Warfare in the Digital Age - Not just a deployed problem

[daftandbarmy]

Very interesting stuff. At  CASC we read all the stuff we can get our hands on coming out of Ukraine, because it gives us a steer on how we should be depicting the current operational environment. It is a bit scary to think what the impact on a typical CMBG would be if it was facing a couple (or even just one...)of the new Russian independent Brigade Tactical Groups.I think that the Army is waking up to the fact that some things need to be changed in training.

What is very interesting is to see the "discovery" of things my generation grew up soldiering with: digging in if you stop for more than a few minutes; camouflage, concealment, dispersal, smaller and more mobile protected HQs;  radio silence or very short transmissions, and surviving massive overmatch by enemy fires and armour.

Russia and China never went away: they were just waiting.

I'm impressed... you didn't mention 'Rocking Horse' or 'Track Mileage' even once

 

[a_majoor]

I freely acknowledge that I know nothing about comms and radios.  But I am confused.

Many ships, aircraft and vehicles are now equipped with Radar Warning Receivers that are activated by the impingement of Radio Frequency beams  - and I believe that includes microwave frequencies.

Equally, I could say the same for Laser Warning Receivers.  And I could add EO/IR systems.

If I can detect incoming energy from all these sources can't I detect the presence or absence of the energy (a binary proposition) and use that as the basis of a communication system.    If my Laser Warning Receiver started going  Buzz-Buzz-Buzz  Buuuuuzzzz-Buuuuuzzzz-Buuuuuzzz Buzz-Buzz-Buzz repeating, might I not infer somebody was trying to tell me something?

And while we are at it, like my USB cable which also transmits power, couldn't those same beams transmit energy?

http://whatis.techtarget.com/definition/free-space-optics-FSO

http://www.laserfocusworld.com/articles/print/volume-51/issue-02/features/laser-powered-devices-high-concentration-pv-cell-enables-high-wattage-laser-power-transmission.html

A couple of things:

Using warning receivers and the like as communications devices might be a possible last ditch part of the PACE plan, but at least what you are describing is pretty low bandwidth morse code transmissions. As well, the warning receiver is now not being used for its primary purpose: receiving warnings. When your vehicle is brewed up by a beam rider missile while you are trying to send a SITREP, you might not be very appreciative of that backup plan after all....

Receiving energy via laser or microwave beams is quite possible, and in fact has been demonstrated over the years, powering vehicles larger than "quad copters" requires kilowatts or even megawatts of energy. You also generally want your energy to be coming in a steady stream. trying to superimpose a signal over that may be like trying to send a mores code message via ladies lamp, while standing on the deck of a lighthouse with the searchlight right behind you. I suppose there are clever work arounds to all these problems, but clear orders, good training and radio silence are equally valid solutions.

 

[Kirkhill]

A couple of things:
...
Using warning receivers and the like as communications devices might be a possible last ditch part of the PACE plan, but at least what you are describing is pretty low bandwidth morse code transmissions. As well, the warning receiver is now not being used for its primary purpose: receiving warnings. When your vehicle is brewed up by a beam rider missile while you are trying to send a SITREP, you might not be very appreciative of that backup plan after all....

...

I wasn't thinking so much of using the actual RWR system as demonstrating that the ability to transmit and receive LOS radio energy at MM wavelength, and equally Laser energy, exists.  Also if it can be done at a slow rate of knots so that morse code can be understood it seems likely, to me at least, that it can be done at a significantly faster rate by digital generation and reception of the signal.

 

[Ludoc]

I wasn't thinking so much of using the actual RWR system as demonstrating that the ability to transmit and receive LOS radio energy at MM wavelength, and equally Laser energy, exists.  Also if it can be done at a slow rate of knots so that morse code can be understood it seems likely, to me at least, that it can be done at a significantly faster rate by digital generation and reception of the signal.

Systems to do this already exist. The civilian telecom industry uses lasers to push data around built up areas. We use technologies like HCLOS to push data around the tactical battle space.

 

[Kirkhill]

Systems to do this already exist. The civilian telecom industry uses lasers to push data around built up areas. We use technologies like HCLOS to push data around the tactical battle space.

I continue to live up to my unofficial motto: "A day late and a dollar short"    ;D

Thanks Ludoc.

 

[garb811]

I don't think much in this article will come as a surprise to some on the board. I do find it a nice, concise, open source summary of some of their capabilities and impacts.

Signaling strength: Russia’s real Syria success is electronic warfare against the US

It is not a secret that for Moscow, Syria has become the “ultimate testing ground” for its weapons. Russian forces have been particularly successful at using electronic warfare (E.W.) technology to interfere with operations of the United States and its allies on the territory of the Arab republic.

In a speech last month at the U.S. Geospatial Intelligence Foundation’s 2018 GEOINT Symposium, General Raymond Thomas, commander of U.S. Special Operations Command, said Syria has become “the most aggressive E.W. environment on the planet.”

“They are testing us every day, knocking our communications down, disabling our EC-130s, etcetera,” he said. Even though the general did not directly say Moscow was behind the operations, according to experts, it is only Russia that has advanced capabilities to successfully carry out such interference in Syria.
...

More at the article link.

 

[garb811]

New article out in the New York Times about what companies are able to do with the data provided by having location sharing turned on for apps on your smartphone...  First article in what is a multi-part series over the next few days.

Twelve Million Phones, One Dataset, Zero Privacy

Every minute of every day, everywhere on the planet, dozens of companies — largely unregulated, little scrutinized — are logging the movements of tens of millions of people with mobile phones and storing the information in gigantic data files. The Times Privacy Project obtained one such file, by far the largest and most sensitive ever to be reviewed by journalists. It holds more than 50 billion location pings from the phones of more than 12 million Americans as they moved through several major cities, including Washington, New York, San Francisco and Los Angeles.

Each piece of information in this file represents the precise location of a single smartphone over a period of several months in 2016 and 2017. The data was provided to Times Opinion by sources who asked to remain anonymous because they were not authorized to share it and could face severe penalties for doing so. The sources of the information said they had grown alarmed about how it might be abused and urgently wanted to inform the public and lawmakers.
...
The data reviewed by Times Opinion didn’t come from a telecom or giant tech company, nor did it come from a governmental surveillance operation. It originated from a location data company, one of dozens quietly collecting precise movements using software slipped onto mobile phone apps. You’ve probably never heard of most of the companies — and yet to anyone who has access to this data, your life is an open book. They can see the places you go every moment of the day, whom you meet with or spend the night with, where you pray, whether you visit a methadone clinic, a psychiatrist’s office or a massage parlor.
...

 

[brihard]

This one's scary. While it uses tracking the location of the President' entourage as an example, this applies universally. Truncated due to post length restrictions; more at link.

https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2019/12/20/opinion/location-data-national-security.html

Opinion THE PRIVACY PROJECT
How to Track President Trump
By Stuart A. Thompson and Charlie Warzel
DEC. 20, 2019

IF YOU OWN A MOBILE PHONE, its every move is logged and tracked by dozens of companies. No one is beyond the reach of this constant digital surveillance. Not even the president of the United States.

The Times Privacy Project obtained a dataset with more than 50 billion location pings from the phones of more than 12 million people in this country. It was a random sample from 2016 and 2017, but it took only minutes — with assistance from publicly available information — for us to deanonymize location data and track the whereabouts of President Trump.

A single dot appeared on the screen, representing the precise location of someone in President Trump’s entourage at 7:10 a.m. It lingered around the grounds of the president’s Mar-a-Lago Club in Palm Beach, Fla., where the president was staying, for about an hour.

Then it was on the move.

The dot traveled to the Trump National Golf Club in Jupiter, about 30 minutes north of the hotel, pinging again at 9:24 a.m. just outside the compound. The president was there to play golf with Prime Minister Shinzo Abe of Japan.

There the dot stayed until at least 1:12 p.m., when it moved to the Trump International Golf Club in West Palm Beach, where the world leaders enjoyed a private lunch.

By 5:08 p.m., the phone was back at Mar-a-Lago.

The president had what he called a working dinner with Mr. Abe that night.

THE DEVICE’S OWNER was easy to trace, revealing the outline of the person’s work and life. The same phone pinged a dozen times at the nearby Secret Service field office and events with elected officials. From computer screens more than 1,000 miles away, we could watch the person travel from exclusive areas at Palm Beach International Airport to Mar-a-Lago.

The meticulous movements — down to a few feet — of the president’s entourage were recorded by a smartphone we believe belonged to a Secret Service agent, whose home was also clearly identifiable in the data. Connecting the home to public deeds revealed the person’s name, along with the name of the person’s spouse, exposing even more details about both families. We could also see other stops this person made, apparently more connected with his private life than his public duties. The Secret Service declined to comment on our findings or describe its policies regarding location data.

The vulnerability of the person we tracked in Mr. Trump’s entourage is one that many if not all of us share: the apps (weather services, maps, perhaps even something as mundane as a coupon saver) collecting and sharing his location on his phone.

Americans have grown eerily accustomed to being tracked throughout their digital lives. But it’s far from their fault. It’s a result of a system in which data surveillance practices are hidden from consumers and in which much of the collection of information is done without the full knowledge of the device holders.

For the nation’s security agencies, however, privacy is critical to the safety of military, defense and security operations across the country and abroad. If threats to that privacy have seemed abstract in the past, the trove of location data we have analyzed has brought them into sharp relief. Military and intelligence officials have long been concerned about how their movements could be exposed; now every move is. As a senior Defense Department official told Times Opinion, even the Pentagon has told employees to expect that their privacy is compromised... (More at link)

 

[Eaglelord17]

Our military (and pretty much everyone) severely underestimates the danger cellphones and other technology represents to us.

We have a technology ADDICTED society which cannot stay off their phones and needs to have them on them 24/7. The dangers are pretty simple, your fighting a war, your platoon is out doing maneuvers, all it takes is one person with a cellphone for the enemy to know your exact movements. Look at the case where the fitbit was able to map out secret US bases in Iraq for example because people were running around the parameter of the base and the device traced the path.

That doesn't even include all the information people send instantly to each other which can be intercepted, the ability to hack into mics or cameras to listen in or see whats happening, and the psychological warfare they can choose to play on your soldiers by intimidating your family and loved ones. Imagine something as simple as the enemy sending messages to your significant other saying you had just been killed, or captured, and because its a warzone your not really able to respond quickly. How much resources could quickly be spent trying to verify your status or peoples time wasted over essentially nuisance complaints, coupled with the morale killing effect this would have.

 

[Jarnhamar]

Our military (and pretty much everyone) severely underestimates the danger cellphones and other technology represents to us.

Underestimates it or doesn't care?

Canadian unit deploys to the field under orders that no cell phones will be brought to the field by anyone (except for one duty cell).

Chain of command realises they can't function without cell phone so begin sending orders and messages over text here and there.

SNCOs see this, roll their eyes and sneak out their cell phones.

Soldiers see officers and NCOs on their cell phones sneaking messages so turn theirs on.

One hapless new private pulls his cell phone out and starts texting, probably in a secure area, and doesn't understand why he's getting in shit since everyone else is doing it.

 

[Brash]

Underestimates it or doesn't care?

Canadian unit deploys to the field under orders that no cell phones will be brought to the field by anyone (except for one duty cell).

Chain of command realises they can't function without cell phone so begin sending orders and messages over text here and there.

SNCOs see this, roll their eyes and sneak out their cell phones.

Soldiers see officers and NCOs on their cell phones sneaking messages so turn theirs on.

One hapless new private pulls his cell phone out and starts texting, probably in a secure area, and doesn't understand why he's getting in crap since everyone else is doing it.

Mobile devices do not need to be actively sending texts in order to broadcast.
They don't even need to be out of airplane/RF-secure mode, or even "on", in order to pose a danger. 
(holding down a button until the screen goes black does not necessarily mean the device is completely powered down)

Train as you fight.
Don't bring devices to the field, charge those that do- even and especially the officers and SNCOs.

 

[PuckChaser]

Mobile devices do not need to be actively sending texts in order to broadcast.
They don't even need to be out of airplane/RF-secure mode, or even "on", in order to pose a danger. 
(holding down a button until the screen goes black does not necessarily mean the device is completely powered down)

Train as you fight.
Don't bring devices to the field, charge those that do- even and especially the officers and SNCOs.

You have to meet troops in the middle. Stop putting them on exercise for a month straight with no comms to home with an order not to bring cell phones. Not every exercise needs to be trained at 100% worst case scenario either. Pick a short exercise, brief an extensive enemy EW capability and then when someone brings out a phone, have consequences that link to the mission (crash move, enemy warned of attack, etc). No cell phones sounds like a BS order until a pallet of arty sims is being thrown at you and you're crash moving the defensive at 0200.

I've spent years briefing IT threats and people only understand when they can see the consequences of action/in action. It also helps when the G6 or SigO can explain things in common language instead of sounding like Sheldon from big bang theory.

 

[Infanteer]

Puckchaser's right - this is akin to telling troops 20 years ago to not bring a book or a deck of cards.  I had platoon warrants collect mobile devices in an ammo can to be stored with the CQ when the tactical scenario warranted it, but other than that, troops were free to bring them to kill time when they had it.

 

[FJAG]

You have to meet troops in the middle. Stop putting them on exercise for a month straight with no comms to home with an order not to bring cell phones. Not every exercise needs to be trained at 100% worst case scenario either. Pick a short exercise, brief an extensive enemy EW capability and then when someone brings out a phone, have consequences that link to the mission (crash move, enemy warned of attack, etc). No cell phones sounds like a BS order until a pallet of arty sims is being thrown at you and you're crash moving the defensive at 0200.

I've spent years briefing IT threats and people only understand when they can see the consequences of action/in action. It also helps when the G6 or SigO can explain things in common language instead of sounding like Sheldon from big bang theory.

No you don't need to meet them in the middle. Maybe I'm showing my age again but we didn't have cell phones etc so when we went into the field for a month or more we were able to survive quite well without messaging people with pictures of our RP-4s or IMPs.

Military life is about both discipline and self-discipline. Training them how to let go of their umbilical cords by leaving these devices at home is part and parcel to their security training. Can you really trust your unit's security to the good will of an 18 year old to not use his cellphone and to disconnect it's battery? If he's not supposed to use it why take it along at all?

:stirpot:

 

[Brash]

You have to meet troops in the middle. Stop putting them on exercise for a month straight with no comms to home with an order not to bring cell phones. Not every exercise needs to be trained at 100% worst case scenario either. Pick a short exercise, brief an extensive enemy EW capability and then when someone brings out a phone, have consequences that link to the mission (crash move, enemy warned of attack, etc). No cell phones sounds like a BS order until a pallet of arty sims is being thrown at you and you're crash moving the defensive at 0200.

I've spent years briefing IT threats and people only understand when they can see the consequences of action/in action. It also helps when the G6 or SigO can explain things in common language instead of sounding like Sheldon from big bang theory.

You absolutely do not need to meet them in the middle. This minimizes the threat perception by the troops, and encourages skirting of the directives.

Your scenario of realizing consequences to the troops involves physically observing when someone brings out a mobile to text, as an indication that this text will compromise your position to an enemy, and penalizing that specific behaviour (bringing out a phone).
This is a woefully simplistic representation of authentic adversary capability, and would not serve to encourage compliance or harden defensive posture in any effective manner.

If the enemy we’re fighting only has capabilities against SMS texts, apparently we’re only preparing to engage with DPRK circa 2005.

One specific counterpoint, what your example fails to catch are the other mobiles that the troops “safely” have in their barracks box/ammo can at CQ, that are collecting movements/position by dead-reckoning, mic recordings, and are waiting to be beacon this information at an opportune time to an adversary. This is only one example.


The majority of troops do not possess a sufficiently technical background to understand the most complex and dangerous threats. We have no more time to create concrete training examples illustrating the threats posed at the bleeding edge of the state of the art of cybersecurity, than we do to teach cybersecurity professionals practical examples involving ballistics, medicine, dentistry, aircraft, tanks, ships...etc.

Like I said, zero tolerance, or you’re only enabling the adversary.

 

[Bruce Monkhouse]

Horsecock…...not all training needs to be absolute.  Typical sad leadership thinking to not trust your troops, at all levels, enough to know the difference between training and real.

..and yes, for some things you do need to "meet in the middle". 

 

[daftandbarmy]

Horsecock…...not all training needs to be absolute.  Typical sad leadership thinking to not trust your troops, at all levels, enough to know the difference between training and real.

..and yes, for some things you do need to "meet in the middle".

Speaking as a reservist, with absolutely zero faith in our radios, if we didn't have our phones we couldn't communicate at all in the field.

But I get the whole EMCON thing in operational conditions. We (OK, much smarter and better trained people than me) used it extensively against the IRA, and other paramilitary organizations, in Northern Ireland and the sigs warfare units were of critical importance in tracking the bad guys and helping to take them out precisely because they used cell phones.

 

[PPCLI Guy]

Horsecock…...not all training needs to be absolute.  Typical sad leadership thinking to not trust your troops, at all levels, enough to know the difference between training and real.

..and yes, for some things you do need to "meet in the middle".

So here is the problem.  You are all acting as if there is a finite difference between peace and war. Your heads are deliberately in the sand. We maybe on Exercise. The enemy is already at war, and actively collects on is every day. This is real. It is a thing.  We can't wish it away, despite every effort of our current government. 

We deserve our fate, as a country and as a force. We need to accept that there are bad guys, and they 're doing bad things, no matter how nice we are 

Bah.

 

[Bruce Monkhouse]

And you think this is new??

 

[PPCLI Guy]

And you think this is new??

And you think this is the answer? 

Horsecock…...not all training needs to be absolute.  Typical sad leadership thinking to not trust your troops, at all levels, enough to know the difference between training and real.

..and yes, for some things you do need to "meet in the middle".

To ignore the problem?