I believe it. I’m no gunologist, but it seems like in a drone-plagued stable-FEBA environment, towed guns are more survivable, more attritable, and more replaceable.
The War in Ukraine
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It seems counterintuitive that towed guns have a higher survivability.
If drones are specifically hunting mechanized kit, and if SPGs are easier to spot and identify than towed guns and are seen as more worthy of hitting, then I can see it versus just another gun towed by a ten ton truck. And that truck is way cheaper and easier to built and replace than an SPG.
I had little difficulty imagining an FPV drone splattering itself into a gun crew, harming the crew, but doing relatively little physical damage to the actual gun, and a replacement crew can pick it up and keep going.
MilEME09
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Most spgs are killed from their thermal signature, towed guns are easier to disrupt that
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I wonder how feasible something similar to chaff on a SPG, tanks, trucks, etc would be.
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Early on towed guns suffered, mainly as events moved quickly, camouflage, digging in and dispersion were not well done. SPG ruled then. The lesson is you need both and know how and when to use them.
MilEME09
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I sense the newly revised field fortification PAM is already being rewritten
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A ramp into a basement and you have a gun firing from cover with overhead protection and camouflage.
MilEME09
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But where do you put the sauna and kitchen?
daftandbarmy
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What's old is new again: dig to survive....
Dug In and Camouflaged, Russian Artillery Is 'Quite Hard to Destroy'
On a drone-patrolled battlefield, mobile guns are much more vulnerable than buried ones are
The Russian artillery corps learned a hard lesson as Ukrainian drones and artillery knocked out more than 900 of Russia’s self-propelled howitzers in the first 39 months of Russia’s wider war on Ukraine.
That’s nearly half the SPHs the Russian land forces had in active service before Russia’s wider war on Ukraine kicked off in February 2022.
Russian gunners may have learned by now that, on a battlefield teaming with tiny drones, hidden guns are much more survivable than mobile guns are.
Dug In and Camouflaged, Russian Artillery Is 'Quite Hard to Destroy'
On a drone-patrolled battlefield, mobile guns are much more vulnerable than buried ones are
www.trenchart.us
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The Finns would know ....
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A pertinent video?
KevinB
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The biggest issues with survivability are less about the platform, and more about the employment.
Ukraine has a number of different combat regions and what applies in some doesn’t necessarily apply to others. The enemy always gets a vote - and while the proliferation of SUAS FPV systems has impacted various systems differently I don’t think any blanket conclusions can be reached on platforms.
While SUAS hits can disable vehicles, they tend to kill personnel on the towed systems, and generally the RuAF (much like the AFU) only release ‘highlight reel’ results so OS collection is limited to that sort of thing. Everything with primary source reports is mainly limited to high side - and thus not publicly available.
It shouldn’t be any surprise to anyone that camouflage and concealment as well as OHP saves lives (and platforms) in LSCO’s, and that the Gulf War and GWOT tactics aren’t applicable to LSCO’s against near peer opponents.
Ukraine has a number of different combat regions and what applies in some doesn’t necessarily apply to others. The enemy always gets a vote - and while the proliferation of SUAS FPV systems has impacted various systems differently I don’t think any blanket conclusions can be reached on platforms.
While SUAS hits can disable vehicles, they tend to kill personnel on the towed systems, and generally the RuAF (much like the AFU) only release ‘highlight reel’ results so OS collection is limited to that sort of thing. Everything with primary source reports is mainly limited to high side - and thus not publicly available.
It shouldn’t be any surprise to anyone that camouflage and concealment as well as OHP saves lives (and platforms) in LSCO’s, and that the Gulf War and GWOT tactics aren’t applicable to LSCO’s against near peer opponents.
I would have assumed the opposite to be true - that towed artillery is a dead concept in a war with thousands of drones flying around
I guess it does make sense for the reasons you stated.
It really is a savage war, and a good peek at what peer/near peer warfare looks like now (in terms of ground forces that are actually in Ukraine)
Die on the road with mobile artillery because of drone strikes, or die by counterbattery fire (but hopefully hidden from said drones)
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In some ways, in others modern conflict could look completely different.
For starters neither side has air superiority which is huge. On top of that Ukraine has fortified the area for a decade so it isn’t just open terrain. And neither side is particularly well trained at larger scale maneuvers.
This is a slug fest at the moment, both sides lack the equipment and training required to bring the fight back to maneuver combat. The key is avoiding the slug fest in the first place.
With the proliferation of ground to air systems and their enhanced accuracy, even with so-called stealth a/c what are the odds of either side in a peer conflict really establishing superiority? I can visualize it on the approaches, behind the line of advance but not otherwise. From observation I foresee the use of stand-off systems like glide bombs rather than actual bombing runs but that is from an amateur's viewpoint.
KevinB
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Based on Israeli operations I think we can safely conclude that actual semi stealth and stealth aircraft can establish Air Supremacy over a Russian style AD system net. The question is more if NATO forces would want to risk A/C for that task when one can sent unmanned systems instead, as Ukraine has shown that even rudimentary UAS can accomplish tasks in a contested environment.
Stand Off Munitions have been used for years. BVR systems are growing more and more plentiful in both AAM and AGM’s. So I would expect that rather than risk additional exposure to crewed aircraft.
MilEME09
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Dug in towed also has the advantage of the crew can take cover during counter battery, and the ammo is usually stored in a pit several meters away. Meaning if the gun isnt in use, the crew likely will survive a strike. Same cant be said for a spg in all situations
Dumb infantry guy thoughts; Does the answer change if we don’t look at altitude bands and threat types monolithically? I suspect “air superiority” or “air supremacy” can be gained against our conventional conceptions of manned aircraft or UAS or similar sizes. An airspace might be dominated and air defences suppressed sufficient to permit operation of Gen 5 aircraft doing stealthy bomb runs or air interdiction at higher altitudes… But the low altitude space where most SUAS are operation could remain very much contested, with both sides able to use that space reasonably liberally for one-way systems.
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How many targets can ground air systems manage? Once they shoot are they now a known location to be targeted? Do you need to destroy all the AD systems in the area or just knocking out key parts enough? Do you need to only focus a specific location to achieve superiority in a specific axis of combat zone allowing your maneuver forces to advance and leave the fortified areas?
These are all questions I have, I am not well versed on any of this stuff, only very very basic understanding of any of it. Ukraine and Russia aren't exactly great examples for air warfare. Both were primarily relying on a limited amount of 30+ year old aircraft which wasn't made to as high a standard/quality/capability as the NATO planes to begin with.
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