The Reconnaissance Brigade

[KevinB]

I think that this struggle is the result of the CA being a small force which holds itself out with a characteristic of being agile and adaptive.

Oh I just don't see the LAV Symmetrical Army as being agile or adaptive

Being small force means not having the national assets that a larger force has. It means you have to rely on being part of a coalition that supplies those assets and that you fully integrate into those larger forces so as to be able to effectively make use of those assets.

National Assets don't necessarily relate to force size - the problem is most of NATO has abrogated those capabilities to the US Government.
Which really causes issue if you don't have Team USA in the corner.

Being a smaller force which also has responsibilities for homeland security means being able to operate with only the national assets that your own country provides for that mission.

That's where I see the problem. The CA cannot be "agile" and "adaptive" enough in a given unit or formation to effectively switch roles. There are doctrine, equipment and training issues that are specific to each. I'm not sure if we've ever actually figured out homeland defence needs in sufficient detail to properly assign assets to the role (I shudder every time I think of Arctic Response Companies - what is really needed are anti-access/area denial systems with an appropriate national policy on when and how they pull the trigger).

Unless Canada all of a sudden starts spending 10% on the CAF and other GoC departments dealing with defense and intelligence issues, the Cyber and Anti Satellite/C-GSR abilities are not going to materialize. Within NORAD you have that from US DOD and the various three letters here.

I think the LIB's can fill a Arctic Response role as a secondary duty - but more symbolic to show the flag by jumping in somewhere - and then hopefully supported by BV's or something better than ski's or snowshoes.

All that to say that you need to focus on whatever slice of scenario you favour - which at this point in time needs to be, in part, LSCO in Latvia. And you need to see that in the light of a Canadian led brigade within a multi-national division (with few enablers) and a multinational corps (with few enablers). That makes the problem solving difficult but realistic. One might go so far as to have a contingency plan for an eventual Canadian-led multinational division in the Baltic states. Quite rightly, because of the speculative nature of that role, it should be highly reserve heavy.

Agreed - but I think the CAF needs to heavily think on what the current and future LSCO will be.

IMHO. Whatever the end result is for that scenario, it will be quite different for the homeland security scenario. I'm not sure how much intellectual effort is going into the planning for the continental defence system. Ships - submarines - for sure. UAV reconnaissance and fighter based strikes - you bet. But army - not so much. We've discussed long range precision rockets in another thread, and I think that's a good start and a logical next step would be something in the nature of a Multi-Domain Task Force (I guess Pan-Domain Task Force in Canadianese) tied in with NORAD. And, yes, a PDTF is a brigade-sized asset and yes, IMHO, a PDTF primarily operates as a recce/strike functioning asset albeit a considerably different one than whatever we put into Europe.

IMHO planning for continental defense for Canada is a mugs game - yes pull your weight with the RCAF and RCN - but DoD has an impossible stick to beat anyone with - so I wouldn't set the Army up for that -- I would have a Light and Medium Response force for other areas of interest.

So. Long story short. I see the need for two distinct "armies" for Canada. One "army" based around the core of a possible multi-national division (with sufficient sustainment/reinforcement/replacement capability) operating within a multi-national corps with few enablers. The other "army" should be a division (formed around a PDTF recce/strike brigade) tied in to both NORAD and US Northern Command relying on both Canadian and US national level defence enablers with sufficient "manoeuvre" brigades and sustainment resources structured for operations in Canada.

Again I don't see the need for a specific Canadian Defense Army - the MDTF is a theater/corps support system that is needed for external operations - but not necessarily domestically due to NORAD and the US assets.

(All of which makes me rethink that my two division army structure needs some major fine tuning but is workable.

Very true. Economy of Effort has always been a principle of war here. It still applies. Secondly, the revival and diversification of air defence and Trophy-like systems may, to a large extent, neutralize the drone and ATGM successes of recent years. There may be more scope for manoeuvre in the future but one thing is for sure - we need a much better defence industry and much cleaner/shorter procurement cycles.

110%

I think in terms of special reconnaissance reverting to Long Range Reconnaissance Patrols (LRPPs) and coast watcher type organizations that can go to work in areas where your satellites and radars and UAVs can't or can't efficiently (assuming they survive the anti-satellite/C-UAV/anti-radar battle). Probably as a theatre level resource.

SR is a SOF task - it isn't LRPP, and true SR has been misconstrued by a lot of the vanilla SOF elements.

That and those who assigned to conduct sabotage; who can connect with dissidents in enemy territory and foment resistance and sabotage that you are probably already thinkin of. To that I would add a modified form of foreign internal defence. For example training our elements of our own populations in remote northern and coastal communities in the operation, servicing and defence of military systems that need to be operated in the north and on the coasts to expand our surveillance capabilities.

Yes to me that is more along the lines of what is needed.

We can't keep our special forces on stand-by training and waiting for a door kicker hostage rescue opportunity. (And yes, yes, I know - they do a lot more than that) All that I'm saying is we need to examine if there is a new repertoire of activities (beyond the core counter-terrorism/counter-insurgency that has become SOF's bread and butter) that are more relevant to today's needs.

You do need a PR asset, as well as a HVT entity - there are many roles for SOF - both white and black side that one could expand CANSOF significantly and still have roles that need filling.

You're right though. They aren't merely a part of the recce/cavalry doctrine.

It's becoming a tough time to be a soldier - more and more requirements are being added to be proficient in - and there are only so many hours in the day... Specialization is becoming a larger and larger issue - despite forces not wanting to do that.

 

[PrairieFella]

I'd recommend upping your maint MRT numbers, you'd likely want 2 x Recovery vehicles, 2 Veh MRT, 1 Wpns MRT, 1 EO MRT, and 1 Mat MRT w/welding trailer

You'd basically need an SSM's fast pack per element plus a full A2 Ech. I think the Armoured Sqn's A1 and A2 w h would fit nicely in this concept.

 

[quadrapiper]

SR is a SOF task - it isn't LRPP, and true SR has been misconstrued by a lot of the vanilla SOF elements.

Asking from a point of zero knowledge, what's the difference, and how has it been misconstrued?

It's becoming a tough time to be a soldier - more and more requirements are being added to be proficient in - and there are only so many hours in the day... Specialization is becoming a larger and larger issue - despite forces not wanting to do that.

Swerving the topic... this seems like an argument for higher pay at an earlier career point: if Pte Bloggins needs to be operating at an elevated level from historical expectations (i.e., whenever the pay baselines and civil service benchmarking were set) then compensation should increase accordingly.

Are there unit (versus school) training/garrison routine lessons to be drawn from SOF practices that would make maintaining proficiency more feasible?

 

[KevinB]

Asking from a point of zero knowledge, what's the difference, and how has it been misconstrued?

Each Military (and sometimes branch) will have a different take, but most LRRP roles fell under SOF around the Vietnam conflict. The USMC was a late hold out not really getting into SOF until GWOT. But it’s infantry recce patrolling just over longer ranges than a typical BN Recce detachment would do, and the teams are generally larger. Wearing uniforms and overtly carrying weapons, and while some may not be fighting patrols trying to find something to fight, the members are acknowledged military forces.

SR is covert, sometimes not wearing uniforms, the goal isn’t to encounter anyone, just observe and report. Sometimes in deniable areas, so it’s a black side SOF or IC role.

Sitting on a mountain in one’s multicam isn’t SR unless your covertly imbedded into another countries military…

Swerving the topic... this seems like an argument for higher pay at an earlier career point: if Pte Bloggins needs to be operating at an elevated level from historical expectations (i.e., whenever the pay baselines and civil service benchmarking were set) then compensation should increase accordingly.

Honestly the only so much time in the day issue has been the problem since man picked up a rock. The issue is now that as medical knowledge, comms, etc have developed now the soldier requires that much more to become proficient and stay current. So your generalist isn’t going to be able to do everything well anymore, and so you’re needing even more specialized areas of expertise, which in turn generally makes teams larger to cover every aspect that needs to be, both in terms of tasks, but also operational manning.

Are there unit (versus school) training/garrison routine lessons to be drawn from SOF practices that would make maintaining proficiency more feasible?

Even tier 1 entities have only so much time in the day. High levels of deployment hurt readiness and lead to troop burn out.
So it’s best to have a good ratio of deployment to garrison, and keep the garrison training as realistic and demanding as possible while also ensuring that troops have a life outside of ‘kick door turn left’.

 

[Fabius]

Are there unit (versus school) training/garrison routine lessons to be drawn from SOF practices that would make maintaining proficiency more feasible?

Not necessarily SOF related but here a few thoughts:

1. Less personnel churn. Personnel need to be in a specific position for 2-3 years. Not switch job and function every 3-4 months.

2. Units need to be staffed to something like 105%. This is too allow for personnel stability and ease of backfill for stuff like TCAT, Crses, PATA.

3. Better HR planning. Note I didn’t say career planning ( that too often is seen to equal rank advancement) Personnel need to have a progression path inside the specialization and need to be employed in that specialization repeatedly and consistently.

4. Resources need to be easily available and plentiful so personnel can get sets and reps using the tools without needing to jump through 3-4 months of staff effort 2-3 levels up. This is everything from a soldier’s individual kit, to ammo, to ranges, to simulation, etc.

 

[FJAG]

SR is a SOF task - it isn't LRPP, and true SR has been misconstrued by a lot of the vanilla SOF elements.

Where my head is at here is this. There are recce and cavalry tasks and roles which effectively operate with manoeuvre units and formations. That effectively is the topic of this thread. When discussing a recce bde, my thought turns to discussing and evaluating such things as former US armoured cavalry regiments or the current UKs 1 Deep Strike BCT. Effectively they are tied directly to providing support to a corps or division.

OTOH, I think of SOF as a national or, at the lowest, a theatre level asset. When we start talking special forces, our thought processes have been greatly influenced by the GWOT, especially in the US where the last two decades have seen an explosion of SF growth and an almost universal gravitation to direct action missions. Canada has fallen into line with JTF2 and the CSOR albeit at a lower scale but with similar concepts.

While the GWOT hasn't gone away, the operational tempo is down from what it was during Afghanistan and Iraq. I frankly do not want to see a reduction in SOF PYs in Canada. You need a certain critical mass to keep a skill set healthy.

I see LRRP as the granddaddy of SR. Coast watching as well. Many of the current US and Commonwealth SOF organizations originally got their start in those fields. There is much technology in surveillance, but we shouldn't discount the back-up that is available from properly trained, equipped and led local resources on the ground.

IMHO planning for continental defense for Canada is a mugs game - yes pull your weight with the RCAF and RCN - but DoD has an impossible stick to beat anyone with - so I wouldn't set the Army up for that -- I would have a Light and Medium Response force for other areas of interest.

I don't think that it's a mug's game at all, although too many in the CAF wish it would go away so that they can concentrate on the sexier aspect of combat. Northern defence is a government priority - and I think it's one the CAF should actually be concerned about if for no other reason than to keep our southern neighbours from thinking they have to do it by default. Yup, its primarily an RCAF and RCN job but in the CAF, if you do not prove your relevance on a daily basis then you become irrelevant and in time disappear as the PY harvesters wander the unit lines looking for PYs to fill more cubicles in Ottawa.

IMHO, the army needs to be serious about offering viable forces for continental three-ocean defences.

Again I don't see the need for a specific Canadian Defense Army - the MDTF is a theater/corps support system that is needed for external operations - but not necessarily domestically due to NORAD and the US assets.

MDTF's have their genesis because the US Army saw itself being crowded out by new operating concepts floated by the US Navy and USAF to oppose great power conflict. The US Army saw it as their contribution to oppose A2/AD being fielded by their adversaries (which is why the US hasn't put one up north). But when you look at the MDTFs' elements they can also form the backbone of an A2/AD system. The army made MDTFs joint which the USN and USAF, per se, are not. MDTFs were the US Army's way of establishing relevance in a new field just before we all saw in Ukraine what new LSCO would look like.

You're right, a MDTF is a theatre resource. I see our three-ocean coastline as a theatre whose defence needs require a joint response. NORAD isn't joint - combined? yes, joint? no. Neither is the USN nor the RCN. What exactly a pan-domain northern brigade should look like and where it fits in between NORAD, CJOC and US Northern Command and what resources it brings to the table and which is shared or contributed by others is something that needs exploring.

 

[GR66]

Copied and pasted the discussion between @FJAG and @KevinB rather then quoted because seeing both parts of the conversation give better context. @KevinB's original comments are in white text with my added comments in yellow.

I think that this struggle is the result of the CA being a small force which holds itself out with a characteristic of being agile and adaptive.

Oh I just don't see the LAV Symmetrical Army as being agile or adaptive

I think it's generally agreed that symmetrical Brigades are out which I think allows more opportunity for a degree of agility and adaptiveness since you don't need to have a single Brigade type adapting for the whole range of conflict types. Instead each Brigade type (Mech and Light) only needs to adapt to a narrower range of conflict types.

As for the size of the CA, couldn't that actually be an advantage in being agile and adaptive with the right mindset and leadership (and funding) since pivoting a small organization should be easier than a large one?

Being small force means not having the national assets that a larger force has. It means you have to rely on being part of a coalition that supplies those assets and that you fully integrate into those larger forces so as to be able to effectively make use of those assets.

National Assets don't necessarily relate to force size - the problem is most of NATO has abrogated those capabilities to the US Government.
Which really causes issue if you don't have Team USA in the corner.

For homeland defence we have NORAD which provides us the "national assets" we require. Since defence of Canada greatly contributes to the defence of the USA I don't see having access to those national assets being withdrawn.

For Latvia, NATO by its very nature is a coalition effort which integrates various national forces. Sadly, as @KevinB notes European NATO members have abrogated the bulk of the high-level capabilities to the US. In the case of a NATO-Russia conflict there are three possibilities:

1. The US remains in NATO and fully honours its Article 5 commitment. In this case our forces in Latvia will have full access to the national-level assets provided by the US and other NATO partners.
2. The US remains in NATO but withdraws the bulk of its forces from Europe for cost saving/re-alignment toward the Pacific. In this scenario if war were to occur between NATO and Russia the US would still share its high level national assets with NATO but the bulk of the combat would be the responsibility of the European NATO members.
3. The US withdraws from NATO and stands aside in a NATO-Russia conflict. In this case we'd only have access to those capabilities available within NATO itself which would certainly impact capabilities significantly, but European NATO combined definitely retains significant overmatch in manpower, equipment and economic power over Russia and in many cases Russia lacks those high-level capabilities as well.

Where the lack of national level assets would hurt Canada most would be in a scenario where we have the need to project power outside Canada (or Europe) without American involvement. The question is which specific capabilities which we currently lack would be most critical?

Being a smaller force which also has responsibilities for homeland security means being able to operate with only the national assets that your own country provides for that mission.

That's where I see the problem. The CA cannot be "agile" and "adaptive" enough in a given unit or formation to effectively switch roles. There are doctrine, equipment and training issues that are specific to each. I'm not sure if we've ever actually figured out homeland defence needs in sufficient detail to properly assign assets to the role (I shudder every time I think of Arctic Response Companies - what is really needed are anti-access/area denial systems with an appropriate national policy on when and how they pull the trigger).

Unless Canada all of a sudden starts spending 10% on the CAF and other GoC departments dealing with defense and intelligence issues, the Cyber and Anti Satellite/C-GSR abilities are not going to materialize. Within NORAD you have that from US DOD and the various three letters here.

I think the LIB's can fill a Arctic Response role as a secondary duty - but more symbolic to show the flag by jumping in somewhere - and then hopefully supported by BV's or something better than ski's or snowshoes.

The homeland security/defence role as noted is largely a RCAF/RCN task (with the capabilities of NORAD behind them) but definitely the Light Battalions need to be properly equipped and regularly trained for operations in our Arctic. The biggest missing element I think though isn't necessarily military, it's infrastructure.

In any conflict in the Canadian Arctic it should feel like we have a definite homefield advantage, however in many ways it would be more like two expeditionary forces engaging each other with Canada having the advantage of lesser distances. A significant increase in Arctic infrastructure (and population) - both military and civilian - would make a big difference and strengthen our sovereignty over our territory in general.

All that to say that you need to focus on whatever slice of scenario you favour - which at this point in time needs to be, in part, LSCO in Latvia. And you need to see that in the light of a Canadian led brigade within a multi-national division (with few enablers) and a multinational corps (with few enablers). That makes the problem solving difficult but realistic. One might go so far as to have a contingency plan for an eventual Canadian-led multinational division in the Baltic states. Quite rightly, because of the speculative nature of that role, it should be highly reserve heavy.

Agreed - but I think the CAF needs to heavily think on what the current and future LSCO will be.

While I support our current deployment in Latvia in support of our NATO allies I don't think we should make LSCO in Europe the primary focus of our army. If current events have shown us anything it's that we need to focus on our own national interest first. Of course it's in our interest to help keep authoritarian powers like Russia from attacking our friends and allies and disrupting the global order (such that it still is) so maintain our current Brigade commitment and provide our forces the tools they need to fulfill that role but I don't think we should focus on structuring the CA around deploying and maintaining a heavy Division in combat in Europe.

Firstly, while Russia may be an existential threat to the frontline NATO members like the Baltic States, Finland and Poland, it simply isn't an existential threat to NATO as a whole (beyond the nuclear threat of course which requires a completely different type of deterrence). Even a re-built Russian Army won't have the capacity to take Berlin, Paris, Rome, London, etc., and the Russian Army certainly isn't an existential threat to Canada. Why then should we plan the structure and equipment of the CA around deploying a major mechanized force in defence of other countries?

IMHO. Whatever the end result is for that scenario, it will be quite different for the homeland security scenario. I'm not sure how much intellectual effort is going into the planning for the continental defence system. Ships - submarines - for sure. UAV reconnaissance and fighter based strikes - you bet. But army - not so much. We've discussed long range precision rockets in another thread, and I think that's a good start and a logical next step would be something in the nature of a Multi-Domain Task Force (I guess Pan-Domain Task Force in Canadianese) tied in with NORAD. And, yes, a PDTF is a brigade-sized asset and yes, IMHO, a PDTF primarily operates as a recce/strike functioning asset albeit a considerably different one than whatever we put into Europe.

IMHO planning for continental defense for Canada is a mugs game - yes pull your weight with the RCAF and RCN - but DoD has an impossible stick to beat anyone with - so I wouldn't set the Army up for that -- I would have a Light and Medium Response force for other areas of interest.

Again as noted NORAD with the RCN have the primary role in national/continental defence. F-35's are an improvement, AEW is being planned, NORAD modernization is taking place and the RCN is being recapitalized. One potential area I would look at is reversing Canada's decision not to participate in BMD. Participation doesn't mean that we need to go all in on the eye-wateringly expensive "Golden Dome" plans of POTUS 47 but participation in the detect portion of the chain along with possibly some (RCAF operated) ground-based interceptors would mean that the next time a US General speaks before a Senate committee regarding Canada's defence contributions they will say that "Yes - 100% Canada is absolutely vital to the defence of the United States".

As for the CA, it should definitely work to improve its capability to depoy to and operate in the North but the land threats are pretty limited so I agree that there is no real need to build our land force around the concept of continental defence. We will gain some capabilities like long range precision strike which of course could be deployed in the North if required, but designing the force around that capability I don't think is required.

The "Light and Medium Response force for other areas of interest" I think could become quite important with America becoming increasingly isolationist. With Canada recognizing the need to diversify our trade and the US no longer willing to fulfill the role of global policeman then there may be situations where Canada may be required to deploy expeditionary forces (with our without allies) in order to protect our national interests. Say for example in a situation similar to the Houthis some group interferes with ships carrying our vital oil/gas exports or some rebel group threatens a Canadian mining interest that provides us some of our strategic minerals? In some ways I see us needing to follow a more French model with a core of Heavy forces to participate in European defence and Light/Medium forces that can be deployed in defence of their national interests outside of Europe.

So. Long story short. I see the need for two distinct "armies" for Canada. One "army" based around the core of a possible multi-national division (with sufficient sustainment/reinforcement/replacement capability) operating within a multi-national corps with few enablers. The other "army" should be a division (formed around a PDTF recce/strike brigade) tied in to both NORAD and US Northern Command relying on both Canadian and US national level defence enablers with sufficient "manoeuvre" brigades and sustainment resources structured for operations in Canada.

Again I don't see the need for a specific Canadian Defense Army - the MDTF is a theater/corps support system that is needed for external operations - but not necessarily domestically due to NORAD and the US assets.

Agreed on the "two army" concept but differ on the specifics. We need to retain a core Heavy force but I don't see the need to expand that to a sustainable Divisional deployment to Europe. NATO is definitely a national interest, but it's not an existential national interest for Canada. I'd stick to the current Multi-National Brigade deployment in Latvia with sufficient Reg Force units to comfortably maintain the deployment and sufficient Reserve-heavy forces to sustain it should war break out.

The "2nd" army, while fully capable of deploying and operating in the Arctic if required should focus on being capable of expeditionary operations in defence of Canadian national interests. That would definitely mean we would need to gain some capabilities that we currently don't have, but realistically we wouldn't be engaging major powers on our own so we wouldn't need the level of capabilities that you'd need if you were fighting say Russia or China. We'd need to look at what those capabilities would be and possibly look at how we'd structure and equip our expeditionary forces. Does the traditional Battalion/Brigade structure work or do we need to look at smaller, combined arms teams based on our transport capabilities (which should definitely be greatly expanded).

(All of which makes me rethink that my two division army structure needs some major fine tuning but is workable.

Very true. Economy of Effort has always been a principle of war here. It still applies. Secondly, the revival and diversification of air defence and Trophy-like systems may, to a large extent, neutralize the drone and ATGM successes of recent years. There may be more scope for manoeuvre in the future but one thing is for sure - we need a much better defence industry and much cleaner/shorter procurement cycles.

110%

I'll see your 110% and raise you another. One area where all our allies are at risk from American isolationism is munitions supply. This is one area where I think Canada could make a unique contribution to NATO that doesn't involve our building up a force structure that isn't best suited for our national interests. We could aim to be a "magazine of democracy". Rather than growing our army to meet a notional 2.5-3% of GDP spending on our military we could meet that goal by becoming a safe manufacturing zone for key munitions. Create a large stockpile of the most important types of shells, rockets and missiles required to sustain high level (i.e. non-attritional) combat operations along with the logistics capability to deliver them to our allies in mass in time of war.

I think in terms of special reconnaissance reverting to Long Range Reconnaissance Patrols (LRPPs) and coast watcher type organizations that can go to work in areas where your satellites and radars and UAVs can't or can't efficiently (assuming they survive the anti-satellite/C-UAV/anti-radar battle). Probably as a theatre level resource.

SR is a SOF task - it isn't LRPP, and true SR has been misconstrued by a lot of the vanilla SOF elements.

That and those who assigned to conduct sabotage; who can connect with dissidents in enemy territory and foment resistance and sabotage that you are probably already thinkin of. To that I would add a modified form of foreign internal defence. For example training our elements of our own populations in remote northern and coastal communities in the operation, servicing and defence of military systems that need to be operated in the north and on the coasts to expand our surveillance capabilities.

Yes to me that is more along the lines of what is needed.

Improving the infrastructure in the North will also naturally help with things like surveillance and communications. And as improved infrastructure encourages population growth there will be a larger pool of people to draw on for the Canadian Rangers and eventually Reserve units. Better infrastructure and larger populations will also make for greater QOL for potential permanently and occasionally manned military facilities.

We can't keep our special forces on stand-by training and waiting for a door kicker hostage rescue opportunity. (And yes, yes, I know - they do a lot more than that) All that I'm saying is we need to examine if there is a new repertoire of activities (beyond the core counter-terrorism/counter-insurgency that has become SOF's bread and butter) that are more relevant to today's needs.

You do need a PR asset, as well as a HVT entity - there are many roles for SOF - both white and black side that one could expand CANSOF significantly and still have roles that need filling.

Greater engagement by Canadian forces and Security Force Assistance work in key nations where we have strategic interests will provide valuable intelligence and create relationships that can assist us if we need to deploy forces.

You're right though. They aren't merely a part of the recce/cavalry doctrine.

It's becoming a tough time to be a soldier - more and more requirements are being added to be proficient in - and there are only so many hours in the day... Specialization is becoming a larger and larger issue - despite forces not wanting to do that.

Agreed. This isn't your Grandfather's army.

 

[FJAG]

While I support our current deployment in Latvia in support of our NATO allies I don't think we should make LSCO in Europe the primary focus of our army. If current events have shown us anything it's that we need to focus on our own national interest first

Our national interest is driven by a peaceful world order, particulalry in Europe. A strong presence in Europe by Canada, deters aggression, reassures and keeps European allies on side and enhances our status amongst them and others. A credible commitment in Europe requires a strong army presence there and at home to sustain it. The army can focus on both regions. The forces required for each region differ. One can't prioritize one over the other until you have a clear allocation of overall national resources available and an assessment of the forces needed for each region. Quite frankly, I doubt if anyone can give us a realistic analysis for the army's role in continental defence beyond the usual homilies of an Arctic para company/battalion here or there. I see A2/AD with more land-launched missiles of varying natures to complement the air and naval resources.

The biggest missing element I think though isn't necessarily military, it's infrastructure.

Agree fully.

One potential area I would look at is reversing Canada's decision not to participate in BMD.

Very much agree.

I don't see the need to expand that to a sustainable Divisional deployment to Europe.

In a way neither do I. The difference is between a "full" division v. a Cdn-led multi-national divisional headquarters, a mechanized brigade and several divisional enablers (let's say an arty bde headquarters with one CS regiment, a sustainment bde hq and some sustainment elements.) That's probably something in the order of a half of a full division - let's say 7-8,000 - most of which are on a fly-over basis. It puts Canadian expertise, commitment and prestige front and centre and gives smaller NATO nations a framework to participate in.

 

[GR66]

Our national interest is driven by a peaceful world order, particulalry in Europe. A strong presence in Europe by Canada, deters aggression, reassures and keeps European allies on side and enhances our status amongst them and others. A credible commitment in Europe requires a strong army presence there and at home to sustain it. The army can focus on both regions. The forces required for each region differ. One can't prioritize one over the other until you have a clear allocation of overall national resources available and an assessment of the forces needed for each region. Quite frankly, I doubt if anyone can give us a realistic analysis for the army's role in continental defence beyond the usual homilies of an Arctic para company/battalion here or there. I see A2/AD with more land-launched missiles of varying natures to complement the air and naval resources.

Agreed that it's in our national interest to have a peaceful Europe which is why I support our current commitment to NATO. I also agree that a credible commitment includes having "boots on the ground" to demonstrate our level of commitment. You say a credible commitment in Europe "requires a strong army presence there and at home to sustain it". How big does that presence have to be? Many of the discussions on these forums talk about Canada needing to be able to deploy a Division or at the very least a Canadian-led Division for our NATO commitment. Even if we structure the CA so that our Heavy forces are largely Reservist-based the PY's and equipment required to deploy and sustain a Division in combat will take the lions share of the Army's budget. Does Canada not have other national interests that don't include defending NATO against the Russians? I'm reminded of the quote by Poland's Prime Minister Donald Tusk:

"The paradox is that 500 million Europeans are asking 300 million Americans to defend them against 140 million Russians. We must rely on ourselves, fully aware of our potential and with confidence that we are a global power,"

Personally I think that the current Canadian-led, multinational Brigade commitment - properly equipped and supported with capabilities we're currently missing and with the resources to sustain that deployment - is enough of an Army commitment to Europe to help deter the Russians and to respond in the unlikely chance that they decide to take on NATO. That alone will likely require close to a full Heavy Division at home.

In a way neither do I. The difference is between a "full" division v. a Cdn-led multi-national divisional headquarters, a mechanized brigade and several divisional enablers (let's say an arty bde headquarters with one CS regiment, a sustainment bde hq and some sustainment elements.) That's probably something in the order of a half of a full division - let's say 7-8,000 - most of which are on a fly-over basis. It puts Canadian expertise, commitment and prestige front and centre and gives smaller NATO nations a framework to participate in.

Where I think we differ is in the way you come across as seeing Canada's NATO commitment as being the primary raison d'etre for the CA...the primary role (or at least co-primary role) that we should structure, equip and train for. If the Army we end up with has the resources and capabilities to deploy a Division or lead a Division in Europe should Russia attack, then fine. But when you bake that commitment right into the structure of the Army in order to "provide a framework for smaller NATO nations to participate in" then you're locked in to that. If we commit now to a Division (either Canadian or Canadian-led) then even if other vital national interests arise we can't pull out without leaving a hole in the NATO ORBAT and leaving our multi-national partners hung out to dry. I'd much rather be in a position where NATO is confident in the sureness of our Multinational Brigade contribution and IF the need arises and we have the capability we provide whatever additional forces we can offer at that time.

 

[KevinB]

Personally I think that the current Canadian-led, multinational Brigade commitment - properly equipped and supported with capabilities we're currently missing and with the resources to sustain that deployment - is enough of an Army commitment to Europe to help deter the Russians and to respond in the unlikely chance that they decide to take on NATO. That alone will likely require close to a full Heavy Division at home.

The Latvia Bde Skeleton should come nowhere close to requiring a Div at home. It should be a posting like 4CMBG was. The rotation system will break the Army, as you don’t have the HQ’s and some of the other units in numbers to be constantly rotating them.

Realistically that Bde- element is there solely for deterrence, should things get worse it will need to be a full Bde and prepare to be able to send 1Div over.

Where I think we differ is in the way you come across as seeing Canada's NATO commitment as being the primary raison d'etre for the CA...the primary role (or at least co-primary role) that we should structure, equip and train for. If the Army we end up with has the resources and capabilities to deploy a Division or lead a Division in Europe should Russia attack, then fine. But when you bake that commitment right into the structure of the Army in order to "provide a framework for smaller NATO nations to participate in" then you're locked in to that. If we commit now to a Division (either Canadian or Canadian-led) then even if other vital national interests arise we can't pull out without leaving a hole in the NATO ORBAT and leaving our multi-national partners hung out to dry. I'd much rather be in a position where NATO is confident in the sureness of our Multinational Brigade contribution and IF the need arises and we have the capability we provide whatever additional forces we can offer at that time.

Canada is a small partner nation.
One needs to scale with the threat.
Right now it is a Bde-, but realistically it may be a Division in the next 10 years.

For a country Canada’s size, having a Light Division, a Medium (LAV) Division, and a Heavy Armored Division as well as Corps Assets should not be a big deal. Having an effective reserve as part of those forces is however a financial requirement.

 

[FJAG]

How big does that presence have to be? Many of the discussions on these forums talk about Canada needing to be able to deploy a Division or at the very least a Canadian-led Division for our NATO commitment.

To reiterate, to have a Canadian division presence in Europe does not mean deploying a full Canadian division. I see it roughly like this:

Entity	Appx Full-time forward deployed (Either posted in or rotational)	Appx Flyover or surge onto pre-positioned equipment
Div HQ & Sigs	Cdn 150 / NATO 150	Cdn 150 / NATO 150
Mech Bde - Cdn	Cdn 800 / NATO 0	Cdn 2,200 / NATO 0
Mech Bde - NATO	Cdn 0 / NATO 800	Cdn 0 / NATO 2,200
Mech Bde - NATO	Cdn 0 / NATO 500	Cdn 0 / NATO 2,500
Arty Bde	Cdn 200 / NATO 300	Cdn 700 / NATO 1,400
Protect Bde	Cdn 200 / NATO 300	Cdn 700 / NATO 1,400
CSS Bde	Cdn 300 / NATO 600	Cdn 600 / NATO 1,100
Totals	Cdn 1,650 / NATO 2,650	Cdn 4,350 / NATO 8,750
Grand Totals	Cdn 6,000 / NATO 11,400 / Tot 17,400

Where I think we differ is in the way you come across as seeing Canada's NATO commitment as being the primary raison d'etre for the CA...the primary role (or at least co-primary role) that we should structure, equip and train for.

I don't know how else to say it, but I really don't at all.

Theoretically we have 44,000 authorized soldiers - RegF and ResF - plus 5,000 Rangers.

When you see the above table, I've committed 6,000 soldiers to Europe. The rule of thumb is to sustain such a force you need a force triple the size back home.

I see all the Rangers committed to Canada and maybe two anti-access/area denial brigades, one light brigade, another light or LAV brigade, and a sustainment brigade - so 5,000 Rangers and appx 15,000 soldiers committed to Canada.

So of the 44,000 CA, that's:

a) 6,000 committed to Europe;

b) about 15,000 committed to Canada; and

c) another 23,000 uncommitted but available as sustainment for Europe or for Canada, if necessary, infrastructure support and as the core to recruit and expand around.

Probably 17,000 - 20,000 are equipped for and training for LSCO because that is the hardest thing to equip and train for and because its easier to allocate well equipped and trained forces to lower levels of conflicts or tasks and because losses there will be the highest. The opposite isn't true.

Quite frankly I don't have much of an idea as to what is needed for a properly trained A2/AD army for Canada - I'm still developing my own thoughts and I'm not to sure where the army stands right now over and above Arctic Response Companies - which IMHO is pretty weak. I've always organized the CA in my mind into two divisions - one equipped and trained for Canada the other for NATO/Europe. More recently I've been turning my mind to an A2/AD role for the Canadian based division and how to effect that.

So kindly stop saying that I'm prioritizing Europe. I consider both equally important but completely different in structure and training. A major core element is specifically equipped and trained for each role.

The Latvia Bde Skeleton should come nowhere close to requiring a Div at home. It should be a posting like 4CMBG was. The rotation system will break the Army, as you don’t have the HQ’s and some of the other units in numbers to be constantly rotating them.

I've recently had some high level talks on that subject and, while I understand the CAF's concerns, I'm of the view that the issues can be overcome. That said, the consensus is that the army will not be broken because it already is broken.

 

[ueo]

THOSE are very good questions. We will make a soldier out of you yet my Jedi friend for the Renaissance Brigade

So what's the response?

 

[MedCorps]

Slight tangent, but good watch on some tried and failed recce models:

The Forgotten U.S. Army Dirt Bike Scout Platoons​

 

[GR66]

To reiterate, to have a Canadian division presence in Europe does not mean deploying a full Canadian division. I see it roughly like this:

Entity	Appx Full-time forward deployed (Either posted in or rotational)	Appx Flyover or surge onto pre-positioned equipment
Div HQ & Sigs	Cdn 150 / NATO 150	Cdn 150 / NATO 150
Mech Bde - Cdn	Cdn 800 / NATO 0	Cdn 2,200 / NATO 0
Mech Bde - NATO	Cdn 0 / NATO 800	Cdn 0 / NATO 2,200
Mech Bde - NATO	Cdn 0 / NATO 500	Cdn 0 / NATO 2,500
Arty Bde	Cdn 200 / NATO 300	Cdn 700 / NATO 1,400
Protect Bde	Cdn 200 / NATO 300	Cdn 700 / NATO 1,400
CSS Bde	Cdn 300 / NATO 600	Cdn 600 / NATO 1,100
Totals	Cdn 1,650 / NATO 2,650	Cdn 4,350 / NATO 8,750
Grand Totals	Cdn 6,000 / NATO 11,400 / Tot 17,400

I don't know how else to say it, but I really don't at all.

Theoretically we have 44,000 authorized soldiers - RegF and ResF - plus 5,000 Rangers.

When you see the above table, I've committed 6,000 soldiers to Europe. The rule of thumb is to sustain such a force you need a force triple the size back home.

I see all the Rangers committed to Canada and maybe two anti-access/area denial brigades, one light brigade, another light or LAV brigade, and a sustainment brigade - so 5,000 Rangers and appx 15,000 soldiers committed to Canada.

So of the 44,000 CA, that's:

a) 6,000 committed to Europe;

b) about 15,000 committed to Canada; and

c) another 23,000 uncommitted but available as sustainment for Europe or for Canada, if necessary, infrastructure support and as the core to recruit and expand around.

Probably 17,000 - 20,000 are equipped for and training for LSCO because that is the hardest thing to equip and train for and because its easier to allocate well equipped and trained forces to lower levels of conflicts or tasks and because losses there will be the highest. The opposite isn't true.

Quite frankly I don't have much of an idea as to what is needed for a properly trained A2/AD army for Canada - I'm still developing my own thoughts and I'm not to sure where the army stands right now over and above Arctic Response Companies - which IMHO is pretty weak. I've always organized the CA in my mind into two divisions - one equipped and trained for Canada the other for NATO/Europe. More recently I've been turning my mind to an A2/AD role for the Canadian based division and how to effect that.

So kindly stop saying that I'm prioritizing Europe. I consider both equally important but completely different in structure and training. A major core element is specifically equipped and trained for each role.



I've recently had some high level talks on that subject and, while I understand the CAF's concerns, I'm of the view that the issues can be overcome. That said, the consensus is that the army will not be broken because it already is broken.

With regard to numbers of troops and where they are committed you need to also consider sustainment of those commitments.

6,000 troops deployed to Europe as the deterrent force filled out by an additional 4,350 flyover troops to fill out the Canadian portion of the Division gives you a total of 10,350 troops committed to Europe. To sustain that you need triple that number of troops (and equipment) which comes to 31,050. By comparison you've committed 15,000 troops to Canada which gives you just 5,000 for a sustainable deployment.

That's twice the troops and equipment committed to Europe over what you've committed to Canada...and if NATO and Russia go to war you will require both so you can't really say that the 23,000 "uncommitted" troops you have can be for either Europe or Canada.

This is why I suggest that you are prioritizing defence of Europe over Canada with a commitment to deploy a Canadian-led Division for NATO.

 

[KevinB]

With regard to numbers of troops and where they are committed you need to also consider sustainment of those commitments.

6,000 troops deployed to Europe as the deterrent force filled out by an additional 4,350 flyover troops to fill out the Canadian portion of the Division gives you a total of 10,350 troops committed to Europe. To sustain that you need triple that number of troops (and equipment) which comes to 31,050.

Why do you feel that way?
I’m always curious as to how folks come about with sustainment numbers.

If you look at the fixed troops as a positing (like 4CMBG) they don’t require a 3x reserve for rotations. The flyover troops do not either.

Yeah sure you have posting back and forth, that every 3-4 years have folks revolving, but if done right that becomes just the typically annual posting season.

Now if you keep up with unsustainable 6 month roto’s then yes I agree you need a larger force at home to rotate — however those rotating troops can be used for other tasks of push comes to shove.

By comparison you've committed 15,000 troops to Canada which gives you just 5,000 for a sustainable deployment.

That's twice the troops and equipment committed to Europe over what you've committed to Canada...and if NATO and Russia go to war you will require both so you can't really say that the 23,000 "uncommitted" troops you have can be for either Europe or Canada.

The USN, USAF, RCN and RCAF protect Canada domestically. The CA doesn’t have the troops or equipment to fight a war in Canada.

This is why I suggest that you are prioritizing defence of Europe over Canada with a commitment to deploy a Canadian-led Division for NATO.

 

[GR66]

Why do you feel that way?
I’m always curious as to how folks come about with sustainment numbers.

If you look at the fixed troops as a positing (like 4CMBG) they don’t require a 3x reserve for rotations. The flyover troops do not either.

Yeah sure you have posting back and forth, that every 3-4 years have folks revolving, but if done right that becomes just the typically annual posting season.

Now if you keep up with unsustainable 6 month roto’s then yes I agree you need a larger force at home to rotate — however those rotating troops can be used for other tasks of push comes to shove.

When I talk about sustainment I don't mean peacetime force generation. I mean sustaining the unit if it actually has to fight (which should always be part of the calculation as far as I'm concerned). I'm talking combat losses, rotation of units, etc. It's fine to say we deployed a Division but if you don't have the troops and equipment to replace your losses then how do you maintain capabilities? What use is a Division that can't fulfill Divisional tasks?

The USN, USAF, RCN and RCAF protect Canada domestically. The CA doesn’t have the troops or equipment to fight a war in Canada.

Just because we won't likely have to fight a war IN Canada doesn't mean that there will be no need for troops in Canada. During WW2 approximately 25% of Canadian troops were stationed within Canada fulfilling security, training and force generation roles among other things.

Also, in a major peer conflict there may be other parts of the world other than the NATO/Russia frontier where Canadian interests require troops to be deployed.

Again, I'm not saying that Canada should not support NATO or remove our current forces from Europe. I'm simply saying that IF we commit to deploying a Canadian-led Division to Europe and if we properly plan for the forces and equipment required to sustain that Division at strength should war break out then that leaves very little capacity left in the CA for any other tasks that may be required.

 

[KevinB]

When I talk about sustainment I don't mean peacetime force generation. I mean sustaining the unit if it actually has to fight (which should always be part of the calculation as far as I'm concerned). I'm talking combat losses, rotation of units, etc. It's fine to say we deployed a Division but if you don't have the troops and equipment to replace your losses then how do you maintain capabilities? What use is a Division that can't fulfill Divisional tasks?

In case of a war there will be mobilization.

You will have a lot more troops,

Just because we won't likely have to fight a war IN Canada doesn't mean that there will be no need for troops in Canada. During WW2 approximately 25% of Canadian troops were stationed within Canada fulfilling security, training and force generation roles among other things.

Agreed - but you’re not accounting for the increase of personnel that will be necessary for expansion.

Also, in a major peer conflict there may be other parts of the world other than the NATO/Russia frontier where Canadian interests require troops to be deployed.

Again if a war breaks out, you’re going to have Canada making much more than a Corps.

Again, I'm not saying that Canada should not support NATO or remove our current forces from Europe. I'm simply saying that IF we commit to deploying a Canadian-led Division to Europe and if we properly plan for the forces and equipment required to sustain that Division at strength should war break out then that leaves very little capacity left in the CA for any other tasks that may be required.

The CA currently has troops for a small Corps.

It doesn’t have equipment for a Division which is pretty sad.

Having an Armored Division dedicated to Europe shouldn’t be a major issue if you had the appropriate equipment

 

[FJAG]

With regard to numbers of troops and where they are committed you need to also consider sustainment of those commitments.

6,000 troops deployed to Europe as the deterrent force filled out by an additional 4,350 flyover troops to fill out the Canadian portion of the Division gives you a total of 10,350 troops committed to Europe. To sustain that you need triple that number of troops (and equipment) which comes to 31,050. By comparison you've committed 15,000 troops to Canada which gives you just 5,000 for a sustainable deployment.

You've got the math wrong. For Canada, the full-time number of troops in Europe is 1,650. To that you add 4,350 troops on flyover for a total of 6,000 Canadian troops committed to Europe when the division is fully manned. The bulk comes from other NATO contributors.

That's twice the troops and equipment committed to Europe over what you've committed to Canada...and if NATO and Russia go to war you will require both so you can't really say that the 23,000 "uncommitted" troops you have can be for either Europe or Canada.

The "uncommitted" part only takes place in the event of losses on the front lines. Personally I think that while Russia might make the gamble to push into the Baltics, I doubt they would simultaneously attack North America. That's a red line even Trump wouldn't abide by.

The purpose of the Canada commitment is to put some teeth into deterring peacetime economic adventurism by either Russia or China.

This is why I suggest that you are prioritizing defence of Europe over Canada with a commitment to deploy a Canadian-led Division for NATO.

Rethink it with the right numbers.