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Unification

Black Watch

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Hello! Im doing a scholl project on the CF in the 60 and 70. I'd like to know the following:
1. Why the unification;
2. If Mobile Command Force (MCF) had air support squadons, why did they didn't do the maintnance on the CF5's?
3. Why did the CF used the green service uniform?
4. Why all CF's commands were moved in Ottawa that late (1996)
5. Why the unificcation didn't work out? and;
6. Why MFC lost it's flying squadrons?

Thanks to all
 
Have you tried Google to start with? A search on "canadian force unification" returns 117,000 websites.

A search on Army.ca for "unification" return 6 pages of results.
 
Here's a start:

http://www.forces.gc.ca/site/minister/eng/Granatstein/gra2engsecintro.html#TOP

This is a report by J.L Granatstein on Structure within the CF while he was acting as commissioner on the Special Commission on the Restructuring of the Canadian Forces.

There is also this nifty website created by googls for the lazy that allows you to avoid using article indexes. I even did the search for you.:

http://scholar.google.com/scholar?hl=en&lr=&q=canadian+forces+unification+act
 
Bottom line it was to save$$$. End result was a lot of really PO'd people & lost espirit, that still huants us today.
cheers
 
CH1 said:
Bottom line it was to save$$$. End result was a lot of really PO'd people & lost espirit, that still huants us today.
cheers

It was in some ways a wise move that did indeed delete duplications and save money and effort.  General consensus among serious scholars, however, is that the implementation was failed, on many levels.

The problem with discussing unification is that it is hard to tell when someone is talking seriously, or simply rehashing the same old hysterical, visceral diatribes.
 
Black Watch said:
3. Why did the CF used the green service uniform?

The previous service uniforms indicated a specific branch, so one colour was chosen to represent the fact that the CF was now one single service.  The uniform wasn't a complete departure from previous unifoms; one can see an evolution from the tropical worsted jackets of the 1940s and 1950s and the CF uniform.  The colour was definitely different, and the deletion of shoulder straps was significant, though that is easilly explained by the desire to include air force and naval rank insignia into the mix.  The work dress uniform - particularly the "bus driver" jacket - was more of a departure, seeming rather unlike what had gone before, its closest predecessor perhaps being the denim battledress blouse.
 
CH1 said:
Bottom line it was to save$$$. End result was a lot of really PO'd people & lost espirit, that still huants us today.

Really, that's not what I got from reading all the material on it - the quest for unified Defence Policy and Planning seemed to be the number 1 issue.
 
Micheal & Infanteer

I will stand corrected.  I was responding from some obviously bitter memories.  The big thing pushed @ regimental & unit levels was the need to conserve dollars by reducing the duplication of trades & uniforms in the Tri service.  Although we also were told about the need to form a cohesive defense structure, emotions ruled the day.  The S2 & S3 dress, was I think derived from what we used to call T-Dubs.  This was a common pattern between the Army & Air Force.  It was a really fancy Summer Parade dress & the wool BDU's were the standard work & parade dress.  Still have my T-dubs & used them on occasion to sub in for my "Blues".

Personal Note:  Micheal I am home for sveral weeks now & Will dig out the voice procedure you are looking for.
 
Unification was the brainwave of Toronto Liberal MP and former Army Corporal Paul Helyer, who was
chosen as Defence Minister in the Liberal government of the period. The concept, despite all the
academic introspection and nit picking was based on costs, commonality of purpose and support,
single sources of supply, etc, etc. The model was the United States Marine Corps - (don't think
Helyer was aware that the Corps is a Department of the US Navy). It went thorough to approval
despite absolute shock by the RCN, because, for one thing, the RCAF supported the concept,
which, for another, would commission all RCAF Aircrew except hard working FE's. Air Force
senior people knew that the Air Force would dominate the "officer corps" of the soon to be
renamed Canadian Forces. It was of course a disaster of epic proportions. In our house the
Canadain Navy is the Royal Canadian Navy, period. The long suffering first rate Canadian Army
emerged relatively unscathed, but lost some first rate, battle trained outstanding senior officers
who were sent on their way - but the Army survived and remains the most effective overall "branch"
of the Canadian Forces. MacLeod
 
A few comments on the Northrop F-5 "Freedom Fighter", which was underwritten by the US Government in the 'sixties to provide high performance, turbine fighters to the international sector
considered friendly to the US at a low price. RCAF of the period needed to replace the F-104
and expected to buy the famous McDonnell-Douglas F-4 "Phantom" - but Northrop, anxious to
sell their airplane offered production to Canada (Canadair-Montreal) - bonus for Quebec. To my
knowledge, the military of the period, referred to the high mobility brigade, as a Mobile Strike
Force. The CF-5 went to Fighter Squadrons like 416, Chatham NB, RCAF of the period insisted pn
total control of all aircraft in their inventory and all maintenance of course. In 2005, people forget
what a powerhouse the RCAF (later the, would you believe, Air Element) was in the overall scheme
of things in DND - why? NATO and the freedom of the real world. F-5 was a solid, tough workhorse
easy to fly and maintain - could do the job but lacked legs (range). The design team on the Northrop
F-5 , led by the late Lee Begin, designed the YF-17, which became the YF-18L "Cobra" which, at
the request of the US Navy and assimilation with McDonnell-Douglas, (MacAir) became the F-18
-CF18A "Hornet". The Northrop team in Canada was headed by Canadian and AVRO "Arrow" veteran
Richard C "Bud" Turner, and LCOL Herb Graves, former CO 417 OTU Squadron Cold Lake - a great
team. Worked with them for several years - spent an afternoon in Northrop Hawthorne talking
with Designer Lee Begin and some of his team - a memorable experience. MacLeod
 
jmacleod said:
Unification was the brainwave of Toronto Liberal MP and former Army Corporal Paul Helyer, who was
chosen as Defence Minister in the Liberal government of the period. The concept, despite all the
academic introspection and nit picking was based on costs, commonality of purpose and support,
single sources of supply, etc, etc. The model was the United States Marine Corps - (don't think
Helyer was aware that the Corps is a Department of the US Navy). It went thorough to approval
despite absolute shock by the RCN, because, for one thing, the RCAF supported the concept,
which, for another, would commission all RCAF Aircrew except hard working FE's. Air Force
senior people knew that the Air Force would dominate the "officer corps" of the soon to be
renamed Canadian Forces. It was of course a disaster of epic proportions. In our house the
Canadain Navy is the Royal Canadian Navy, period. The long suffering first rate Canadian Army
emerged relatively unscathed, but lost some first rate, battle trained outstanding senior officers
who were sent on their way - but the Army survived and remains the most effective overall "branch"
MacLeod

Looking through my salt encrusted navy blue coloured glasses I would dispute your statement that the Army is the most effective branch. Time and time again the Navy has been able to respond and sail with 10 days notice and arrive in theatre ready to go. While the Army was still sorting out its transport. (East Timor for example).
That being said, I hope that Hillier vision is able to right the wrongs of unification.
of the Canadian Forces.
 
Time and time again the Navy has been able to respond and sail with 10 days notice and arrive in theatre ready to go. While the Army was still sorting out its transport. (East Timor for example).

If this is your definition of effectiveness, than I would have to disagree with you.  Army units (ie the immediate reaction unit (IRU) maintained by each area for domestic response are able to easily meet the 8/12/24 NTM timing for the recce/vanguard company/main body respectively (I can't remember what the NTM is for your ready duty ship).  This has been accomplished time and time again when responding to domestic emergencies.  For the Ontario/Quebec ice storm, LFWA was able to deploy 1 CMBG in its entire in approximately a 48 hours period with its vehs and eqpt arriving shortly thereafter.  Can the army power project in a short amount of time?  Sure can, and it has.  Can it power project overseas in the same amount of time?  It could but a deployment doesn't mean simply dumping soldiers in a hot DZ and then heading off for a shower (ie a self contained ship or the air force deployed to a five star hotel).  There is a large logistical tail required by the army in order to achieve sustained operations.

Having said that, I believe it is a totally falacious argument to compare a mechanized infantry battle group with all the bells and whistles attached to it with a self contained ship(s) or an aircraft(s) is like comparing apples to oranges to bananas.  Rethink your answer and post it if the navy wasn't able to tie up at a port for six months and then think if it would be able to deploy in only 10 days.

Cheers,

PS - I don't agree with jmcleod comments on the army being the most effective "branch", but I don't agree with your argument.
 
Gunner said:
  Rethink your answer and post it if the navy wasn't able to tie up at a port for six months and then think if it would be able to deploy in only 10 days.

Little late in the night to be re-thinking, so I'll only give a short reply:

East Timor: Was watching the news with the wife when PM Chretian was in New Zeland at a conference and stated that Canada would send troops to East Timor. I said to my wife that we (PROTECTEUR) would be going. Got the call about 2 hrs later and 10 days later we left. I might add that we took a whole load of unnecessary kit for the Van Doos. (winter equipment, I kid you not!).
There are several other examples and I'll address them later.

I don't want to start a pissing contest between the Army and Navy on who is more operationally relevent. We both bring seperate tools to the table. I always thought that Unification should have used the USN or RN as the model (having the Marines). I think that General Hillier has bought into the "From the Sea" concept (borrowing a USN term). Lets see if Ottawa will let him follow through with it.

good Night!! :salute:
 
Let's gang up on the Air Force - you have Naval Aviation and you have the Army Air Force.  Two services that run their own shows.... :dontpanic:
 
As a final word on "unification" - it was badly thought out, without consideration to the overwhelming
negative aspects to the Canadian military, and its ability to undertake what eventually became very
complex military operations. Unification caused many dedicated, smart and higly trained professionals
representing all ranks to leave the Forces, caused the huge growth of non military bureaucrats in
DND, and their ability to introduce and undertake major policy decisions which in many cases had
a negative effect on the composition and morale of the forces - the direct result of this type of
activity was the termination of the Canadian Airborne Regiment. MP Helyer promoted "unification"
because of his ambition to become leader of the Liberal Party (an impossible dream), but in fact
caused what became the slow and unrelenting down-sizing of the military presence in Canada and
abroad, and the contempt of our NATO and US allies - that is Helyer's real legacy. The Mulroney
government understood this to a certain degree, and attempted the first steps in undoing "unification"
by the introduction of three distinct uniforms for the Canadian Forces - unfortunately, his government
did not have a long enough mandate to finish the job. MacLeod
 
jmacleod said:
caused the huge growth of non military bureaucrats in DND, and their ability to introduce and undertake major policy decisions which in many cases had
a negative effect on the composition and morale of the forces

Just curious on how Unification caused this?   My understanding was that this didn't come around until Donald MacDonald and Management Review.

I, for one, am still generally supportive of Unification in a general sense - some of it finer nuances are bad for business and need to be done away with (the discussion on Purple trades and basic training is an example), but Unification saves us alot of hassle at the senior level (where are problems seem to be more related to civilianization).
 
Unification was, indeed, poorly thought out but Mr. Hellyer can be forgiven because he received lousy advice - including from his service chiefs.

Two factors dominated:

"¢ Money; and

"¢ More money.

As early as 1960 the government-of-the-day (Conservative (Dief the Chief) or Liberal (Mike Pearson), makes no never mind) faced an ever growing list of increasingly expensive defence materiel requirements which had to be accommodated in an environment in which Canadians wanted to spend less and less on services which brought them no direct, measurable benefits (usually seen as a cheque with a red maple leaf on the envelope),  Ministers from successive governments and senior bureaucrats were convinced that DND, especially, was poorly organized - top to bottom.  Many politicians and senior bureaucrats had WWII service and they had, almost uniformly, returned to civvy street with a firm conviction that Navy, Army and Air Force HQs were part of the problem - any problem.

The Glasco Commission was not so much evidence of bureaucratic ineptitude - throughout the government - as it was an indictment of the military and civilian staffs in defence HQ.  The AVRO Arrow fiasco gave the Commission all the evidence needed to convince ministers - not just Hellyer - that the defence staff and the civilian departmental staff were paralyzed, unable (not unwilling) to make sound policy judgements.

Hellyer should not be blamed for coming to believe that he might find some of the savings he needed by shaking up a moribund bureaucracy.

Hellyer should be blamed for two things:

"¢ Picking a lousy staff; and

"¢ Failing to pay attention to the briefings given by his American colleagues.

Paul Hellyer's closest advisor was a retired RCAF senior officer named Bill Lee.  Lee was a public relation officer and a political whiz kid of considerable repute.  He had a particular point of view - he detested the Anglophilic navy and army, regarding them as anti-French and anti-modern anachronisms which were dangerous to national unity and served as impediments to logical, operational defence reorganization.

Hellyer and Lee listened to the (then) recent, bruising experience in the USA.  The Americans told them:

Unification (joint staffs, joint formations, joint operations): Yes!

Integration (purple units and diluted, multi-service standards): No!

----- At this point 'facts', as I understand them, end and opinion begins. -----

It has always seemed to me that Hellyer and Lee got the whole thing back-asswards, probably by mistake.  Relations between Hellyer/Lee and most of the senior admirals, generals and air marshals were already poisonous because Lee insisted upon putting himself in between Hellyer and DM and service chiefs Hellyer insisted upon making sure he stayed there.  Much has been made of Hellyer's bitterness at his own wartime service - compulsory re-musters, etc - and I think they did play a role in fuelling his distrust of the senior officers and strengthening his faith in Lee, who had his own axes to grind.

LGen Geoffrey Walsh (late RCE) was almost the 'perfect' worst choice to serve near Hellyer and Lee - he was a rough, tough, gruff man who inspired fear more than any other emotion in subordinates; he was, probably, everything Hellyer (and many other politicians and bureaucrats) hated about the 'old' army.  The navy, I think, was even worse: snobbish, pseudo-British to the core.  In official Ottawa - Mike Pearson's Ottawa (Trudeau was not yet a power) - there was a perceived requirement to remake Canada in a new, less British, image.  The other Royal Commission - B&B - had put that wind in every sail.

My guess is that Hellyer was impressed with what he heard in Washington: unification (as the Americans -  correctly - understood the word) was solving, had solved many of the worst inter-service rivalry problems which, too often, paralyzed military decision making.  It also cost less: there were fewer big, national headquarters and new inter-service agencies promised even more savings on common services.

"Let's do it!  Let's integrate,â ? one can imagine Hellyer saying.  One can also imagine Lee (and a few others) agreeing because integration goes way beyond unification - out to a new frontier - where things would really get shaken up and where reputations might just be made.  Notwithstanding the highly (but briefly) publicized (ridiculed, actually) resignations of e.g. Moncel and Landymore, there were many senior officers in the CF, led by (newly minted) Air Chief Marshall Miller who thought integration (purple suiting) was a splendid idea.

The media was on Hellyer's side - Bill Lee was a highly skilled PR officer, after all - and the media moved public opinion on side, too.

There was one big problem: in all the fuss over integration the unification issue was put aside - for about 40 years.  It used to get mentioned - my old boss (MGen H.C. Pitts (late QORofC)) used to pound the table on a regular basis but the inter-service rivalries which Hellyer had tried to diminish were stronger than even - despite everyone being in the jolly green jumper.

Problems were, in fact, exacerbated by lazy ministers who decided that they didn't want to do the hard work of sorting out the inevitable and healthy disputes between military chiefs with their ever increasing laundry lists of expensive requirements and the DM  who is the keeper of the public purse.  The unification (of sorts) of National Defence Headquarters forced an unnatural and highly ineffective partnership on the DM and CDS - they are now required to agree even when they cannot and should not.  The effect is to paralyze decision making, yet again and even more, by allowing the minister to claim that matters are still under review when, in fact, they are simply stalled because neither the DM nor the CDS can give further ground.

Defence is an expensive business; there are limited ways to save; making the headquarters and the overall structure more efficient or cost effective was, and should always be a noble goal - it's always, without fail, better than cutting troops or failing to equip (adequately) the troops we have.  That was the problem Hellyer set out to solve, I think.  He and his minions ended up doing something else.  Too bad.
 
Edward Campbell said:
Unification (joint staffs, joint formations, joint operations): Yes!

Integration (purple units and diluted, multi-service standards): No!

That's what I was getting at - Unification makes sense as defined in the top line - like you, I think this was the original intent; we fumbled the ball somewhere and ended up with Integration (which, to me, signifies unifying from the bottom up - we are better served by "Jointness" at that level).

The unification (of sorts) of National Defence Headquarters forced an unnatural and highly ineffective partnership on the DM and CDS - they are now required to agree even when they cannot and should not.   The effect is to paralyze decision making, yet again and even more, by allowing the minister to claim that matters are still under review when, in fact, they are simply stalled because neither the DM nor the CDS can give further ground.

Again, was this not a product of Donald MacDonald (and the perfumed prince himself, Trudeau) civilianizing the DND with the Management Review in 1972?  As far as I am aware of, Hellyer's Unification kept the DND and CFHQ separate (this is something he maintains to defend his actions to this date - "The other guy f#&@ed everything up, not me!").

Cheers,
Infanteer
 
My final thoughts on Unification.

Long before the fall of the CAR, was the retiring the colours of many a good unit.  Pers were transferred into other units or branches.  Generally there was a lot of confusion at the sharp end of the stick.  I think the intent of retiring colours was to strengthen other units while reducing costs.

It is apparent that did not fare well in the long term.

As bitter as I am over unification, in retrospect, the "purple trades" are not that bad an idea.  They reduced a lot of duplication.  How ever the execution left a little to be desired.  The other thing connected to the "purple trades", was that some pers that were not classified as "purple" ended up scattered to the 4 winds as it were.  They were in 1 element & spent more time with other elements, which did not help esprit de corps.

I think that for those of us that were part of this party, we have different views, than those that followed.  We inadvertently became the demarcation line between the "old school WWII, Korean" lines of thought & the "new  Tri-service".  The Tri-service became the kinder, gentler military.

I think we all agree, no matter what the reasons, that there was a lot of long term damage created, that still affects the military today.

Cheers
 
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