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I am going to stick to the discussion of Force Generation. I agree with McG. There is room to prepare for a broader spectrum of operations and also prepare more tightly focused, cohesive, Battlegroups/Task Forces/Field Forces/What-have-you.
The magic ingredient is time.
Time is bought by decreasing the size of the Force assigned to the deployed Task Forces, and thus increasing the number of Task Forces that can be generated, thus increasing the intervals between deployments, thus allowing more time for an ad hoc Task Force to complete common training and learning how to work with each other.
Similarly, the more time between deployments the more time can be spent by units in individual training, sub-unit training and formation training.
To get to this desired end state then the requirement is to get the politicians to accept a smaller deployed force.
As to the argument that a smaller deployed force will be vulnerable or less able to fulfill certain tasks - the answer is of course. But the counter is that every deployment we are capable of making is at danger of over-match. We will always have to work with allies, otherwise we won't be going (this is not to say we shouldn't be doing more and shouldn't be able to lead more forcefully by getting ourselves into the fray more speedily). But we willl always have to pick our fights. Even the Americans have to do that - they can't deal with Iraq and N.Korea any more than they could deal with Russia and China simultaneously.
So if we accept a 1on 4 off deployment pattern and a requirement to deploy 2 forces concurrently then we come back to the need to be able to generate AT LEAST 10 Task Forces. We have 12 Armd and Inf Units available so lets use them as the basis of the deployments. With 12 units that means a 1 on 5 off schedule allowing 3 years between deployments.
The Units then could be structured with sufficient numbers of sub-units to both maintain a conventional fighting capability as a formed unit and also to be able to detach subunits in support of the task forces.
To take KevinB's proposed structure of one light, one mech, and one recce subunit, lets say under a Mech HQ, then the Parent CBMG would comprise 1 Lt Unit 2 Mech Units and 1Cav Unit. One of the Mech Units would deploy with its HQ, Recce Pl, and 1 Mech Coy. The Remaining Sub-units would stay on base conducting individual training.
Kevin's model requires a force structure of 12 Recce Sqns, 12 Lt Coys and 12 Mech Coys as well as 12 Recce Pl etc. That demands that each of the 3 Armd Regts find 4 Recce Sqns each, that the 3 Lt Bns find 4 Coys each and that the 6 Mech Bns find 2 Coys each. As we have about 27 Lt or Mech Coys than that would work out about right. The 3 Extra Coys could be the source of the 3 extra Recce platoons and reinforcements for the other coys.
As we only have 9 Armd Squadrons and only 6 of them are officially Recce Sqns, then failing an increase in bodies or kit then the size of the Squadrons will have to fall to support a long term deployment plan. The Squadron will be able to do less, but it will be able to do it consistently and repetitively. SOPs can be generated, force commanders will know its capabilities and our allies will know how we can work with them. I leave the make-up, kit, taskings etc to others.
With this structure:
3 brigades each with a 4 Squadron Armd Regt, a 4 Coy Light Battalion and 2x 2 Coy Mech Battalions then you might see the following situation;
1 CMBG has 2 Task Forces on Deployment for 6 months. 1PPCLI HQ and a Mech Coy Plus a Lt Coy and an Armd Sqn attached and 3PPCLI has one Coy deployed with a Mech and Armd sub-unit attached.
That leaves 2 PPCLI back on Station with a full complement of 2 Coys. It leaves 1 Coy of 1 PPCLI on Station. It leaves 2 Lt Coys on Station and it also leaves LdSH on station with an HQ and 2 Squadrons.
2 CMBG is working up its two task forces for the next roto
5 CMBG is working up the roto after that
That still leaves a useable force for the area commander (2 HQs, 3 Mech Coys, 2 Lt Coys and 2 Armd Sqns) that could be engaged in individual training, conducting training with cross-attachments or supplying ready reaction forces.
We always used to expect that sub-units would be un-plugged from the parent and plugged into a sister unit in the formation, often on very short notice. So I am having difficulty seeing where the plug'n'play concept is alien to what has been done in the past.
The area that I see that is different is that in the past an Armd commander new what he was getting when he was assigned a Mech Coy and likewise a Mech commander new what a tank squadron was and what it could do. This was because of standardization, training and SOPs.
Summarizing, why can't the system work if we accept that the reality of taskings for the foreseeable future are stability ops, that in order to maintain a viable force we need to reduce the size (not number) of commitments and then build a force structure that can sustain those commitments. With enough time between deployments then training can be geared towards maintaining our broad-spectrum of capabilities and with standardized units then SOPs can be developed.
I understand this may seem to some like putting the cart before the horse, essentially I am suggesting that we take the existing bodies and kit, divide by 12 and then ask ourselves what that result can do and then train to do that. As opposed to looking for an ideal sized lego brick devised by our allies and then trying to figure how many units we can build and wondering why we don't have enough bricks or units.
The more time between deployments then the more varied can be the training and the more capable will be the CF. In the meantime, the fact that all units that are going to deploy on a given Task Force are located on a single base and regularly train with each other will, along with common SOPs contribute to the necessary cohesion.
IMHO,
Cheers.
The magic ingredient is time.
Time is bought by decreasing the size of the Force assigned to the deployed Task Forces, and thus increasing the number of Task Forces that can be generated, thus increasing the intervals between deployments, thus allowing more time for an ad hoc Task Force to complete common training and learning how to work with each other.
Similarly, the more time between deployments the more time can be spent by units in individual training, sub-unit training and formation training.
To get to this desired end state then the requirement is to get the politicians to accept a smaller deployed force.
As to the argument that a smaller deployed force will be vulnerable or less able to fulfill certain tasks - the answer is of course. But the counter is that every deployment we are capable of making is at danger of over-match. We will always have to work with allies, otherwise we won't be going (this is not to say we shouldn't be doing more and shouldn't be able to lead more forcefully by getting ourselves into the fray more speedily). But we willl always have to pick our fights. Even the Americans have to do that - they can't deal with Iraq and N.Korea any more than they could deal with Russia and China simultaneously.
So if we accept a 1on 4 off deployment pattern and a requirement to deploy 2 forces concurrently then we come back to the need to be able to generate AT LEAST 10 Task Forces. We have 12 Armd and Inf Units available so lets use them as the basis of the deployments. With 12 units that means a 1 on 5 off schedule allowing 3 years between deployments.
The Units then could be structured with sufficient numbers of sub-units to both maintain a conventional fighting capability as a formed unit and also to be able to detach subunits in support of the task forces.
To take KevinB's proposed structure of one light, one mech, and one recce subunit, lets say under a Mech HQ, then the Parent CBMG would comprise 1 Lt Unit 2 Mech Units and 1Cav Unit. One of the Mech Units would deploy with its HQ, Recce Pl, and 1 Mech Coy. The Remaining Sub-units would stay on base conducting individual training.
Kevin's model requires a force structure of 12 Recce Sqns, 12 Lt Coys and 12 Mech Coys as well as 12 Recce Pl etc. That demands that each of the 3 Armd Regts find 4 Recce Sqns each, that the 3 Lt Bns find 4 Coys each and that the 6 Mech Bns find 2 Coys each. As we have about 27 Lt or Mech Coys than that would work out about right. The 3 Extra Coys could be the source of the 3 extra Recce platoons and reinforcements for the other coys.
As we only have 9 Armd Squadrons and only 6 of them are officially Recce Sqns, then failing an increase in bodies or kit then the size of the Squadrons will have to fall to support a long term deployment plan. The Squadron will be able to do less, but it will be able to do it consistently and repetitively. SOPs can be generated, force commanders will know its capabilities and our allies will know how we can work with them. I leave the make-up, kit, taskings etc to others.
With this structure:
3 brigades each with a 4 Squadron Armd Regt, a 4 Coy Light Battalion and 2x 2 Coy Mech Battalions then you might see the following situation;
1 CMBG has 2 Task Forces on Deployment for 6 months. 1PPCLI HQ and a Mech Coy Plus a Lt Coy and an Armd Sqn attached and 3PPCLI has one Coy deployed with a Mech and Armd sub-unit attached.
That leaves 2 PPCLI back on Station with a full complement of 2 Coys. It leaves 1 Coy of 1 PPCLI on Station. It leaves 2 Lt Coys on Station and it also leaves LdSH on station with an HQ and 2 Squadrons.
2 CMBG is working up its two task forces for the next roto
5 CMBG is working up the roto after that
That still leaves a useable force for the area commander (2 HQs, 3 Mech Coys, 2 Lt Coys and 2 Armd Sqns) that could be engaged in individual training, conducting training with cross-attachments or supplying ready reaction forces.
We always used to expect that sub-units would be un-plugged from the parent and plugged into a sister unit in the formation, often on very short notice. So I am having difficulty seeing where the plug'n'play concept is alien to what has been done in the past.
The area that I see that is different is that in the past an Armd commander new what he was getting when he was assigned a Mech Coy and likewise a Mech commander new what a tank squadron was and what it could do. This was because of standardization, training and SOPs.
Summarizing, why can't the system work if we accept that the reality of taskings for the foreseeable future are stability ops, that in order to maintain a viable force we need to reduce the size (not number) of commitments and then build a force structure that can sustain those commitments. With enough time between deployments then training can be geared towards maintaining our broad-spectrum of capabilities and with standardized units then SOPs can be developed.
I understand this may seem to some like putting the cart before the horse, essentially I am suggesting that we take the existing bodies and kit, divide by 12 and then ask ourselves what that result can do and then train to do that. As opposed to looking for an ideal sized lego brick devised by our allies and then trying to figure how many units we can build and wondering why we don't have enough bricks or units.
The more time between deployments then the more varied can be the training and the more capable will be the CF. In the meantime, the fact that all units that are going to deploy on a given Task Force are located on a single base and regularly train with each other will, along with common SOPs contribute to the necessary cohesion.
IMHO,
Cheers.
), I think that the original topic of the thread as I proposed it, the Downward Diffusion of Combined Arms, requires a corresponding downward diffusion in the way we organize our Personnel (as opposed to our kit).
(it shouldn't matter anymore, as a crewman can be posted to an infantry company within a Combined Arms battalion to drive the LAV).
