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TKMS Type 212CD (Victoria class replacement megathread)

So with this AIP system, your basically reliant on homebases with the propellents stored there to function long term?

Is that not a huge weakness in the design as you’re relying on that homebase always being secure to supply the fuel?

With how vulnerable naval yards are proving in the Ukraine war (or Iranian war) is this a good strategic decision over a more conventional diesel electric system? It sounds like AIP works great in the field but logically could become a serious issue in the event of a serious war.
 
So with this AIP system, your basically reliant on homebases with the propellents stored there to function long term?

Is that not a huge weakness in the design as you’re relying on that homebase always being secure to supply the fuel?

With how vulnerable naval yards are proving in the Ukraine war (or Iranian war) is this a good strategic decision over a more conventional diesel electric system? It sounds like AIP works great in the field but logically could become a serious issue in the event of a serious war.
I've wondered if what we may need is class of Sub tender and possibly destroyer tenders. As well.
 
So with this AIP system, your basically reliant on homebases with the propellents stored there to function long term?

It depends. There could be a stowage tank at the home port pierside for the AIP reactants of LOX and for hydrogen. There tends thou to be evaporation if the stowage is not very very good. So one concept could be the AIP reactants could be generated off base, and trucked in a day or two before the submarine needs to be replenished, and then put into temporary stowage, or possibly fed directly via truck into the submarine. I suspect the later only possibly used in backup factlities.

An another possibility, is the reactant is generated on site, a day or two (hours ?? ) prior to being needed by the submarine.

My research suggests long term stowage of reactants LOX/hydrogen has issues, due to evaporation, and the quantity may dissipate moderately quickly with time if stowage not incredibly good.

Is that not a huge weakness in the design as you’re relying on that homebase always being secure to supply the fuel?

Yes. Although i believe, as noted , the reactants can be generated off site and then delivered.


With how vulnerable naval yards are proving in the Ukraine war (or Iranian war) is this a good strategic decision over a more conventional diesel electric system? It sounds like AIP works great in the field but logically could become a serious issue in the event of a serious war.

Yes - I agree it could be vulnerable, if only one reactant generation site. But it is possible to create more than one place for generation of the reactants, and then truck in the LOX/hydrogen. But do such transportation quickly, as there are evaporation issues.

Still, as you likely noted, I have pondered the same thing, and I have read there are commercial companies that produce containers than can generate hydrogen (although quality would need to be checked if it meets the needed quality), and containers that can produce GOX (gaseous oxygen) and then equipment on skids (which I believe that can be containerized) to convert the GOX into LOX, where the submarine needs the LOX (liquid oxygen). If containerized, the containers could be moved, and less likely to be in one fixed location. And if containerized, such could still be far from the pier, and the reactants trucked in. There are various possiblities. And as noted on this thread, there are major safety and other issues. Its far far easier to type this, than to do this.

One thing also, it takes a fair amount of electricity to generate the reactants, so one can not just do it anywhere unless one has a powerful electricity generation facility/generator.

Canada has been blessed with its geography, being far from all countries but one (USA), so its difficult frankly, to think of an enemy that can reach far enough to attack Canadian ports ... and hence I believe not too much attention is paid to survivablity of a home port's facilities.

Frankly, i don't know what measures Germany/Norway take ... my assumption is they plan to truck it in from some TBD commercial supply, if something should happen to their pier side stowage or generation.
 
So with this AIP system, your basically reliant on homebases with the propellents stored there to function long term?

Is that not a huge weakness in the design as you’re relying on that homebase always being secure to supply the fuel?

With how vulnerable naval yards are proving in the Ukraine war (or Iranian war) is this a good strategic decision over a more conventional diesel electric system? It sounds like AIP works great in the field but logically could become a serious issue in the event of a serious war.

Ukraine and Iran are two totally different situations. They are fighting across the sea of Azov or the Chorne sea in one case and the Gulf of Hormuz in the other. It would as if we were fighting someone across Lake Ontario (Oh! Wait! We are). We, on the other hand are protected by two huge oceans.

Moreover, the AIP propellant is not, repeat, not the only fuel. They also carry diesel and, when out of propellant, still act as a classically propelled submarine. And diesel is easy to refuel anywhere. So, yes it is a good strategic decision because they are conventional submarines that just happen to have one more ace up their sleeve so long as they can access AIP propellant.
 
Ukraine and Iran are two totally different situations. They are fighting across the sea of Azov or the Chorne sea in one case and the Gulf of Hormuz in the other. It would as if we were fighting someone across Lake Ontario (Oh! Wait! We are). We, on the other hand are protected by two huge oceans.

Moreover, the AIP propellant is not, repeat, not the only fuel. They also carry diesel and, when out of propellant, still act as a classically propelled submarine. And diesel is easy to refuel anywhere. So, yes it is a good strategic decision because they are conventional submarines that just happen to have one more ace up their sleeve so long as they can access AIP propellant.
Yes we are geographically blessed, however with modern tech thats becoming less of a factor, consider Ukraine hitting Vladivostok, over 7000km from the front lines, or St. Petersburg.

The other factor is where do we intend to operate said subs and will the supply be nearby for usage? Outside of Germany, Norway, and Canada it might be a logistical issue to locate and supply the propellents.
 
The other factor is where do we intend to operate said subs and will the supply be nearby for usage? Outside of Germany, Norway, and Canada it might be a logistical issue to locate and supply the propellents.

Its an interesting question. TKMS also build the Type-212A (Germany, Italy), Type-214 (Greece, South Korea, Portugal, Turkey) and Type-218SG (Singapore) which need similar AIP reactants. I don't know though if the connectors needed are identical (industry standard ? ) between submarine classes, nor, if not identical, if TKMS supply adapters. Someone who has worked in the business may need to answer.

... as noted in a post above, worse case, its back to batteries (lithium) and diesel engines if no AIP reactants.
 
Any sense on high far north and where the Norwegians are thinking their ops will be for their TKMS’s?
Norway does not publish patrol areas or a maximum northern latitude for its Type 212CD submarines, but its statements in the media point clearly toward the Norwegian Sea, the Bear Gap and the Barents Sea. Their principal mission will be monitoring Russian naval activity around the Kola Peninsula, tracking submarines approaching the North Atlantic and, if required, denying them freedom of action. That could place Norwegian 212CDs around Bear Island and the approaches to Svalbard, roughly 74° to 80° north depending on the mission, season and ice conditions.

Norway considers operating in ice affected waters a normal part of its submarine environment. That could include the marginal ice zone and limited passages beneath seasonal or broken ice. However, Norwegian officials also acknowledge that conventional submarines must eventually snorkel to recharge their batteries, limiting how long they can remain under ice. Under ice communications present another constraint. There is consequently no public evidence that Norway intends routine, extended patrols beneath the consolidated ice north of Svalbard or toward the North Pole.

The important distinction is that Norway’s most strategically significant Arctic operating areas can generally be reached through open or seasonally ice affected water. The 212CD does not need to cross hundreds or thousands of miles beneath continuous ice to reach the Bear Gap, western Barents Sea or approaches to the Kola Peninsula. My sense is that Norway will operate them quite far north, potentially at Svalbard’s latitude or beyond when conditions and the mission permit, but their normal work will remain around the Norwegian and Barents seas.
 
Thankyou for your reply. I think the viability of Arctic transit and Arctic patrols by modern AIP equipped submarines needs to be debated. We are doing such and I think such is useful.

I believe your delineating notes of different aspects, are simply overstating the complexity. Canada has a very competitant and dedicated naval service, which in my view can address and solve each and every point, with the professionalism the service is known for. That is not to say such will be easy, just the opposite. Yes, it will be difficult. But this is to say that such is definitely doable.

I wish to point out, currently a Harry DeWolf-class AOPS (HMCS Robert Hampton Gray ) is transiting the Canadian Arctic—in September. It will be interesting to read their account of the September ice.

Its a Polar Class 5, which means year-round operation in medium first-year ice, which may include old-ice inclusions. A PC5 vessel is generally designed to operate in ice, with appropriate ice-navigation procedures and, depending on conditions, possibly icebreaker support.

Medium first-year ice in the PC5 classification refers to ice in the specified medium first-year-ice category. In September, however, first-year ice will have undergone substantial seasonal melt, so the actual thickness encountered can be considerably less.

While accompanying Robert Hampton Gray is CCGS George R. Pearkes, an Arctic Class 2 vessel, it should be noted that her icebreaking capability for Arctic ice is not superior to that of Robert Hampton Gray. Research this if you don't believe me.

If a Harry DeWolf-class vessel and CCGS George R. Pearkes can go through occasional patches of such ice in September (and I emphasize September), I think it is reasonable to conclude that an AIP-equipped submarine operating submerged could pass underneath such medium first year ice (if need be), using its AIP and/or its lithium batteries, and return to periscope depth or surface once clear of the occasional ice. Also statistically, in September, the ice in the North West passage is at its lowest during the year, with there being large areas of open water. I previously posted data on that.

The location of the ice can be updated by satellite using synthetic-aperture radar (SAR), of which Canada has the RADARSAT Constellation Mission, which has specifically been identified by National Defence as critical to monitoring Canada's Arctic. The ice-mapping information can be relayed to a surfaced or periscope-depth submarine to help it dynamically plan its transit. The Canadian Department of National Defence helps fund the RADARSAT Constellation. So data access to ice information is not an issue.

September transit for an AIP equipped submarine could thus be planned and implemented. And as noted elsewhere in this forum thread, the global warming trend is making this more and more viable and if global warming continues, the season suitable for transit (and ultimately patrols) will increase more and more.
I agree that the viability of limited Arctic operations by modern AIP submarines deserves serious discussion. Where I disagree is the leap from “technically possible under favourable conditions” to “definitely doable” as an operational capability.

The passage of HMCS Robert Hampton Gray and CCGS George R. Pearkes does not establish the feasibility of a submarine transit beneath the same ice. A surface ship can see the ice, manoeuvre around difficult concentrations, stop, reverse, request assistance and remain in continuous communication. Its ice classification is relevant because its hull is designed to interact with ice. A submerged submarine faces an entirely different problem: ice keels extending below the surface, restricted water depth, uncertain bathymetry, limited communications and the possible absence of a safe place to surface should it suffer a casualty. The fact that a PC5 surface ship can negotiate intermittent September ice says very little about the risk accepted by a submarine underneath it.

SAR imagery would certainly support planning, but it would not make “data access a non issue.” Satellite products provide an evolving regional picture, not a guaranteed real time route or verified surfacing location. The information must be processed, transmitted and received, potentially requiring the submarine to expose a mast or come shallow. Meanwhile, winds and currents continue moving and compressing the ice. Open water shown earlier may not remain open when the submarine arrives.

An AIP system and lithium ion batteries may provide the energy for a short submerged passage, but propulsion endurance is only one part of the problem. Navigation accuracy, charted depth, ice clearance sonar, emergency procedures, rescue arrangements, machinery reliability and the ability to surface following fire, flooding, battery trouble or another casualty are equally important.

Could a properly equipped AIP submarine conduct a carefully planned September passage through predominantly open water, occasionally going beneath limited ice? Quite possibly, and that is broadly consistent with the Canadian RFI’s language concerning operations predominantly in navigable waters and occasional short under ice passages between ice free areas. But that is substantially different from proving a reliable Arctic transit or patrol capability beneath extensive ice. Climate change may enlarge the seasonal opportunity, but it does not eliminate the need to define the acceptable ice conditions, route, submarine equipment and emergency support arrangements. The conclusion remains conditional, not “definitely doable” simply because two surface vessels can navigate the route in September.
 
I agree that the viability of limited Arctic operations by modern AIP submarines deserves serious discussion. Where I disagree is the leap from “technically possible under favourable conditions” to “definitely doable” as an operational capability.

What DND has stated publically says otherwise. DND claims sustained operations in the Arctic is planned for the submarines. Don't believe me here ... Go check the press releases. Check what DND has stated to the Standing Committee on National Defence. Check other official government documents.

As for your phrase "under favourable conditions" ... that is pretty general and applies to more than just submarines.

I honestly do not believe you have checked the official government public documents provided to both politicians and to the public, in regards to what they state as to the submarine's intended sustained presence in the Arctic.

I would not assume there is a consensus among submariners on this. You are not the only one with submariner contacts. I too have such. My understanding is that there are different views on what the principal limitations to extended Arctic operations would be. In any case, I'd be reluctant to regard anecdotal opinions, in either direction, as settling what is ultimately a question of Government policy, military requirements, their implementation, engineering feasibility and operational utility.

The passage of HMCS Robert Hampton Gray and CCGS George R. Pearkes does not establish the feasibility of a submarine transit beneath the same ice. A surface ship can see the ice, manoeuvre around difficult concentrations, stop, reverse, request assistance and remain in continuous communication. Its ice classification is relevant because its hull is designed to interact with ice. A submerged submarine faces an entirely different problem: ice keels extending below the surface,

OK. Lets stop there.

Ice keels.?? Ice keels

I was specifically referring to the ice that the HMCS Robert Hampton Gray and CCGS George R. Pearkes are specified to go through. Medium first-year ice. Such medium first-year ice has no "ice keels". Much older ice has such. That was why i specifically pointed to those two vessels.

Clearly, this aspect of the ice, and the amount present in September, is not something you wish to objectively examine.

Reference ice keels, since you raise that ... Indeed they present an issue in older ice ... with emphasis on older ... that clearly submarines need to avoid. The Type-212CD has a forward looking sonar (also used for mine detection in addition to ice detection) that can be used for ice detection directly ahead. I believe that is not enough. However as I have pointed out, if DND wishes to make these submarines under-ice capable (and DND and the government are stating that is indeed the intended plan) then they realistically need to add an upward looking ice detection sonar.

Again - do not believe me. Go read official government documents on this.


SAR imagery would certainly support planning, but it would not make “data access a non issue.”

I re-read your statement. Why do you believe accessing SAR data would be an issue given DND helped fund the satellites.

Data access would be a non-issue. There is no doubt there. If you don't believe me, ask someone involved in that area.

I do note that just because there is accessible data, is not the be all and end all of transiting through ice, and no one ever said that SAR satellite data would make transit a non-issue.

But SAR imagery will allow far superior ice mapping than that which was ever in place before such satellites. Canada operates such satellites. And DND has access to the ice mapping that comes from such.

Again - don't believe me. Go research this yourself.

An AIP system and lithium ion batteries may provide the energy for a short submerged passage, but propulsion endurance is only one part of the problem. Navigation accuracy, charted depth, ice clearance sonar, emergency procedures, rescue arrangements, machinery reliability and the ability to surface following fire, flooding, battery trouble or another casualty are equally important.

Definitively submarines that go under ice must very much be aware they can not suddenly surface, unless ice above is very thin and unless the sail/periscopes have been significantly strengthened to allow such penetration through ice.

... I think anyone who reads accounts of even SSNs going under the ice, will read of extra inspections and checks being done, even in those submarines, before any under ice transit, so to try to minimize/reduce the risk of a fire, or of anything that may cause the need for an emergency surface. Clearly a submarine does not just motor under ice with no extra precautions made prior.

Could a properly equipped AIP submarine conduct a carefully planned September passage through predominantly open water, occasionally going beneath limited ice? Quite possibly, and that is broadly consistent with the Canadian RFI’s language concerning operations predominantly in navigable waters and occasional short under ice passages between ice free areas.

Its good we are finally getting some agreement. This is progress.


But that is substantially different from proving a reliable Arctic transit or patrol capability beneath extensive ice. Climate change may enlarge the seasonal opportunity, but it does not eliminate the need to define the acceptable ice conditions, route, submarine equipment and emergency support arrangements. The conclusion remains conditional, not “definitely doable” simply because two surface vessels can navigate the route in September.

I think it important as well to note here the RFI defines the 'for information' submarine's capabilities. The CPSP RFI did not define the detailed shore logisitics/sustainment capability planned.

Perhaps the RCN/TKMS contract will (define some of that), but I doubt on this open unclassified forum, anyone will be able to say much about all aspects of that contract.
 
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What DND has stated publically says otherwise. DND claims sustained operations in the Arctic is planned for the submarines. Don't believe me here ... Go check the press releases. Check what DND has stated to the Standing Committee on National Defence. Check other official government documents.

As for your phrase "under favourable conditions" ... that is pretty general and applies to more than just submarines.

I honestly do not believe you have checked the official government public documents provided to both politicians and to the public, in regards to what they state as to the submarine's intended sustained presence in the Arctic.

I would not assume there is a consensus among submariners on this. You are not the only one with submariner contacts. I too have such. My understanding is that there are different views on what the principal limitations to extended Arctic operations would be. In any case, I'd be reluctant to regard anecdotal opinions, in either direction, as settling what is ultimately a question of Government policy, military requirements, their implementation, engineering feasibility and operational utility.



OK. Lets stop there.

Ice keels.?? Ice keels

I was specifically referring to the ice that the HMCS Robert Hampton Gray and CCGS George R. Pearkes are specified to go through. Medium first-year ice. Such medium first-year ice has no "ice keels". Much older ice has such. That was why i specifically pointed to those two vessels.

Clearly, this aspect of the ice, and the amount present in September, is not something you wish to objectively examine.

Reference ice keels, since you raise that ... Indeed they present an issue in older ice ... with emphasis on older ... that clearly submarines need to avoid. The Type-212CD has a forward looking sonar (also used for mine detection in addition to ice detection) that can be used for ice detection directly ahead. I believe that is not enough. However as I have pointed out, if DND wishes to make these submarines under-ice capable (and DND and the government are stating that is indeed the intended plan) then they realistically need to add an upward looking ice detection sonar.

Again - do not believe me. Go read official government documents on this.




I re-read your statement. Why do you believe accessing SAR data would be an issue given DND helped fund the satellites.

Data access would be a non-issue. There is no doubt there. If you don't believe me, ask someone involved in that area.

I do note that just because there is accessible data, is not the be all and end all of transiting through ice, and no one ever said that SAR satellite data would make transit a non-issue.

But SAR imagery will allow far superior ice mapping than that which was ever in place before such satellites. Canada operates such satellites. And DND has access to the ice mapping that comes from such.

Again - don't believe me. Go research this yourself.



Definitively submarines that go under ice must very much be aware they can not suddenly surface, unless ice above is very thin and unless the sail/periscopes have been significantly strengthened to allow such penetration through ice.

... I think anyone who reads accounts of even SSNs going under the ice, will read of extra inspections and checks being done, even in those submarines, before any under ice transit, so to try to minimize/reduce the risk of a fire, or of anything that may cause the need for an emergency surface. Clearly a submarine does not just motor under ice with no extra precautions made prior.



Its good we are finally getting some agreement. This is progress.




I think it important as well to note here the RFI defines the 'for information' submarine's capabilities. The CPSP RFI did not define the detailed shore logisitics/sustainment capability planned.

Perhaps the RCN/TKMS contract will (define some of that), but I doubt on this open unclassified forum, anyone will be able to say much about all aspects of that contract.
“Ice keels? Ice keels!”, man you need to simmer down a bit.

Yes, ice keels. You might want to direct your repeated instruction to “go read official government documents” toward yourself.

The Canadian Coast Guard defines an ice keel as the submerged portion of a pressure ridge and states that ridged ice is “usually found in first year ice.” The Canadian Ice Service says pressure ridges occur mostly in newer ice and may extend four to five times farther below the surface than above it. The National Research Council even published a 154 page report titled An Overview of First Year Sea Ice Ridges. Please read

So no, ice keels are not confined to “much older ice.” Medium first year ice describes the thickness of level ice. It does not guarantee that the ice remains level. Wind, currents, tides and pressure can deform first ear ice into ridges, with keels extending several metres beneath the surface.

That rather theatrical “OK. Let’s stop there” did not expose my failure to examine the ice objectively. It exposed yours. You confidently declared that medium first year ice has no ice keels when official Canadian sources say precisely the opposite. Perhaps ease up on telling everyone else to research the subject until you have read the documents yourself.

You are also conflating three different propositions: sustained Arctic operations, sustained undersea presence and sustained operations beneath continuous ice. DND has publicly stated the first two and has described the future submarines as under ice capable. I have never disputed that. What the public documents do not establish is that Canada intends routine, extended transits or patrols beneath extensive continuous ice.

The CPSP RFI was much more qualified. It described Arctic operations predominantly in navigable waters, with occasional short under ice transits between ice free areas. Precisely the type of transits the NRP Arpão did last year in the Arctic, and they didn't have the need to fill their reactants in the Arctic either. Its long range transit, 21 day continuously dived and 60 day endurance requirements were separate from the under ice requirement. A broad press release does not erase those distinctions or transform “under ice capable” into unlimited operations beneath continuous ice.

DND access to Canadian SAR data is not the principal obstacle. DND can task, receive and exploit RCM imagery through Polar Epsilon 2. But claiming that data access is categorically a “non issue” confuses institutional entitlement with operational delivery. Coverage, collection timing, processing, product latency, communications with a submerged submarine and the limitations of what overhead SAR can reveal all remain part of the problem. You're a weather satellite guy aren't you?, you of all people should know that.

SAR would greatly improve ice mapping and route planning, but it would neither provide a complete picture of the under ice environment nor remove the need for onboard sonar, ice forecasting and conservative operational limits. “Ask someone in that area” is not evidence, particularly when the government’s own documents acknowledge continuity and capability gaps.

Nor does mentioning a forward looking sonar settle the issue. A forward looking obstacle or mine avoidance sonar and an upward looking ice profiling system perform different functions. If the selected submarine requires additional ice sonar, strengthened structures, modified procedures, specialized training or new rescue and sustainment arrangements, those capabilities must be engineered, tested and accepted. Saying that DND intends an under ice capability tells us the objective. It does not prove that every proposed method of achieving it has already been resolved.

As for submariner contacts, there is an important difference between our sources. Mine include people presently serving and directly involved in the decisions now being made. Yours appear to have retired roughly twenty years ago. Their experience deserves respect, but it does not give them privileged knowledge of today’s requirements, engineering assessments, procurement decisions or operational planning. Retirement does not invalidate experience, but neither does an old qualification automatically outweigh current professional involvement.

You are correct that the RFI did not define the complete shore sustainment system. That reinforces my point, not yours. Where the public record does not provide the detailed concept, neither of us can legitimately declare that a future contract will contain whatever infrastructure, Arctic support arrangements or mobile AIP reactant replenishment system our argument requires.

DND intends sustained Arctic operations and an under ice capability. Agreed. That does not prove routine extended operations beneath continuous ice, nor does it prove that your preferred support concepts are feasible, funded or planned. You have repeatedly moved from broad public statements, to unnamed retired contacts, to speculation about classified contract provisions, all while telling everyone else to “go research it.”
 
Norway does not publish patrol areas or a maximum northern latitude for its Type 212CD submarines, but its statements in the media point clearly toward the Norwegian Sea, the Bear Gap and the Barents Sea. Their principal mission will be monitoring Russian naval activity around the Kola Peninsula, tracking submarines approaching the North Atlantic and, if required, denying them freedom of action. That could place Norwegian 212CDs around Bear Island and the approaches to Svalbard, roughly 74° to 80° north depending on the mission, season and ice conditions.

Norway considers operating in ice affected waters a normal part of its submarine environment. That could include the marginal ice zone and limited passages beneath seasonal or broken ice. However, Norwegian officials also acknowledge that conventional submarines must eventually snorkel to recharge their batteries, limiting how long they can remain under ice. Under ice communications present another constraint. There is consequently no public evidence that Norway intends routine, extended patrols beneath the consolidated ice north of Svalbard or toward the North Pole.

The important distinction is that Norway’s most strategically significant Arctic operating areas can generally be reached through open or seasonally ice affected water. The 212CD does not need to cross hundreds or thousands of miles beneath continuous ice to reach the Bear Gap, western Barents Sea or approaches to the Kola Peninsula. My sense is that Norway will operate them quite far north, potentially at Svalbard’s latitude or beyond when conditions and the mission permit, but their normal work will remain around the Norwegian and Barents seas.
Question -

Does that shorter route that Norway has to travel not mean that their options to travel to that area is vastly smaller and as a result, more predictable, thus increasing their risk/exposure to being discovered/sunk?

Given the choices of 'shorter and less ice' (Norway) vs 'longer and more ice' (Canada), which would you rather have to cover as your area of patrol?
 
d may extend four to five times farther below the surface than above it.

You know how thick Medium First year ice is right?

And you think a submarine would be worried about an icekeel a few multiples of that very thin first year ice thickness? I can only assume you have never been in a submarine when it dived. I can only assume you don't know, that such, is nothing a submariner would need worry about (being able to have the submarine dive under) given we are talking of September and open water not distant.

Yes. Ice keel from medium first year ice? Stop there. Its a silly comment to think a submarine should be worried about diving under ice keels of medium first year ice. It only has to be considered if emergency surfacing needed. Its easy to go under.

I had thought you had Arctic experience. ... I am now beginning to doubt that.


You are also conflating three different propositions: sustained Arctic operations, sustained undersea presence and sustained operations beneath continuous ice.

I am conflating nothing. You are mixing up things.

Your use of 'conflating' term though, has me wondering. It suggests to me you are using an AI to compose your replies as AI's love to use that 'conflating' term. And that explains the massive exaggeration in your replies, as those are AI traits. It also explains your tangents and making up of things I never stated.

Now - back to the RFI. The RFI on the CPSP defined information wanted from submarine suppliers, on a potential submarine to meet RCN mandatory requirements.

That is not the same thing as what DND tells the Standing Committee on National Defence, nor what is listed in Minister transition documents, nor other documents.

Those are high level documents that encompass far more than an RFI. They provide recommendations and can establish government intent as much as practical. And they are very important in establishing the 'building blocks' on which more detailed requirements hang. Its on documents such as those that the more detailed requirements not only for a submarine procurement, but for its infrastructure, and operations, and other aspects hang.

Its becoming clear to me you do not understand that. I am asking myself, did you ever spend any time in DND requirements? In DND procurements? Did you ever go to any meetings of Standing Committees on National Defence? I beginning to think NOT, based on what I see as your confusion.


DND access to Canadian SAR data is not the principal obstacle. DND can task, receive and exploit RCM imagery through Polar Epsilon 2. But claiming that data access is categorically a “non issue” confuses institutional entitlement with operational delivery.

You can't read. Or you skim so fast you can't read.

The non-issue is the access to the data. That is what I typed, and you, possibly using your AI bot reply, was confused there and , using your words, let your AI bot 'conflate it to be something else.

So that you understand, for the 3rd time : DND helps fund RADARSAT that can provide superior ice maps to what has been seen in past years, and DND will have no issues accessing that data. Its a non-issue for DND to access that data. DATA ACCESS!! Clear?? It was not clear to you (or not clear to your AI bot) the first 2 times I typed this.


SAR would greatly improve ice mapping and route planning, but it would neither provide a complete picture of the under ice environment nor remove the need for onboard sonar, ice forecasting and conservative operational limits.

No one said such but YOU incorrectly and likely deliberately inappropriately inferred such in my statement. I was clear in my reply, the SAR data (that DND can access) improves greatly the ice mapping of the past.

I am beginning to think you want to invent false statements of someone else, to bolster a weak argument on your side.


Nor does mentioning a forward looking sonar settle the issue.

No one said forward looking sonar will settle the issue. Who said that will 'settle the issue'??? Again, a false statement by you. You clearly stopped at my mention of forward looking sonar, and read not one word further.

. If the selected submarine requires additional ice sonar, strengthened structures, modified procedures, specialized training or new rescue and sustainment arrangements, those capabilities must be engineered, tested and accepted.

Exactly.

As for submariner contacts, there is an important difference between our sources. Mine include people presently serving and directly involved in the decisions now being made. Yours appear to have retired roughly twenty years ago.

This is getting silly.

As I noted ... what matters is the top level requirements.

What matters is what was promised to the Canadian government.

Point such document requirements requiring sustained Arctic presence out to your supposed contacts. I suspect many have not read such, or perhaps they don't like what they read. But they are not the one's signing off on such documents.


You are correct that the RFI did not define the complete shore sustainment system. That reinforces my point, not yours.

No. You have that backward.

DND intends sustained Arctic operations and an under ice capability. Agreed.

Good. We agree on something.

That does not prove routine extended operations beneath continuous ice,

Please point out a post of mine that states "routine extended operations beneath continuous ice" ... I have noted 'sustained operation' in the Arctic and under ice capable. Making up statements I never stated, is a sign of a lost debate.

I am keen on debating this, as i believe it needs debate - but I see zero point in made up statements that you assigned to me. That is plan silly. And it indicates, you lost the debate.
 
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DND intends sustained Arctic operations and an under ice capability. Agreed.

I want to follow up here on this point - to see if I understand your view.

What do you consider to be 'sustained Arctic operations" ?? ie 'sustained' ? How far ? How long? Define in your view, sustained.

And do you believe your view of 'sustained' matches what was intended in the top level documents? ie for example these documents:

  • January 2026 Deputy Minister of National Defence transition material
  • December 2025, meeting of the Standing Committee on National Defence (when briefed by DND)
  • July 2026 Government of Canada CPSP backgrounder

How do you see those 'sustained Arctic operations' being met given the current Canadian Patrol Submarine preferred supplier TKMS has proposed the Type-212CD. ?

If you read those top level documents, you will also note it states submarine patrols on all Canada's coastlines, including those in the north.

How do you propose those noted aspects in those top level statements, will be met by submarines ? both 'sustained Arctic operations' and submarine 'patrols' of the northern coast lines?

That does not prove routine extended operations beneath continuous ice, nor does it prove that your preferred support concepts are feasible, funded or planned. You have repeatedly moved from broad public statements, to unnamed retired contacts, to speculation about classified contract provisions, all while telling everyone else to “go research it.”

Another silly not helpful statement. I won't reply to that - as i see no point - and it is wrong in multiple ways.
 
The Canadian Coast Guard defines an ice keel as the submerged portion of a pressure ridge and states that ridged ice is “usually found in first year ice.” The Canadian Ice Service says pressure ridges occur mostly in newer ice and may extend four to five times farther below the surface than above it. The National Research Council even published a 154 page report titled An Overview of First Year Sea Ice Ridges. Please read

So no, ice keels are not confined to “much older ice.”

One more point re: ice (... likely for everyone else's amusement). I specifically referenced September.

Ice keels are mostly confined to older ice in September.

The textbook definitions and NRC reports you cited are for winter ice mechanics, my original point specifically concerned medium first-year ice in September.

During the late-summer seasonal minimum, active first-year ice and associated ice keels are minimal along Canadian shipping routes, so citing general winter parameters doesn't apply to September conditions.
 
You know how thick Medium First year ice is right?

And you think a submarine would be worried about an icekeel a few multiples of that very thin first year ice thickness?
Given First year Ice can be up to 2m thick in flat spots -and potentially have ridges 6-10m

I would think that yes a submarine probably would be concerned about that.




I can only assume you have never been in a submarine when it dived. I can only assume you don't know, that such, is nothing a submariner would need worry about (being able to have the submarine dive under) given we are talking of September and open water not distant.
You seem to be be cherry picking portions of @Stoker ’s post and taking them out of context.


Yes. Ice keel from medium first year ice? Stop there. Its a silly comment to think a submarine should be worried about diving under ice keels of medium first year ice. It only has to be considered if emergency surfacing needed. Its easy to go under.
Again sort of an out of context take
It also ignores depth under keel concerns that you previously brought up in posts about the passage.


You may want to reevaluate your posting attitude, as to me at least you are looking like an ass.
 
Of interest to the Canadian Submarine project, is on 6 March 2026, the Canadian National Defence issued a further Request for Information (RFI) : Notice of Proposed Procurement (NPP) - Request for Information (RFI) for the Sustainment of the Canadian Patrol Submarine. Noah has a description on his TrueNorth strategic review site: Defence Investment Agency seeks input from Canadian industry on future submarine fleet sustainment

I don't know the content of the RFI - but it would not surprise me if it addresses some AIP reactant replenishment aspects. My not having found nor read it though, I could be wrong on this. If anyone knows of a link as to where the RFI actual content was posted (to share), it might be an interesting read.
 
You may want to reevaluate your posting attitude, as to me at least you are looking like an ass.

When someone fabricates words you did not say, and uses that as the basis of their debate (which is what Stoker does)? ... Well .. .we have different views there.
 
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