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Russia in the 21st Century [Superthread]

Thucydides said:
...a GDP the size of Italy...
Which makes it a top ten GDP in the world.
According to the United Nations Statistics Division, it is 8th largest in the world (after the US, China, Japan, Germany, France, the UK and Brazil).
According to the IMF, it is 8th as well (after the US, China, Japan, Germany, France, the UK and Brazil: the same as the UN Stats Division)
Same listing according to the world bank and the CIA world fact book.

(Interestingly, the EU is ahead of the USA in GDP, as an aside)

Also, let's not forget that Russia works by Russia's rules, not by ours.  And GDP isn't all it takes to succeed. 

 
Indeed, but having fiscal resources is very important to acheive your goals. To act as a Superpower (the Putinite dream), then you need access to superpower levels of financial capability. Given the relatively limited financial capabilities, plus the declining manpower, Russia will have to make some very hard choices about where to actually deploy the resources.

Russia becoming a new "Japan" or "Germany" is a very achievable goalithin its resource envelope.

Of course to use these resources effectively, there will have to be a huge shift in Russian "culture", including developing independent and relatively "clean" institutions (rather than centralized corruption).
 
They've turned the corner on their declining population.  Of course, its effect won't be felt for a decade or so.
But...its debt is only 11% of its GDP, whereas the U.S.'s is about 101%.
You keep talking as though Russia is about to collapse.  It's far from it, its economy is growing, and Putin has international clout, such as it is.
And he was able to mass a combined arms army on Ukraine's border, with over 800 tanks. He has power and we'd be daft to brush him off as impotent.
 
Look at the economic disaster that is Ukraine.The previous government spent the country into the ground.Which is why they need EU money.The Russian economy cannot carry the Ukraine without damaging its own shaky economy which is why I think Putin will be satisfied with the Crimea.

http://www.theglobeandmail.com/globe-debate/canada-has-a-role-to-play-in-ukraines-future/article17131989/
 
I agree with the article but rather than seeing the "informal economy" as a problem to be solved by technocrats (Gawd how I detest that word) I would see that as the foundation of a proto-capitalist society.  I would not be worrying about raising taxes from the broke and starving.  I would be encouraging them to convert and build the informal economy, through support to small and medium businesses, into a productive economy that can be taxed.

Ukraine needs short term financing.  It can't wait for the IMF to get its act together, and frankly the IMF terms seldom give comfort to any but the lenders.

Canada can afford to carry some of the bill as a bilateral loan.  The same is true for Britain, the US and Germany.

 
This latest crisis also bumped the price of NG, which helps Russia as it sells to Europe.
 
Is this the sort of thinking behind the actions of the Russian "elites"?

http://www.nationalreview.com/article/372353/eurasianist-threat-robert-zubrin#!

The Eurasianist Threat
Putin’s ambitions extend far beyond Ukraine.

ByRobert Zubrin
The National Bolshevik Party flag flies near a statue of Lenin.

As the Putin regime invades Ukraine, it has become apparent that a new force for evil has emerged in Moscow. It is essential that Americans become aware of the nature of the threat.

Putin is sometimes described as a revanchist, seeking to recreate the Soviet Union. That is a useful shorthand, but it is not really accurate. Putin and many of his gang may have once been Communists, but they are not that today. Rather, they have embraced a new totalitarian political ideology known as “Eurasianism.”

The roots of Eurasianism go back to czarist émigrés interacting with fascist thinkers in between-the-wars France and Germany. But in recent years, its primary exponent has been the very prominent and prolific political theorist Aleksandr Dugin.

Born in 1962, Dugin was admitted to the Moscow Aviation Institute in 1979, but then was expelled because of his involvement with mystic neo-Nazi groups. He then spent the Eighties hanging around monarchist and ultra-right-wing circles, before joining for a while​ Gennady Ziuganov’s Communist Party of the Russian Federation (CPRF, a neo-Stalinist group partially descended from, but not to be confused with, the previously ruling Communist Party of the Soviet Union, CPSU), after which he became a founder and chief ideologue of the Eurasianist National Bolshevik Party (NBP) in 1994.

Nazism, it will be recalled, was an abbreviation for National Socialism. National Bolshevism, therefore, put itself forth as an ideology that relates to National Socialism in much the same way as Bolshevism relates to Socialism. This open self-identification with Nazism is also shown clearly in the NBP flag, which looks exactly like a Nazi flag, with a red background surrounding a white circle, except that the black swastika at the center is replaced by a black hammer and sickle.

Dugin ran for the Duma on the NBP ticket in 1995, but got only 1 percent of the vote. So, switching tactics, he abandoned the effort to build his own splinter party and instead adopted the more productive strategy of becoming the idea man for all the bigger parties, including Putin’s United Russia, Ziuganov’s CPRF, and Vladimir Zhirinovsky’s ultranationalist Liberal Democratic Party of Russia. In this role he has succeeded brilliantly.

The core idea of Dugin’s Eurasianism is that “liberalism” (by which is meant the entire Western consensus) represents an assault on the traditional hierarchical organization of the world. Repeating the ideas of Nazi theorists Karl Haushofer, Rudolf Hess, Carl Schmitt, and Arthur Moeller van der Bruck, Dugin says that this liberal threat is not new, but is the ideology of the maritime cosmopolitan power “Atlantis,” which has conspired to subvert more conservative land-based societies since ancient times. Accordingly, he has written books in which he has reconstructed the entire history of the world as a continuous battle between these two factions, from Rome v. Carthage to Russia v. the Anglo Saxon “Atlantic Order,” today. If Russia is to win this fight against the subversive oceanic bearers of such “racist” (because foreign-imposed) ideas as human rights, however, it must unite around itself all the continental powers, including Germany, Central and Eastern Europe, the former Soviet republics, Turkey, Iran, and Korea, into a grand Eurasian Union strong enough to defeat the West.

In order to be so united, this Eurasian Union will need a defining ideology, and for this purpose Dugin has developed a new “Fourth Political Theory” combining all the strongest points of Communism, Nazism, Ecologism, and Traditionalism, thereby allowing it to appeal to the adherents of all of these diverse anti-liberal creeds. He would adopt Communism’s opposition to free enterprise. However, he would drop the Marxist commitment to technological progress, a liberal-derived ideal, in favor of Ecologism’s demagogic appeal to stop the advance of industry and modernity. From Traditionalism, he derives a justification for stopping free thought. All the rest is straight out of Nazism, ranging from legal theories justifying unlimited state power and the elimination of individual rights, to the need for populations “rooted” in the soil, to weird gnostic ideas about the secret origin of the Aryan race in the North Pole.

The open devotion to Nazism is Dugin’s thought is remarkable. In his writings he celebrates the Waffen SS, murderers of millions of Russians during the war, as an ideal organization. He also approves of the most extreme crimes of Communism, going so far as to endorse the horrific 1937 purges that killed, among numerous other talented and loyal Soviet citizens, nearly the entire leadership of the Red Army — something that Stalin himself later had second thoughts about.

What Russia needs, says Dugin, is a “genuine, true, radically revolutionary and consistent, fascist fascism.” On the other hand, “Liberalism, is an absolute evil. . . . Only a global crusade against the U.S., the West, globalization, and their political-ideological expression, liberalism, is capable of becoming an adequate response. . . . The American empire should be destroyed.”

This is the ideology behind the Putin regime’s “Eurasian Union” project. It is to this dark program, which threatens not only the prospects for freedom in Ukraine and Russia, but the peace of the world, that former Ukrainian president Victor Yanukovych tried to sell “his” country. It is against this program that the courageous protesters in the Maidan took their stand and — with scandalously little help from the West — somehow miraculously prevailed. But now the chips are really down. The Ukrainians are being faced not with riot police, but with Russian divisions, subversion, and economic warfare. The country needs to be stabilized, and defended. The Ukrainians deserve our full support — and not just for reasons of sympathy for those resisting tyranny or respect for the brave. It is in the vital interest of America that freedom triumphs in Ukraine.

Without Ukraine, Dugin’s fascist Eurasian Union project is impossible, and sooner or later Russia itself will have to join the West and become free, leaving only a few despised and doomed islands of tyranny around the globe. But with Ukraine underfoot, the Eurasianists’ program can and will proceed, and a new Iron Curtain will fall into place imprisoning a large fraction of humanity in the grip of a monstrous totalitarian power that will become the arsenal of evil around the world for decades to come. That means another Cold War, trillions of dollars wasted on arms, accelerated growth of the national-security state at home, repeated proxy conflicts costing millions of lives abroad, and civilization itself placed at risk should a single misstep in the endless insane great-power game precipitate the locked and loaded confrontation into a thermonuclear exchange.

The 20th century saw three great-power confrontations. Two of them turned into total war. We lucked out on the third. Do we really want to roll those dice again? We will have to, unless the Eurasianist program is stopped.

The stakes in Ukraine could not be higher.

— Robert Zubrin is president of Pioneer Energy and the author of Energy Victory. The paperback edition of his latest book, Merchants of Despair: Radical Environmentalists, Criminal Pseudo-Scientists, and the Fatal Cult of Antihumanism, has just been published by Encounter Books.
 
Deserved to be in a Russia thread, but there isn't enough information for its own.

Apparently a 100MW power plant in Novokuznetsk exploded yesterday, looks like it supplied power to a town of about 550,000 people as well as being home to metal industries.  On the bright side, its non-nuclear.

http://englishrussia.com/2014/03/07/an-explosion-at-novokuznetsk-power-plant/#more-141118
http://www.liveleak.com/view?i=89f_1394272050&utm_source=dlvr.it&utm_medium=twitter
http://investing.businessweek.com/research/stocks/private/snapshot.asp?privcapId=33227215
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Novokuznetsk
 
Russian nationalism raises some disturbing questions about what sort of future Vladimir Putin is setting for Russia, and what sort of state it is evolving into:

http://www.the-american-interest.com/articles/2014/03/14/putins-nationalist-gamble/

Putin’s Nationalist Gamble

Raymond Sontag

In justifying his intervention in Crimea with a duty to defend Russians abroad, Putin is fueling the destructive fire of nationalism. It could be Russia’s undoing.

Published on March 14, 2014

On the eve of Moscow’s incursion into Crimea, the Kremlin mouthpiece Izvestia ran a headline declaring “A Majority of Russians Consider Crimea Russian Territory”. Curiously, though, the article that followed was not about Russia needing to grab territory, but rather about its struggle to hold the territory it has. According to a recent poll, the paper wrote, while 56 percent believe Crimea is Russian land, only about 40 percent consider Russia’s predominantly Muslim regions of Chechnya and Dagestan to be such. Existing state borders, it seems, mean little to Russians’ ideas of what constitutes Russia.

This fact may embolden the country’s leaders to occupy foreign territory, but it also scares them. Izvestia called this failure to accept ethnic minorities as countrymen the “single greatest danger to the Russian state’s integrity”. In this, it echoed Vladimir Putin’s recent campaign to promote a civic national identity as opposed to one based on ethnicity. “Nationalists must remember that by calling into question our multi-ethnic character… we will begin to destroy ourselves” he warned recently. “In order to maintain the nation’s unity, people must develop a civic identity on the basis of shared values.”

In justifying his intervention in Crimea with a duty to defend Russians or Russian-speakers abroad, though, Putin has fueled the destructive fire of nationalism that his civic-identity campaign is meant to combat. If Russians conceive of their country in ethnic terms, why should minorities and the regions they dominate be part of that country? And why should predominantly ethnic Russian regions in other countries not be part of that state? A Russia that defines itself in ethnic terms will be unable to integrate territories in the North Caucasus peacefully and will be more likely to look at lands beyond its borders as rightfully its own.

Many have dismissed both Putin’s civic-identity campaign and his commitment to Russians abroad as cynical ploys meant only to serve immediate political needs. Indeed, Putin until now has shown little interest in ethnicity, ideology or identity, largely ignoring Russians abroad and dismissing the search for a national idea that many pundits and politicians engage in as an “ancient Russian game”. But Putin’s motivations and sincerity are beside the point. The dangerous nationalist tendencies he claims to combat at home are real even if he does not recognize or care how his actions abroad exacerbate those tendencies.

An Old Problem

Russia’s worsening interethnic relations do seem to have captured Putin’s attention before his latest adventures in Ukraine. According to the Levada polling firm the number of people who support the idea that “Russia is for [ethnic] Russians” – a favorite slogan among right-wing groups – grew from 55 percent to 66 percent between 2002 and 2013, while the proportion who oppose the phrase as “true fascism” declined from 28 percent to 19 percent. Similarly, over that period the number of people who said they “felt hostility toward people of different nationalities” grew from 12 percent to 20 percent. As a 2013 government report noted, “post-Soviet Russia has a crisis of civic identity, ethnic intolerance, separatism and terrorism, as a result of which there is a danger of society disintegrating.” To combat this, the report proposes a $186-million, 6-year program to “strengthen the unity of the Russian Federation’s multinational people”. Putin has devoted considerable attention to this problem, making it the focus of his 2013-state of the-nation address.

The problem of forming a common identity out of myriad ethnicities and managing ethnic Russian nationalism is, of course, not new for Russia. The Soviet Union faced the same challenge and it was ultimately a resurgence of ethnic nationalisms that broke that country apart. Putin’s civic-identity campaign, in fact, borrows heavily from Soviet nationalities policy: It is based largely on opposition to Western liberalism; it seeks to preserve and promote the country’s various ethnic cultures while uniting them in a larger community; it emphasizes protecting the state and the ethnic group and deemphasizes the rights of the individual; and it seeks simultaneously to temper ethnic Russian nationalism and harness it as a uniting force. “For centuries, Russia developed as a multi-ethnic nation” Putin said in his 2012 state-of-the-nation address, “a civilization-state bonded by the [ethnic] Russian people, Russian language and Russian culture native for all of us, uniting us and preventing us from dissolving in this diverse world.”

Whereas the Soviet Union could build an identity around Marxism-Leninism, Putin’s Russia lacks any such unifying ideas. He has offered as ideology a brand of conservatism that emphasizes defending “traditional values” against Western political and cultural encroachment, with opposition to same-sex partnerships and efforts to promote democracy around the world featuring prominently. He presents this conservatism as a philosophy of national salvation from forces that would overturn the traditional order, explaining it by quoting the twentieth-century anti-revolutionary philosopher Nikolai Berdyaev: “The point of conservatism is not that it prevents movement forward and upward, but that it prevents movement backward and downward, into chaotic darkness and a return to a primitive state.” But while the Kremlin has assigned reading and organized seminars for government officials in an effort to develop this ideology, it still largely lacks positive values and is primarily reactive. Putin is far longer on what he opposes than what he is for.

Can’t Have It Both Ways

The crisis in Ukraine has shown the promise, limits and dangers of Putin’s ideology. On the one hand, the idea of defending the beleaguered people of Crimea from Western encroachment has been a powerful and popular message within Russia. On the other hand, official language on the subject veers quickly into ethnic Russian nationalism, with no real appeal to common values. Putin’s rhetoric on Ukraine is, in fact, another attempt to harness ethnic Russian nationalism without embracing it. He has tried to avoid mention of ethnic Russians when discussing motivations for intervening, instead pointing to a duty to protect “Russian-speaking populations”. Russian language, something common to all Russia’s citizens, seems like safer ground than ethnicity for building support for military action abroad. Further down the Kremlin’s propaganda vertical, though, this distinction becomes muddled.

The country’s main television channel this week, for example, described a large protest in Stavropol as being in “defense of [ethnic] Russians and Russian-speaking citizens of Ukraine”. That a protest in Stavropol, a city in the diverse and restive North Caucasus, would focus on protecting ethnic Russians is notable and troubling. Interethnic tensions have been most destructive in this part of the country and checking separatist movements there is a primary objective of the civic-identity campaign. If, encouraged by Moscow, people in the North Caucasus are taking to the streets to defend the rights of ethnic Russians, what chance do efforts to build peace and unity through common civic values have? In his drive for Crimea, Putin is undermining one of the great projects of his presidency: keeping regions such as Chechnya and Dagestan within Russia.

Moscow’s expansion of power in Ukraine weakens its power in the North Caucasus not only because of the separatist precedent it sets, but because of what it says about how the country sees itself: as “Russia for Russians” and not a multinational people. Putin has kept the North Caucasus under control through force and massive spending, a policy that has spawned one of Russian nationalists’ favorite slogans: “Enough Feeding the Caucasus!” Money and lives spent in the North Caucasus alienates the rest of Russia from that part of the country, necessitating that more lives and resources be spent to hold on to it. Failure to build a real sense of national unity means that Russia’s colonial project within its own borders will have to continue until the will and means to fight are exhausted. The idea of Russia ultimately paying a high price at home for its actions in Ukraine may well please American politicians and pundits eager to see Putin punished. But Russia losing control of the North Caucasus would likely be disastrous for the outside world.

Raymond Sontag received his doctorate in politics from the University of Oxford in 2011. He previously served as the program officer for the National Democratic Institute's political party program in Moscow.
 
Putin is nothing if not astute. He knows what ancient buttons to push in the Russian psyche, and how to exploit what seem to me to be the narrow-minded, suspicious, xenophobic/paranoid attitudes of the average citizen. (Kind of like a Russian version of the Tea Party...)

All he has to do is say "those Western devils and their lackies the (insert despised ethnic minority here) are threatening Mother Russia! They will force us all to be gay liberals, and to wear clothes that were made after 1978!!"

Then the usual gang of skin-heads, neo-fascists, bemedalled veterans and leather jacketed, slightly overweight men with bad haircuts take to the streets and kick it up a notch.

OK, now I'm indulging in stereotyping.... >:D

Even Stalin and his gang resorted to this nationalism in WWII: when things when bad, he made an emotional and deeply traditional appeal to Russians as Russians, not as internationalist Communists. After all: look at what they called WWII: "The Great Patriotic War of The Fatherland".
 
http://p.washingtontimes.com/news/2014/mar/6/putin-has-transformed-russian-army-into-a-lean-mea/?page=all

Good read on Russia's new military mobility. This talk of how weak Russia's economy and what not isn't valid IMO. For one the Wests economy is crumbling, the US is trillions in debt, American society is filled with violence and crime and corruption also(maybe not as much as Russia, but very close), and the EU isn't strong IMO. Not to mention if we continue aggressive measures on Russia, then I guarantee  China will side with Russia damaging everyones economy. Gas would need to come from somewhere else not to mention all the other resources Europe gets from Russia. The Russian mainland has all the resources and minerals needed to sustain its own war machine for a long time. Underestimating Russian resolve and might are mistakes histories greatest military minds gambled on and lost big time. Its Naive to think the present situation is the basis to which to estimate capabilities.
 
Infantryman2b said:
http://p.washingtontimes.com/news/2014/mar/6/putin-has-transformed-russian-army-into-a-lean-mea/?page=all

... Underestimating Russian resolve and might are mistakes histories greatest military minds gambled on and lost big time...

I agree with what you said here.

Infantryman2b said:
Its Nivea to think the present situation is the basis to which to estimate capabilities.

...But I don't think you meant "Nivea". That is a kind of hand cream.
 
Russia's project seems more and more like reassembling the USSR, or Imperial Russia:

http://hotair.com/archives/2014/03/21/is-putin-making-moves-in-latin-america-too/

Is Putin making moves in Latin America too?
posted at 10:41 am on March 21, 2014 by Bruce McQuain

While everyone is focused on the Ukraine and eastern Europe, Vladimir Putin has also been projecting Russian power into our own backyard:

Away from the conflict in Ukraine, Russian President Vladimir Putin is quietly seeking a foothold in Latin America, military officials warn.

To the alarm of lawmakers and Pentagon officials, Putin has begun sending navy ships and long-range bombers to the region for the first time in years.

Russia’s defense minister says the country is planning bases in Cuba, Venezuela, and Nicaragua, and just last week, Putin’s national security team met to discuss increasing military ties in the region.

“They’re on the march,” Sen. Joe Donnelly (D-Ind.) said at a Senate hearing earlier this month. “They’re working the scenes where we can’t work. And they’re doing a pretty good job.”

Gen. James Kelly, commander of U.S. Southern Command said there has been a “noticeable uptick in Russian power projection and security force personnel” in Latin America.

“It has been over three decades since we last saw this type of high-profile Russian military presence,” Kelly said at the March 13 hearing.

Less obviously, but for a longer time, China too has been establishing a presense in the region:


“In Venezuela, a lot of the money that’s been able to prop up President Chavez and now Maduro has been Chinese money,” Kelly said.

But the push by Russia has implications which can’t be ignored, especially its attempt to establish bases in its old client states when it was the USSR.

Meanwhile, Latin America certainly hasn’t been much of a priority for the US:


According to Sen. Tim Kaine (D-Va.), there are 10 countries in Latin America that currently have no U.S. ambassador because they either haven’t been nominated yet or confirmed, a sign that the region is seen as a low priority.

Another sign of an inept foreign policy. If we don’t move quickly to correct the situation, the outcome is pretty easy to predict:


“We will be losing the ability to influence developments in a region that is very important to us because of proximity,” Rabasa said.

Indeed.  Likely these warning will be waved off as alarmism until it is too late.  And it will then tally as another failure in a long line of foreign policy failures by this administration.
 
Вели́кая Оте́чественная война́
Great Patriotic War.  No need to add "of the fatherland", because "patriotic" implies that.
 
Technoviking said:
Вели́кая Оте́чественная война́
Great Patriotic War.  No need to add "of the fatherland", because "patriotic" implies that.

Спасибо, Господи
 
Putin's upcoming May meeting with Chinese Pres. Xi Jinping should also be something to watch for this year.

Reuters

Putin looks to Asia as West threatens to isolate Russia

By Timothy Heritage and Vladimir Soldatkin

MOSCOW  Fri Mar 21, 2014 6:09am EDT


(Reuters) - When President Vladimir Putin signed a treaty this week annexing Crimea to great fanfare in the Kremlin and anger in the West, a trusted lieutenant was making his way to Asia to shore up ties with Russia's eastern allies.

Forcing home the symbolism of his trip, Igor Sechin gathered media in Tokyo the next day to warn Western governments that more sanctions over Moscow's seizure of the Black Sea peninsula from Ukraine would be counter-productive.

The underlying message from the head of Russia's biggest oil company, Rosneft, was clear: If Europe and the United States isolate Russia, Moscow will look East for new business, energy deals, military contracts and political alliances.

The Holy Grail for Moscow is a natural gas supply deal with China that is apparently now close after years of negotiations. If it can be signed when Putin visits China in May, he will be able to hold it up to show that global power has shifted eastwards and he does not need the West.

(...EDITED)
 
An interesting contrast piece; Russia in pre revolutionary times, photographed in colour. the images are very sharp and colour saturated, being photographed using a 3 plate process, details in the article.

The Final Years of Pre-Soviet Russia, Captured in Glorious Color

http://www.wired.com/rawfile/2014/03/prokudin-gorskii-photos-russia
 
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