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The War in Ukraine

It's hard to say with the limited details available whether the ROI is worth it. One thing to note is that the Ukrainians were watching the location, which is 80km behind the front, with a view to hit it with long range fire. In all likelihood, the drone was probably sent there in response to some other sort of intelligence. Based on what they saw, the Ukrainians felt it was worth expending four missiles.

We don't know that they are in the category of "disposable" mobiks; given the location they could be CSS troops.

My own view is that if you can see about 120 troops, that is already more than most Russian companies have. Also, there are probably a bunch more soldiers nearby that you can't see. That would make this a Bn or Bn(-) target, which is probably worth the warheads.

If nothing else, the psychological impact of hitting a grouping of soldiers deep within the AD umbrella and 80km behind the front lines would be considerable.
It could also be a training formation and taking out experienced instructors (along with the mobiks) would be a win as well.
 
Not sure this makes a lot of sense.

Russia was an "ally" of convenience at most. They were just as responsible as Germany for starting the war by invading Poland, and their treatment of PoWs and civilians in territories they occupied was abhorrent. Not to mention the long-term consequences of their victory over Eastern Europe.

Patton had the right idea.
The point was more that Putin has been outraged that Russia hasn’t been invited to the 80th anniversary of D-Day (I guess he missed the memo that Russia didn’t participate then either). Putin has been busy screaming about how Russia defeated the Nazi’s and everyone else was along for the ride.
 
The point was more that Putin has been outraged that Russia hasn’t been invited to the 80th anniversary of D-Day (I guess he missed the memo that Russia didn’t participate then either). Putin has been busy screaming about how Russia defeated the Nazi’s and everyone else was along for the ride.

I actually think it is historically accurate. In both 2024 and 1944 they were too busy fighting in Ukraine to send troops to France.

Mind you, they were doing a little better in 1944.
 
I actually think it is historically accurate. In both 2024 and 1944 they were too busy fighting in Ukraine to send troops to France.

Mind you, they were doing a little better in 1944.
Oh dang Japan is falling, better declare war on them as well. Yea we know it's Aug 1945, but hey we want some of the pie as well.
 
The point was more that Putin has been outraged that Russia hasn’t been invited to the 80th anniversary of D-Day (I guess he missed the memo that Russia didn’t participate then either). Putin has been busy screaming about how Russia defeated the Nazi’s and everyone else was along for the ride.

Actually, France did invite "Russia" to participate in the 80th anniversary, but they specifically excluded Putin from the invitation. Then they changed their mind and no Russian contingent. Putin has been at previous D-Day commemorations, the 60th and 70th but he was not invited (expressly excluded) from the 75th in 2019. The French have a story of why and why not. The Russian Putin's retort is that the Normandy invasion wasn't that much of a big deal, the real action was on the Eastern Front.
 
It's hard to say with the limited details available whether the ROI is worth it. One thing to note is that the Ukrainians were watching the location, which is 80km behind the front, with a view to hit it with long range fire. In all likelihood, the drone was probably sent there in response to some other sort of intelligence. Based on what they saw, the Ukrainians felt it was worth expending four missiles.

We don't know that they are in the category of "disposable" mobiks; given the location they could be CSS troops.

My own view is that if you can see about 120 troops, that is already more than most Russian companies have. Also, there are probably a bunch more soldiers nearby that you can't see. That would make this a Bn or Bn(-) target, which is probably worth the warheads.

If nothing else, the psychological impact of hitting a grouping of soldiers deep within the AD umbrella and 80km behind the front lines would be considerable.
Look at it from this point of view - let's say 80 were killed and 40 were wounded. Think of the resources needed to deal with the scale of dead and wounded - even by Russian standards. Those 40 wounded are going to 'eat up' another 100+- Russians to deal with them - getting them off the field, transport them back to the aid station/hospital. Think of the number of hospital staff they will tied up, that's another 40 beds used up. That's a fair amount of blood/plasma needed to deal with them. All the Specialists needed to treat them immediately, short term, long term. The local hospital in that area was probably overwhelmed with the sheer number of wounded to treat. This may have caused some of the local Russians to die from lack of immediate care - "Old Ivan from down the road suffered a heart attack and needs treatment, oh well, can't deal with him right now, we've got 40 wounded soldiers who are clogging up our resources." The ripple effect of something like this is massive and it can certainly knock out for a period of time the resources of that area in trying to deal with the aftermath of a missile strike like this.
 
Some discussion of Russian casualties at the link, based on things that Putin has said. It provides an estimate of roughly 5000 KIA and 15000 WIA per month, but I think this only refers to Russian Armed Forces personnel. It might be even higher if you include the Donbas/Luhansk militias, which are administratively unique even though they fall under Russian command.

 
Some discussion of Russian casualties at the link, based on things that Putin has said. It provides an estimate of roughly 5000 KIA and 15000 WIA per month, but I think this only refers to Russian Armed Forces personnel. It might be even higher if you include the Donbas/Luhansk militias, which are administratively unique even though they fall under Russian command.

That is incredible and if true a tragedy. Even ten percent of that is a tragedy.
 
That is incredible and if true a tragedy. Even ten percent of that is a tragedy.
Until they start losing 3k/month dead from the St Petersburg, Moscow city limits nothing will change. Six-9 months that occurring, along with 8-9k/month wounded from the same area and the pot will start to boil. Otherwise the frog is still blissfully unaware of what's going on.
 
That is incredible and if true a tragedy. Even ten percent of that is a tragedy.

If anything it might be on the low side. Some of the OSINT providers are estimating that Russia took about 35000 casualties in May, but that was a much busier month than normal. As for the source, Putin is likely understating Russian casualties somewhat; in the same interview where he gave those numbers, he claimed the Ukrainians were taking five times as many casualties.

Considering the attritional nature of the war, the real question is whether Russian losses are higher than the number of new soldiers arriving in combat units.

Something the CAF needs to consider - how long could we sustain casualties amounting to perhaps 10-30% of our deployed force every month, considering that those will be disproportionately heavy amongst the infantry and in the leadership ranks?
 
And also likely doesn't include any of the various PMC's or foreign mercenaries.
Some discussion of Russian casualties at the link, based on things that Putin has said. It provides an estimate of roughly 5000 KIA and 15000 WIA per month, but I think this only refers to Russian Armed Forces personnel. It might be even higher if you include the Donbas/Luhansk militias, which are administratively unique even though they fall under Russian command.

 
WW1 use of terrain to disguise an observation post. With enemy drone saturation and EW overmatch, the old may become new once again.Screenshot_20240606-082241~2.png
 
I’ve lost track- is there now a complete overseas pipeline to take Ukrainians off the street, through basic flight, and through to specific airframe fighter jet training?
 
I’ve lost track- is there now a complete overseas pipeline to take Ukrainians off the street, through basic flight, and through to specific airframe fighter jet training?
Sort of. Most of the pilots conducting F-16 transition were already pilots. However I does appear that some have had to take basic flight first, and others had to take English language first as well.

I would assume that Ukraine still has the ability to intake pilot candidates and conduct some portions of the training in Western Ukraine, but I’ve not looked into that.
 
So to those good wIth defense economics math, what percentage of US GDP is actually spent on directly related NATO military expenditure? We give countries like Luxemburg or Belgium heck for not meeting the 2% target but ALL of their defense spending contributes to NATO as they have no overseas troops or bases to support or a blue water navy that spends most of its time in the Pacific.

Would be interesting to split off the GDP percentage focussed on the Middle East and China and see if the US actually does meet the 2% target when it is evaluated on the same playing field as the Baltics etc.
 
Sort of. Most of the pilots conducting F-16 transition were already pilots. However I does appear that some have had to take basic flight first, and others had to take English language first as well.

I would assume that Ukraine still has the ability to intake pilot candidates and conduct some portions of the training in Western Ukraine, but I’ve not looked into that.
Justin Bronk over at RUSI had some interesting observations on the UAF pilot training program(s) and issues vs proficiency.
 
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