Train as you fight...fight as you Train

[vonGarvin]

Got this idea from another thread.  Anyway, here goes.
Under the new "force employment/force generation" thingy, units that are "generating" will train to a maximum level of Combined Arms Team (I believe).  Only when in "Force employment mode" will they go to "Task Force" level.  So, at "unit" level, the infantry battalion, comprised of three rifle coys, a sniper platoon and a recce platoon, will train mostly at coy level.  No battalion level FTXs.  So what?  Well, I am one who would believe that an infantry battalion similar in organisation to the "cold war" version would be better for a variety of reasons. 
So, four rifle companies, a recce platoon, a sniper platoon, a mortar platoon, a pioneer platoon and an anti armour platoon (along with sigs platoon, BHQ and Combat Service Support company, of course) to make the infantry battalion the building block upon which to "task tailor" forces.  Why in such a format?  Well, the unit could then train on a continuous basis as it would deploy.  And if that infantry battalion were to get a task requiring a less-than-battalion level of force, the battalion commander could then "task tailor" according to need.
For example, look at the mission to Ethiopia/Eritrea.  A company was deployed along with Recce Platoon and elements of CSS coy and BHQ. If called upon to deploy NOW (as the case with CANBATT 2 in 1992) the battalion could deploy and survive on its own for a limited time without external support.  I understand the rationale for the current force employment philosophy and I also realise that I'm talking about ideal situations with unlimited budgets, but this is just a forum for discussion.
First question I can see raised: why four rifle companies?  Well, four (vice three) provides the ability for depth and reserve (never to be confused with one another).  By depth I don't mean "two up, one back" a la fighting for the Fulda Gap, but more in terms of the COE (Contemporary Operational Environment).
About mortars: the 81 is a groovy piece of kit, especially when mounted on the Bison.  You can be in and out in a matter of minutes with pretty good fire which is also EXCELLENT for complex terrain.  A mortar can hit areas that even artillery can't.  For anyone who's been to Julien, think of the mountain range to the south of the camp (immediately behind the Queen's Palace).  Suppose Tommy Taliban were launching rockets from there and suppose that the mortars were in action.  They would have no trouble hitting that spot.  LG1?  Difficult to impossible.  Also, with the latest ammo, the range of 5.6 km makes it the longest range weapon in the infantry battalion.  Go to 120mm?  Perhaps, but the 81 does have a higher rate of fire and is quite man-portable (ammo is greatest limitation)
The other platoons have also proved their worth time and time again.  Now, they do not eliminate the need for the other Combat Arms of course, and the more the merrier.  My main point is this: we had a flexibile and extremely capable force in the past that would be quite suitable in the Full Spectrum of Operations (FSO).  So, would a reversion to an organisation similar to the one of old make sense?  Points and thoughts would be greatly appreciated.

 

[TCBF]

"So, would a reversion to an organisation similar to the one of old make sense?"

This 011 Crewman says "Yes, it would."  You are correct as to why it would, and also to why we cannot - at present - do it.

Tom

 

[Chilly]

I fully agree with you on this one vonGarvin, the flexibility was greatly enhanced.  The lose of internal specialist such as PNR's, TOW, and Mortars has greatly reduced the fighting capability of the Infantry on its own and now has to rely on the other arms for support ( of which brigade might or might not deem necessary at any given time.  This is not to say that we don't need or have need for Armour, Engineers or even the guns.  But having these as a BN asset was great and should be brought back IMHO.

As a side note -- having served in both PNR'S,TOW, and Recce Pls I have seen the benefits and witnessed the demise of the INF BN in the last four or five years promting myself to leave and move on to another trade within the army.

vonGarvin this is for you:

I have also seen the difficulty in controlling the mortar pigs around the coffee and donuts

chilly

 

[vonGarvin]

vonGarvin this is for you:

I have also seen the difficulty in controlling the mortar pigs around the coffee and donuts

chilly

Mortar pigs require NO controal around coffee and doughnuts.....

They just need lots of room, and heaven help anyone who gets their fingers in the way!! 

 

[MG34]

The "old' system worked much better from an Infantry point of view ,as the support required was on hand and under control to a certain extent of the BN CO. Having built in fire support,Pioneers, Anti Armour was an effective and to put it in the simplest terms possible it worked.Couple the current problems in getting any of the other organizations to actually get together and train with the mess the "new" system has made of Infantry carreer progression,and you have a less capable organization. It is sad.

 

[vonGarvin]

The "old" system (which is still in use by every one of our major allies, by the way) came into being not because of budget cuts and then justified in terms of "force employment concept" and "advancing with purpose", but rather came into being because it worked.  I think an ideal situation would be one in which the different combat arms are under one umbrella (I'll call it a "brigade") and then trained on their own when required (for example, a DP 1 armoured crewman course) and trained together as often as possible. 

Think of 2 RCR and C Sqn RCD (or even A Sqn 8 CH) in Gagetown.  Combined with W Bty and you had there in one spot a battlegroup that was highly trained.  Now, alot of it was because of the location (CTC right there).  Still no reason why 2 R22eR and 12e RBC and 5e RALC couldn't do the same in Valcatraz.

Anyway, I digress. 


Anyone got any razor blades?  :crybaby:

 

[George Wallace]

Think of 2 RCR and C Sqn RCD (or even A Sqn 8 CH) in Gagetown.   Combined with W Bty and you had there in one spot a battlegroup that was highly trained.   Now, alot of it was because of the location (CTC right there).   Still no reason why 2 R22eR and 12e RBC and 5e RALC couldn't do the same in Valcatraz.

And don't forget they guys in 22 Fd Sqn.  I am sure they would feel left out if you forgot them.  ;D

 

[pbi]

Von Garvin: I am with you 100%. In the four rifle coy Cdn Mech Inf  Bn We had, arguably, the world's most tactically capable TOE (I'm talking structure, not the kit in it...). Others were stronger in certain areas, but I don't think that anybody had all the same organic capabilities. The tactical capability of the structure was excellent, and the leaders that Regtl duty produced (especially our WOs) were second to none in terms of experience and skill sets. By the time a Reg Inf WO reached Coy Sgt Maj level, he was normally a very skilled and experienced individual particularly in Cbt Sp functions, and it showed in the abilities of the companies. Our junior officers tended to be well-rounded as well, provided they got a chance to serve in Cbt Sp as well as a Rifle Coy.

We have damaged that, badly. The reasons the damage was done were IMHO "soft" institutional ones rather than operational or combat development ones, but the impact will be felt (and is being felt) in both areas. It is never too late to rebuild or create new, if we have the will, but it is a tragedy to me that we even have to think about a salvage operation: we never should have done the damage in the first place. The Infantry is the basic arm, the backbone of any Army, and the arm most lkely to be employed in the widest range of situations. Therefore, IMHO, it must be as institutionally strong and tactically self-sufficient as it can be, even if that comes at the expense of other arms that are less likely to be employed.

Cheers.

 

[30 for 30]

I think transformation's advocates would make the argument that the "old system" won't work if we are to embark on the Army's proposed deployment schedule/pace. If I understand correctly we now need to limit task force infantry contingents to two coys in order to provide the desired number of TFs outlined in the recent policy document with the desired duration of rest/trg time between deployments. It seems to me we need to rethink our position and limit our commitments. If we deployed our six mech bns as full-size, old style BGs that would suffice for an "indefinite" Bosnia/Kabul-style mission. Our remaining three light BGs could be similarly deployed as full-size, traditional formations to cover the shorter missions we have witnessed over the last decade: Haiti, Eritrea, East Timor, Somalia, Khandahar etc. (mostly six-month, one-off deployments?).

We wouldn't be left with further Task Forces to send elsewhere (except perhaps a small SF TF capability), but at least we would be deploying fully-capable bns. Just like the old days I guess. The key is a commitment to restrict deployments to just one long term and one short term at any given time. Two indefinite Task Forces plus various short-term versions seems excessive.

On a side note the protection of a LAV-less light BG could be addressed with investment in a small, BV-206S type vehicle, which should now be an affordable option. Anyway, back to work...

 

[Acorn]

pbi,

I think your "backbone of the Army" comment hits the mark, though the zips and herbies, and even the thumpers, may take issue, since it comes from a pongo. That being said, if one sets aside one's hat-badge, one will see what?

Gunners providing mortar pl for inf bns - a task formerly done very well (if I don't say) by infanteers
Troopers (black hatted) providing direct fire support (with some bird gunners who're wondering what they really signed up for) The TOW guys provided what is available today, at great expense.
Sappers providing what infantry pioneers were very able to provide until recently.

So, why do we need the other guys? Well, warfighting, of course. But the current configuration is basically only saying that we don't intend to use the more complex capabilities of the other branches (with the possible exception of the Sappers - their roles will never go away). In other words the warfighting capabilities of the Army.

I'm reminded of the M*A*S*H episode with the "Luxembourg Lieutenant." A niche role? Do we deserve it?

Sorry. A Monday night ramble. Bottom line is that I agree with you: the driver of this "transformation" is more one of budget than operational considerations.

Acorn

 

[Kat Stevens]

And don't forget they guys in 22 Fd Sqn.  I am sure they would feel left out if you forgot them.  ;D

To be honest George, even when the Engineers are included, they're left out.  Countless runs up and down the same trace in Wainwright. We could set our watches by what we weren't doing: "0945- any minute now, they'll meet a minefield and bypass it...brew up."  At least in the AET we got to fill in a ditch and clean up afterwards...great training for us

CHIMO,  Kat

 

[George Wallace]

Kat

Back in the 1980's 22 Fd Sqn and C Sqn RCD were very close in their training and social interactions.  They were both "Fly Over" Sqns and spent a lot of time training together in Gagetown and Germany.  It is one of the closest Inter-Arm relationship I have come across in the Forces.  2 RCR, also partook in much of that training and the experience they all garnered was evident whenever they went to an RV.  Those three units were the only ones in Canada, at the time, who truly made a Cbt Team work the way it should.  2 RCR had the experience of working with actual Tanks and Hvy Engr assets, whereas the remainder of the Units were poorly trained (bad lessons learned) by the use of Cougar and other non-Mech equip.  The experience really showed at RV.

 

[Kat Stevens]

George,
  You obviously had the advantage of combat team commanders who had trained on the odd REFORGER, and knew of the value of ALL arms operations.  During the same time period, we in the West had officers who were either uninformed of what Sappers can bring to the table, or felt that for some reason we didn't belong on the pointy end.  As I mentioned, up and down the trace with nothing to do but get very good at the tactical driving.  Things began to change when Lahr closed, and the Strats got their tanks.  I also think our boys performance in A-Stan did a lot to wake people up the fact that, just maybe, we don't belong in the baggage train...

CHIMO,  Kat

 

[mover1]

I was in Gagetown  and the topic got on to American tactics and how they are changing and how we should change ours because the old Cold War ideas of fighting a in the woods are gone. (OK everyone can jump on me now or put this in a new thread or call me stupid and direct me to a thread that was already discussed ( sorry I missed it I wasn't on line 2 years ago)) Anyways my point is the Americans are getting killed and the British are not. Do we go and start emulating the way Americans fight or do we go the British way?

Everyone can start calling me stupid starting..........


NOW!!!

this link is interesting

http://icasualties.org/oif/

 

[TangoTwoBravo]

Mover1,

I think that your question would be best served as another thread.  Be careful about looking at casualties from Iraq and trying to make conclusions about doctrine.  If you are going to compare casualty rates you need to also look at where the different forces are operating and what they are doing.  The threat differs in Iraq by region.  If you are trying to say that British doctine is superior based on a cursory look at casualties I think that you are on very shaky ground.  Perhaps British techniques are superior, but you'd need to go much deeper.

In Canada we are influenced by both US and UK doctrine while also having some ideas and techniques of our own.  While the Canadian army is active in the world, we need to study recent US and UK experience as they have much more "high intensity" experience than us.  We'd be fools not to look around and adapt ideas that are proven in battle.

2B

 

[mover1]

Thanks for 2B, what scared me was the thought that these guys had,  American tactics were superior and we should emulate them, my thoughts are that even though they are increasingly taking the brunt of the fighting, and the lessions learned are there,  that there are probably better ways to fight a war.

We traditionally have been a defensive army. Now we are going to have to start thinking in offensive. Who do we learn from, the US the British or both.


I will stop talking out of my hat now because I am completely ignorant on the army and tactics as they play out now adays, just the conversation we had tweaked my interest.

 

[Michael Shannon]

The current gutting of infantry battalions isn't tactics driven. It is the option that leaves the rank structure of the combat arms least effected. If the CF is destined to never again fight above the unit level and never against even a third rate enemy what are the brigade HQs for? Why so much, if any artillery? Why nine infantry battalions none of which can deploy without substantial reinforcement and a huge subsequent training bill. The structure we have now is completely about maintaining senior officer and sergeant major positions.

      The Army really has enough people for about eight cohesive units capable of "rapid" (in the sense of weeks instead of months) deployment. I would see these as permanent battalion groups based on four rifle companies, an engineer company (3 field, 1 support and 1 "assault" platoons) , a recce company (3 motorized recce platoons, sniper platoon & a LRRP platoon), Sigs, Int(-) AA, & mortar platoons. I'm not sure if the infantry use LAVs and the armoured corps doesn't have tanks if the armoured corps should exist as a separate arm. An amalgamation of the mech infantry and armoured corps might make sense.

  Gunners might also be endangered as a separate arm. Mortars are an infantry weapon and the air force can operate drones and drop precision munitions. I really don't know where a gun battery fits in the new army on operations.

    Perhaps the only combat arms should be Light Armour, Light Infantry, and Engineers. The Army would then have 4 light armoured and 4 light infantry units. ATOF would be shelved and all units could maintain a high level of readiness. These units would report to one of two HQs: Light Armour Group or Light Infantry Group. These HQs would not be operational but rather administrative and training organizations.  At the end the Army would require at least 100 fewer senior officers and 60-70 sergeants major. The army would be much leaner and capable of rapid response but at serious cost to the careerists.

   

 

[pbi]

I also think our boys performance in A-Stan did a lot to wake people up the fact that, just maybe, we don't belong in the baggage train

There may, once upon a time in the far off pre-Yugo days, have been Cbt A officers who didn't have much time for Sappers. Since we first went to that mine-infested place in the early 90's, all Inf ofrs I know have nothing but the greatest respect for our Engineer brethren.

Cheers

 

[Infanteer]

There may, once upon a time in the far off pre-Yugo days, have been Cbt A officers who didn't have much time for Sappers. Since we first went to that mine-infested place in the early 90's, all Inf ofrs I know have nothing but the greatest respect for our Engineer brethren.

Cheers

Roger that - I can echo the sentiments as a Private preparing to deploy to a much quieter Balkans.   The Engineers did an excellent job of reminding us that instant danger remained to bite the unweary in the ass and that they really did know what they were talking about.   Combining that with the fact that my 2ic was pretty close when MCpl Isfeld was killed by a minestrike, we had a healthy dose of respect for these dangers and the Engineers who made it their business. 

 

[a_majoor]

  Gunners might also be endangered as a separate arm. Mortars are an infantry weapon and the air force can operate drones and drop precision munitions. I really don't know where a gun battery fits in the new army on operations.

Gunners can deliver ordnance with very short time of flight, and in weather which prevents the use of aircraft, helicopters, UAVs or other flying devices. In theory, guns can also deliver a greater weight of fire (although today we don't have the guns or logistics resources to do so). I certainly see the guns as being an important player for years to come.