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MGen (Ret’d) Lewis MacKenzie joins the debate in this column, reproduced, without further comment, under the Fair Dealing provisions (§29) of the Copyright Act from the Ottawa Citizen:
http://www.ottawacitizen.com/news/Lewis+Mackenzie+What+objective+Libya/4500221/story.html
http://www.ottawacitizen.com/news/Lewis+Mackenzie+What+objective+Libya/4500221/story.html
What is our objective in Libya?
BY LEWIS MACKENZIE, THE OTTAWA CITIZEN
MARCH 25, 2011
In virtually all the military learning institutions around the world, students from corporals to generals are taught and retaught the 10 principles of war. I won’t bore the reader by listing numbers two to 10, inclusive, because No. 1, Selection and Maintenance of the Aim, is more important than all the rest. It means, in layman’s terms, before going to war decide what your overall objective is and stick to it.
Regrettably, the UN Security Council’s Resolution 1973 authorizing international military action against the forces of Colonel Gadhafi in Libya failed to precisely pin down the political and, by default, the military’s objective, thereby leaving this critical decision to individual nations enforcing the resolution. At this stage there are still a number of vastly different interpretations of what the resolution was attempting to achieve. Some, particularly in the Arab camp, suggest the objective is to freeze the military situation on the ground so diplomacy led by the Arab League and the African Union can proceed. Others have limited their opinion to a more literal interpretation of the resolution and say the role of the no-fly zone should be to protect civilians and population centres, presumably, while the war rages on away from the cities and towns. A more aggressive interpretation sees the aim as defeating Gadhafi’s military, something well beyond the intent of the resolution. All of the above have been suggested at various times during the past week because the resolution, in order to be passed, is intentionally broad and vague and, to date, no nation has taken the lead and convinced the other participants, including Canada, to agree to a common aim.
In the absence of coherent political direction, a dangerous escalation has been called for by the rebels. Based on their recent pronouncements it appears they consider the coalition air forces currently enforcing the no-fly zone to be their air force and they have new roles for it. Temporarily advancing south of Benghazi a few weeks ago against little and in many cases no opposition, the rebels now have their sights set on Libya’s capital and Gadhafi’s support base, Tripoli, some 1000 kilometres to the west. This they claim they can do with coalition air support “clearing” Gadhafi’s forces before them during their advance. The concept has been mentioned by at least one coalition member, France.
The idea of a successful rebel advance to Tripoli is beyond comprehension with or without coalition air support. Allied support for such folly should be rejected and the sooner the better before the rebels are led down the garden path by our silence on the matter.
The rebels are undisciplined, unco-ordinated and ill-equipped. They are also naive, thanks to their early success against limited opposition, and have no comprehension of the unique and demanding requirements of offensive operations. Defending built-up-areas (civilian population centres) is relatively straightforward. A few well placed, untrained marksmen can hold up an advancing column of infantry and tanks which the rebels themselves demonstrated during Gadhafi’s assaults on Benghazi. Possessed of a common hatred of Gadhafi and unquestionable bravery, the rebels can mount a determined defence. Unfortunately for them, offensive operations are out of their league even with the help of foreign military advisers infiltrating across the Egyptian border to give them a hand.
To describe a ridiculous but possible scenario to reinforce the slippery slope awaiting any decision to become the rebel’s air force, imagine the rebels advancing toward Tripoli with allied air support and having to fight their way through Ajdabiyah, a town currently held by Gadhafi’s forces 150 km south of Benghazi. As a result of the rebel’s offensive would not the ensuing battle that they initiated threaten the civilian population of Ajdabiyah? That being the case would not paragraph 4 of UN Resolution 1973, which states in part, “take all necessary measures to protect civilians and populated areas under threat of attack,” require the coalition air forces to bomb the rebels? Perhaps not such a ridiculous scenario after all, considering the rebels are now asking for air strikes to help them retake the town of Ajdabiyah.
Absent well-defined political leadership for the implementation of UN Resolution 1973, we now have a number of coalition military actions that arguably go beyond the letter and the intent of the resolution and seem to be more in support of regime change than protecting civilian population centres. If that is the case, the Security Council should meet and sanction the current military actions in Libya in support of Resolution 1973 and clearly state the removal of Colonel Gadhafi as the mission’s objective.
In the meantime, a ground invasion force led and dominated by Arab countries should be organized to deal with the inevitable, near-term stalemate.
Retired general Lewis MacKenzie served on nine UN peacekeeping missions and commanded two of them.
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