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The RCAF's Next Generation Fighter (CF-188 Replacement)

It's one thing to split the fleet. And another to shrink the F-35 order to such a small number (32 frames) so that we end up with basically all the overhead of the fleet but a lot less combat power. 32 jets in the fleet means about 20 jets that are combat coded (to use an American term). 50 was about the minimum fleet size to get one gun squadron each of 15 frames in Cold Lake and Bagotville.

Next, if you're going to split the fleet because you want to develop your industry, looking to the past is dumb. We could have joined a sixth gen program and gotten workshare. But now we're basically going to be tied to Saab forever. They'll be worse than Bombardier. We'll have to buy whatever Saab puts out. Even if it's a fighter or AEW plane rejected by several allies. Saab is going to determining what the RCAF looks like from now on.



There's no Ukrainian order. It's an LOI. They don't have money to pay for 150 jets.

Guess who's going to be paying for those aircraft? That's what our aid to Ukraine is going to be once the factory is built.
What could be in the works is the development of a 6th gen fighter with the SK’s, us and the Swedes. I am sure that there are many many moving parts behind the scenes that we are not aware of.
Would a 6th gen fighter developed with SK and Swedes work for you?

The Ukrainian LoI is only different than our LoI for the F35 by 2 things; 1) ours stipulates the buying of 16 of the 88 first and then the future possible purchase of the rest; 2) we can afford to buy 88 if we decide to do so.

A major difference between us joining with say the Brits, Italy and whoever in a ‘workshare’ program is that wouldn’t give us the ability to build an entire aircraft independently ourselves. From an initial read of the G&M article it looks like we will be building the entire plane here in Canada. That’s much different than a workshare program where we might build only the landing gear, flaps and rudder of a plane.

At this point we might be aware of 10-15% of everything that is happening behind the scenes. Even if it’s 30% of what is happening it still means that the majority of the final news is still to come out and all of that might not be ‘bad news’ but incredibly good news overall.

If we go with SK subs and the SK use Bombardiers Global 6500 in their AEW planes, because they are completely disappointed with their E7 purchase, Bombardier becomes a linch pin between us, the Swedes and them. The SK’s haven’t teamed up with anyone yet for their 6th gen plane. They won’t do it with the US or Japan or just about any other Euro country. It very well could be us and the Swedes that team up on this.
 
What could be in the works is the development of a 6th gen fighter with the SK’s, us and the Swedes. I am sure that there are many many moving parts behind the scenes that we are not aware of.
Would a 6th gen fighter developed with SK and Swedes work for you?

This is the same company and country that still tries to downplay the value of stealth because they didn't have the ability to build truly stealthy aircraft. Can't wait to hear from Saab how AI isn't necessary for 6th gen. I don't expect Saab's 6th gen to be more capable than an F-35.

A major difference between us joining with say the Brits, Italy and whoever in a ‘workshare’ program is that wouldn’t give us the ability to build an entire aircraft independently ourselves. From an initial read of the G&M article it looks like we will be building the entire plane here in Canada. That’s much different than a workshare program where we might build only the landing gear, flaps and rudder of a plane.

The Globe and Mail article really doesn't say that. It doesn't say how much is being moved over. And localizing the supply chain entirely would be an insane effort that would absolutely balloon the cost of all the aircraft.

But also for our industry. Again, companies are going to get a piece of 70 frames. And lose out on the several hundred GCAP will sell.

The Ukrainian LoI is only different than our LoI for the F35 by 2 things; 1) ours stipulates the buying of 16 of the 88 first and then the future possible purchase of the rest; 2) we can afford to buy 88 if we decide to do so.

Again, Ukraine doesn't have the economy to buy 150 Gripens @ €182M apiece (going by Colombia's order). I think Ukraine is hoping allies fund this. And if the line needs to keep running, the ally that will be funding it, is Canada.

If we go with SK subs and the SK use Bombardiers Global 6500 in their AEW planes

I think it's a foregone conclusion that we'll get the Globaleye if this Saab deal goes through.

People need to understand. This deal happens and we're Saab's bitch.
 
This is the same company and country that still tries to downplay the value of stealth because they didn't have the ability to build truly stealthy aircraft. Can't wait to hear from Saab how AI isn't necessary for 6th gen. I don't expect Saab's 6th gen to be more capable than an F-35.
Maybe that’s where Canada’s lead in AI will be used for this development.
The U of Waterloo is among the best of the best in the areas of computer science, physics, math. This area of expertise can very well be used going forward to develop our own stealth technology.
The Globe and Mail article really doesn't say that. It doesn't say how much is being moved over. And localizing the supply chain entirely would be an insane effort that would absolutely balloon the cost of all the aircraft.

But also for our industry. Again, companies are going to get a piece of 70 frames. And lose out on the several hundred GCAP will sell.
We will have to see what the final number of F35 turns out to be. All this hand wringing might turn out to be nothing at all.

Again, Ukraine doesn't have the economy to buy 150 Gripens @ €182M apiece (going by Colombia's order). I think Ukraine is hoping allies fund this. And if the line needs to keep running, the ally that will be funding it, is Canada.
True the Ukkies are broke. Colombia’s contract includes the building of new facilities to house/maintain their Gripens. I think this cost could be excluded from the Ukkies price. They have depth of knowledge/experience on the engineering/building side to build maintain their own facilities.

I think it's a foregone conclusion that we'll get the Globaleye if this Saab deal goes through.
Could very well be. But does it mean that we couldn’t expand the capabilities of the Globaleye to include AAR in the future?

People need to understand. This deal happens and we're Saab's bitch.
Does that mean we’ll be the Hanwha’s bitch if we do a deal with them on the subs?
 
There's no Ukrainian order. It's an LOI. They don't have money to pay for 150 jets.

Guess who's going to be paying for those aircraft? That's what our aid to Ukraine is going to be once the factory is built.
Yes, it is a LoI which nine times out of ten leads to it happening. Regardless of who bank rolls it, an order is an order, and that equals jobs, investment and building an industry.

This is potentially a golden opportunity for canadian aviation to return. DeHaviland wants into the light and medium tactical transport game, Saab and Bombardier in the fighter jet and EW game, we have the potential to rebuild an entire domestic military aviation industry not seen since the 60s.
 
Yes, it is a LoI which nine times out of ten leads to it happening. Regardless of who bank rolls it, an order is an order, and that equals jobs, investment and building an industry.

This is potentially a golden opportunity for canadian aviation to return. DeHaviland wants into the light and medium tactical transport game, Saab and Bombardier in the fighter jet and EW game, we have the potential to rebuild an entire domestic military aviation industry not seen since the 60s.

It's not Canadian aviation when you're just an assembly line plant for another country's components. Canada - the lego set assembler. The real engineering will still happen outside the country.
 
From a set of inputs I added into ChatGPT:

Yes — if Canada selects Hanwha’s submarine design (likely the KSS-III variant or a customized Canadian AIP/SSK design), it further increases the odds of a Canada–South Korea–Sweden 6th-generation fighter partnership.

This would be a major geopolitical and industrial shift, and it strengthens the triangle in several ways.

Below is a clear, realistic breakdown.

✅

1. Choosing Hanwha submarines would dramatically deepen Canada–Korea defense ties

Until now, Canada and South Korea have had mainly commercial links — not deep military-industrial ties.

A submarine deal would change that.

✔ Canada becomes a major Korean defense customer

A submarine program is $20–60 billion over its lifetime.
This creates:
  • shared technology management
  • shared training systems
  • shared R&D
  • shared shipyard engineering
  • long-term after-service agreements
These are the exact kinds of ties that precede fighter co-development in other countries.
✔ South Korea gains confidence in Canada as an industrial partner

If Canada trusts Korea for submarines — among the most sensitive platforms — then Korea will trust Canada for:
  • secure communications development
  • stealth materials
  • electronics suites
  • joint fighter engine testing
  • weapons integration
Trust is the currency of joint 6th-gen fighter projects.

✔ Korea becomes invested in Canadian industrial capacity

If Canadian shipyards or engineering centers are involved in a Hanwha submarine project, Korea becomes economically tied to Canada — making a future aerospace partnership more natural.

Scenario
Estimated Probability of a Joint 6th-Gen Jet
Before anything~10%
After Gripen production + Korean AEW on Global 6500~30–40%
After Canada buys Hanwha submarines~50–60%

With a submarine deal, the odds cross into “a real possibility” territory.

🧩

5. Why the submarine choice matters so much

✔ Submarines require highly sensitive information sharing

This includes:
  • acoustic signatures
  • AIP systems
  • combat management systems
  • weapon integration
  • stealth hull materials
  • sonar algorithms

If Korea shares this with Canada, it signals a strategic intimacy far beyond normal defense trade.

✔ Long program timelines align with fighter development

Submarines and fighters both have 25–40 year development cycles.

Shared timelines create natural windows for joint R&D transitions.

✔ Cross-domain integration becomes possible

Future warfare revolves around:
  • air–sea sensor fusion
  • AI networks
  • shared drone swarms
  • undersea-to-air data links
A Canada–Korea submarine partnership could feed directly into next-gen combat cloud development — a core part of any 6th-gen fighter.

🚨

6. What remains the final barrier?

Only one major obstacle remains:

❗ Canada must politically commit to being a “producer nation,” not just a buyer

This means:
  • committing billions over decades
  • forming a national defense industrial strategy
  • guaranteeing domestic production for fighters and subs
  • shifting procurement culture away from U.S. defaults
If Canada does that, the partnership becomes not only possible but strategically natural.

🎯

Yes — if Canada buys Hanwha submarines, the probability of a Canada–Sweden–South Korea 6th-generation fighter partnership rises substantially.

Combined with:
  • Gripens built in Canada
  • Korea adopting Bombardier AEW aircraft
…this forms the strongest industrial and geopolitical foundation Canada has ever had for joining a next-generation fighter design program.

Canada would go from being “a customer nation” to a true co-developer, which is a precondition for any 6th-generation project.

✅
2. Sweden benefits indirectly

You might not expect it, but Sweden is strengthened too:

✔ Sweden prefers partners who diversify away from U.S. supply chains

A Canada–Korea submarine partnership signals that Canada is opening its defense markets and reducing reliance on U.S. military procurement.

Sweden sees that as a green light to pursue deeper industrial fusion.

✔ Sweden and Korea already share interests in naval + aerospace innovation

Both nations are mid-sized powers that rely on high-tech solutions rather than huge fleets.

A tri-national 6th-gen partnership fits their strategic style.

⭐
3. Strategic Triangular Effect: Gripen + AEW + Submarines

If all of the following happen:

🇨🇦

Bombardier + Saab build Gripens in Canada
– Canada and Sweden lock in a long-term aerospace partnership.

🇰🇷
South Korea adopts the Bombardier Global 6500 for AEW

– Korea connects its airborne early warning needs to Canadian aerospace.

🇨🇦
Canada adopts Hanwha submarines

– Canada and Korea form a deep naval-industrial alliance.

➜ Outcome: A powerful three-way strategic bond

This becomes very similar to the industrial ecosystems behind major fighter programs like:
  • GCAP (UK–Japan–Italy)
  • FCAS (France–Germany–Spain
These programs formed after decades of cross-platform defense ties.

Canada–Sweden–Korea could replicate this structure.

📈
4. How much does this change the probability?

Let’s quantify the rough, conceptual odds:
 
It's not Canadian aviation when you're just an assembly line plant for another country's components. Canada - the lego set assembler. The real engineering will still happen outside the country.
Thats purely speculation on your part, we dont know what the deal would look like in terms of manufacturing but it would not be profitable or logical to just do final assembly in canada only as the current sub component factories cannot keeo up which is why Saab needs a second production line and feeder facilities
 
It's one thing to split the fleet. And another to shrink the F-35 order to such a small number (32 frames) so that we end up with basically all the overhead of the fleet but a lot less combat power. 32 jets in the fleet means about 20 jets that are combat coded (to use an American term). 50 was about the minimum fleet size to get one gun squadron each of 15 frames in Cold Lake and Bagotville.

This is exactly what is being proposed. I don't know why people keep ignoring this part. The rumour is a drastic reduction of the F-35 buy from 88 to 32-40, as per the Globe and Mail leak.
I'm 100% with you on the numbers. 32 x F-35's is not enough. So few that it creates deployment and support issues (as well as capability issues especially in the NATO/China missions) and such a big cut from the original order that it would definitely cause unnecessary friction with the US.

I've consistently said that ideally we should get the full 88 x F-35's or at the very least the original 65 x F-35's that the RCAF originally said was required. That is a large enough fleet to meet your 50 minimum to have two gun squadrons to deploy for the NATO role plus a couple of extras to QB Gripens for the NORAD Role. It's also fulfills the original stated requirement by the RCAF so should minimize complaints by the US.
Also a lot of the low end work that those aircraft used to do in the past can be done cheaply and safely today with drones. We don't need 400 manned fighters. The goal should be something like an inventory of 100 manned and 300 unmanned with that 300 divided up between some portion of CCAs, Cat 5 CUAS operated by the air force and Cat 3/4 drones operates by (or in support of) the army and navy.
Agreed that much of the roles currently done by manned aircraft will be done by unmanned systems in the future. These systems use much of the same technology and industrial base as are used in manned aircraft production. Getting into fighter production with the Gripen can set us up for future unmanned system production using the same supply chains and manufacturing facilities. Gripen production doesn't just have to be about producing Gripens, it can be about creating a domestic military aviation production ecosystem beyond just the sub-component sector that we currently have.
But does it mean that we couldn’t expand the capabilities of the Globaleye to include AAR in the future?
I share your concerns about the Globaleye not having an AAR capability. I think the GOC should flatly state to Bombardier that if they want the AEW contract they need to add that capability. Before anyone moans about how difficult it is to change the design of an aircraft to add that capability I'd point out that the Gloster Aircraft Company was producing the Gloster Gladiator II (the last British Biplane) up until 1940 and in 1944 the Gloster Meteor was the first operational Allied jet fighter. I'm sure that if there is the will there is a way.
It's not Canadian aviation when you're just an assembly line plant for another country's components. Canada - the lego set assembler. The real engineering will still happen outside the country.
It was part of the latest announcement that Saab would enable more that just assembly in Canada:
“If Canada wants to create sovereign capabilities and to do their own upgrades, to build parts of it, to do final assembly and test, we are prepared to do that,” said Johansson. “We could do a technology transfer to Canada and support that build up.”
Also as part of the original 2022 offer Saab was to establish a "Gripen Centre" and an "Aerospace R&D Centre" in Canada.
The first of these centers is the “Gripen Center”, which will be managed by Canadians and will host the Canadian fighter mission system. The hosting of the fighter mission system includes the ability to conduct domestic research and development for the system, along with the opportunity to perform technology upgrades in order to respond to ever-evolving threats. These capabilities will provide Canada with a fighter mission system that is not only built in Canada but can meet Canada’s domestic, NORAD and NATO obligations. In addition, the Gripen Center will also play a key role in the coordination of the sustainment of Gripen and its associated systems, including upgrades, fleet management, repairs and modifications.
The second center to be established is the “Aerospace R&D Center” which will be co-located with the Gripen Center and be focused on developing a rich ecosystem for research and innovation, representing a key component of Saab’s long-term vision in Canada. The Aerospace R&D Center will support the development, test and production of the next generation aerospace systems and components to complement the existing Canadian aerospace industry. Areas of research could include unmanned aerial systems, Artificial Intelligence and environmentally friendly aviation technologies. These initiatives will be conducted with Canadian engineers, scientists, academia and government organisations within an innovative and collaborative environment. Sweden and Canada are a perfect match in these and in other areas. In time, new areas of research will arise that will provide further opportunities to industrialise valuable research in Canada with an eye to global export markets.
So we'd be looking at more of a joint venture that simply assembly of a foreign product.
 
Fully realizing that this is just a possible outcome put together by ChatGPT-

Great — here’s a concrete, plausible 2025–2045 timeline that shows how a Canada–Sweden–South Korea 6th-generation fighter partnership could form given the three enabling moves you described (Bombardier + Saab Gripen production in Canada; Korea adopting Bombardier Global 6500 + L3Harris AEW; Canada buying Hanwha submarines). I’ll include key milestones, decision points, actors, estimated cost/time ranges, likelihoods at each stage, and recommended next actions/policies to maximize the chance it happens.








2025–2030 — Foundation & Trust (establish industrial links

Objective: Build trusted industrial relationships, execute initial procurements, create joint R&D links.

  • 2025
    • Bombardier + Saab sign MOUs and initial contracts for Gripen assembly in Canada (finalize industrial participation plan).
    • South Korea finalizes AEW purchase: Bombardier Global 6500 + L3Harris mission system (contract award / support agreements).
    • Canada awards Hanwha submarine contract (or signs a Letter-of-Intent) — begins shipyard/tech transfer planning.
    • Outputs: Industrial teams formed, initial tech-transfer roadmaps, joint working groups.
    • Probability these happen (by end 2025): medium–high if domestic politics align (60–75%).

  • 2026–2028
    • Gripen assembly line established in Canada; first Canadian-assembled jets enter regional test/acceptance programs. Local supply chain ramps (composites, avionics, tooling).
    • Korea receives first AEW aircraft and opens maintenance/training links with Bombardier/Canadian firms.
    • Hanwha submarine program begins in Canadian yards (construction, integration, training). Korean engineers co-based in Canada for transfer.
    • Industrial effect: Canadian engineers gain experience in stealth coatings, avionics integration, systems integration, and classified supply-chain handling.
    • Probability that capability baseline is achieved (by 2028): medium (50–65%).







Why this matters: these are the trust-building, capability-building steps that convert Canada from “customer” to “producer” — a precondition for co-development of advanced fighters.








2029–2034 — Joint R&D & Formal Consortium (create governance)








Objective: Move from bilateral programs to a formal trilateral R&D consortium targeting next-gen technologies (sensors, AI, data-fusion, engines).





  • 2029
    • Saab, Bombardier (or its Canadian successors), Hanwha/KAI, and leading Canadian institutes sign a formal R&D consortium charter. Governments sign cost-sharing framework for pre-development (TRL 3–6) funding.
    • Primary workstreams: sensor fusion, secure datalinks/Combat Cloud, loyal wingman (drone) integration, Arctic/sea-denied operations, materials & low-observable treatments, and engine co-development feasibility.
    • Funding: joint public R&D commitments (combined) of $1–3B over 3–5 years (rough ballpark).
    • Probability consortium forms (by 2029): medium (45–60%) — depends on political winds and budget cycles.

  • 2030–2032
    • Demonstrator projects: prototypes for sensor-fusion nodes, AI mission-assist systems, and a medium-sized loyal-wingman drone jointly prototyped and flight-tested (multinational trials).
    • Shared maritime–air data links tested using Canadian Hanwha subs + Korean AEW assets + Gripen test aircraft. (Important cross-domain integration proof.)
    • Outputs: validated tech building blocks, classified information-sharing protocols, industrial IP agreements.
    • Probability these demonstrators succeed (by 2032): medium (50%).

  • 2033–2034
    • Consortium produces a “Pre-System Definition” report outlining architectures, rough cost estimates, production roles, and risk register. Governments consider formal program approval to move into System Definition & full development.
    • Decision point: Each government must commit to multi-decade funding (20–25 years) to move beyond R&D.
    • Probability governments commit (conditional on good demo results): moderate (30–50%).










2035–2040 — System Definition & Full Development (program launch)








Objective: Full program approval, development of a 6th-gen demonstrator/engine prototype, begin production planning.





  • 2035
    • If political approvals are obtained, consortium converts into a formal Joint Program Office (JPO) with seats for Canada, Sweden, South Korea. Roles agreed roughly as:
      • Sweden (Saab): systems integration, EW, avionics, sensor fusion, airframe architecture.
      • South Korea (KAI/Hanwha): primary airframe production, flight testing, manufacturing scale, avionics assembly.
      • Canada (Bombardier/CAE/P&WC): engines (P&WC co-develop or partner), training systems, simulation, Arctic hardening, MRO, and Combat Cloud backbone.

    • Funding: Development stage budget $20–50B (very rough, contingent on ambition).
    • Probability of launch given strong political will and positive demos: moderate (30–50%).

  • 2036–2039
    • Development: prototypes, ground testing, engine testing (possible multinational engine program or licensed US engine cooperation if needed), software integration (AI/Autonomy stacks), and classified security regimes established.
    • Loyal-wingman integration and manned/unmanned teaming matured in testbeds.
    • Export control work to ensure access to critical subsystems (sensors, specialized semiconductors) — this may require negotiated waivers or third-party suppliers.
    • Risks: US export controls on cutting-edge tech; budget overruns; political changes. Mitigations: redundancy in supply, phased commitments, bilateral defense diplomatic efforts.

  • 2039–2040
    • First full-scale demonstrator flight (non-production) — shows core mission systems (sensor fusion, stealth signature, survivability).
    • Probability demonstrator flies successfully (by 2040): conditional moderate (40–60%) — high technical risk.










2041–2045 — Production & Operational Fielding








Objective: Final design freeze, low-rate initial production (LRIP), fielding with partner air forces.





  • 2041–2043
    • Design freeze and LRIP begins (small initial batch for operational testing). Domestic industrial yards convert to production lines.
    • Simultaneous ramp in training & MRO infrastructure (Canada’s CAE leads multi-national pilot/simulator programs).
    • Costs: initial unit cost likely high; program lifetime could exceed $60–100B across partners.
    • Probability program reaches LRIP (by 2043): risky but possible (30–45%).

  • 2044–2045
    • Operational squadrons begin to form in participating air forces. Export opportunities discussed with close allies (UK, Australia, NATO partners).
    • Ongoing upgrades planned (software-first approach allows iterative capability enhancements).
    • Probability of operational service (by 2045): conditional and optimistic scenario only (25–40%).
















Key Decision Points & Political Requirements (short list)








  1. Canada commits to long-term aerospace industrial policy (25+ year funding horizon) — without this, partnership collapses.
  2. Sweden opts for a smaller coalition path rather than deepening ties with GCAP/European projects.
  3. South Korea chooses to invest post-KF-21 in an external co-development rather than purely domestic continuation.
  4. Export controls and critical tech access must be negotiated (especially for semiconductors, some sensors, and advanced engines).
  5. Public buy-in & parliamentary approval in all three countries to sustain multi-decade budgets.
















Risks & Mitigations








  • Risk: US export controls / diplomatic pushback.
    • Mitigation: Early diplomatic engagement with the U.S.; seek tech waivers; design modularity so certain subsystems can be swapped for US-origin parts if necessary.

  • Risk: Political change / budget cutoffs.
    • Mitigation: Staggered funding with phased milestones, legally-binding industrial participation agreements, and diversified political support (bipartisan framing).

  • Risk: Technical complexity / cost overruns.
    • Mitigation: Heavy emphasis on demonstrators, software-first architecture, digital twins, strong program management, independent cost oversight.

  • Risk: Doctrinal mismatch (Arctic vs Pacific needs).
    • Mitigation: Design with modular mission-packages and software-configurable modes; shared operational concepts developed early.
















Metrics to Track (how you’d know momentum is real)








  • Number of jointly-funded R&D projects and their TRL progress (e.g., sensor fusion demonstrator success).
  • Level of classified tech transfer agreements signed (e.g., engine co-development MOUs).
  • Concrete industrial investments (new factories, co-owned shipyards, test ranges).
  • Parliamentary budget line items with multi-year commitments.
  • Joint military exercises demonstrating cross-domain integration (sub + AEW + fighters).
















Recommended Immediate Actions (for policy makers / industry)








  1. Canada: publish a national aerospace industrial strategy with explicit fighter R&D goals and a 10–20 year funding envelope.
  2. Sweden/Korea: negotiate an early trilateral MOU that locks IP-sharing principles and export-control approaches.
  3. All parties: fund a 3–5 year demonstrator program focused on sensor fusion, Combat Cloud, and loyal-wingman integration.
  4. Secure contingency plans for critical subsystems (engines, chips) — e.g., partner with trusted suppliers or invest in domestic alternatives.
  5. Public diplomacy: create a joint white paper explaining strategic rationale to build political consensus.
















Bottom Line (short)








If Bombardier + Saab build Gripens in Canada, South Korea adopts the Global 6500 AEW (Bombardier + L3Harris), and Canada buys Hanwha submarines, the probability of a Canada–Sweden–South Korea 6th-gen fighter shifts from “unlikely” to plausible. With disciplined funding, a formal trilateral consortium, demonstrator success, and skillful diplomacy (especially around export controls), a realistic timeline for a demonstrator → development → low-rate production spans ~2030–2045, with operational fielding in the mid-to-late 2040s in an optimistic scenario.
 
The greatest benefit that Sweden and South Korea could give to Canada is teaching us how to rely on ourselves and market ourselves. They are both very good at it.

Small countries with constrained resources that are internationally known.

Samsung and Ikea
Bofors, Saab, Hagglunds
Hyundai, Kia, Hanwha.

What are our Canadian equivalents?
 
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