Bigfoot,
I suspect that Guy is thinking of the British 2-colour Desert DPM uniforms that were worn by our personnel participating in the demining effort in Kuwait immediately following Desert Storm. To my knowledge, that is the only foreign Desert uniform to be "officially" issued and worn by Canadian soldiers.
British 2-colour Desert DPM uniforms were purchased for (and worn by) the 3 PPCLI Sniper Section during Op APOLLO, however that was an "unofficial" purchase made with unit funds. It was necessary due to the lack of an available CF-issue desert uniform. Members of 3 PPCLI Recce Pl also wore borrowed U.S. 3-colour Desert trousers during Op CHEROKEE SKY, but that was done for deception purposes rather than individual concealment.
Frederick G,
Sorry, but I don't buy your rationale one bit. And you need not remind me when we first committed to Afghanistan, as I was there.....
An "expectation" that we would not be deploying to a desert environment was insufficient grounds for disposing of our operational stock of tan uniforms prior to their replacement by CADPAT AR. In light of subsequent events, that "expectation" proved to be fundamentally flawed, didn't it? And when we suddenly needed desert uniforms they were decorating the shelves of army surplus stores across the nation.
It is not a bad thing to dispose of equipment that has been superceded or deemed inappropriate for future operations. However, It IS highly inadvisable to dispose of perfectly good kit based on manifestly flawed "predictions" of operational need. Some bean-counter at ADM Mat jumped the gun, made a stupid decision to prematurely scrap the existing desert uniform, and as a result we ended up deploying soldiers to an environment for which they were inappropriately equipped. In that context, it is absolutely "fair" and "logical" to assign blame for what proved to be a very poor bureaucratic decision.
A fundamental characteristic of "Roto 0" deployments is that they tend to emerge rather unexpectedly. There have been numerous recent examples of that current reality, aside from Op APOLLO. Consider 2 RCR's deployment to Eritrea - another desert operation for which there was no arid regions uniform available. Or consider that same unit's more recent deployment to Haiti. The latter occured in a matter of days from warning to boots on the ground. Short-notice deployments in response to unexpected developments around the globe have tended to be the rule rather than the exception since at least the mid-1990s. Woebetide the modern military force that lacks the foresight to maintain a reasonable stock of operational clothing for all conceivable environments.
"Not really expecting" to deploy to an arid environment is pathetically weak substantiation for not having maintained an operational stock of desert uniforms between the late 1990s and 2003. The sudden development of Op APOLLO (21 days from mission warning to deployment) was ample proof of that.
I will close by noting that your Leopard Tank analogy is flawed in relation to the desert uniform debacle. Mothballing equipment is one thing. Disposing of equipment which still has a viable operational purpose (and not replacing it) is another thing entirely. Mothballed equipment can be quickly restored to service should an operational need arise. The latter are gone for good. The desert uniforms were scrapped on the flawed premise that there was no potential operational requirement. And that premise was wrong, full-stop. When mistakes of that magnitude are made, it is indeed "fair" and "logical" to determine why the decision was made, and who was responsible. That is precisely how such mistakes are avoided in the future.