"Trading Saber for Stealth" or "Are We a One Trick Pony?"

[a_majoor]

If we want a true 'stealth recce.' vehicle, we should be talking about us dressing recce. troops in local civilian pattern clothing and using beat up Toyota pickup trucks or orange Mercedes dump trucks which would blend in with a civilian population better than a NATO camouflage pattern painted military vehicle.

Better yet, "Always buy civvies as soon as you hit the ground".   We should have all been kitted out with Adidas track pants and a Woodland camo jacket when we went to the Balkans.... :warstory:

As long as the vehicles are capable of the same sort of tactical movement (or at least a reasonable approximation) one can move from an ultra-light, ultra-low-surviveability recce vehicle like an Iltis or GWagon to something more capable/surviveable/expensive without too much difficulty. I've done recce in Iltis, M113, and Bison and the skillset was pretty much portable between each vehicle. There was a little bit of a learning curve as one adjusted to the quirks of each individual vehicle, but those were overcome pretty quickly.

While these may be valid points, I think they overlook the thrust of Major Taylor's article. What is being described is variations of HUMINT, or Infantry foot recce. "Dressing the part" is a time honoured technique used in Kenya and Oman by the British (with white troops, no less) with great success, and Robert Kaplan mentions this as a great weakness in current US deployments, since most natives are not tattooed white men with bodybuilder physiques chewing Skoal or Redman...

Armoured troops can do these things, but is this really the primary role of the armoured? Going to Major Taylor's article the main strength of Western forces is the sheer speed at which we can move, and the ability to rapidly adapt and transition between one thing and another. Fast moving armoured fighting vehicles are the key in this model, and if they have the ability to transport (or escort) dismounted scouts then so much the better. Being able to move tactically will not count for much if you have little or no protection or fighting power when discovered, which was proven again and again with "jeep" recce in Tunisia, or HMMVW recce platoons in the Persian Gulf War and OIF. The situation was only resolved in the 1940s with the introduction of "Stuart" light tanks and by pressing combined arms formations or Armoured Cavalry units forward in 1991 and 2003. When the overt resistence dies down, the Armoured recce can still maintain the initiative by presence patrols, and rapidly inserting and extracting dismounts (disguised or not) into areas of interest to develop the HUMINT we desire.

By this reasoning, we need to discount the Illtis, G-wagon or proposed Duro APV as possible recce vehicles, and concentrate on a real AFV with at least a moderate level of protection and on board fire power. Our recce also needs a dismounted component, either carried on the recce vehicle itself (i.e. a LAV with a four man scout team) or in a protected vehicle for insertions and extractions (i.e. the ADI Bushmaster)

 

[ArmyRick]

after reading Major Taylor article I have a few thoughts.
(1) Complacency kills. I wonder if after so many years of not being in a true slug it out war, if the yanks were not making decisions based on theory and not practice. I am refering to them putting scouts into Humvees. Then commanders are hesistant to commit them  to block three war fighting. Whats the point in having this kind of recce? I wonder if the SBCT Stryker RV will be a good compromise. Its the stryker carrier with the LRAS sight on it and a 6 man crew that dismounts 4. It is armored, fast and has good OP tool on it. It is better protected than a Humvee and faster than a M3. A compromise?

For more info on this stuff during the Iraq war, read "Generation Kill" its about a marine force recon platoon in Humvees and all the ups and downs that went with it.

 

[KevinB]

HUMINT - this is getting overlooked while crew survivability is getting hoisted to a unrealistic expectation.  The M1A2 may be a good High Intensity Battlefield ATC recce vehicle -- but it is not a COIN tool -- other than a fortified pillbox to react from.

Boot on the ground - US ODA's operating in the neighborhoods -- or a similar Canadian setup will the the only way to gather intel on the enemy.  Set up covert sniper positions in the neighbourhood - run Inf recce dets in local garb and Nissan Terrano's or Toyota Land Cruisers.

Once again I cannot understand why we got rid of the Iltis - as it had the visibility and ability to interact with the populace -- nothing short of a LAV or perhaps not even that, requiring a M1 to be secure against Anit Armour weapons and VBIED threats.  However in COIN ops we then loose the ability to interact and win the hearts and minds - thus denying the enemy the safety of the community to hide.
Yes we are softer targets and in the short term may lose more soliders from those attacks -- but in the long run it will serve to bring the populace onboard.

 

[a_majoor]

ArmyRick, the Stryker recce vehicel is a good compromise between an unarmoured truck and an M-3 CFV, the major weakness in that design is the lack of on board fighting power, since the sight unit uses the OWS as a mount, leaving the examples I've seen with a pintle mounted GPMG. Other than that, it would meet the needs identified by Major Taylor in the paper, and we are discussing here.

Kevin, what you are saying is true, but what I think is being overlooked (at the risk of sounding parochial) is who is supposed to do these things? If we are concentrating on running HUMINT operations out of jeeps and light trucks, do we need the Armoured Corps to do this? The Composite Reserve Company was doing this mission mounted on Illtis out of Bihac in 2003, with no black hats embedded/attached or otherwise involved at the Coy level.

Moderatly protected AFVs give the speed to swarm and dominate areas, fighting power to stay effective if things so wrong, and if they have a proportion of dismounted scouts available, then the Armoured recce has the ability to generate HUMINT, do low profile "sneak and peeks", or even dismount and continue fighting, giving a much wider range of flexability than currently exists.

 

[George Wallace]

OK.  I think we should totally ignore HUMINT in this discussion.  It is a form of Intelligence Gathering that anyone can do; not solely a Recce Task.  There are so many types of Int gathering organizations out there, that if you start factoring them in this equation, you will get totally lost and thrown off track (as we can see this discussion going). 

In ISTAR, the new "improved" name for what we have been doing all along, (it seems we are reinventing the wheel all the time).  Recce is Recce.  We have new tools to do the job, but the job has not changed.  Humint is Humint.  Like SIGINT, IMINT, etc., HUMINT is another tool altogether in the Intelligence gathering process.  You bring them all together and come up with your INTREPs and INTSUMS.  It is not RECCEs job to do HUMINT, as it is not HUMINTs job to do RECCE.  They each have their own special niche and role in developing the big picture.

Just to side track for a second; in ISTAR (like everything before us) we are gathering information from our Recce people, our HUMINT people, our EW people, our IMINT people, our SIGINT, people, our flanking Allies, our Higher Comds, etc., and compiling it all together to develop a clear picture of what we are facing.  In saying that, do we need to give them all the same vehicle to gather info?  Of course not.  Therefore, arguing that the guys in HUMINT need the same vehicle as Armd Recce is a mote point.

 

[Infanteer]

Recce is Recce.

George, regarding "recce", could we not say:

It is a form of Intelligence Gathering that anyone can do

Is not "recce" something anybody can (and should do) - I'm not sure what the official doctrine bills it as, but to me it just seems to be "visual information on terrain, enemies, etc".  All maneuver forces should be doing it.  The Armoured Corps should do it in support of its own operations (which I feel can best be accomplished by a Cav setup) and not make it it's raison d'etre (the one-trick pony statement).  Thus, the question revolves back to the original question - is the "armoured recce" that we use suitable for supporting forces in light of the information presented?  Is the force structure of the Armoured Corps one that is sufficent for a maneuver unit for which "armoured recce" will support (ie: all Sense but no Act)?

 

[KevinB]

George, I disagree that we should ignore HUMINT in this discussion, at least in one light.  The very fact that we cannot role up upon enemy formations in the open fields with Armour these days pushes recce down.  Unless we go toe to toe with the Chinese or North Koreans it is very unlikely that we will ever fight a conventional opponent again.

Before people disagree - look to coalition Airpower, no one who is SANE is going to sit and wait in a Russian style defensive position for a Cbt Team attack - why? Well we are not very sporting folk - and people who like to wait for us usually become a crater curteousy of the US AIR FORCE.  True their is terrain that that will not be applicable to massive airpower even precision bombing, but...

Given the state of our Army and the NO TRACK policy (which is dumb IMHO) we do not have the ability to do recce by force even in mid intensity conflicts (I would consider the Iraq conflict MID Intensity - since they had no opposing air power and there where few combined arms meetings).

I think the Regimental system in its current rendition is the biggest problem (other than the NO TRACK FIASCO).  Crewman are crewman - and Infanteers the guys who walk and stick bayonets in peoples chests. 
Back to my original tenet - Human Intelligence is any int gathered by humans - not necessarily a specific person/entity that is tasked as "HUMINT".  Using Infanteers point about CAV -- using the LAVIII as a CAV variant - crewed by armoured with Inf dismounts -- the dismounts can exit and exist on their own for brief periods and interact with the local populace, either over watched by the CAV crew (which can still fight in a limited role by itself and same with the dismounts).
  A Tank crew or even a Coyote Patrol does have have the luxuries of dismounts (dismounting the surv op is not credible IMHO).
Yet a 2 x LAVCAV patrol would have 8 dismounts (taking to people "gaming" a LAVote with the survop and kit they found room for 4 dismounts) - which is basically an Inf section.

Until we have a REAL HumInt MOSID/MOC with intergrated FST units (I dont think this will come on board until SOG is operational) the 031 on the ground is the best way in semi-permisive environments to glean info.
Even still if we have "localled up" HUMINT the LAVCAV patrols will still be able to do recce and surviellance - as well with the benifits of being able to make a patrol base with the LAV's in surviellance and overwatch - and let the black cadillacs go out for a romp.


AND in the miniturized LOSAT (its name currently escapes me) to the LAVCAV and you have a formidable platform for full spectrum battle.

 

[George Wallace]

George, I disagree that we should ignore HUMINT in this discussion, at least in one light.   The very fact that we cannot role up upon enemy formations in the open fields with Armour these days pushes recce down.   Unless we go toe to toe with the Chinese or North Koreans it is very unlikely that we will ever fight a conventional opponent again.

Kev
Are you thereby advocating that we put off the procurement of a Recce Vehicle, until such time as we will need it, and buy it off the shelf at the last minute, like the current trend seems to be?  Do we have to be caught with our pants down all the time, before we decide to purchase the equipment we need? 

.....   True their is terrain that that will not be applicable to massive airpower even precision bombing, but...

?

Given the state of our Army and the NO TRACK policy (which is dumb IMHO) we do not have the ability to do recce by force even in mid intensity conflicts (I would consider the Iraq conflict MID Intensity - since they had no opposing air power and there where few combined arms meetings).

I think the Regimental system in its current rendition is the biggest problem (other than the NO TRACK FIASCO).   Crewman are crewman - and Infanteers the guys who walk and stick bayonets in peoples chests.  

I agree with you and think that this is the main argument of this thread.

Back to my original tenet - Human Intelligence is any int gathered by humans - not necessarily a specific person/entity that is tasked as "HUMINT".   Using Infanteers point about CAV -- using the LAVIII as a CAV variant - crewed by armoured with Inf dismounts -- the dismounts can exit and exist on their own for brief periods and interact with the local populace, either over watched by the CAV crew (which can still fight in a limited role by itself and same with the dismounts).

Agree.  Humint is a job for everyone.  However, we are deploying personnel whose sole purpose is to conduct HUMINT.  These people don't required the same heavily armoured vehicle as the RECCE guys.  They need a vehicle that will give them good protection, but also offer them the "closeness" they need to do their job.  Armoured GWagens or even armoured staff cars would do (they may even be too much), not the more heavily armoured and armed Recce Vehicle.  Your idea of a 2 x LAVCAV patrol which would have 8 dismounts is another option.

Anyway, the main topic of discussion here is the RECCE function; not any other form of information gathering found in other units or formations.  That is why I say to drop the inclusion of HUMINT, or any information that is gathered outside of the Stealth mode.

 

[Kirkhill]

If you have to "fight for information" why not just bring forward a "fighting formation"?   It seems to me that one of the reasons that the light recce elements described both in WW2 and OIF experiences were of limited value was that the formation they were supporting was effectively "in contact".    The commander may not have known to the meter where every last MG and RPG or AT gun were located but he had a good idea of where they weren't.   It is as important to find where the enemy isn't as where it is.

If the tempo is as high as described then effectively you are back to an "advance to contact" and that used to be done by all combat arms (inf and armd; lt, med and hvy; air, wheeled, mech or boat).   Isn't that ultimately the reason that you advance "1 or 2 up" with "2 or 1 back" (according to personal preference and tactical situation)?   So that you can react when you bump the unexpected?   Inf platoon leaders also practice "Contact" drills.


As many have stated, everybody does recce.   Advance to Contact is one form of recce.

It seems to me that stage one of any operation is to define where the enemy is known to be from Int and Map Recce.   Then define where the enemy might be and might not be.  

That defining process is the job of dedicated Recce troops whose sole job it is to clarify that position.   If they don't get shot at they keep advancing.   Once they are shot and that event is reported back to higher then they have done their job.  If they see the enemy before they get shot then so much the better. The only question is whether higher wants them to keep "eyes on" (conduct surveillance) until a suitable "fighting formation" is brought up, whether they will engage the enemy with supporting fires, or whether they will be pulled to look for an open route or flank.

If they can't find an open flank or route then they have fulfilled their task (WWI, WWII).   In that case they are superfluous to requirement.   If the combat power represented by the man-power and kit invested in Recce forces is necessary to win the engagement under those circumstances then it seems to me that the problem is with the rest of the army, not the Recce forces.  

If all routes are opposed then it is ludicrous to send light forces forward to assault an enemy that is expecting to see them in 5 minutes.   At that point I agree with those that suggest there is a need to push forward with a tank (where ground permits) or your heaviest available armour.   That doesn't necessarily mean that the Recce force needs to have tanks does it?   Couldn't the formation commander, assuming that tanks were on strength somewhere, send forward a tank element to lead the "advance to contact".

WW2 experience is starting to look to me like a poor basis of analysis.   It wasn't difficult to find the enemy for either side.   Just as in WW1 he was virtually everywhere.   Dedicated Recce forces, at least in Italy and NW Europe probably weren't as useful to the Corps and Division commanders as perhaps another battalion/regiment of tanks under their direct control might have been.   It wasn't hard to find the enemy.  

In OIF it seems to me to be much the same thing. It wasn't hard to find the enemy there either, at least the conventional enemy, nor does it seem to have been particularly difficult to enumerate their strength, operational movements and form up positions.   While individual enemy vehicles and platoons went undetected, possibly even companies and battalions,   the enemy couldn't manoeuver larger formations because recce assets (such as satellites and aircraft) along with supporting fires (aircraft, helicopters, long range artillery - missile and tube) denied them the "other side of a (big enough) hill".

From here it sounds like the good Major is making a case for all formations to remember how to conduct "advance to contact" operations, or else bemoaning that in Recce by stealth he wasn't getting enough action to suit him.

I recall somebody saying that as soon as they passed the start line at OIF they were in contact.   At that point all the tactical commander has to do is remain in contact.   If he is able to steam roller the opposition, and that is the operational aim, then he doesn't need to concern himself with open enemy flanks and routes.   Recce can then be used to observe/screen/secure his own open flanks along his lines of communication.

 

[Steel Badger]

Kirkhill makes a good point


The Armoured recce regiment for 4th Canadian Armoured Div in Northwest Europe 44-45 was used as a medium tank regiment rather than a recce regiment most time........
(See Black Yesterdays by Fraser and South Albertas by Graves)

In fact most of their Sabre Squadrons spent time paired off with Inf units.....



SB

 

[DG-41]

WW2 experience is starting to look to me like a poor basis of analysis.  It wasn't difficult to find the enemy for either side.

It's not just a case of "finding the enemy", but also a case of determining his intentions, mapping his positions, and basically checking ground to see if the plan as envisioned by the heavier elements is actually workable.

It's not just bumbling down the road until somebody blows up.

That's how recce was employed in WW2 (and ever since) "I have made contact with the enemy and intend to execute a left flanking attack while the units in contact fix the enemy in place. Recce go check the route along which my flanking units will traverse, and find out of the route is passible and if the enemy is already there."

or maybe better "I have made contact with the enemy and need to decide how to deal with them. My initial analysis suggests trying a flanking attack either up the left or right side. Recce, go check the routes up both flanks, report if the going is passible, and the extents of his positions."

Other tasks recce has been called upon to do:

"I am supposed to be advancing shoulder to shoulder with another unit, but I have lost contact with them. Recce, go find them, make sure the enemy isn't in the gap between us, and report to me on what is going on"

"I am executing an attack. Recce, go screen my flanks so I get warning of any enemy counterattck"

"I am advancing to contact, and my route takes me through an obstacle and over a bridge. Recce, you move faster than the main body can, go up there and see if the enemy is waiting at the obstacle and/or at the bridge. If he is at the obstacle, find me a bypass route. If he is at the bridge, find me an alternate crossing point. If the bridge is currently unoccupied, check to make sure it can hold the traffic I want to cross it, and take and hold the approaches to the bridge until we get there"

"I am about to execute a left flanking attack. Recce, scoot up the right flank, make contact with the enemy, and harrass him as part of my deception plan"

etc etc

And while the South Albertas et all were emplyed more as medium tank units in support of the infantry, they retained a large (11 cars I think) Recce Troop, plus the integral AA troop was also employed in the recce role. The CO of the SAR was famous for how hard he worked his recce elements.

DG

 

[Kirkhill]

DG-41.

I see your point and understand it.  However apart from the last instruction do any of the others demand that the recce element actively engage the enemy or isn't it enough to locate the enemy? Higher will then decide whether to exploit the route or flank, won't they?  Even in the case of "harassing" does that mean that you want your own vehicles engaged or could the enemy by effectively "harassed" by observed artillery fire or air support?

I still don't see that recce troops are best employed trading shots.  Even your example of the South Albertas,  assuming that the other Squadrons in the Regiment were tasked out to support the brigades with medium tank support (including driving along the tops of dykes amongst flooded polders while the enemy identified their position to accompanying infantry by firing at the lone tank), then that left the Div commander with one 11 car troop to conduct recce ops of the type you describe.  Despite how hard the CO had to work that troop it doesn't seem to suggest that Div or Corps felt they needed to invest a whole lot of effort in that field.

 

[Infanteer]

WW2 experience is starting to look to me like a poor basis of analysis.  It wasn't difficult to find the enemy for either side.  Just as in WW1 he was virtually everywhere.  Dedicated Recce forces, at least in Italy and NW Europe probably weren't as useful to the Corps and Division commanders as perhaps another battalion/regiment of tanks under their direct control might have been.  It wasn't hard to find the enemy.  

In OIF it seems to me to be much the same thing. It wasn't hard to find the enemy there either, at least the conventional enemy, nor does it seem to have been particularly difficult to enumerate their strength, operational movements and form up positions.  While individual enemy vehicles and platoons went undetected, possibly even companies and battalions,  the enemy couldn't manoeuver larger formations because recce assets (such as satellites and aircraft) along with supporting fires (aircraft, helicopters, long range artillery - missile and tube) denied them the "other side of a (big enough) hill".

I think you're confusing the operational and tactical levels.  Operationally, sure, we know that, forward of the line of departure, the enemy is out there.  Tactically, the goal seems to develop an idea of who and what the enemy is as much as tell them where you are, which should inform commanders about how to shape the battle - this was the process referred to as templating.  Ideally, from the NTC, you'd want to template the enemy before you got into it with him and committed your forces.  Two ways to template are close "stealth" recce and surveillance - which is, surprise, what our Armoured Corps is focusing on.

Maj Taylor argues that, in reality, operational tempo renders these skill sets as ineffective at the tactical level (indeed, "iconology was dead").  The tempo is either driven by us or the enemy.  In the Gulf and Iraq, coalition forces drove tempo - tactically, using recce assets that required time to deploy was unfeasible; they were either too exposed or simply didn't get the information in time.  Sure, a Canadian Brigade (if we were there) could have deployed Coyote and "DURO" assets to template the enemy, but we would have noticed that we were holding up 3ID's advance and 1 MARDIV had blown right past us.  WWII provides an example (IMHO) of where the enemy drives tempo - the Germans were a wily lot and the counter-attack at all levels was well known.

Complexity also affected templating - weird things like when a Republican Guard formation surrenders en masse and a small group of Fedayeen hold up the advance for a day.  This is why Maj Taylor brought up HUMINT (I guess you could say Advance to Contact is a form of "HUMINT"; you're intacting directly with the enemy  ).  Electronic means of surveillance and "stealth recce" on an enemy position tells us nothing about his forces capability of the "moral plane" - this is where Canadian doctrine is focused on, but yet how to we ascertain it with a camera?  This is probably a remnent of our Cold War roots where we focussed on an enemy that consisted of Shock Armies and Motor Rifle Divisions all led by Frunze-trained leaders.  Complexity threw a wrench into that.

 

[Kirkhill]

Not confusing ops and tactics. The issue is that there is no clear distinction amongst tactics, ops and strategy.   All blend into each other.   Its kind of like a border line on a map.   You can't see the border.   You may not even be able to identify where the border exists on the ground.   All you know for sure is that where you stand now the border is somewhere ahead of you.   Once you get to the other side and hear people speaking in a foreign dialect then you might be able to speculate that the border is behind you.

Similarly tactical needs and capabilities blend into operational needs and capabilities which blend into strategic needs and capabilities.   Tactics may be the realm of the battalion CO but if his unit is at the leading edge of a formation, or on a flank then he/she relies on operational and strategic intelligence and contributes to that intelligence.    The battalion recce platoon is conducting tactical, operational and strategic reconnaissance.

If the recce platoon discovers a blocked route or a closed flank then the CO has to decide, or Brigade/Div/Corps/Army has to decide, whether to engage on that route or flank, whether to hold ground, whether to move to an open route or whether to retire.

One option that is available is to have the CO task a Combat Team to conduct an Advance to Contact, ultimately to develop strategic intelligence that will answer the questions you posed.

I am not arguing the need for tanks. I am not arguing the value of Duro vs a tank.   I am not arguing that close recce (whether for tactical, operational or strategic reasons) might not be best conducted by tanks, or for that matter a single scout/sniper from recce platoon.

I am simply pointing out that recce is a task performed by all arms, that recce is about gathering information and that some information can be gathered from 50,000 ft above, other information can be gathered by observation on the ground and still other information can only be gathered by actively engaging the enemy.     Engaging the enemy is the role of the combat arms, including the armour.  

I don't argue that tanks are a suitable platform, even a desirable platform, to conduct close recce, also known as 'advance to contact'.  

In the 1980s good intelligence used to consist of being able to draw a circle round a grid square and declare it was held by an inf company or an armd regiment.   In World War I it was an intelligence coup for the Germans to discover where the Canadian Corps was deployed. In World War II the Germans misread where the entire Normandy invasion force, 250,000 men, were headed.   Now it seems like good intelligence is defined as which room Jake is in and what he is armed with and what Zack is doing in the backyard.   The fact that we can contemplate trying to answer the latter question already tells us something about how technology has advanced and contributed to the battle.   It also tells us something about expectations.

 

[DG-41]

If the recce platoon discovers a blocked route or a closed flank then the CO has to decide, or Brigade/Div/Corps/Army has to decide, whether to engage on that route or flank, whether to hold ground, whether to move to an open route or whether to retire.

Actually, a good recce troop has a decent understanding of the commander's intent, and is supposed to seek courses of action based on their own initiative, their read of the ground, and the disposition of the enemy.

The pentultiamte case of this is probably the battle of Gettysburg, where the Union recce (cavalry) commander made contact with the enemy, realized that he had just crossed the best piece of defensive ground one could hope for, knew that it would take time for the enemy to deploy from column into line of attack, knew that his main fighting brigades were coming up behind him (so he would get support) and chose to dismount and fight as infantry on the spot. He was beaten back from his position, but he had forced the Confederates to deploy in the low ground and the follow-on Union forces had the high ground. The "task force commander" thus inherited the best possible place to fight, and the rest is history.

The more things recce can try before the main body arrives, the more information the task commander has, and the better the resulting plan can be - and sometimes, that plan is "sieze the target of opportunity that recce turned up"

DG

 

[a_majoor]

The pentultiamte case of this is probably the battle of Gettysburg, where the Union recce (cavalry) commander made contact with the enemy, realized that he had just crossed the best piece of defensive ground one could hope for, knew that it would take time for the enemy to deploy from column into line of attack, knew that his main fighting brigades were coming up behind him (so he would get support) and chose to dismount and fight as infantry on the spot. He was beaten back from his position, but he had forced the Confederates to deploy in the low ground and the follow-on Union forces had the high ground. The "task force commander" thus inherited the best possible place to fight, and the rest is history.

Excellent example. Recce mounted on LAVs, or American "Armoured Cavalry Regiments" represent that line of thinking. These formations can disperse down to the point of having foot patrols interacting wioth the locals, or power up to fight for information if required. Even in the case of a LAV recce, there is a strong case that the lead vehicle could survive a brush with an enemy (RPG, IED, machinegun fire) and be able to pop smoke and retreat while laying down a blanket of 25mm and GPMG fire. In fact in most of the scenarios we are considering today, this migh be enough fighting power to force the gap, given they are fighting from the back of a Toyota land cruiser; able to overmatch a G-wagon but not much beyond.

The term "fighting for information" should not imply a massed tank battle, but having enough fighting power to be able to deny the enemy his recce elements (in some scenarios this might imply dropping off foot patrols, in others zapping a technical with a 25mm, and in others needing to deal with an enemy tank), and prevent the enemy from consolodating his position.

 

[Matt_Fisher]

DG,

Your point about Gettysburg is a good one, however lets look at how the troops of the day were similarly equipped.  Also, Recce. in the defensive (as such with the Union cavalry at Gettysburg) has an enormous advantage as compared to its ability to perform in offensive operations.  Perhaps we should be looking at the role that the confederate played (or more aptly put, failed to play) at screening the advance of Lee's Army of Northern Virginia at Gettysburg?

Considering most future engagements, are there really that many likely defensive battles that Canadian recce. elements will be tasked with?  Barring Canadians putting troops in South Korea to screen a North Korean advance, or similarly in Taiwan against a Chinese onslaught, etc. most of the scenarios seem to be pointing towards intervening in 'failed states', meaning going into somebody elses backyard and conducting offensive or security & stabilization ops/aka peacekeeping.

In reference to the SAR, again you're looking at a recce. force that was equipped with a light TANK, the M-3 Stuart Honey armed with a 37mm, not an unarmoured jeep.

 

[Kirkhill]

In response to DG-41, a-majoor and Matt, I am not contesting the need to "fight for information".  I am debating which unit is allocated to gain that information.

Regardless of hat badge or corps affiliation it seems that terrain and route availability will largely determine whether an armoured, a LAV, a Light or an airmobile force will be best equipped to conduct the task and secure the information.

While we may not be predisposed to task a complete unit (virtually our entire committed field force), inf or armd, to determine the state of our enemy a Corps or Army commander with 50 or more such units might be more inclined to risk moving one those units forward secure in the knowledge that he has 49 other units available to exploit the information.  A similar rate of risk for a force commander of 1500 bodies would be 30 troops, or a recce platoon/troop.

 

[DG-41]

Gettysburg was technically a meeting engagement. The Northern army was manoevering to block the South's advance, and they met head on at Gettysburg. That the actual battle would up being the South attacking uphill to a hastily fortified North's positions was a consequence of the ground each side occupied. It could have easily been the North attacking downhill onto the South's hastily fortified positions - except that only a moron would have left those heights, especially when the South was so accomodating as to attack uphill.

I see the Honey/Stuart and the LAV as being functionally identical. The LAV has better speed on good ground and more firepower. The Stuart has better mobility in poor ground. Protection I think is a wash, especially if the LAV has the uparmour kit fitted. So really, a WW2 recce troop with Stuarts and a UNPROXXX recce troop with a LAV are the same thing.

I agree that we're not likely to see the Soviet style masses of armour moving around anymore; we're far more likely to do protection/repulsion of minor players (Gulf War I, Afganistan) or failed states (Yugoslavia) None of those preclude armed clashes between manoever elements, it is just more likely that the sizes of the forces will be smaller. All the players in Yugoslavia had armies with tanks, Iraq had the 4th largest army in the world at the time, and Afganistan is full of old Soviet equipment. A mechanized unit run by a warlord is still a mechanized unit. A T54 or T34 is still a tank. A meeting engagement with a unit that rides to battle in school busses and gets its fire support from pickup trucks with MGs mounted in the bed is still a meeting engagement.

There are three blocks in the "3 block war". The spectrum in "full spectrum ops" is FULL spectrum, not "half spectrum". And all the most recent examples in the world at the moment have started with full-on warfighting that gradually tapers into insergant/partizan fighting, and eventually (one hopes) into nation building. That means to me that the entry point into an operation is likely to be a full bore warfighting op, and keeping that capability is very important. If you lose the first block, you don't get to experience the next two.

BTW, wouldn't the American Civil War count as a "failed state" scenario?

DG

 

[Infanteer]

except that only a moron would have left those heights, especially when the South was so accomodating as to attack uphill.

Well good thing Burnside and Hooker had already had their go, because they probably would have done it....