Status of the US Navy

[Kirkhill]

The Status of the Navy: Part I

The world has changed immensely since the American Navy's heyday during World War II, but given today's environment, what is the importance of naval power?

patriotpost.us

Current Status of the Navy and Shipbuilding

According to the United States Naval Institute, we now have fewer ships than at the end of President Trump’s first term — 293 as of July 21, four fewer than when President Trump left office in 2021. The actual numbers are worse than that. With 293 ships in commission, the reality is that 20%-25% of them at any given time are not deployable. The Navy aims to achieve 80% deployability by 2027. So, the real number of ships we have is roughly 234.

According to the secretary of the Navy, all current shipbuilding programs are missing deadlines and are overbudget despite promises to improve.

The Status of the Navy: Part II

Beginning with an assessment of U.S. shipbuilding capability and working toward evaluating the real threat coming from Communist China.

patriotpost.us

The U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO) has reported that Navy shipbuilding programs have routinely exceeded their budgets and schedules. For instance, the Zumwalt-class destroyer program experienced a total cost of $24.5 billion for three ships, averaging about $8 billion per ship, which was significantly higher than initial estimates.

A 2024 GAO report indicated that the Navy’s ship design practices often lack alignment with leading commercial practices. This misalignment contributes to delays and cost overruns, as projects proceed without a full understanding of design maturity and readiness for construction.

The GAO has also identified that U.S. shipyards face significant workforce shortages and aging infrastructure. These issues hinder the ability to meet the Navy’s shipbuilding goals, with fewer than 40% of ships completing repairs on time, even when space is available in shipyards.

 

[Kirkhill]

The Marine Corps San Antonio-Class Amphibious Ships are 'Sitting Ducks'

It's the ship designed to lead an assault, but it has no offensive weapons. The curious case of the under-armed San Antonio-class amphibious dock.

nationalsecurityjournal.org

San Antonio's need help. Zumwalt didn't show up.
Options are to try and retrofit kit.
Other options around more unmanned arsenal type LUSVs.

 

[Kirkhill]

Navy's Top Admiral Wants To Tailor Warship Deployments To Specific Missions

New ways to pair the unique capabilities of different ships could help better address commanders' needs and do so faster.

www.twz.com

Another opportunity for me to make a fool of myself and be instructed.

This article seems to suggest that the USN has had two solutions to every problem: the CSG (Carrier Strike Group) and the ARG (Amphibious Ready Group). However both of those forces have been falling in number, reducing in hulls and losing aircraft. And all of it is getting older.

While this has been a problem across numerous administrations it is becoming notably more problematic with the combination of the rise in China's PLA(N) and Trump's current posture.

There was a third option available to the CNO and that was the SAG or Surface Action Group. It sounds as this type of force was used sparingly and was more of an ad hoc solution than a playbook solution. It would be built around Cruisers (Ticonderogas), Destroyers (Arleigh Burkes), Frigates (missing from the order of battle) and, latterly, LCS ships (Independences and Freedoms).

But it doesn't sound as if the USN has much of a recent history in that type of deployment. That might also be linked to a lack of frigates.

....

The article also references mixing Arleigh Burkes and LCS's as something of a novel experiment.

....

So here's where you get to correct me.

If the USN is short on practice mixing different ship types with different capabilities into tailored task forces when they have people on board, how are they going to manage stowing task force capabilities off-board on robot ships?

Second issue: does any of this, partcularly the lack of frigates and smaller combatants that might be appropriate for these tailored SAGs, tie into concerns about loss of shiphandling skills?