a standoff as large protest rallies showed no sign of letting up. The opposition lost its attempt to topple the government by parliamentary means when a vote of no-confidence they called failed by a sizeable margin. Protest leaders, however disappointed, vowed to continue their demonstrations. Soon after the vote, about 5,000 protesters gathered outside the presidential administration building, then moved to the capital's central Independence Square, where the crowd grew to more than 10,000, according to police estimates. The opposition called for the parliamentary vote in protest both of President Viktor Yanukovych's shelving of a long-anticipated agreement to deepen political and economic ties with the European Union, and the violent tactics used by police to disperse demonstrators protesting that decision.

"There is no way back," says Volodymyr Sherstiuk of the Ukrainian folk-rock group Kozak System, one of several bands playing on the scene. “People are united and will stay here as long as they have to."

But despite the transformation over the weekend – from simple protest against the government's decision not to sign an association agreement with the EU last week, to hundreds of thousands of Ukrainians calling for the government and president to step down – experts say that current events in Ukraine are not a replay of Ukraine's Orange Revolution.

Though the protests have similarities to the 2004 demonstrations that knocked Ukraine out of Russia's orbit, their outcome is likely to be far less radical, as President Viktor Yanukovych tries to wait out protesters and thread the needle to placate both pro-European forces and Russia.

Revolutionary mood

The current protests are made up of young people who are too young to remember the Orange Revolution, and are still learning how to organize protests. But the 2004 revolution remains a touchstone for their efforts against the government.

“If we don't defeat them, we will have no future here,” says Oleg, one of the young activists at the square.

“I don't belong to any party, I came here to fight with police” in response to their weekend attack on protesters, he adds. “During the Orange Revolution it was different, then there was no aggression. Now people are very angry.”

That anger was fed by the Ukrainian opposition’s failed no-confidence vote earlier in the day, which protesters had hoped would oust Prime Minister Mykola Azarov’s cabinet. But the opposition fell 40 votes short of the mark.

“We've stood here in freezing weather for a few days, and politicians, as usual, let us down,” says Tatiana Marchenk, a student in Kiev.

A different Ukraine

But despite the mood on the streets, analysts say, these protests will not follow the same arc as 2004.

“It's not a second Orange Revolution,” says Pawel Kowal, a chairman of the European Parliament delegation to the EU-Ukraine Parliamentary Cooperation Committee. "It's hard to compare protests in 2004 with what is happening today at [Independence Square] in Kiev."

“The Orange Revolution was a middle-class revolution, was organized by the opposition, and had strong leaders: Yulia Tymoshenko and Viktor Yushchenko. Today, those on the streets are mainly young people and students who gathered there spontaneously to protest against Yanukovych and his government,” Mr. Kowal adds.

At the same time, Mr. Yanukovych's political support among Ukraine's southern and eastern regions, which are more pro-Russia, may be ebbing. Though the country's Russian-speaking regions are unhappy about integration with the EU, those regions are not coming out for Yanukovych the way they did during the Orange Revolution.

“Yanukovych is losing active support – during the Orange Revolution we saw many people on the streets in the eastern part of the country," particularly in his native, industrial region of Donetsk,” says Ievgen Vorobiov, a Ukrainian analyst at the Polish Institute of International Affairs in Warsaw." But today, this is a very rare sight."

“Many people are disappointed with him," says Rostyslav Kramar, a political analyst at the University of Warsaw and a Ukrainian. "He promised a lot but economic and social conditions didn't improve during his presidency, thousands or even millions of Ukrainians have been forced to look for jobs abroad.”

Even Yanukovych's party is not a monolith now – a few people left the party since the protests began. The governor of Donetsk has backed protesters in Kiev. And students from Donetsk wrote a public letter in the Ukrainian language to students in Lviv – a major city in pro-EU western Ukraine – in which they proclaimed their desire to walk through the EU's doors with their western peers. These kind of gestures would have been hard to imagine during the Orange Revolution, says Dr. Kramar.

Yanukovych's next move

The EU has emphasized that its door remains open to Ukraine, and that Yanukovych is welcome to sign the agreement at a planned EU-Ukraine summit in the spring. But “he has to act more quickly, if he wants to be ready on time," warns Kowal. "In the latter half of the next year it will be too late, because we will have elections for the European Parliament" – pulling the EU's focus away from Ukraine – "and in 2015 Ukrainians will choose a new president,” further delaying a deal.

Kramar says the most likely scenario is that Yanukovych will stay in power, but his prime minister, Mr. Azorov, will be forced to resign. “Yanukovych's main goal is to win elections in 2015. He will do everything to achieve this goal, even sacrifice his ministers and impose Russian standards in Ukraine, if that will help him to win an electoral contest.”

Yanukovych has already started his campaign, Mr. Vorobiov says, pointing to the president's decision to travel to China today despite the situation in Kiev. "He wants to show that nothing serious is really happening and everything is under control.”

Kramar thinks that in the coming months the protests in Ukraine will lose momentum. “People can't protest on the street forever, the winter is coming and so are the holidays. I'm afraid that the opposition will lose some power and vigor, and Yanukovych will play for time. He won't impose any radical changes and reforms in the country.”

And Yanukovych will likely try to keep his options open with both the EU and Russia, Vorobiov adds. “Yanukovych will go to Brussels soon and probably promise to sign some kind of agreement with the EU to neutralize the opposition," and “later he will visit Moscow and try to negotiate better trade arrangements with Putin.”

Escalation?

And while some protesters have taken to calling the president "bloody Viktor" after the police's violent attacks over the weekend, experts say that it doesn't seem that Yanukovych will decide to use force against protesters again.

But still, they note, there is cause for concern.

“It seems like [Yanukovych] looks through Eastern not Western politician's glasses now,” says Kramar. “If we look at Russia or other countries in the region, military solution is not something unusual.”

“It is a bad sign that many policemen from the Berkut special unit are very close to the square,” adds Vorobiov. Anti-government groups accuse the Berkut riot police of using intimidation to suppress protests.

But if Yanukovych uses force, he will be totally isolated in the West and will have no other choice than become a vassal of Moscow.

“People are determined to fight, it doesn't look like they will give up easily,” says Kramar. “Everything depends on a political solution being worked out in the coming days. If politicians don't satisfy the protesters, I would not rule out a military solution.”

 

[Lightguns]

What if the Russians sent two ships. 

http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-2533846/Battle-stations-Navy-scrambles-destroyer-challenge-Russian-warship-British-coast-takes-24-hours-make-600-mile-journey-Portsmouth-base-Putin-testing-response-time.html#ixzz2pZG9Gslw

 

[MilEME09]

What if the Russians sent two ships. 

http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-2533846/Battle-stations-Navy-scrambles-destroyer-challenge-Russian-warship-British-coast-takes-24-hours-make-600-mile-journey-Portsmouth-base-Putin-testing-response-time.html#ixzz2pZG9Gslw

24 hours is a long time, and a black eye to the Royal navy in my opinion, a ship loaded with land attack cruise missiles could cause a lot of damage and be gone in 24 hours. Though from the article it sounds like the RAF was on top of things at least. With decreasing Western military budgets Russia seems to be taking full advantage to push their capabilities and test response times of the west. I wonder if this will become business as usual in the North Sea, similarly to how Russian aircraft have to be intercepted in the arctic frequently?

 

[Robert0288]

Definitely a black eye for the navy, but in all honesty the RAF could have sunk the thing extremely quickly compared the the naval response time.

In other news:
http://www.defensenews.com/article/20140106/DEFREG01/301060017/Russia-s-Navy-Buy-40-New-Vessels

Russia's Navy To Buy 40 New Vessels
WARSAW — With the aim of modernizing and overhauling its fleet, the Russian Navy plans to acquire 40 new vessels in 2014, said Rear Adm. Viktor Bursuk, the Navy’s deputy commander.

The procured vessels will include a Borey-class nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarine, a Varshavyanka diesel-electric submarine and the search-and-rescue ship Igor Belousov, Bursuk told local news agency RIA Novosti.

The admiral, who is responsible for the Navy’s arms procurements, said that at least two diesel-electric submarines are to be added to the Black Sea fleet. The Navy already operates two Borey-class submarines.

Bursuk did not disclose the value of the planned acquisitions.

The procurements will be part of Russia’s plan to spend US $650 billion on new arms and military equipment for its armed forces by 2020.

In December, Russian President Vladimir Putin said that strengthening the Navy’s presence in the Arctic is one of Russia’s top defense priorities for the future. The announcement was made at a meeting of the Russian Defense Ministry’s board.

 

[a_majoor]

Given the Russian economy is about the size of Italy's, we should be wondering how they can afford this and if this buying spree is sustainable.

We should also wonder why with the size of our economy we cant afford to procure a few basic things like combat boots and trucks in a reasonable amount of time (much less ships and aircraft).

 

[57Chevy]

Quote from article above;
"Putin said that strengthening the Navy’s presence in the Arctic is one of Russia’s top defense priorities for the future"

Perhaps it's time to consider adding a section to The Rangers.

:sarcasm:

 

[Retired AF Guy]

What if the Russians sent two ships. 

http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-2533846/Battle-stations-Navy-scrambles-destroyer-challenge-Russian-warship-British-coast-takes-24-hours-make-600-mile-journey-Portsmouth-base-Putin-testing-response-time.html#ixzz2pZG9Gslw

Depending on its home port (NORFLT or BALFLT) you would have thought that either Norway or Denmark would have passed on info of its transit.

 

[Journeyman]

Depending on its home port (NORFLT or BALFLT) you would have thought that either Norway or Denmark would have passed on info of its transit.

The article did note that ".....as the Russian ship retreated. They followed it north to the Baltic Sea, where a Russian task force was on legitimate manoeuvres."  I'd guess its transit was reported as part of the "legitimate" group, then breaking off further out to sea. 

But then, making an assessment based on one newspaper article (UK Daily Mail at that) is a gutsy move.  :dunno:

 

[a_majoor]

The interesting thing about this is while the economic decline is observable, the reason for the decline is hotly debated. I would suspect that a very strong factor would be the extreme centralization of the Russian economy, with a great many resources misallocated due to crony and State capitalism.

http://nextbigfuture.com/2014/01/russia-is-losing-sources-of-economic.html

Russia Is Losing Sources of Economic Growth and like Brazil and India has stagflation

Anders Aslund of the Peterson Institute for International Economics has written about the problems that Russia has generating economic growth

The annual Gaidar Forum, held last week in Moscow, is a good occasion to assess the country's economic state of affairs. Russia's economy and politics are marked by what optimists call stability and what pessimists call stagnation.

Prime Minister Dmitry Medvedev claimed that Russia's economic growth sources have been exhausted, and he introduced the idea of Russia being in a "middle-income trap," drawing on an academic paper by the Berkeley Professor Barry Eichengreen. Medvedev was concerned with the sudden slowdown in economic growth, which is common to countries that have reached middle incomes, such as Russia and Brazil.

Sensibly, Medvedev emphasized that the causes were primarily domestic in nature. Russia risks losing out when competing with more advanced economies because of insufficient institutions and high costs in less developed economies. It needs to improve the quality of its labor, management, health care, pension system and, most of all, its institutions. Yet as usual, Medvedev ended with only minor proposals for improvement, notably in the business environment.

First Deputy Chair of the Central Bank of Russia Ksenia Yudayeva claimed that Russia, like India and Brazil, had entered "stagflation," as the West did in the 1970s. Their economic growth was declining, while inflation was rising.

Economic Development Minister Alexei Ulyukayev opened the forum with a daring programmatic speech. Russia now seemed stuck at an annual growth rate of no more than 2.5 percent, while the rest of the world was set to grow at 3.5 percent. He focused on two factors to boost growth. Russia's investment of 21 percent of gross domestic product needed to increase to the savings rate of 30 percent of GDP. The other factor was to promote supply by improving Russia's institutions in several ways.

Corruption was discussed in multiple panels, but only as a low-level problem of doing business rather than as top-level larceny. The obvious solution is to discipline big state corporations, privatize them, and liberalize their markets. But everyone realizes that this is not possible under the current regime, which favors economically harmful state corporations.

 

[pbi]

How this ends will have long term implications for Russia's ability to remain relevant. Attempting to stand between the EU and Russia is not tenable. If the Ukraine moves to Russia, it strenthens Russian power for a generation, while if the protestors are successful and move to the EU, it will weaken Russia far more than most people probably realize (looking upthread at Russian economic statistics and the questions about Russian demographics don't put them in a good place):

http://www.csmonitor.com/World/Europe/2013/1203/Is-Ukraine-s-unrest-a-new-Orange-Revolution-in-the-making-video

I don't see how Russia can let this situation go south (no pun intended...) It would mean that they were then flanked on all three sides (less the East) by pro-Western countries (I don't count Belarus, which as far as I can tell is a Russian "Mini-Me".) It would also (and perhaps more critically) deny them access to the port use agreement by which, AFAIK, they are still able to sustain a Black Sea Fleet.

As much as I bet Putin really, really doesn't want a detraction from the Potemkin village that is Sochi, my money is on a military intervention if the anti-Russian crowd actually seizes power. The pretexts will be variations on one or more of the usual that Russia has trotted out in the past: "fraternal" assistance to the legally elected govt of the Ukraine against Western-controlled rebels; protection of ethnic Russians in east Ukraine, etc, etc.

 

[Journeyman]

..... doesn't want a detraction from the Potemkin village that is Sochi...

:rofl:  Nice.

If nothing else, I think the Russians tend to have a better grasp on time.  I suspect that 'Sochi being wonderful' will trump pretty much anything else; whatever happens in Ukraine will go uncontested (except hand-wringing within Pravda) because Russia can wait to deal with them.  After the Olympics, all bets are off.


ps - I think Belarus is worse than a Russian "Mini-Me" in that they're just as xenophobic, but living in Russia's shadow they have a "small man" neurosis tacked onto it.


Edit: punctuation

 

[vonGarvin]

Most of Ukraine isn't protesting, especially east of Kiev. That side is very amenable to closer ties to Russia than to the EU. 
As for Belarus, aren't they more Russian than the Russians?

 

[pbi]

Most of Ukraine isn't protesting, especially east of Kiev. That side is very amenable to closer ties to Russia than to the EU. 
As for Belarus, aren't they more Russian than the Russians?

That's always been my impression. They want Stalin to come back: Putin is too much of a Westernized wussy for them.

But, seriously, you raise a good point about East-West Ukraine division. One wonders if there is a Yugo-style civil war on the horizon. Which will, of course, only further guarantee that Moscow will send in the Cossacks.

 

[a_majoor]

Russia as a Potemkin Village. So long as people remain dazzled by the external appearance, or need the backing of a supposedly Great Power for diplomatic purposes, Russia can continue to pull off the Great Power act. The economic foundation is crumbling, and Russia's social foundations have been unmoored for at least a generation:

http://www.the-american-interest.com/blog/2014/02/21/putins-achilles-heel/

Putin’s Achilles Heel

Give Putin some credit: He has put together an impressive spectacle in Sochi. But while the world’s attention is focused on Kiev and the billion-dollar show in the Caucasus, Russia’s economy as a whole is slowly falling apart. Capital flight is accelerating, and the ruble has fallen by 8.1 percent this year and 1.7 percent in the past week alone. Only the Argentinian peso is doing worse.

Russia was also forced to cancel three debt auctions in four weeks due to weak demand and high yields. The markets have cast a skeptical eye on Putin’s policies, particularly his decision to pledge $15 billion in aid to Ukraine so soon after dropping nearly three times that amount on Sochi. As one analyst told Bloomberg:

“The meddling with Ukraine certainly hurts Russia’s image as an investment destination,” David Hauner, a fixed-income and currency strategist at Bank of America Corp., said in a telephone interview from London. “It is not going to bankrupt Russia, but $15 billion can turn out to be $50 billion, and Russia will have to plug the holes for a couple years.”

Another analyst noted that the trouble in Ukraine was hurting Russia’s image in the markets:

“From a psychological standpoint, Ukraine’s problems affect foreign investors’ perception of Russia,” Vladimir Bragin, head of research at Alfa Capital in Moscow, said in a telephone interview. “In their eyes, the first reaction is to sell Russia, cut risks. It’s in Russia’s interests that the situation stabilizes” in Ukraine.

Putin’s foreign policy successes will be hard to replicate in the economic sphere, where he can’t count on Western fecklessness or incompetence to bail him out. Russia’s economic troubles are the consequence of his failure to lead an effective economic transformation over the past two decades.

Imagine if Putin had been able to develop a track record like the Chinese Communists over the past 20 years. Russia would be in far better shape than it is today and would likely have the money to devote to both Sochi and Ukraine without spooking the markets. But he hasn’t, and he doesn’t appear likely to do so in the future.

Russia’s failure is not about democracy, transparency, or corruption. China has galloping corruption and little democracy or transparency, but it has still managed to pursue a successful development path. Putin’s Russia hasn’t, and now it’s paying the price.

 

[a_majoor]

Magic Realism as a metaphor for Russia's political class. The striking contrast between the reality (a GDP the size of Italy and a per capita GDP similar to that of the Barbados) and the aspiration to regain Great Power or even Superpower status is going to ba a source of long term problems given Russia's xenophobic culture and the lingering sense of bitterness from their defeat in the Cold War:

http://www.the-american-interest.com/articles/2014/02/14/russias-political-magical-realism/

Russia’s Political Magical Realism
AUREL BRAUN
The glitter of the Sochi spectacle hides the reality of an empire in decline. Is Putin’s profligacy hastening Russia’s nosedive?

Published on February 14, 2014
Visitors who have braved the threat of terrorism and shelled out big bucks for airfare, hotels, and event tickets at the Sochi Olympics are getting something for their money: lavish ceremonies, world-class athletic competition, architecturally striking sporting venues, and spectacular vistas from the slopes. President Putin undoubtedly views the grandeur of these Olympics, by far the most costly in history, as a testimony to the greatness of Russia and a sign of its return to the commanding center of the international system. The irony is that Sochi reflects not what is great about Russia but much of what is fundamentally wrong with it.

The Sochi Olympics are emblematic of a perilous political distortion in Russia. Let’s call it “political magical realism,” after the literary technique used so successfully by writers like Gabriel Garcia Marquez. In the political context, this approach entails evading problems by retreating into fantasy rather than finding solutions for them. Some of the hallmarks of this approach are President Putin’s highly publicized, thoroughly ridiculous staged feats of personal strength, underwater archaeology, and wildlife rescues. The policy manifestations of this approach are Russia’s grandiose domestic projects and manic international activities, highlighted by political subversion of the judiciary, anti-gay laws, the prosecution of political opponents, and electoral malfeasance. The country, including now a large and seething opposition, are thus left to face a bizarre mix of the repressive and the risible.

None of this is to deny that Russia has the potential to climb out of this morass. Blessed with enormous natural resources and a talented, well-educated population, it still has the ability to become a successful modern state. Note that this is not about superpower restoration—a Putinite delusion. (Russia’s well documented demographic problems preclude this.) Rather, it is about Russia’s potential to become another Japan or Germany.(Interpolation: this is the best case scenario in the post Putin environment)

Russia remains weighed down by an uncompetitive uni-dimensional economy whose only viable exports are energy and armaments. The Kremlin’s unconscionable waste of Russia’s entrepreneurial energy, scientific talent, and national wealth have left the country with a nominal GDP equivalent to Italy (but without its international competitiveness and diversity) and a per capita GDP approximating that of Barbados.

Corruption in Russia remains not only endemic, but cannibalistic. Business law offers little protection, particularly to foreign investors, and the outflow of funds usually far exceeds incoming capital and investments. Putin has centralized corruption rather than reducing itPutin has centralized corruption rather than reducing it. Transparency International’s Corruption Perception Index ranks Russia 127th out of 174 countries.

Nonetheless Putin’s government continues to be driven by seemingly limitless domestic and international ambitions. With a stagnant economy that will likely come under increasing stress over the next few years, Russia is witnessing the yawning gap between the Kremlin’s unrestrained imperial ambitions and its true capacity transform into a treacherous gulf.

To be sure, Russia has enjoyed some seeming international successes. For example, Putin appears to have outmaneuvered President Obama and saved Russia’s Syrian client, Bashar al-Assad. Moscow also succeeded in bullying Ukraine into dropping its promise to sign the (Eastern Partnership) association agreement with the European Union and setting out on a path to join the Russian controlled Eurasian (Customs) Union. But as with many things involving Russia, here too appearances are deceiving.

In Syria, the Russian-brokered chemical weapons agreement with Syria could be called a “one percent solution” (as 99 percent of those who have died have been killed by conventional weapons); the fighting continues unabated and the situation has grown more unstable over time. There is also continuing friction between Moscow and Washington over the Kremlin’s support for Iran, its pressure on Ukraine and over its apparent violation of the 1987 treaty on intermediate-range nuclear forces. All of these may be coaxing the Obama Administration to take tougher measures against the Kremlin.

Further, Russian support for sordid dictatorships presents long-term risks—and not just risks to its reputation. In protecting the Iranian regime and thus facilitating its nuclear weapons ambitions, Moscow may find itself confronting a nuclear Iran whose missiles could just as easily reach the Russian capital as they could Israel. Associations with Belarus and support for Assad also impose heavy economic costs. In the case of Ukraine, the weakness and ineptness of the Yanukovych government could cause Russia’s expensive hegemonic plans there to unravel.

In light of all of these problems, the Sochi Olympics looks like nothing more than an absurdly lavish party, a fantasy that Russia can ill afford. After the Olympic torch goes dark and the euphoria of the games dissipates, the Kremlin will still have to face the cold reality of its failure to transform Russia into a modern state.

Aurel Braun is visiting professor in the Department of Government at Harvard University. He is also Professor of International Relations and Political Science at the University of Toronto. His latest book is NATO-Russia Relations in the Twenty-First Century.