Saluting... just curious

[Michael Dorosh]

And that makes Hill 127 an even bigger flight of fancy, since the Canadians left France in September 1944 and fought in Belgium, then Holland in October thru February, then briefly in Germany on both sides of the Rhine, then Holland, then Germany again.



As for Hitler ignoring the warnings of his generals, I don‘t think any of them were especially clairvoyant vis a vis Normandy. Rommel also expected a landing at Pas de Calais, for example. Hitler did release panzers late in the day on the 6th, and sizeable armoured formations made their way to the bridgehead area in days to come, notably against the British and Canadian sectors. The Mortain counteroffensive was a major attempt to defeat the landings, and actually helped the Allies by forming the Falaise pocket, which unfortunately the Allies were too slow to close.

To continue the theme of Canadian abilities, the closure of the pocket is sometimes blamed on the inexperience of the Canadian troops fighting to close it. While they certainly didn‘t lack in courage (as evidenced by Currie who won the VC at St. Lambert sur Dives) a combination of inexperience, combat exhaustion (Third Division was in the line for a long stretch between 6 June and the Falaise fighting), and perhaps inadquate equipment (ie the Sherman V) led to (understandable) delays in sealing the gap (as well as the order to the Americans not to advance north and close off the gap at its neck).

The German Army at Falaise suffered great casualties nonetheless, and much equipment was lost.

Perhaps the greatest evidence that Hitler had lost favour with his generals was not his handling of Normandy, but in the fact that on 20 July, he was injured in an assassination attempt.

 

[Pikache]

Gryphon, you really don‘t want to argue with our resident military historians.

 

[sgt.shmedly102]

...the closure of the pocket is sometimes blamed on the inexperience of the Canadian troops fighting to close it.

Really? We just always blamed Montgomery. Of course we blamed him for just about everything.

Actually I always wondered what the Canadians think of him. He‘s not too popular in the US for various reasons, and the Brits love him simply because he was British. Since the Canadians served under him, but weren‘t technically British, I always figured they should have the most fair opinion. Any good Canadian books on the man?

 

[combat_medic]

I‘m reading a good book right now called "Marching as to War" by Pierre Berton. It‘s Canada‘s history from 1899-1960 (?), and while it‘s verly politically oriented, there‘s a lot of good stuff in there, about Montgomery and many others.

 

[Gryphon]

Sounds good. I want to Major in military history (major as in the University degree, not the rank ) But right now i‘m only in CEGEP (Quebec College). So i‘m not even in university, and the only army history that i get is from what i read..

I conceede then

 

[Michael Dorosh]

Montgomery was a brilliant trainer of troops, and American historians generally have no idea of that aspect of him. He would go into the new Canadian divisions in the UK, inspect every battalion, and instantly be able to pick out which COs, company commanders, and RSMs were good or bad. He made many on the spot judgements - usually correct - and the Canadian Army benefitted directly from these inspections.

He had his faults, just like Patton, MacArthur, et al - vanity, perhaps, and in Monty‘s case, a disturbing trend after the war to bend the truth as to what his true intentions were during the war. But he was the best the British had, and if he was slow and methodical, so what? The Canadian Army also preferred to "use guns instead of men", though both the British and Canadians may have suffered a bit from a lack of aggressiveness, they also didn‘t go around saying idiotic things like Patton (for example), who admonished his commanders when not enough officers were being killed (bad for morale, according to Patton, to see Enlisted casualties not matched by officer casualties).

Monty was a rock at Alamein, where he was needed most, and was amazingly progressive even when commanding 3rd Div in France in 1940. He was the first general to wear battledress, and he gave no-nonsense orders about VD - admitting that the troops were going to sleep around anyway, his instructions were on minimizing the impact on his soldiers rather than prohibiting sexual contact between his men and the locals.

In Sicily and Italy, 8th Army had no dress regulations; Monty figured that latitude in orders of dress (and one can see this in his own attire as well) was not a big issue. When I Canadian Corps HQ set up shot in Italy under Crerar, with it came so much chicken**** that the troops were quickly fed up. Monty had simply not cared about such things as officers wearing ties, or soldiers painting names on their trucks. Canadian staff officers did, and were detested by the fighting troops for it.

There are many Canadian soldiers who had no use for Monty, and many historians have mixed feelings about him. He was a colorful figure among many colorless people - certainly the Canadian commanders found no equal to him; Crerar was old and stodgy; McNaughton was brilliant but not flashy; Vokes was gruff and abrasive; Burns was cold and unapproachable; Hoffmeister was brilliant but soft spoken; Simonds was an excellent protege but was cold and aloof; Victor Odlum was just plain old; Matthews, and a slew of other div commanders are mostly just names to us now.

Monty had rapport with the troops - standing on the bonnet of a jeep and gathering men around him - but it was very put on and had a PR feel to it. The Canadians in Sicily wearily marched for miles after the campaign up and down hills for the privilege of listening to one of his staged pep talks; their only question for him was if he had brought beer for them.

He hadn‘t.

Overall, feelings towards him remain mixed - but I think we profited by his participation in many, many ways and would have been hard pressed to find a better commander in NW Europe for 21st Army Group. Perhaps Horrocks?

 

[Art Johnson]

Michael, re what was learned at Dieppe. I suggest that you view the War Amps tape on Dieppe, Cliff Chatterton gives a resume of the weapons and tactics that were developed as a result of the Dieppe Raid.

 

[Michael Dorosh]

Art - I‘ve actually had this discussion here (and at Tanknet, MLU, etc.) several times, and there have been one or two people to point out some good lessons learned at Dieppe. I haven‘t checked out Chadderton‘s take on it, but will try and do just that. I was mainly trying to see if anyone would rise to the challenge.

I have heard that ship to shore communication was improved as a result of Dieppe, and underwater demolitions teams were also improved, for two examples.

I still have to wonder, though, how many of the hundreds of technical innovations pioneered at Normandy would have been developed had Dieppe never occurred. I would certainly hope no one would seriously suggest that disasters like Dieppe should be de rigeur for military training?

I think Russ has a copy of Chadderton, I will give it a look - thanks for the advice.

 

[Art Johnson]

Cliff mentions the advent of the Sherman mounted Bombard for blowing holes in the sea wall as another outcome of Dieppe.

 

[Anderson56]

sgt s - you cracked me up.

As to1812 - nice to think that the Americans lost, but the truth is, it was a dead draw. Burn York, Burn Washington - I understand that the White House is white because it had to be painted after the war.

 

[Jarnhamar]

No way, we win by default. They tried to invade, but were still canada. :blotto:

 

[Marti]

As to1812 - nice to think that the Americans lost, but the truth is, it was a dead draw. Burn York, Burn Washington - I understand that the White House is white because it had to be painted after the war.

i think it‘s quite clear the British won the war, they managed to take quite a bit of ground from the Americans before they gave it all back in the Treaty of Ghent.

 

[Anderson56]

You know, I think you‘re right generally Marti, but I always had the feeling that the British had largely bogged down and had no real momentum at the time the war ended. Does that thought have any merit, or am I just talking (or typing) through my hat?

 

[Marti]

after doing a bit of reading, i found that the British had gained momentum at the end of the war, that was when the raids on Washington and Baltimore and the occupation of Maine took place. perhaps if Brock had survived Queenston heights, the British side would have had a bit more momentum througout the war, or as much as resources would allow anyways.

 

[Anderson56]

Well I certainly will second the thought on Brock - it really took the wind out of the British sails to lose him. You know, more I think about it - seems that a lack of the right stuff in the command ranks has been a little more than endemic in Commonwealth ranks, though, as soon as I typed that, I wondered if I could point that figure at NZ, because I have always read that Freyburg was a very good commander.

 

[Cpt. Kap]

Hoping I don‘t make myself look like an idiot but I believe the salute orginated during the crusades. Mounted knights would salute with thier right hand to demonstrate that their hands where empty. They also passed on the right to purposely leave themselves open to attack fom the opposite knights right (sword) hand.

 

[sarsteve]

Just bein‘ anal, but the Alamo and Bay of Pigs were battles, not wars and the Bay was technically a Cuban Op, not American.

 

[Linc]

Well Alamo was a battle in a war that the Yanks won, and Bay of Pigs was a CIA activity using Cuban exiles, not a US military one. And even if you want to agree that 1812 was ‘tie‘ or an American ‘moral victory‘ there are still plenty of other nations that have never lost wars. Canada has never lost a war. Australia has never lost a war, I‘m sure there are plenty of others too.

 

[Danjanou]

Well as long as we appear to have strayed waaay off topic here, a few points about the War of 1812. Yes it was a British/Canadian victory. US history books will of course argue that just because they won the last battle, New Orleans, which was fought incidentally after the Peace Treaty ending the war was signed, they therefore “won” the war.

The war was mainly about US Expansionism into the British Territories in North America. Other reasons such as the American claims it was about press ganging US sailors off of ships were merely excuses for the hawks in the US Government to go ahead.

They were hoping to take advantage of British preoccupation with the war against Napoleon to ensure they either didn’t notice or could do nothing about.

As at the end of hostilities US forces did not hold any British/Canadian territory, and in fact as was already noted some US territory was held (later returned), the Yanks lost.

It was not as some popular historians would suggest a pure “Canadian” victory. The myth of the proud Canadian farmer militia type driving off the American invaders just don’t wash. In most engagements where they were employed the Canadian Militia were either used in supporting roles or ineffective.

It was not either a total British victory, as some historians over there would suggest. The British garrisons in BNA were rather small, and included troops unfit for duty eleswhere. As the British Army was rather preoccupied for most of the war with the fighting in Spain and Portugal no initial help would be forthcoming.

It was rather a combination of these two elements, small cadres of regulars supported by fairly untrained militia that resulted in victories. These were bolstered by the not insubstantial number of regular Canadian troops in the war, the locally raised Fencible regiments such as the Royal New Brunswick Regiment (105th Regt of the Line), the Royal Newfoundland Fencible Regiment, the Canadian Volitguers and the Glengarry Light Infantry (Fencible). Finally the support of the numerous Indian tribes that fought against the Americans for various reasons must also be included.

There was also the factor of superior leadership on the British/Canadian side, at least for the most part. Mind the British didn’t have a monopoly on that. For every Brock or de Salaberry we were also saddled with a Prevost. On the American side, leaders such as Scott balanced incompetents such as Hull and Van Rensselaer.

The argument that towards the end of the war the British/Canadians were gaining momentum is valid. For the first three years of the war the British due to their commitments elsewhere fought basically a defensive action. After Napoleon’s defeat in 1814, plans to send reinforcements to North America were commenced.

Plans for a systematic invasion of the states were developed although the peace treaty ended them. Two invasion columns one on the Niagara front and another down the traditional invasion route alongside Lake Champlain would be launched. The Lake Champlain one under Prevost initially failed. The column was being reinforced with more veteran troops and a more aggressive commander when peace broke out.

A third strike with veteran troops from Spain was sent against New Orleans and it too failed. The earlier raid against Washington and Baltimore of course did not.

In retrospect it was a pathetic little war fought for unclear reasons. But then how many other conflicts does that also hold true for.

BTW Michael, while I agree with your points on Montgomery, both good and bad, I’d still place Slim as the “best” of the British generals in WWII. What he accomplished with 14th Army in India China and Burma had a lot to do with the ultimate victory against Japan. That he did t with such limited resources is even more remarkable

 

[Veteran`s son]

To continue the topic of saluting, I have some questions.

If someone is a Private(Untrained/Trained), do they salute a Private(with one chevron),a Corporal, Master Corporal or any NCM?

Are only Officers saluted?

Is a Private(with one chevron) or a Corporal addressed only as Private or Corporal?

Again, any responses to these questions would be helpful!