The utility of three military colleges, funded undergrad degrees; Officer trg & the need for a degre

[Humphrey Bogart]

It's also a large part of my job  and I use it through a number of organizations that I belong to.

In case it was missed,  the ring knocker comment was in jest.

Hahaha no worries!  I may be dense but I still understand sarcasm.... sometimes  ;D

 

[quadrapiper]

Someone made a comment, either on this thread or the service academies one, about much of the "socialization" of young officers happening at the Regiment post-RMC.

While sending packs of pre-RMC OCdts to working units sounds like a likely non-starter, is there anything that might be done before the academic portion of their training that would front-load some of that experience? Copy-paste Sandhurst's program?

Looking at ways to ensure RMC cadets are young officers seeking a degree, rather than college kids who are going to be officers.

Hell, on that front, perhaps run everyone through VENTURE and equivalents first, send them away to the fleet/regiments/squadrons, then bring them to RMC or through Civvy U as SLts/Lts.

 

[PuckChaser]

The recruiting website says BMOQ is completed after your first year of university. If that's the case, then perhaps BMOQ needs to happen prior to the first year commencing, which would instill some military bearing prior to the pressures of academia. If you don't pass BMOQ, you don't get into ROTP that year.

 

[captloadie]

The recruiting website says BMOQ is completed after your first year of university. If that's the case, then perhaps BMOQ needs to happen prior to the first year commencing, which would instill some military bearing prior to the pressures of academia. If you don't pass BMOQ, you don't get into ROTP that year.

It used to be that way fpr most OCdts. If you didn't make the cut as basic training, you didn't get to go to school. Many trades, at least those associated to the RCAF, do OJT with the units in the summer. This should also give them a little more insight into how the real world works. 

 

[dapaterson]

The recruiting website says BMOQ is completed after your first year of university. If that's the case, then perhaps BMOQ needs to happen prior to the first year commencing, which would instill some military bearing prior to the pressures of academia. If you don't pass BMOQ, you don't get into ROTP that year.

My understanding is that there will shortly be an amendment to that ( I don't know if it will be in time for this summer).  As I understand it, ROTP cadets will do a BMOQ spread over two summers - part I before they enter RMC, part 2 in the first summer after.

 

[GGHG_Cadet]

My understanding is that there will shortly be an amendment to that ( I don't know if it will be in time for this summer).  As I understand it, ROTP cadets will do a BMOQ spread over two summers - part I before they enter RMC, part 2 in the first summer after.

Good to see that changing back to how it once was. The next change that needs to be made is the return of NCOs to each squadron to support the Squadron Commander. When I left RMC, there was a minimal NCO presence; something to the tune of an NCO to every 300 OCdts. I believe the return of Sgts and WOs to the squadrons would help the OCdts understand that they are not just "college kids who are going to become officers."

 

[PuckChaser]

NCO/Warrant Officer exposure is important, but where do you find them? I don't think line units are going to give up experienced Snr NCOs and Warrant Officers to go to RMC for 3-4 years to provide guidance. You'd also have to have clear responsibilities for them, otherwise the appearance will be that they're going there as babysitters.

 

[SeaKingTacco]

About the "necessity" of NCMs being imbedded into the cadet wing at military college:

I went to Royal Roads, back when the earth was still cooling. There was a Capt/Lt(N) per Squadron (about 70 cadets). There were 2 Sgts and a MWO as drill staff for 230 cadets. That was the sum total of the non officer Cadets you routinely dealt with in my day (leaving aside the Orderly Room, Clothing stores, and Kitchen staff for a moment)

I do not notice that my respect for NCMs or understanding of their role was ever seriously undermined by this state of affairs. We were, frankly, in awe of the drill staff because they were so superbly disciplined, well turned out and in spite (because of ?) the exacting standards they demanded.of us, I immensely respected them and felt bad when I felt I had let them down. They obviously cared a great deal about us as human beings, but would not accept anything less than perfect from us.

Even the other NCMs we dealt with that I mentioned above were always professional in their dealings with us Cadets. You learn a lot about what true competence looks like in that situation.

In case you were wondering about discipline amongst the cadets- it was maintained by the cadets and it was superb. The CDS designate was a few years ahead of me, and he was a superb model of leadership. As were most others.

My point is that it is not the raw numbers of NCMs that matter- it is the quality of NCMs that you send to RMC that matter. I also firmly believe that the Cadets must be made to hold themselves and each other accountable. It is the only way to learn leadership, properly.

 

[OldSolduer]

NCO/Warrant Officer exposure is important, but where do you find them? I don't think line units are going to give up experienced Snr NCOs and Warrant Officers to go to RMC for 3-4 years to provide guidance. You'd also have to have clear responsibilities for them, otherwise the appearance will be that they're going there as babysitters.

If we stopped making everything a command......MPs, HS etc then we probably could.

 

[GGHG_Cadet]

NCO/Warrant Officer exposure is important, but where do you find them? I don't think line units are going to give up experienced Snr NCOs and Warrant Officers to go to RMC for 3-4 years to provide guidance. You'd also have to have clear responsibilities for them, otherwise the appearance will be that they're going there as babysitters.

Finding the NCOs is definitely the problem. The Sqn NCOs were removed from RMC sometime between 2005-2007 because units were not willing to give up their experienced NCOs at a time when they were greatly needed for Afghanistan. Since then, I'm not sure RMC has ever made the push to have a more significant contingent of NCOs working with the Cadet Wing. In fact, I think RMC is content with the number of NCOs present and instead the emphasis is being placed on OCdts to police themselves. This is a good thing, which should help these future officers better understand and meet the standards that will be expected of them once they graduate; however, in my opinion, they cannot achieve this by themselves and they will always need the help and guidance of quality NCOs who show them exactly what right looks like. Yes, this can easily be construed as baby sitting, but I liken it to the relationship between Troop Leader and Troop Warrant. Sure, the Tp WO could do the entire job himself, but he knows that is not his role, so instead he will give the young officer the guidance he needs, even going so far as having some private words to set the Tp Ldr on the right path. This is the same type of role that is needed at RMC.

...
I do not notice that my respect for NCMs or understanding of their role was ever seriously undermined by this state of affairs. We were, frankly, in awe of the drill staff because they were so superbly disciplined, well turned out and in spite (because of ?) the exacting standards they demanded.of us, I immensely respected them and felt bad when I felt I had let them down. They obviously cared a great deal about us as human beings, but would not accept anything less than perfect from us.
...
My point is that it is not the raw numbers of NCMs that matter- it is the quality of NCMs that you send to RMC that matter.

I don’t think that the current lack of NCOs at RMC necessarily contributes to a lack of respect or understanding of the NCO role, I just think that it’s a missed opportunity in teaching and mentorship. Having quality NCOs posted to RMC for 3-4 years within the squadrons presents great opportunities for these experienced NCOs to impart their professionalism and experience on these young officers, many of whom are sponges in awe of these NCOs. Also, I think this exposure is great for the NCOs as well; they can go back to their units having a better understanding of the strengths and weaknesses of the officer training system, and as a Tp WO or SSM they will be better prepared to mentor these young officers arriving at the unit.

 

[SeaKingTacco]

And I am going to once again re-iterate that NCMs imbedded in the Cadet Wing are not required. Experienced Snr NCMs are a finite resources in the CF.

It used to be that the Cadet Wing was reasonably self-regulating on discipline. That was meddled away, some years ago, in favour of a system where the supposed adults supervised everything the Cadets did. That seems to have turned out real well...

Leaving aside sarcasm- you want people to act like adults? Give them real responsibility, real rewards and real consequences and accept that they will make mistakes- mistakes that will be real lessons to everyone around them. Someone, somewhere seems to be under the misapprehension that creating tough, skilled, combat leaders is a clean, antiseptic process. It is nothing of the sort. There will be a wastage rate. There will be hurt feelings. Lots of people will find out that for the first time in their lives, they do not measure up. Get used to it.

 

[FSTO]

And I am going to once again re-iterate that NCMs embedded in the Cadet Wing are not required. Experienced Snr NCMs are a finite resources in the CF.

It used to be that the Cadet Wing was reasonably self-regulating on discipline. That was meddled away, some years ago, in favour of a system where the supposed adults supervised everything the Cadets did. That seems to have turned out real well...

Leaving aside sarcasm- you want people to act like adults? Give them real responsibility, real rewards and real consequences and accept that they will make mistakes- mistakes that will be real lessons to everyone around them. Someone, somewhere seems to be under the misapprehension that creating tough, skilled, combat leaders is a clean, antiseptic process. It is nothing of the sort. There will be a wastage rate. There will be hurt feelings. Lots of people will find out that for the first time in their lives, they do not measure up. Get used to it.

While an admirable goal, I cannot see this happening in this Risk Avoidance culture that rules the CAF these day.

 

[OldSolduer]

While an admirable goal, I cannot see this happening in this Risk Avoidance culture that rules the CAF these day.

And it's been that way for over 20 years.

 

[SeaKingTacco]

And it's been that way for over 20 years.

Coincidentally, exactly when the wheels started to come off the bus, IMHO (probably said by every generation of military personage, since Moses was a recruit...)

 

[FSTO]

Coincidentally, exactly when the wheels started to come off the bus, IMHO (probably said by every generation of military personage, since Moses was a recruit...)

So true.
I've been saying to my compatriots that "This is no longer the Navy I joined" quite a bit lately.

 

[SeaKingTacco]

The thing of it is... Do the GOFOs truly not understand that it is impossible to have a military that will win you wars and that is risk adverse? I am not saying we should be reckless in how we train and mentor our people, but we do need to accept risk.

 

[OldSolduer]

So true.
I've been saying to my compatriots that "This is no longer the Navy I joined" quite a bit lately.

Same here, but my perception is somewhat affected by the position I'm in.

About 20 years ago we started speaking "bureaucratese" with phrases like "Positive Control" and "maximum supervision" which is just code for "we don't trust anyone". Then when we were discouraged from saying things like "kill the enemy"....because it may have offended some lacy knicker wearing bureaucrat.
Then came along "for your SA". When I first heard it I thought maybe I had to write an essay....

 

[daftandbarmy]

Same here, but my perception is somewhat affected by the position I'm in.

About 20 years ago we started speaking "bureaucratese" with phrases like "Positive Control" and "maximum supervision" which is just code for "we don't trust anyone". Then when we were discouraged from saying things like "kill the enemy"....because it may have offended some lacy knicker wearing bureaucrat.
Then came along "for your SA". When I first heard it I thought maybe I had to write an essay....

It can all be traced back to when 'Start Line' gave way to 'Line of Departure' IMHO.

We start, they depart.  FFS  :

 

[Edward Campbell]

The thing of it is... Do the GOFOs truly not understand that it is impossible to have a military that will win you wars and that is risk adverse? I am not saying we should be reckless in how we train and mentor our people, but we do need to accept risk.

Oh, I think you're getting closer.

But it's not the GOFOs (not most of them, anyway) who are risk averse ninnies concerned only with media spin, they (most of them) understand the business end of war ...

Nor is it the senior civil servants, who can be just as bloody minded as any admiral or general, they run the business end of government (the machinery of government) and they know there are prices to be paid ...

No, it's two groups who are at the root of our problem:

    First, it's the people, often quite young people, who run the "business of politics," of opinion making, of "Manufacturing Consent," they are the ones who impose nonsensical standards on a rough and dirty business; and

    Second, it's the people, often in the military themselves, who try to bureaucratize the most human and idiosyncratic of all "businesses," and end up replacing a clear, simple, definition of battle procedure* with 17 f'ing steps!

They're the ones who change simple concepts, like a "start line" to something more complex, like a "line of departure" and who try to bend the nature of military service and leadership into something that suits prevailing (and ever shifting) public norms.


_____
* Battle procedure: the whole process by which a commander does his reconnaissance, makes his appreciation and plan and issues the order that commit his troops to battle.

 

[Old Sweat]

Oh, I think you're getting closer.

But it's not the GOFOs (not most of them, anyway) who are risk averse ninnies concerned only with media spin, they (most of them) understand the business end of war ...

Nor is it the senior civil servants, who can be just as bloody minded as any admiral or general, they run the business end of government (the machinery of government) and they know there are prices to be paid ...

No, it's two groups who are at the root of our problem:

    First, it's the people, often quite young people, who run the "business of politics," of opinion making, of "Manufacturing Consent," they are the ones who impose nonsensical standards on a rough and dirty business; and

    Second, it's the people, often in the military themselves, who try to bureaucratize the most human and idiosyncratic of all "businesses," and end up replacing a clear, simple, definition of battle procedure* with 17 f'ing steps!

They're the ones who change simple concepts, like a "start line" to something more complex, like a "line of departure" and who try to bend the nature of military service and leadership into something that suits prevailing (and ever shifting) public norms.


_____
* Battle procedure: the whole process by which a commander does his reconnaissance, makes his appreciation and plan and issues the order that commit his troops to battle.

Now you've done it. This is one of my pet bugbears - the "if one word is good, twenty words are better" theory of military writing. Perhaps people feel that a simple phrase does not justify their hours of hard work and endless meetings. But let's take a look at a couple of mission statements.

"Capture Vimy Ridge" or "Contribute to the fulfilment of the First Army goals in the Arras Offensive, thereby lessening pressure on the French while forcing a general German withdrawal across the Douai Plain, by conducting a massive artillery preparation coupled with extensive engineer mobility support followed by an assault to prevent the Germans from retaining possession of Vimy Ridge."

How about "Defend Kapyong" or "Prevent the Chinese Forces from advancing on and capturing Seoul, thus endangering the freedom of South Korea by utilizing the natural strength of the Kapyong feature to block the enemy offensive, and forcing them to pause and regroup, thereby creating an opportunity for air power to degrade their effectiveness."

I recently heard part of a radio program discussing selling ideas. The presenter raised the subject of the elevator theory, that is, to sell an idea you must be able to explain it between the first and second floors on an elevator. He cited a couple of examples of successful pitches in the movie industry. The first was for Aliens, which was pitched as Jaws in space. The second was for a comedy, I believe it was titled Twins, which was sold as the story of twins separated at birth and reunited many years later, with the twins played by Arnold Schwartzenegger and Danny de Vito.

Sorry for the rant, which is a bit off theme.