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Using the Army to sink ships?

We might get more bang for the buck with a slightly different approach.

Using long range fiber optic guided missiles as regular artillery, we would be able to attack high value targets at ranges of up to 60 km (using something like the Polyphem Fibre-Optic-Guided Missile System). If the truck happens to drive to the shoreline and launch a missile at a target at sea, the same effect can be achieved, so long as the truck/battery has access to targeting data from an external source which is tracking the enemy ship. Since the Polyphem is a FOG-M, the operator can actually identify the target and guide it in on the final approach, if required.

LR guided missile artillery should be able to deal with lots of targets at ranges that are infeasible for conventional artillery, and also to deal with high value targets in complex terrain which other weapons systems are not able to attack, and even have the ability to threaten helicopters in rotor defilade, so this is not a "one trick pony".
 
As an Army officer it almost pains me to say this but I have to agree that a better investment in the Canadian context would be in more ships. Our interests are better served in projecting power from our shores rather then meeting threats in the last 60km or so. The only possible area I could see deploying this would be in a future North-West passage scenario but this is better served through a combination of naval power cued by long-endurance UAV's mixed in with an air platform that can deliver some type of anti-ship missile (manned or unmanned).

I get why the Americans, with an already robust rocket capability, would want to extend this to free up their high-value, low-quantity (given their requirements) naval assets from littoral defence; it just doesn't make sense in Canada to me. The US also has the added challenge of numerous small "outposts" all over the world or a future scenario in which they might be facing an adversary who could deny them, at least for a short period of time, access to certain areas (Persian Gulf for example) using shore based systems. The ability to reciprocate with our own shore based missiles based in friendly locations might be helpful.
 
I have to agree with you jeffb.

The US has the "numbers" to have such "luxuries".  We do not. 

The other thing to remember is that this suggestion in a Canadian scenario, is not to have a "stand alone" system as the be all/end all.  It would have to be one system within a number of systems that would only work if they are integrated.  The requirement for Air and Naval elements would not be diminished, as this would only be a system to compliment them.
 
Why would we even want or need a capability like this?  Every Canadian capability should be at a minimum very mobile.  The local geography is large and we are far away from trouble spots.  If you want to sink ships invest in the air/naval capability to do it.  Air launched anti-ship missiles would be a great start before you even thought about land-based missiles.  You could change requirements for the  Long-Range Precision Rocket System (which may have died a bureaucratic death by now...).

Personally, if you want the army to have missiles how about a return of a Multi-mission effects vehicle type concept a SHORAD system.  Or maybe just more anti-tank missile capability.
 
Coastal defence was the excuse the US Army Air Corps gave for initially acquiring the B-17 though of course they wanted it for Douhet-type strategice bombing:

...Headlines on the following day [17 July 1935] announced the new'15-ton Flying Fortress', and seizing upon the name the company had it registered as the official name of its Model 299. Contrary to popular belief, this was not because of its defensive armament, but because it was procured as an aircraft which would be operated as a mobile flying fortress to protect America's coastline, a concept which needs some explanation.

USAAC protagonists of air power were still compelled to step warily, despite procurement of the B-10 bomber, for the US Navy had the most prestigious support in the corridors of power and was determined to keep the upstart US Army in its place. Even if strategic bombers were required, efforts must be made to prevent the US Army acquiring such machines. The USAAC was, however, quite astute when needs be and so, with tongue in cheek, succeeded in procuring 13 YB-17s, the original service designation of the Fortress, for coastal defence...

The utilisation of the Y1B-17s, designated B-17 in service with the 2nd Bombardment Group, did little to improve relations between the US Army and US Navy. When three of the force were used [12 May 1938] to stage an 'interception' of the Italian liner Rex some 750 miles (1207 km) out in the Atlantic, to demonstrate that the USAAC was more than capable of defending the nation's coastline, it sparked a row which dispersed the air power disciples from General Headquarters Air Force (GHQAF) to other commands, where they were remote from each other and potential influential supporters. Orders for additional B-17s had to be reduced after it had been underlined by Major General Stanley D. Embrick that . . . "the military superiority of a B-17 over the two or three smaller aircraft which could be procured with the same funds has yet to be established." This helps explain why, despite the growing war clouds in Europe, the USAAC had less than 30 B-17s when Hitler's forces invaded Poland on 1 September 1939...
http://www.pilotfriend.com/photo_albums/timeline/ww2/2/Boeing%20B%2017.htm

More:

Rendezvous With the Rex
...
rex01.jpg


Two B-17s, having spotted the Italian liner Rex in the Atlantic, move into position to simulate an attack [note low-level as with Fw 200 Condor].

The scenario postulated an aggressor—a combination of adversaries from Europe and Asia. Enemy airplanes, warships, and troops would be employed to attack and attempt to capture industrial territory in the northeastern United States. The US Navy would be busy in the Pacific, so GHQ Air Force had to defend the eastern seaboard. A seaborne invasion force was headed for New England.

The scenario called for Air Corps airplanes to find the enemy force at sea before its aircraft carriers could attack, but no US ships were available to play the part of the enemy. The Navy, then conducting its own fleet exercises in the Pacific, was not about to give Andrews any of its ships to use as targets for his B-17s. Without Navy participation, it appeared that GHQ Air Force would have to fly out, simulate the intercept of ships, and fly back.

Then, with the maneuvers already under way, there emerged an opportunity to use an actual ship for the intercept and gain other advantages for the Air Corps as well.

Andrews had borrowed from the Air Staff Lt. Col. Ira C. Eaker, who was chief of its Information Division. Eaker was to serve as G-2 (intelligence) for the maneuvers and to handle the press. Eaker brought with him Reserve 2nd Lt. Harris B. Hull, a reporter for the Washington Post who had been called to active duty for the exercise. Hull learned that the Italian cruise liner Rex was about 1,000 miles offshore, inbound to New York. He suggested an "intercept" of Rex to Eaker, who proposed it to Andrews, who was all for it. It was a splendid opportunity to bring the range and capability of the B-17 to public attention...
http://www.airforcemag.com/MagazineArchive/pages/2008/december%202008/1208rex.aspx

Mark
Ottawa
 
WRT shore based artillery, a FOG-M with a 60km capability would be somewhat short ranged for that mission, but since this would be a secondary purpose for the battery, a range of 60km is almost double the range of a 155mm cannon shell, so sufficient for the primary tasking. Also since Polyphem was a project from the early 2000's, it seems pretty straightforward to extrapolate a much longer range from that technology today.

As far as the primary anti shipping task, if we were to settle on a FOG-M, a missile such as Polyphem can also be carried and fired from ships and helicopters as well. This actually plays into one of my other arguments in procurement: buying in bulk to gain economies of scale. Using a long range FOG-M (or indeed any) missile which can be carried and fired from vehicles, ships and aircraft against a multitude of targets means you can not only buy more of the munitions, but can also have some complimentary effects (a battery on shore can fire at a ship, but a Canadian ship can also support forces on land as well).
 
Underway said:
Why would we even want or need a capability like this?  Every Canadian capability should be at a minimum very mobile.  The local geography is large and we are far away from trouble spots.  If you want to sink ships invest in the air/naval capability to do it.  Air launched anti-ship missiles would be a great start before you even thought about land-based missiles.  You could change requirements for the  Long-Range Precision Rocket System (which may have died a bureaucratic death by now...).

Personally, if you want the army to have missiles how about a return of a Multi-mission effects vehicle type concept a SHORAD system.  Or maybe just more anti-tank missile capability.

Our defensive positions around Riga might find them useful one day:

Latvia’s National Armed Forces (NBS) patrol vessel P-05 Skrunda reported spotting two Russian navy vessels maneuvering close to Latvia’s territorial waters Monday.

http://www.lsm.lv/en/article/politics/russian-navy-sub-and-warship-edge-by-latvian-waters.a95014/
 
Even a system with a  60km range basically can secure all of the Gulf of Riga from Latvian shore and almost halfway to Gotland.
 
Given the growing importance of the Northwest Passage, and the fact that many nations do not recognize this passage as Canadian internal waters, there might be something to this concept for the Arctic theater of operations.

The Northwest Passage is quite narrow so environment challenges aside it might not take a very complex system to cover the passage. Perhaps a system at Resolute (and/or Cambridge Bay) and another at Kugluktuk (sp?) would due the trick.

If nothing else it would be a good posting to motivate/ demotivate the artillery. ;)

However if we are spending money on missiles I would say we have more pressing needs... man-portable ATGMs for the infantry, HIMARS, an AA capability of any kind... the list goes on.
 
Loch Sloy! said:
Given the growing importance of the Northwest Passage, and the fact that many nations do not recognize this passage as Canadian internal waters, there might be something to this concept for the Arctic theater of operations.

The Northwest Passage is quite narrow so environment challenges aside it might not take a very complex system to cover the passage. Perhaps a system at Resolute (and/or Cambridge Bay) and another at Kugluktuk (sp?) would due the trick.

If nothing else it would be a good posting to motivate/ demotivate the artillery. ;)

However if we are spending money on missiles I would say we have more pressing needs... man-portable ATGMs for the infantry, HIMARS, an AA capability of any kind... the list goes on.

Man-portable missiles are one thing - AT, AA, A-Pers, A-Structure.

But HIMARS is something else again - It is essentially just a box on a truck.  And so far the original truck carries boxes of all the original rockets as well as the precision rockets and has the capacity to launch the 250 lb class guided bombs - and - it can carry the ATACMS family of rockets.  Concurrently, as has been noted, there is the Common Launcher push capable of launching all manner of missiles for all manner of targets.  And there is the NASAMs Multi Missile Launcher - another box to put on the back of the truck.

It seems to me that one truck, with a variety of boxes, with a variety of missiles, with a variety of warheads, with a variety of seekers and nav systems covers a lot of capability gaps.  Especially when allied with a broad spectrum ISTAR capability.
 
It seems to me that one truck, with a variety of boxes, with a variety of missiles, with a variety of warheads, with a variety of seekers and nav systems covers a lot of capability gaps.  Especially when allied with a broad spectrum ISTAR capability.

I couldn't agree more. Something like HIMARS could theoretically cover a big air-defence gap in the CAF (as I understand it we currently have no ground based air-defence... which strikes me as appallingly short sighted) and would also give us the ability to destroy a grid square from 300km away... sounds good to me. I would be surprised if there isn't also potential to do shore based anti-shipping tasks too.

As for the ATGM plug, as a dirty faced mudfoot I couldn't help but throw in a comment from the peanut gallery for a weapons system that everyone acknowledges we sorely lack at the moment. Having said that I believe that there have been some use of these weapons against ships in Egypt and Yemen. Also if it was Spike instead of Javelin the Finnish coastal Jaegers intentionally deploy them in the anti ship role.
 
The rationale for the initiative:

They are available
They are proven
They are numerous
They are small
They are cheap
They have lots of reloads
Compared to carriers and cruisers they can relocate quickly after launch.
They have growth potential
They can be supplied to allies (at a deep Trump negotiated discount).


AUTHOR: JEREMY HSU. DATE OF PUBLICATION: 03.01.17.

THE ARMY GETS BACK IN THE SHIP-KILLING BUSINESS

SINCE 1996, THE Chinese military has steadily expanded its umbrella of land-based missiles, strike aircraft, and submarines designed to overwhelm both US air bases and carrier strike groups. That buildup aims to discourage the US military from potentially intervening in China’s territorial disputes with neighboring Asian countries. Now, the US response appears to be taking shape, first in the form of a new use for an old weapons system.

In late 2016, the Pentagon announced that it would convert the Army Tactical Missile System (ATACMS), a weapon typically fired from a truck-mounted rocket launcher, into a guided ballistic missile capable of hitting moving warships. That represents a planned upgrade of an existing Army missile that can strike targets at distances of about 186 miles. It could also form the linchpin of a US “forward defense” strategy meant to keep China from becoming too aggressive with its growing naval power.

“For a long time, the US has taken air and sea supremacy for granted,” says Cmdr. Keith Patton, deputy chair of the Strategic and Operational Research Department at the US Naval War College in Newport, Rhode Island. “Now the military is looking back again to see what can be done and what can be defended; people are rediscovering their past.”

Sea Change

Conversion of the Army missile into a ship-killing weapon is a “logical step” given US security concerns in the near future, says Patton. The weapon already has a proven combat record from the 1991 Gulf War and the post-9/11 wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. And if not for limitations imposed by the Intermediate Range Nuclear Forces Treaty, it could have even greater long-distance strike capability.

The shift to the sea represents a sharp change from the US Army’s focus for most of the past 70 years. While coastal artillery guns still played a role in WWII, the dominance of long-range bombers and aircraft carriers eventually made large, fixed guns obsolete as shore defenses.

“After World War II, the US was seen as unchallenged at sea, with the possible exception of Soviet submarines,” Patton explains. “Coastal defense artillery, or even missiles, could not help with that threat, and would have been a distraction to Army’s primary mission of winning a major land war in Europe.”

These days, the US no longer holds such a clear oceanic advantage. China has the world’s largest conventional ballistic missile force, and two different types of anti-ship ballistic missiles designed to kill ships such as US Navy carriers. By 2020, the Chinese military will also match or exceed the US military in number of surface-to-air missiles (SAMs) and anti-ship cruise missiles, said Andrew Erickson, professor of strategy in the US Naval War College’s China Maritime Studies Institute, during a hearing for the US-China Economic and Security Review Commission on Feb. 23. He added that China would “unambiguously” have the world’s second-largest blue water navy by 2020.

China’s growing naval power has inadvertently highlighted the gaps in US anti-ship capabilities. The US military’s primary anti-ship weapon has been the sea-skimming Harpoon missile that flies slower than the speed of sound. By comparison, ATACMS with an upgraded guidance system could become a ballistic anti-ship weapon that dives toward targets at speeds of up to Mach 3.

Scoot and Shoot

The US Army already plans to train for its “multi-domain battle” role in possibly firing land-based missiles at enemy warships. Such anti-ship weapons may also end up being sold to US allies in the Pacific. It’s one thing for an adversary to target a huge US aircraft carrier or static air base, but it’s another matter entirely to try tracking dozens of mobile missile launchers mounted on trucks. “With an aircraft carrier or an airfield, you could hit the runway and disable it for a while,” Patton says. “But the US military has learned how hard it is to track small, missile-launched vehicles.”

The shoot-and-scoot mobility of rocket trucks is just one advantage of the land-based missile systems, says David Johnson, a senior fellow at the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments in Washington, D.C. Unlike anti-ship weapons carried by aircraft or naval vessels, land-based weapons can have “deep magazines,” with no serious physical limitation on the number of missiles available. And the ATACMS conversion may just be the start, as the US military develops a next generation of land-based missiles that could target ships in any military theater of operation.

“ATACMS is attractive because it’s already been developed—you may have to change the guidance technology, but it’s an approved system,” Johnson says. “Whether it’s an interim solution or just an idea to start thinking of how to solve the problem, long-ranged fire is an advantage that these systems will bring to those theaters that will complement joint military operations.”

That aligns with recent US military strategic thinking on the Pacific. A 2013 RAND report sponsored by the US Army suggested that “the strategic placement of anti-ship missile systems” could help deter open conflict by “significantly raising the cost for China,” or actively “interdict warships” or “be used to form a full blockade of critical waterways in times of war.”

Land-based missiles may also offer a solution to a current dilemma faced by the US military in supporting Asian countries that often face off with China over competing territorial claims. The U.S. has traditionally relied on forward air bases and carrier strike groups—such as the USS Carl Vinson group that embarked on a patrol of the South China Sea in February—to provide highly visible reassurance to allies in the Pacific-Asia region. But such high-visibility military assets are also the most vulnerable to China’s many missile-armed forces if it came to open conflict.

The US military could sidestep this dilemma if it chose to “emulate China by fielding mobile, land-based missile forces of its own,” said Evan Montgomery, a senior fellow at CSBA, in a recent report titled “Reinforcing the Front Line: US Defense Strategy and the Rise of China.” Land-based anti-ship missiles positioned on the territory of U.S. allies could provide the same reassurance while also being much less vulnerable militarily—and perhaps reduce the overall risk of open war by acting as a powerful deterrent.

There is always the possibility that China would take a dim view of US military moves to reinforce its allies with land-based missiles. But any potentially stabilizing strategy beyond the status quo would be welcome, as tensions in the South China Sea continue to bubble and brew.

https://www.wired.com/2017/03/army-converting-missiles-ship-killers-china/
 
Chris Pook said:
The rationale for the initiative:

They are available
They are proven
They are numerous
They are small
They are cheap
They have lots of reloads
Compared to carriers and cruisers they can relocate quickly after launch.
They have growth potential
They can be supplied to allies (at a deep Trump negotiated discount).


https://www.wired.com/2017/03/army-converting-missiles-ship-killers-china/

I like the idea of killing things 200kms away with a Mach 3 missile.

And then... the Satellite laser batteries will be deployed to nail the counter-battery action!
 
Missiles in a box might be a viable solution to many of our own artillery woes. This proposal uses a 15 round launcher box o the back of an medium truck as a SHORAD launcher, but the article states that Hellfire missiles can be launched from it as well. It really doesn't take much to start thinking about what other rockets or missiles can be fired from this, so in the ideal world, several hundred trucks with boxes could be purchased, and distributed among the various artillery regiments.

Some would fire SAMs, some might carry guided missiles to attack ground targets and some might just carry dumb rockets for saturating area targets. Long range guided missiles would be a good compliment for tube artillery.
 

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Thucydides said:
Some would fire SAMs, some might carry guided missiles to attack ground targets and some might just carry dumb rockets for saturating area targets. Long range guided missiles would be a good compliment for tube artillery.

Whoa, whoa, whoa... now you're encroaching on my job: Paratroopers :)
 
Lucky for us, the countries we are fighting right now don't even have proper weapons, let alone any ships :)
 
EricBoss said:
Lucky for us, the countries we are fighting right now don't even have proper weapons, let alone any ships :)

Not really. Good enemies make us stronger.

If you want to see what weaker third world enemies do to first world armies study the opening phases of the Boer War and see how well the British did in the face of some first world like opposition following decades of 'golly bashing' in the colonies.
 
LM Canada planned a land-based test site (LBTS) to
be constructed in the Dartmouth area of Nova Scotia that
would support the validation of the combat system design
prior to setting to work on the first refitted ship. The LBTS
would utilize the 13th shipset of equipment destined for
the Combat System Training Centre, and provide an
integration environment with realistic sensor performance.
The power was designed to match the three-phase supplies
on the ships, and shipboard type cables would be used to
closely replicate the shipboard design. Critical ship
equipment interfacing with the combat system was
selected, along with the design for the test scenario
generator used in the combat system training devices and
simulated equipment models. A rooftop platform was
planned that would allow the installation of all selected
sensors (2D, 3D and navigation radars, Identification
Friend or Foe (IFF), electronic support measures (ESM),
and fire-control radars), such that they could radiate and
detect real-world air targets in the local area.

I saw this in the Maritime Engineering Journal as posted here.

http://navy.ca/forums/threads/76442/post-1483531.html#msg1483531 

Page 37.

In line with Gunners sinking ships and discussions of GBAD/LRPRS integration with the RCN - 

Did this facility get built? 
Is it still standing?
Have the RCA considered playing with it to see whether or not the same architecture can accommodate some of the kit they are considering?

It seems to me that it would a useful platform to explore commonalities and differences and how to bridge or exploit differences.
 
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