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US Presidential Election 2024 - Trump vs Biden 2 - Vote Hard with a Vengence

Again, Europe can do that without the US chipping in. Anyone who seriously believes that Putin is lining up to attack a NATO member ought to behave accordingly. I'm not seeing much urgency except in the countries bordering NATO. I'm not seeing any in Canada. From that I infer that behind the closed doors of the high councils their information is telling them an invasion of a NATO member is low-risk. All the noise about what the US should be doing is just the usual opportunistic free-loading.
Sad isn’t it. But the army is ramping up albeit very slowly certain capabilities. Canada not ramping up the way it should is no reason at all to dismiss the threat that Russia poses.
Should that be what our PM tells them when confronted by requests to ante up a little more? We aren't forbidden to step outside that "system".
Who cares. We weren’t discussing that now we’re we. We absolutely should be increasing. You mentioned Taiwan. Again how does that fit into NATOs mandate and goals? If China attacks the US and they invoke article 5 then I expect NATO to step up.
Ukraine isn't a NATO member. Once beyond NATO members, it's reasonable to look at the entire world.
Go read the NATO goals and mandate. Yes, it is reasonable to look at the entire world. Your position would have the US retreat from that.

Is Ukraine in Europe? Yes. Very much a NATO issue.

Is a Russian occupied Ukraine good for the US or bad? I think it’s bad. We either try and check Russia’s ambitions or we might as well pack it in. I’d rather not pack it in.
 
They wouldn't need to.

If Trump's previous tone/attitude re: NATO continues into a POTUS47 term, if RUS poked, say, Finland or Estonia ....
1) if US audiences are tired of helping out Europe, they'll be OK with RUS taking off a bit without the US getting involved, and
2) if foreign actors continue to help whip up the "Europeans want to defend NATO to the last American/Canadian/whatever" narrative via the usual suspect info ops, and various publics buy into the "what have they done for us lately?" (like they did during POTUS45's term, and are starting to with UKR), there'll be less public appetite - and more political pressure - on all governments to stay out of 'er in spite of Article 5.
Trump's tone/attitude applies to "deadbeats". Finland and Estonia aren't deadbeats by any customary measure. Why is it appropriate to keep moving the goalposts on what Trump said?

"Helping out Europe" is not the same as "meeting a NATO commitment". Everyone ought to stop blurring that line, too. There isn't going to be a majority of Democrats and Republicans in either the House or Senate to renege on NATO, and Congress has both the power to declare war and the power to pay for it.

People worried about Trump and a shift of isolationist American voters from the Democratic party to the Republican party ought to be less antagonistic toward Trump and isolationist American voters. Supplicants aren't really in a position to be insulting.
 
Like it or not, much of the open global trade structure that underpins our modern economies is based on the post-WW2 security guarantee provided by the United States.

Much of what makes modern commodities and technology so cheap and available around the entire globe is based on the fact that the United States as the global hegemon ensured that regional powers did not disrupt the flow of key resources, materials and products by seizing the sources for themselves. That included, when necessary, the US stepping in - directly or through proxies - and preventing belligerent states from taking other states by force. The threat of US intervention has been a deterrent factor in major wars of aggression.

US support of Ukraine is a manifestation of that deterrent role of the US in maintaining the Global system. If the US decides that it is not in its direct interest to counter Russian aggression in Ukraine then it will inevitably lead Russia (and other nations including China) to conclude that they can get away with aggression so long as it doesn't cross the line of being a direct threat to the US.

At the same time, it tells the nations bordering potentially aggressive neighbours that unless their independence in some way directly benefits the US then they cannot count on the US intervening should they be invaded. That will leave these nations much more vulnerable to not only direct invasion, but also other forms of coercion from their more powerful neighbours. So when Taiwan, Malaysia, Indonesia or the Philippines begin to question whether the US will support them in a conflict with say China, then they may be much more willing to bend to pressure from China and shift their policies to be more pro-China and less pro-USA.

As the US becomes more and more isolated from the World it will lose many of the advantages that a global economy provides. Will it mean an American collapse? Of course not, but as access to cheap resources, labour and products lessens due to decreased American influence then the cost of everything will become more expensive and labour is near-shored away from the cheapest sources and supply moves away from the lowest cost producers. The result is a poorer nation with both less money and less global reach to influence events around the World.

That's why I think that the USA pulling back from supporting Ukraine is a very bad idea in the long run. Does that mean that I don't understand American frustration of bearing the cost of being the World's policeman? Of course not. But to my mind the solution is the rest of the Western-alligned nations stepping up to bear much more of the burden alongside the United States to maintain the current order rather than the US turning isolationist and allowing the system to contract/collapse which will make the World both much poorer and much more dangerous (including for the USA).

$0.02
 
If anyone thinks the prospective isolationism of the US in a few months is a worry, be prepared to panic if the Democratic election AAR tells them they lost too many non-college-educated voters. If they conclude they were outflanked on trade protectionism and isolationism by populist Republicans, Democrats will adopt positions further enough out to be distinct.

As usual, the obvious solution is for other countries to contribute more to international security - provided they believe all the Chicken Little talk.
 
If anyone thinks the prospective isolationism of the US in a few months is a worry, be prepared to panic if the Democratic election AAR tells them they lost too many non-college-educated voters. If they conclude they were outflanked on trade protectionism and isolationism by populist Republicans, Democrats will adopt positions further enough out to be distinct.

As usual, the obvious solution is for other countries to contribute more to international security - provided they believe all the Chicken Little talk.
The problem is while many believe the Russian Bear is hungry again, most don’t want to have to deal with it themselves.

Which puts the US in a Catch-22, do we again bail out Europe, which generally tends to feel superior to us, other than when they are needing our might. Or do we risk the (IMHO) probably inevitable larger conflict if we sit back.

My belief is that while we are generally a poor Stewart of the World Order, abandoning that post is a lot more costly as it will allow our rivals/enemies to grow and eventually become a threat to our very way of life.

By and large the majority of US material that can help Ukraine isn’t going to be worth much for Taiwan, so pushing Abram’s, Bradley’s, M109, MLRS and HIMAR’s to Ukraine is a cheap way of defeating Russia and securing Europe
 
By and large the majority of US material that can help Ukraine isn’t going to be worth much for Taiwan, so pushing Abram’s, Bradley’s, M109, MLRS and HIMAR’s to Ukraine is a cheap way of defeating Russia and securing Europe
All the money comes out of the same pot. The US is already fiscally overstretched. If domestic spending starts to get pinched, Democrats will revert to their usual preference for emphasizing domestic issues over foreign ones, and all their atypical support for Ukraine - which is possibly in large part simply do-the-opposite-of-what-Trump-says - will vanish abruptly. Getting allies to do more is a much deeper issue than simply propping up Ukraine and delivering weapon systems.
 
All the money comes out of the same pot. The US is already fiscally overstretched.
Abram’s, and Bradley’s are old stock. They aren’t new money.

If domestic spending starts to get pinched, Democrats will revert to their usual preference for emphasizing domestic issues over foreign ones, and all their atypical support for Ukraine - which is possibly in large part simply do-the-opposite-of-what-Trump-says - will vanish abruptly. Getting allies to do more is a much deeper issue than simply propping up Ukraine and delivering weapon systems.
No disagreement there - but either side arguing that that we are being stretched when the overwhelming amount of equipment that Ukraine would need isn’t stuff that would help for Taiwan is not true.
 
Abram’s, and Bradley’s are old stock. They aren’t new money.


No disagreement there - but either side arguing that that we are being stretched when the overwhelming amount of equipment that Ukraine would need isn’t stuff that would help for Taiwan is not true.
So the US would not be replacing the equipment sent to Ukraine, or conducting operations in the event of war over Taiwan?

Short of simply handing over equipment and munitions, there is little the US can do that won't need new money.
 
So the US would not be replacing the equipment sent to Ukraine, or conducting operations in the event of war over Taiwan?

Short of simply handing over equipment and munitions, there is little the US can do that won't need new money.
Those assets where designed to fight Russia.

So they best be used to do it.

It’s a flimsy argument to argue that equipment already slated to be replaced is going to cost money - that is a no shit Sherlock comment and frankly beneath you.

Those tanks etc are going to cost money to replace regardless, and they are slated for replacement…
 
Plus, the simple act of providing Ukraine with considerable amounts of lethal aid is somewhat deterrent in its own right. “If they’ll give to Ukraine, they’ll probably give to Taiwan” is undoubtedly part of the calculus here. It bolsters the credibility of any security pact, so long as there’s not a direct and conflicting overlap in which kit is needed to be donated. Since Taiwan’s materiel needs differ from Ukraine’s, donating to the latter while having a credible capacity to rapidly reinforce the former is a good thing from a deterrent standpoint.
 
NYT opinion piece.

I can’t say I disagree with a lot of it, which is pretty awful when you consider it, and even worse when he’s probably going to win simply due to the Democratic Party’s inability to get a better candidate on their ticket.

The leader of the USA needs to be seen as a strong leader, and right now that isn’t the current POTUS

 
It’s a flimsy argument to argue that equipment already slated to be replaced is going to cost money - that is a no shit Sherlock comment and frankly beneath you.

Those tanks etc are going to cost money to replace regardless, and they are slated for replacement…
I don't take it for granted that equipment will be replaced on the same scale, and I don't take it for granted that future appropriations will match the past. I look at the US fiscal position, which is unsustainable, and conclude something will change; I expect domestic spending to prevail over foreign spending. And all aid which costs money but isn't a sunk capital cost (ie. equipment already bought and paid for) is still a new cost. If stuff slated for replacement is actually replaced and is junked rather than mothballed, then consuming it might be reasonable. But stuff not replaced and kept as potentially serviceable at need is part of deterrence.
 
But stuff not replaced and kept as potentially serviceable at need is part of deterrence.

Funny enough you’ve accidentally made exactly the point at hand. All of that kit existed to fend off Russia, and to deter Russia. There’s no other land war threat of close to that scale.

If America is concerned about Russia as a land war threat, there will never be a better opportunity to neuter them for a generation or two than right now. Deterrence has already partially failed, but the way to ensure that’s Russia is deterred from strikes on NATO partners is to simply render them unable to conceivably win such a conflict. They’re already well on the way to that incapacity, but in Ukraine the US has a willing and enthusiastic ally engaged in an extremely righteous war to protected itself from Russian aggression. Giving the kit to destroy Russia’s military capacity achieves exactly the strategic effect that the preservation of that mothballed equipment was intended for in the first place.

The war in Ukraine already exists. Why wait for a future war in the Baltics to pull from mothballs all that equipment, and to commit it to the fight in the hands of those who will use it enthusiastically?
 
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The war in Ukraine already exists. Why wait for a future war in the Baltics to pull from mothballs all that equipment, and to commit it to the fight in the hands of those who will use it enthusiastically?
Yes. I can guess that in 10 years or more it'll look like pretty much every other foreign adventure of the last 70 or 80 years - an outcome not worth the cost. In this case, it'll be a war that drags on without moving the battle lines much for however much longer the people fighting it can stand it, and settles - whether suspended or ended - with Russia controlling approximately what it controlled after a few months.

The point of a deterrent is to not use it, not to use it to keep a war muddling along at great cost because we think attrition is a good idea.

If the case for aiding Ukraine is to defeat Russia, then bloody well escalate and defeat Russia. If the case is to indefinitely exchange Ukrainian lives to weaken Russia, we're despicable.
 
Yes. I can guess that in 10 years or more it'll look like pretty much every other foreign adventure of the last 70 or 80 years - an outcome not worth the cost. In this case, it'll be a war that drags on without moving the battle lines much for however much longer the people fighting it can stand it, and settles - whether suspended or ended - with Russia controlling approximately what it controlled after a few months.

The point of a deterrent is to not use it, not to use it to keep a war muddling along at great cost because we think attrition is a good idea.

If the case for aiding Ukraine is to defeat Russia, then bloody well escalate and defeat Russia. If the case is to indefinitely exchange Ukrainian lives to weaken Russia, we're despicable.
what cost and to who? Its not despicable its just reality. How is weakening Russia so that it represents a much lessor threat to NATO a bad thing? That it costs some Ukrainian lives is immaterial. They can choose to fight or not
 
If the case for aiding Ukraine is to defeat Russia, then bloody well escalate and defeat Russia. If the case is to indefinitely exchange Ukrainian lives to weaken Russia, we're despicable.

Which is what a bunch of us have been saying since the start. Don’t send 30
Abrams, send 300. Got a few hundred recently retired F-16s in mothballs? Figure out how many Ukraine can absorb, and then figure out how to increase that number.

figure out what can be spared, restored, or built, and then do it. Putin has shown himself as willing to embark on naked and raw conquest as Hitler. Treat his Russia accordingly and frustrate their aims by making their military objectives impossible to achieve facilitate the destruction of Russian kit and the death or wounding of their troops until they pack up and go home. They forgot the lesson America taught them in 1980s Afghanistan, so give them a reminder.

I agree that this slow-walking of aid bullshit is unconscionable. The taps should be open. In doing so, Russia loses the ability to drag us into an article V war in the Baltics or Poland in five or ten years. Russia doesn’t get to decide if Ukraine’s allowed to exist or not. If that lesson hurts a lot, so be it.
 
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