The Brigade Fight

[Infanteer]

I don't think tube artillery qualifies a formation to conduct deep operations.  If a CMBG is going to employ its artillery, it'll be aiming its piddly 8x howitzers in support of its lead unit.  Our tube artillery cannot really reach into an enemy's depth in any significant way.

While I understand the framework of close, deep, and rear could be applied to CMBG planning, I'm not really sure it is helpful, or useful.  Land Ops states that deep operations must be long range (probably not what I'd define a M777 as...) and protracted (probably not something 8 tubes could deliver, even with a leaflet drop from a CH-146 layered over it...).  I'm not sure a Brigade is the right organization to manage and coordinate such widely dispersed tactical engagements.  The CMBG, and I'd argue most (all?) brigade-sized formations are designed, scaled, and resourced to fight the "close battle," dealing with the problem to their front.  We should probably avoid teaching or training Brigade Commanders and their staff to go out trying to fight a "deep battle."

 

[daftandbarmy]

FWIW....

Brigades are to Corps as Companies are to Brigades. Plus artillery.

A guy I know, who went on to bigger things, described it that way to me and it kind of made sense to me.

 

[FJAG]

I don't think tube artillery qualifies a formation to conduct deep operations.  If a CMBG is going to employ its artillery, it'll be aiming its piddly 8x howitzers in support of its lead unit.  Our tube artillery cannot really reach into an enemy's depth in any significant way.

While I understand the framework of close, deep, and rear could be applied to CMBG planning, I'm not really sure it is helpful, or useful.  Land Ops states that deep operations must be long range (probably not what I'd define a M777 as...) and protracted (probably not something 8 tubes could deliver, even with a leaflet drop from a CH-146 layered over it...).  I'm not sure a Brigade is the right organization to manage and coordinate such widely dispersed tactical engagements.  The CMBG, and I'd argue most (all?) brigade-sized formations are designed, scaled, and resourced to fight the "close battle," dealing with the problem to their front.  We should probably avoid teaching or training Brigade Commanders and their staff to go out trying to fight a "deep battle."

If I haven't been branded a cynic on this forum a long time ago, then do it now.

Does anyone here really think or plan on going to war with an 8 gun artillery regiment to support a brigade? Hell when I started in this business we had eight gun batteries to support a battalion who had eight mortars of their own. Brigades had 32 guns and we still felt ourselves (and were in fact) outgunned by our opponents. Don't even get me started on anti-armour.

I'm truly in awe of all of you who are serving now and not ripping your hair out in despair.

 

[Ostrozac]

If I haven't been branded a cynic on this forum a long time ago, then do it now.

Does anyone here really think or plan on going to war with an 8 gun artillery regiment to support a brigade? Hell when I started in this business we had eight gun batteries to support a battalion who had eight mortars of their own. Brigades had 32 guns and we still felt ourselves (and were in fact) outgunned by our opponents. Don't even get me started on anti-armour.

I'm truly in awe of all of you who are serving now and not ripping your hair out in despair.

We don’t seem to want to actually going to a major war equipped as you’ve described. We are a Counter-Insurgency/Constabulary Army that for some reason likes to play-act that we can fight in a major war. Our theory that a few howitzers towed behind trucks and tripod mounted TOW is sufficient for a near-peer adversary is outdated even by Cold War standards, our headquarters are slow and deliberate (and fairly immobile), and our weapons selection seems ideal for quagmires in the Third World rather than trading shots with the latest and greatest.

A Canadian brigade would probably be quite comfortable in the kind of war that France is currently fighting in Mali. But against Russia? We’d be found by UAVs that we can’t shoot down, fixed by self-propellled tube and rocket artillery that we can’t counterbattery, and encircled by all arms manoeuvre battalions that overmatch our anti armour weapons. We’d look like the Republican Guard in ‘91.

I am not sure why we as an institution continue to pretend to embrace modern war and deny our actual war fighting mission, which is very much on the lighter side of the spectrum. There’s nothing inherently shameful about being a counter-insurgency army, and there are plenty of countries that could occupy our time for 10+ Rotos of low intensity war, but a COIN army that tries to bluff its way onto a major battlefield might just end up a speed bump.

 

[blacktriangle]

Do we really need all this overheard at NDHQ and other places to run a COIN force? The cynic in me says this is why we keep pretending to be a real military.

 

[Infanteer]

We aren't, nor do we need to be, a "COIN Force."  Countries with insurgencies need to build their own COIN forces.

Some of the commentators here are focusing too much on the glaring equipment deficiencies.  While accurate, they do not define what an Army is or should be capable of.  Remember, unlike navies or air forces, which are defined by platforms, armies are defined more by organizations.

Just because we have capability deficiencies in certain areas doesn't mean we drop the whole programme.  As Afghanistan demonstrates, we are 1 or 2 UORs away from fixing those issues.  My comment on 8 howitzers was made somewhat tongue in cheek, as most professionals understand that peacetime force generation organizations do not translate into wartime force employment ones.

In the meantime, we conceptualize and train based on the anticipated threat.  When we don't have the 100% solution to work with, we figure out other ways to intellectually prepare our soldiers.  Remember, the German Army built a world beating mobile force in the 1930s using cars with tank mock-ups and being forbidden to have warplanes.  Don't "fight the whites" on this one.

 

[FJAG]

Do we really need all this overheard at NDHQ and other places to run a COIN force? The cynic in me says this is why we keep pretending to be a real military.

I don't think that we do but leaving aside our heavily bloated headquarters structure in Ottawa, I find that we aren't getting enough combat power for the army that we have.

Running some purely rough numbers on the US, Russian, UK, French and German armies (reg and res components) one finds that for every 2,000 to 8,000 troops in the army there is one equipped manned brigade/brigade group (either manoeuvre or support). The numbers per brigade, type of brigade and country vary greatly.

Based on an army of roughly 40,000 we should, on average, be able to man eight equipped manoeuvre brigade groups or support brigades. We currently man three equipped manoeuvre brigade groups and one combat support brigade. Our ten reserve brigades are solely administrative entities which are under-strength and unequipped making them non functional.

Quite frankly we have the manpower and need to do more than COIN. Considering that Strong, Secure, and Engaged has identified our high end adversary is Russia not only could we but we must restructure ourselves to provide a viable, credible force for use in a high intensity Multi-Domain Operations in a NATO context. What we need is a will at the military leadership level to reconfigure and equip for our future roles. That includes special operations forces, a light and medium weight element for UN COIN type operations and a heavy force for NATO.

:2c:

 

[Kirkhill]

...armies are defined more by organizations.

So, with that in mind, why don't you get rid of all the tinkering, with 5 men here, 3 men there, 6 back yonder and a bakers dozen up ahead, and just establish a uniform structure to organize the manpower into functional teams?  Then you can allocate teams to tasks and kit to teams.

What does that mean in real life?

1 Corporal - 3 Privates, Troopers, Sappers, Mechanics etc
1 Sergeant - 4 Corporals (3 Teams and a spare Corporal)
1 Warrant - 4 Sergeants (3 Sections and a spare Sergeant with an extra team)
1 MWO - 4 WO etc
1 CWO - 4 MWO etc

Once you have got them formed up on parade then you can start reviewing needs, allocating tasks and issuing kit. 

Especially effective for organizing Reserves and for organizing Infantry battalions, engineer squadrons, gun batteries and recce squadrons to accept reserves.  (The High Casualty Elements).

 

[BDTyre]

Remember, the German Army built a world beating mobile force in the 1930s using cars with tank mock-ups and being forbidden to have warplanes.  Don't "fight the whites" on this one.

To be fair they also seized the initiative with surprise and maintained it with the liberal use of methamphetamines.

 

[blacktriangle]

Some of the commentators here are focusing too much on the glaring equipment deficiencies.  While accurate, they do not define what an Army is or should be capable of.  Remember, unlike navies or air forces, which are defined by platforms, armies are defined more by organizations.

Unfortunately, when you don't have even basic equipment, and you don't have anyone higher than a Cpl or MCpl to fill the Pl WO slot...I'd say any talk of a "Brigade fight" is getting a little ahead of ourselves.

 

[Haligonian]

Some of the commentators here are focusing too much on the glaring equipment deficiencies.  While accurate, they do not define what an Army is or should be capable of.  Remember, unlike navies or air forces, which are defined by platforms, armies are defined more by organizations.

Just because we have capability deficiencies in certain areas doesn't mean we drop the whole programme.  As Afghanistan demonstrates, we are 1 or 2 UORs away from fixing those issues.  My comment on 8 howitzers was made somewhat tongue in cheek, as most professionals understand that peacetime force generation organizations do not translate into wartime force employment ones.

Infanteer beat me to it.  I'd also note that some of those UORs for those critical capabilities have in fact been submitted.  It remains to be seen if they'll be actioned however.

 

[Haligonian]

Unfortunately, when you don't have even basic equipment, and you don't have anyone higher than a Cpl or MCpl to fill the Pl WO slot...I'd say any talk of a "Brigade fight" is getting a little ahead of ourselves.

I sympathize with your perspective but we need to keep the knowledge alive of how we would fight a bde/formation, otherwise when the time comes to fight at that level we'll spend people's lives learning lessons we should have already known.

If we were to ever to put a Bde in the field against a competent enemy then we'd either spool up recruitment to fill the holes or do what we've done for ages now and rob peter to pay paul.  A Bde to make a BG, and the Army to make a Bde.  In the mean time we apply imperfect solutions.

 

[ballz]

A Bde to make a BG, and the Army to make a Bde.

I just had a wet dream thinking of all the unnecessary crap that would get cut if we had to stand up a real a Brigade + run national training for an influx of recruits.

It's probably exactly what we need to force ourselves to unf**k ourselves.

 

[Infanteer]

See "Canadian Army, 1950" for an example of that.

 

[daftandbarmy]

To be fair they also seized the initiative with surprise and maintained it with the liberal use of methamphetamines.

And they didn't have Class A reservists providing the Cbt Sp Coy capability for their Infantry battalions....

 

[TangoTwoBravo]

I don't think tube artillery qualifies a formation to conduct deep operations.  If a CMBG is going to employ its artillery, it'll be aiming its piddly 8x howitzers in support of its lead unit.  Our tube artillery cannot really reach into an enemy's depth in any significant way.

If we look at a warfighting CMBG, lets assume that it has mortars for its infantry battalions and a full Regiment of 155 artillery. The Brigade Commander has the ability to sense and strike beyond his immediate fight in terms of time and space. He can see and strike well beyond (comparatively) the FLOT. Guns striking the enemy for the next battle are not supporting the close battle, but that is at least a choice he makes. It is not unreasonable to factor in Reinforcing tube artillery for a CMBG/Brigade. The Brigade also has the staff horsepower to plan and execute CAS in a much more fulsome manner than a typical Battle Group. So while I agree that the Brigade Deep battle is much more limited in scope than the Div and Corps deep battle, I still maintain that it is the first level at which we can realistically have a Deep battle going on the same time as the Close battle. The Div is indeed were the Deep battle really comes into itself. I would also agree that the Brigade should not fight the Deep at the exclusion of the Close.

 

[FJAG]

... So while I agree that the Brigade Deep battle is much more limited in scope than the Div and Corps deep battle, I still maintain that it is the first level at which we can realistically have a Deep battle going on the same time as the Close battle. The Div is indeed were the Deep battle really comes into itself. I would also agree that the Brigade should not fight the Deep at the exclusion of the Close.

Agreed. FM 3-96 "Brigade Combat Team" makes much use of the term "deep-close-security operational framework" throughout. For example:

6-196. Decentralized execution is characteristic of the exploitation; ... Tactical air
reconnaissance and Army aircraft maintain contact with enemy movements and advise the commander of
enemy activities. Interdiction, close air support, close combat attacks, and deep artillery fires can attack
moving enemy reserves, withdrawing enemy columns, enemy constrictions at choke points, and enemy forces
that threaten the flanks of the exploiting force. ...

and also:

7-21. As an example, the deep-close-security operational framework historically has been associated with
terrain orientation, but this framework can apply to temporal and organizational orientations as well. The
BCT can use the deep-close-security operational framework to engage simultaneously the enemy in three
distinct areas–deep area, close area, and security area. ...

:cheers:

 

[Infanteer]

So while I agree that the Brigade Deep battle is much more limited in scope than the Div and Corps deep battle, I still maintain that it is the first level at which we can realistically have a Deep battle going on the same time as the Close battle.

We'll probably have to disagree on this one, and the key is the term "realistically."  Just because a CMBG commander or planner can take the Land Ops pub and plop down a battlespace framework for close and deep operations on his JCATs screen doesn't mean it can be realistically done to any level of military effectiveness.  To call a regiment of guns enough for deep battle is like calling a M203 lobbed over a hill "indirect support" - technically yes, but realistically no.

The range of a CMBG's fires assets (M777) is about 24 to 30km, dependent on round type and other factors.  If you give some space for distance from the AMAs to the FLOT, this means a CMBG can realistically target 16 to 22 km at max range.  This isn't even the normal depth of an adversary Brigade.  As well, the time it can take for an adversary's mobile forces to close this gap isn't very long.  If a CMBG can't reach behind the depth of the adversary's lead echelon in either time or space, it can't be expected to conduct deep operations (long range and persistent operations to shape the enemies depth echelons and activities).

I've seen a argument that a CMBG could conduct a deep operation with the insertion of a parachute company, but I feel these arguments don't appreciate how little combat power a foot-borne infantry company pitched off into the enemy's rear area really has.

The other factor of "realistically" is related to command of deep operations.  The British Official History of the Gulf War describes how the GOC of 1(UK) Armd Div conducted deep operations and put his Divisional Artillery Chief in command.  The Division was augmented with elements from BAOR, and the officer responsible for deep operations had staff planning and command support capabilities that are inherent in Divisional Fires organizations.  I don't think we could reasonable expect a CO of a close support artillery regiment, with a HQ primarily focused on moving the guns and providing FSCC support to the Brigade manoeuvring in the close fight, to have the ability to run a concurrent deep operation.

When I conducted planning with an Allied organization (in training) for the coordination of close and deep operations, the deep battle was properly assigned to a general officer who (in our organization's case) possessed a significant air element (like, more aircraft than the RCAF) as well as access to long range fires from a variety of joint force platforms.  He also possessed the HQ to control these capabilities, so that he could properly fight a deep operation.

The so what of this argument?  As I said before, we shouldn't be training our CMBGs to try and conduct a deep operation.  We should recognize that the "X" level formation, with regards to time, space, and force, is a organization designed to fight the close battle.

My  :2c:.

Cheers,

8)

 

[Infanteer]

Agreed. FM 3-96 "Brigade Combat Team" makes much use of the term "deep-close-security operational framework" throughout. For example:

7-21. As an example, the deep-close-security operational framework historically has been associated with
terrain orientation, but this framework can apply to temporal and organizational orientations as well. The
BCT can use the deep-close-security operational framework to engage simultaneously the enemy in three
distinct areas–deep area, close area, and security area. ...

I disagree with this assertion in US Doctrine.  It stretches the meaning of the close/deep/rear framework, which was created for contiguous, linear operations (look at the Russian and U.S. theory behind it), almost to the point of uselessness.  What does "organizational or temporal orientation" mean without relation to terrain and space?

 

[daftandbarmy]

We'll probably have to disagree on this one, and the key is the term "realistically."  Just because a CMBG commander or planner can take the Land Ops pub and plop down a battlespace framework for close and deep operations on his JCATs screen doesn't mean it can be realistically done to any level of military effectiveness.  To call a regiment of guns enough for deep battle is like calling a M203 lobbed over a hill "indirect support" - technically yes, but realistically no.

The range of a CMBG's fires assets (M777) is about 24 to 30km, dependent on round type and other factors.  If you give some space for distance from the AMAs to the FLOT, this means a CMBG can realistically target 16 to 22 km at max range.  This isn't even the normal depth of an adversary Brigade.  As well, the time it can take for an adversary's mobile forces to close this gap isn't very long.  If a CMBG can't reach behind the depth of the adversary's lead echelon in either time or space, it can't be expected to conduct deep operations (long range and persistent operations to shape the enemies depth echelons and activities).

I've seen a argument that a CMBG could conduct a deep operation with the insertion of a parachute company, but I feel these arguments don't appreciate how little combat power a foot-borne infantry company pitched off into the enemy's rear area really has.

The other factor of "realistically" is related to command of deep operations.  The British Official History of the Gulf War describes how the GOC of 1(UK) Armd Div conducted deep operations and put his Divisional Artillery Chief in command.  The Division was augmented with elements from BAOR, and the officer responsible for deep operations had staff planning and command support capabilities that are inherent in Divisional Fires organizations.  I don't think we could reasonable expect a CO of a close support artillery regiment, with a HQ primarily focused on moving the guns and providing FSCC support to the Brigade manoeuvring in the close fight, to have the ability to run a concurrent deep operation.

When I conducted planning with an Allied organization (in training) for the coordination of close and deep operations, the deep battle was properly assigned to a general officer who (in our organization's case) possessed a significant air element (like, more aircraft than the RCAF) as well as access to long range fires from a variety of joint force platforms.  He also possessed the HQ to control these capabilities, so that he could properly fight a deep operation.

The so what of this argument?  As I said before, we shouldn't be training our CMBGs to try and conduct a deep operation.  We should recognize that the "X" level formation, with regards to time, space, and force, is a organization designed to fight the close battle.

My  :2c:.

Cheers,

8)

I think we try to 'big up' the Brigade because, in peacetime, it seems like such a big formation. In reality, the Bde is pretty small fry in the bigger picture of a general conflict. The Bde Comd, for example, doesn't have artillery under command - I believe - so the 'real' General ranks start at MGen.

The 'deep battle' starts at Div and above IIRC, and the Bde Comd contributes as required within the context of the overall plan. I worked with some US Army guys back in the day, and they were fond of saying that 'everything below Division is a frontal'.

I'm likely well outside my lane here but, if we have an independent Bde deployed somewhere, along the 'plug and play' lines the US dreamt up as a result of the Iraq/AFG conflicts, I assume that it can be allocated Div/Corps/Army assets dependent on the mission, but it might be a mistake to plan/assume that these will be available all the time in a bigger war.